Glass BlaiOQ 
Book « - 



f 

THE 



NECESSARY EXISTENCE 



OF 



# DEITY? 



SECOND EDITION. 



OF Co£ 



EDINBURGH : 

PHILALETHEAN-PUBLICATION-OFFICE. 
MDCCCXL. 




Had not revelation discovered the true principles of religion, they had 
without doubt continued altogether unknown. ■ Yet on their discovery, 
they appeared so consonant to human reason, that men were apt to mistake 
them for the production of it. 

Warburton's Div. Leg. B. III. Sect. v. 

\ 



^1 

T>RINTEI> Bt NEILL AND CO., OLD F I SH M AR K ET , ED I N BT.< B OB ■ 



AN 



EXAMINATION 

OF 

ANTITHEOS'S "REFUTATION 

a OF THE 

" ARGUMENT A PRIORI FOR THE BEING 
" AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD." 



BY 

WILLIAM GILLESPIE. 



ISSUED 
BY THE SOCIETY 
FOR PEACEABLY REPRESSING INFIDELITY. 



rbv khsiror avdgsg s&oj&ev 

* A^rov' fiscal ds Aihg nrami [mv ayuicu, 
Tiadai 6' avdgtotfwv ayopa), fbs<sri ds §d\a,(f<fu, 
Ka/ Xifisvsg' ffavry} ds Awg xs^yjfjbsda tfdvrsg' 
Ts y<k§ xai y'svog h/Asv. 

Aratus. 



CONTENTS. 



Advertisement to the Second Edition, . . Page 9 
Preface, . 13 

PART I. 

The Relevancy of a priori argumentation for A Real 

Existence, ....... 21 

PART II. 

The " Argument, a priori, for the Being and Attributes 

of God," an irrefragable Demonstration, . 43 

PART III. 



The non-infinite divisibility of Extension and of Matter, 61 
PART IV. 

The " Argument, a priori, for the Being and Attributes 

of God," an irrefragable Demonstration, . 93 

PART V. 

The " Argument a priori, for the Being and Attributes 

of God," an irrefragable Demonstration, . . 113 

PART VI. 

The Argument " a priori, for the Being and Attributes 

of God," an irrefragable Demonstration, . . 129 



6 



CONTENTS. 



PART VII. 

The " Argument a priori, for the Being and Attributes 

of God," an irrefragable Demonstration, , 145 

Of the Sentiments of Philosophers concerning Space. — 

M. Des Cartes, Mrs Cockburn, Etc. * . . 150 

PART VIII. 

Of the Sentiments of Philosophers concerning Space.-— 
Newton, Clarke, Butler, Price, Locke, Addison, 
Tillotson, Milton, Etc. . . . . 165 

PART IX. 

Of the Sentiments of Philosophers concerning Space — 
Antitheos, Reid, Gleig, Gassendus, Episcopius, 
Leibnitz, Etc. ...... 182 

PART X. 

Of the Sentiments of Philosophers concerning Space.— 

Law, Watts, Brougham, Kant, Berkeley, . 202 

PART XI. 

The ".Argument, a priori, for the Being and Attributes 

of God," an irrefragable Demonstration, . . 226 

PART XII. 

The " Argument, a priori, for the Being and Attributes 

of God," an irrefragable Demonstration, . . 244 

Notes to Part XII., . . . . . 257 



CONTENTS. 



7 



APPENDIX, 



Appendix to Part IV., . . . Page 261 

VI., .... 265 

VIII. 

Appendix A, . . . . . 270 

B, .... 273 
Appendix to Part X. 

Appendix 281 

... ^ . . . . 282 
Appendix to Part XII. 

Appendix N . . . 283 

... 1^ . . . . 284 



ADVERTISEMENT TO THE SECOND EDITION. 



The first edition, of 1000 copies, being now exhausted, a second 
is become necessary. 

In presenting which to the public, it is right briefly to state 
wherein it differs, in any essential respect, from the preceding edi- 
tion. 

In the present edition, the head lines, indicating Part and Section,] 
will be a great help to readers, in a work containing so many re- 
ferences backwards and forwards. 

Besides a few alterations, some less some more important, a good 
deal of new matter has been introduced, which Ave presume to think 
will not be found either useless or uninteresting. 

To say nothing more concerning the improvements which have 
been made, in a few instances : the new matter includes a passage 
of great moment, occurring in the fourth Part, J and an Appendix 
big with the fates of an Atheistical Society, and of an Atheistical 
Newspaper.|| 

t It may be proper to mention on what principle the sectioning proceeds. A 
section-'mark (§) occurs at the beginning of every paragraph ; the section-marks 
being used for the sake of reference merely. In short, they denote topical as op- 
posed to logical divisions. 

I See the note (t) to § 22. 

!| See Appendix to Part. XII : Appendix ^ 



10 



ADVERTISEMENT.* 



From the many highly favourable opinions, expressed by persons 
whose authority is entitled to much weight, which have been com- 
municated to the author, he feels very confident as to the ultimate 
result of his undertaking, to establish the necessary existence of Deity. 
Whatever misgivings the author may have had as to the reception 
which his mode of treating his subject might meet with ; he never 
allowed himself to have any misgivings as to the goodness of his 
cause, generally or particularly : Generally, or as to the Being of 
a god ; particularly, or as to the applicableness and validity of 
a priori reasonings in reference to that momentous topic. The age 
we live in is certainly the age of superficialness. Much ground is 
indeed gone over, but then little of the ground is thoroughly ex- 
plored : Men rather knowing that there are many sciences, and 
having at command a few common-places with regard to each, than 
caring to be complete proficients in any one branch of knowledge. 
But notwithstanding this circumstance, the author has now no un- 
easiness as to the fate of his production. The age is superficial, but 
there are exceptions to the general rule : And it is very fortunate 
that no age receives those impressions which are to be lasting, and 
to influence the sentiments of posterity, from any but the more pro- 
found thinkers. The skimmers over the surfaces of things may make 
a little noise as they pass along, but in a short while all trace of 
them is vanished. 

The author, then, anticipates that ere long a great change will 
take place in the public mind, in relation to the question of the 
fitness and value of the species of reasonings employed in this work. 
>Tis beyond all question, that a priori reasonings on subjects out 
of the mathematical sciences have descended to a low point in 
the general estimation, though it is equally certain, that at a for- 
mer period such reasonings used to occupy a very high and con- 
spicuous position. But there are signs that better treatment is 
awaiting argumentation from the necessity of the case for a First 
Cause. 

The immediate consequences, or rather th e concomitants, of a change 
so ardently desired, would be the following — to specify no more at 
present. 1. A sudden stop in the tune of your mere a posteriori 
men. We should no longer have thrust into our hands whole vo- 
lumes of anatomy, botany, astronomy, and what not, called, in virtue 
of an exceedingly small sprinkling of other matter, treatises on 
Natural Theology ; we should no longer, I say, have such thrust 



ADVERTISEMENT. 



11 



upon us as containing the only sound arguments to be met with, for 
proving the first grand article of all religion. We should no longer, 
therefore, be told, that the infinity^ and the unity of the Divine Na- 
ture cannot be made out. 2. The quick disappearance of specula- 
tive, or avowed, atheism — a consummation, however devoutly to be 
wished for, which has never been brought about under the long, 
presumptuous reign of the oracular responses issuing from the ex- 
perimental School. 

"Who does not at once perceive of what mighty consequence it 
were to have the mouth of avowed speculative atheism closed for 
ever \ Have not the very bad kinds of practical atheism too often 
been prone to seek shelter under the wings of speculative atheism % 
To live in all respects as if there were no God : Therefore, to wish 
most anxiously that there were no God : Therefore, to confirm one- 
self in saying that there is no God : — Are not these not unfre- 
quently bound together as links in the same dreadful chain \\ And 
to make application to the circumstances of the present day : Where 
is it that Socialism, the prevalent form of Infidelity, takes refuge 
when hard pressed by pursuers \ Where, but in downright atheism \ 

There are very few persons among us who are not aware of the 
alarming progress which Socialism, or Owenism, is making in the 
British dominions, — to say nothing of the state of matters on the 
Continent. Socialism is just another name for Infidelity. It was j ust the 
favourite disguise under which Infidelity proceeded to extend itself 
in all directions. Certain events, which are still but recent, have 
had the effect of tearing off the mask which Socialism chose to wear* 
on many occasions, and of rendering apparent, to all but the most 
stupid and unthinking, that that widely-spread system is at bottom 
nothing less than a thoroughly God-denying system. 

In conclusion : It cannot be too often repeated, that the being of 
a god constitutes the fundamental point of all religion. To the 

+ This word is here taken in the popular, that is the loosest, acceptation. 

{ Faults in the life hreed errors in the brain, 
And these reciprocally those again. 
The mind and conduct mutually imprint 
And stamp their imago in each other's mint : 
Each, sire and dam, of an infernal race, 
Begetting and conceiving all that's base. 

Cowper's * Progress of Error." 



12 



ADVERTISEMENT. 



doctrine of human immortality and future retribution, Theism is a 
necessary preliminary. The Christian faith does not lay, but it 
builds on, this foundation — There is a god. Remember at all times, 
therefore, that to set out the proof for the existence of God, is the 
first step to the demolishing of Infidelity, of what description so- 
ever the Infidelity may be, 

Edinbobqh; August, 1840, 



PREFACE. 



It seems to be a duty which is due to the public in general, 
to give some account of the circumstances which led to the 
present controversy. Antitheos's production was " called forth 1 ' 
in consequence of a challenge, sent by the author of " An Ar- 
" gument, a priori, for the Being and Attributes of God," to 
a society of professed atheists in Glasgow, " to answer and re- 
" fute the reasonings contained in the aforesaid work." The 
letter containing the challenge gave a detail of those incidents 
which had conducted to it. And for this reason, and for another 
to be subsequently alluded to, that letter shall be inserted here, 
word for word. 

" To the Society of Atheists which calls itself ' The Areo- 
" P a g us »' or 4 The Zetetic Society,' Glasgow. 

" Before proceeding to the proper business of this letter, it 
" may be but proper to give you a short account of the manner 
44 in which I was led to think of addressing you. 

44 Some months ago, seeing, in the window of a small book- 
44 shop in a conspicuous street in this city, a newly printed copy 
44 of Paine's 4 Age of Reason,' I determined on speaking to the 
44 person who sold the work, in order to know whether he be- 
44 lieved the book to be infamous, and sold it merely for the 

A 



14 



PREFACE. 



" sake of gain, or whether he was, in every sense, a patron of 
4 1 so infamous a publication.^ 

" In the book-shop to which I allude, I saw a person who 
" gave me to understand, there was a society of Atheists in 
" Edinburgh, who met on the Sunday evenings, for the sake of 
" confirming each other in infidelity. J Subsequently, I met a 
" member of the Society, (who is said to be one of their best 
" hands,) who, indeed, made no secret of his sentiments. He 
" told me, that there neither was, nor could be, in the universe, 
" any being greater than himself ;| that his body and brain (for 
" he positively assured me, he had no soul but his brain,) had 
" been produced by unintelligent necessary causes ; and that, 
" after his death, the particles of his body and brain might 
" compose a cloud or a dung-hill, but could never, by any chance, 

" compose, again, the person , for so this (by no means 

"fortuitous) concourse of atoms was called. 

" i undertook to answer, with ease, any thing that 

" could be urged in favour of Theism. I challenged him, and, 
" through him, all his atheistical associates, to refute my * Ar- 
" gument a priori? Sec. * * * A copy of which had been 

" forwarded to the body. I was soon informed, that 

" did not hesitate for a moment to engage to refute me. With 

| The sight of infidel works, in a public shop, was new to me three years 
ago. Matters are so much altered since about the beginning of 1837, that 
sheets and volumes of infidelity, much more hideous than Paine's, may be 
seen, any day, vended publicly enough. 

X An atheistical society is no rarity to me now. And that there are socie- 
ties of ath ists, and that the societies are studded, thickly studded, over the 
country, every one by this time knows ; thanks to the Bishop of Exeter and 
the House of Lords. 

|| All that was here meant to be conveyed was this : That the person 
spoken of asserted, there neither was, nor could be, in the universe, a being 
of a species superior to the human. Surely I never could intend to convey, 
that the atheist in question had maintained, it was a downright impossibility 
that there should be a cleverer man than he in the world. And that, for 
very obvious reasons. 



PREFACE. 



15 



** regard to the proposed refutation, I imposed on him two con- 
44 ditions only. 1st, That the answer should be on paper. And 
44 2dly, That it pointed out some (alleged) specific fallacy in my 
" alleged demonstration. After waiting long for the promised 
44 refutation, I was, at length, made aware, by a friend of — — 

** % that the said . could not answer it. However, 

44 to make up for my disappointment, I was told, that there was 
'* a society of Atheists in Glasgow, more numerous, more clever, 
" and more learned, and that there neither was, nor could be, any 
" ground to doubt, that the 4 Areopagus' would, on being chal- 
** lenged, step forward and (endeavour to) overturn my reasonings. 

" Shortly after receiving this piece of news, I came to the 
" determination of challenging you, each of you and all of you : 
As, accordingly, I now hereby do challenge you to answer and 
" refute the reasonings contained in the aforesaid work. Two 
" copies of which are herewith sent to you. 

" You challenge the world to prove, to you, that there exists 
44 an Intelligent Great First Cause. The work in question 
" professes to demonstrate that matter by the most rigid ratio- 
" cination. It asks you to grant no proposition but tyose pro- 
M positions which constitute the starting points of your Atheism, 
" to-wit, that there is Infinity of Duration, and that there is 
44 Infinity of Extension, — be that extension of matter merely, 
" or of space merely, or of matter and space together. How 
44 plain must those truths be which are insisted on by all sound 
" Theists, (I might have said, by all men sound in their minds,) 
44 and are the primary assumptions in Atheism itself. 

" We shall soon see whether you are able to do all that you 
4< profess to have a capacity for, j" or whether, like the Edinburgh 

t Certainly I formed an estimate of atheistical talent from what I ha 1 
seen of the metropolitan atheists. But, it must he confessed, the western 
antitheists can command talents and acquirements very superior to what 
the easterns have at their service. A certain piece of information allude*! 
to in this challenge was quite correct. 



16 



PREFACE. 



" Atheists, you must be altogether dumb before one of that class 
" of persons who are (in your opinion) so weak and foolish as 
" to believe in a necessary Being who contains within himself 
" all possible perfections. 

" I have to lay down to you the same conditions which I im- 
" posed on the Atheists here. The conditions are (in one re- 
" spect) not hard. I am, being very truly desirous of yOur 
" attaining to a better mind," 

(Signed) " William Gillespie." 

" Edinburgh, 21st August 1837." 

To this letter and challenge, a letter, dated Glasgow, 28th 
August 1837, was received in answer, in which it is said : 

" What you say of — denying to any one in the uni- 

" verse, an iota of superiority to himself in the scale of intelli- 
" gence, is not exactly the mode in which atheists commonly 
" express themselves. * * * * It has frequently been said, 
" that we know of no intelligence superior to that of man (and 
" I think any one is warranted in so saying.)" 

The concluding paragraph, &c. are as follows : " Relative to 
" your clfeallenge, it is hereby accepted upon your own terms. 
" A reply to your 4 Argument' will be commenced forthwith; 
" but as the writer has not much time to spare, it cannot be 
" expected to proceed very rapidly. But as the Society intend 
" publishing it at their own charges, and are anxious that the 
" thing should be proceeded with, you may rely on no time 
" being lost. A copy will be forwarded to you as soon as it 
" comes out of the press. I have the honor to be," &c. 

(Signed) " " 

" To William Gillespie, Esq.' 1 '' 

About the middle of April 1838, I was put in possession by 
the writer of that letter, according to his promise, of a copy of 
his reply. It is entitled, " Refutation of the Argument a priori 
" for the Being and Attributes of God ; shewing the lrrele- 



PEEFACE. 



17 



" vancy of that Argument, as well as the Fallacious Reasoning 
" of Dr Samuel Clarke and others, especially of Mr Gillespie, 
" in support of it. By AxTiTHEOS."t 

I have hinted, that there was another reason for giving a 
copy of the letter which contained the challenge. My adversary 
alleges in his Preface, that the letter was guilty of " containing 
" passages which could by no means militate in favor of the 
" writer." After asserting this, need it have been added that 
my respondent wished to take no advantage of the " passages ?" 
What ever operates more to one's prejudice than to say that the 
conduct of one has been faulty in some instance, but the in- 
formant is too charitable to communicate the impropriety ? But 
of the matter before us, the public have now been constituted 
the proper judges. 

" Mr Gillespie," * * * says Mr Gillespie's opponent, 
" had been disappointed, it seems, in finding an antagonist 
" elsewhere,J notwithstanding has anxious endeavours to pro- 
" voke opposition. The gauntlet was thrown down, but no one 
" was fully prepared to take it up." (Preface.) If Antitheos 
h in his eye, as his words may tend to lead his readers to 
suppose he had, any thing besides the affair with the Edin- 
burgh Atheists, (who certainly, though they had taken up the 
gauntlet, had not been " fully prepared" for the combat ;) he 
might have been informed, had he made inquiry, that very soon 
after the appearance of the " Argument," the author thereof 
found an antagonist, an unchallenged antagonist, an antagonist 
of very considerable and acknowledged metaphysical abilities, 
an antagonist who wrote laborious strictures on the work as 
long as the work itself. 

t Published for the Glasgow Zetetic Society, 1838. 

+ Mr Gillespie had been disappointed — not in finding, as Antitheos has it 
but — in not finding an atheistic antagonist. See the narration in the chal 
lenge, (p. 14—15 hereof.) 



13 



PREFACE. 



The " "Refutation" gives very satisfactory evidence that its 
author is a person of no mean talents. The topics which, in- 
cidentally and briefly, or otherwise, have been introduced into 
the work, are very numerous : so numerous, indeed, that there 
is very little one could say, in conjunction with that which is 
the grandest of all subjects, but what would find something 
bearing upon it there. For these two reasons, — in connection 
with this discussion, we propose to meet and to remove every 
metaphysical difficulty which atheists can possibly start ; in a 
word, we shall, first or last, entirely exhaust the subject, to the 
complete and everlasting confusion of the deniers of A God. 

It is to be regretted that Antitheos has not numbered his 
paragraphs. When I quote or animadvert on his words, I 
shall give not only the chapter but the paragraph : the reader 
who wishes to look at the passage under discussion must count 
for himself. 

In quoting, I may occasionally leave out, for brevity's sake, 
or perspicuity's sake, words which make nothing to the point 
as to which the passage is adduced. With regard to every such 
case, I most willingly leave it to others to decide, whether I 
have, to the least extent, misrepresented my author. 



EXAMINATION 

OF 

ANTITHEOS'S " REFUTATION." 



PART I. 



THE RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENTATION FOR 
A REAL EXISTENCE. 

§ 1. There are two tilings which the author of the 
" Refutation" has undertaken to do. One of them is, to 
shew that the a priori mode of procedure is directed 
wide of the mark when applied to the question of the 
being of A God ; and the other is, to overturn the parti- 
cular reasonings of those who have adopted that method 
of argumentation. 

§ 2. The first chapter of that work is devoted to the for- 
mer, and the remaining chapters are occupied with the 
latter undertaking. 

§ 3. Our atheist begins by being very merry on the sub- 
ject of the irrelevancy of a priori argument for the ex- 
istence of Deity. " To hear of the existence of a GoDf 
" being made the subject of demonstration by argument, 
" is," he remarks, " altogether astounding. Theannounce- 
" mentonthe other hand," he adds, " sounds so oddlg,asto 
" mitigate the effect of the first impression, if not to ex- 
•« cite ridicule at the wonderful discrepancy between the 

t We have given capitals to certain of the words used by Anti- 
theos, on which he had not bestowed one capital letter. That he is 
so desirous of degrading, so far as he can, certain collocations of let- 
ters, is a good evidence of someth in >j. 



22 



RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENT. [Part I. 



" end in view, and the means laid out for the attainment 
44 of it." (Chapter I. paragraph 1.) 

§ 4. But when the laugh is over, and it becomes time 
to serve us up something more substantial, we are disap- 
pointed at the meagreness of our fare. Such as it is. we 
shall probe every piece of it. 

§ 5. It being granted, argues our author, that " a God 
a * * must be held as a real being," " argument' 1 (he 
means a priori argument) 44 appears quite out of place." 
— Now for the proof, Sir, if you please ? — 44 It would 
" never do to talk of proving the existence of the man 
# 44 in the moon by argument ; neither would it be of any 
44 avail to employ a syllogism or a sorites to demonstrate 
44 the existence of a navigable channel between the At- 
44 lan tic and Pacific oceans, through the arctic regions of 
44 America r — All that is here meant may be quite unob- 
jectionable. Our author goes on : — 44 If the reasoning 
" under review be relevant, these must be so too. If 
" an a priori argument be capable of proving the exist- 
44 ence of one thing, another may be proved by the same 
a * * process." (Par. 2.) The proof, the proof of this ? 
where is it to be found X 

§ 6. Passing over two pages and a half, where* not a 
word on the subject occurs, we come, in the eighth para- 
graph, to something that looks as if it would turn out to 
be what we want. 44 The truth is, the argument in ques- 
44 tion" (the argument a priori) 44 is nothing else than an 
attempt to establish the application of mathematical' 1 
(this word should be metaphysical, vide infra, § 47, et se- 
quentes) 44 reasoning to what it has nothing in earth or 
t4 heaven to do with, — namely, real existences." — The 
proof? — C£ How vain and preposterous the attempt V 9 — 
This metal will not pass. — " As well might it be main- 
i( tained, that as the whole is in the abstract a perfect 
44 quantity, it must contain within itself all the qualities 



4-8.] RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENT. 



23 



6< of the different parts of which it is composed ; that, as 
" some of these parts are small and some large, some 
" round and some square, some black and some white ; 
" it must be white and black, and square and round, and 
" large and small at the same time !" — Neither will this 
do. Where is the proof of the AS well might it be main- 
tained, kc. ? the proof of the analogy between the cases ? 
It is to seek. Well, we have had nothing like proof as 
yet. But we approach a syllogism, and Antitheos does 
not deny, that " every sound argument is capable of 
" being reduced to the syllogistic form." We may hope 
then to get some satisfaction at length. 

" Whatever necessarily possesses absolute perfections 
" is God; 

" Metaphysical abstractions possess absolute perfec- 
" tions ; — 

" Therefore, metaphysical abstractions are God." 

§ 7. " If this be not, 11 says Antitheos, " a fair state- 
" ment of the whole argument in the most logical form, I 
,4 am at a loss to know what is." — But I am not. — 
44 Should it be any way wrong, and should some ardent 
u disciple of the metaphysical school of theology deign 
" hereafter to take a part in this discussion, it would be 
** well were he to consult the Stagyrite and correct it." 
(Par. 9.) I mean to correct it, though I do not know 
that the Stagirite here will be of vast service, for the 
principal fallacy to be pointed out is not of a strictly 
logical character. 

§ 8. Passing over the major proposition, the minor 
is, " Metaphysical abstractions possess absolute perfec- 
tions." What are metaphysical abstractions \ They 
compose a certain class of thoughts. The minor propo- 
sition therefore amounts to this ; A certain class of our 
thoughts, to-wit, metaphysical abstractions, possess ab- 
solute perfections. — But by the bye, this minor proposition 



24 



RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENT. [Part I. 



omits a word, to us a very necessary word. Antitheos 
should have known that the Stagirite does not allow the 
middle term as it occurs in the major, to contain a com- 
plete element not to be found in the middle term when 
it appears in the minor. This instance of high treason 
against the Prince of Logicians cannot be suffered to pass. 
Supplying the word which has been kept back, we have 
" Metaphysical abstractions" " necessarily" " possess ab- 

" solute perfections" Do they indeed ? Metaphysics 

have been in very bad repute for a good while. Berkeley 
and Hume, not to mention any other metaphysician, have, 
(it seems) brought them into everlasting disgrace with 
the majority of people. But behold how far Antitheos 
runs in an opposite direction. He is downright in love 
with metaphysics. Metaphysical abstractions, he has it, 
necessarily possess absolute perfections. The metaphy- 
sical abstractions which this gentleman has been eonver- , 
sant with, must be very superior indeed to the generality 
of those with which other people have been brought into 
acquaintance in these days.t 

§ 9. After having said so much about the minor, we 
hardly need to draw the conclusion, the full and proper 
conclusion, to the premises set down by our author. It 
runs thus : Therefore, a certain class of our thoughts, to- 
wit, metaphysical abstractions, is God. The conclusion, 
like the minor, speaks for itself. 

§ 10. Having thus paved the way, I proceed to do what 
was promised, and shall now correct Antitheos 1 's syllogism. 
I do not mean to say, it will be unobjectionable even in a 

t Antitheos may say, that the absurdity of this minor proposition is 
not to be fathered upon him, he doing no more than putting a certain 
collection of words into the mouths of your metaphysical theists. The 
more shame to him ! To write sheer nonsense is bad enough. But 
to write sheer nonsense, and call it other people's reasoning, is nei- 
ther more nor less than — what Antitheos has done. But let him keep 
what is his own, and nobody's else. 



§5 9-13.] RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGOIEXT. 25 



corrected form. But if one make the best that can be 
made of it, he shall do very well. Here then it comes as 
corrected. 

Whatever necessarily possesses absolute perfections is 
God. 

But that about which certain of our metaphysical ab- 
stractions are employed necessarily possesses absolute 
perfections. 

Therefore, that about which certain of our metaphysical 
abstractions are employed is God. 

§ 11. Antitheos next proceeds to say : " Our reasoners 
" a priori have either to acknowledge the absurdity here 
" set forth in mood and figure, or deny that they appro- 
" priate abstract reasoning to questions of ontological 
" science. 1 ' These reasoners will not deny, that they ap- 
propriate abstract reasoning to questions of ontological 
science, but they will acknowledge the absurdity there set 
forth in mood and figure, and that even as has been 
shewn. 

§ 12. We go on to the words which succeed : " If their 
" God be a real being — an "agent, he cannot be a heap 
" of abstractions," that is, a heap of our thoughts, for ab- 
stractions are thoughts of ours. — True, He cannot. — 
" If made up of abstractions,' 1 or men's thoughts, " He 
" cannot be an agent." — Most true. — " No reasoning ima- 
" ginable can make Him both." — Surely. — " Yet to no- 
" thing short of working out this impossibility does the 
" argument aim." How was that made out? By the 
syllogism ? Oh, then, as I have corrected the syllogism 
— " I say no more. 11 ^ 

§ 1$. Well : no great things as 'yet in the way of prov- 
ing, that if A God be a real being, a priori argument is 
quite out of place. Perhaps we shall alight on the thing 
we are in search of, at last. Of a truth, the proof (such 
as it is) which we are seeking we come up to at the twelfth 



26 RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENT. [Part I. 



paragraph, but the reasonings which constitute the proof 
are not Antitheos's own, nor yet those of the Reviewer 
who is cited, they having been employed by Mr Hume, 
and being very ancient indeed. 

§ 14. " The character of irrelevancy here laid at the 
" door of the a priori argument, is not unwarranted by 
" the authority of good judges among the religious them- 
" selves. Abundance of quotations might be adduced, 
" but I shall content myself with an extract from the 
" Edinburgh Review for October 1830, (vol. Hi. p. 113,) 
" in an article upon Dr MoreheacT s ' Dialogues on Na- 
" ' tural and Revealed Religion.' That the reviewer rea- 
" sons upon theistical principles is evident from the allu- 
" sion he makes to ' the will of the Creator,' to which, 
" T may remark in passing, he allows the most orthodox 
" latitude." (Why, does Antitheos suppose, he may meet 
an atheist at every corner he can turn V) " Relative to 
" our argument a priori he observes : — £ The truth is, it 
" ' involves a radical fallacy which not only renders it 
" ' useless but dangerous to the cause it is intended to 
" ' support. The question as to the being of a God, is 
" ' purely a question of fact : he either exists or he does 
" ' not exist. But there is an evident absurdity inpretend- 
tc 1 ing to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by 
" 'argument a priori; because nothing is demonstrable, 
** ' unless the contrary implies a contradiction, and this 
" ' can never be predicated of the negative of any pro- 
" 4 position which merely affirms or asserts a matter of fact. 
" ' Jlliatever we conceive as existent, we can also con- 
" « ceive as nonexistent, and consequently there is no being" 
" ' whose non-existenoe implies a contradiction, *>r, in 
" 1 other words, whose existence is a priori demonstrable. 
" 4 This must be evident to every one who knows what 
« ' demonstration really means. It is a universal law, 
<< < that all heavy bodies descend to the earth in a line di- 



§§ 14-17.] RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENT. 



27 



" £ rected towards its centre. But the contrary of this 
*' * may easily be conceived, because it involves no contra- 
" e diction ; for bodies might have fallen upward, if we 
" £ may so express it, as well as downward, had such 
" * been the will of the Creator. But we cannot con- 
4£ * ceive the opposite of one of the demonstrated truths of 
" ' geometry — as, for example, that the three angles of 
" 6 a triangle should be either greater or less than two 
" 6 right angles — because this implies a contradiction. 
" £ The distinction, therefore, between necessary or de- 
" £ monstrable truths and matters of fact, consists in this, 
<£ £ — that the contrary of the former involves a contra- 
££ £ diction, whereas that of the latter does not. But there 
<£ £ is no contradiction implied in conceiving the non- 
<£ £ existence of the Deity ; and therefore His existence 
" ' is not a necessary truth, a priori demonstrable."* "1" 

§ 15. Of this extract from the Edinburgh Review, the 
words which are here put into italic characters are pre- 
cisely the words of Mr Hume, as they are to be met with 
in the ninth Part of his £t Dialogues concerning Natural 
" Religion. We shall present our reader with the passage 
in the ££ Dialogues" in which those words are to be found. 
An original, generally, is preferable to a copy. 

§ 16. ££ There is an evident absurdity in pretending to 
" demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any ar- 
" guments a priori. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the 
44 contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing, that is dis- 
" tinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction. Whatever 
" we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non- 
" existent. *There is no being, therefore, whose non- 
" existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there 
" is no being, whose existence is demonstrable." 

§ 17. Mr Hume has emphatically added : ££ I propose 
" this argument as entirely decisive, and am willing to rest 
" the whole controversy upon it." ££ Dialogues," Part IX. 

t The reader may consult, here, the note (t) to § 33 of Part VI. 



28 



RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENT. [Part I. 



§ 18. These words of Mr Hume contain all that is ar- 
gument in the citation made by Antitheos from the Edin- 
burgh Review. All the rest of the citation is mere illus- 
tration or repetition. 

§ 19. Our author thus comments on the passage he 
has quoted : " To add any thing to the foregoing reason- 
" ing of the reviewer were perhaps superfluous. Tt is clear 
" and satisfactory." (Par. 13.) 

§ 20. Clear and satisfactory the reasoning referred to I 
believe to be, with regard to what the first users of such 
ratiocination had in their view. But whether it be so 
clear and satisfactory in every case, we shall presently see. 

§ 21. For reasons already hinted, I shall address myself 
to the ratiocination as contained in Mr Hume's words 
rather than in those of the Reviewer. 

§ 22. It may be remarked, that since Mr Hume rests 
the whole controversy upon that argument, our atheist 
may be thoroughly assured, that if it turn out to be the 
very reverse of clear and satisfactory, his cause is a mighty 
bad one. Up to this stage of the business, our atheist's 
faith and trust in the argument are boundless. 

§ 23. " There is," says Mr Hume, " an evident ab- 
" surdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, 
" or to prove it by any arguments a priori." Because Mr 
Hume has said so. many take the existence of the ab- 
surdity for granted, who perhaps have never seriously 
weighed the evidence of its reality. The Sceptic's argu- 
ment against any a priori argument for any matter of 
fact, is happily very easily answered. And, for the rea- 
son already brought out,t if it can but be shewn, that it 

t Neither in the Dialogues on Natural Religion, nor in any other 
quarter of his writings, is there offered any other argument against 
the possibility of a valid a priori argument for the being of A Deity. — 
The same argument substantially, a little differently set out, occurs 
again in the " Inquiry concerning Human Understanding." Sect. XII. 
part iii. 



§§ 18-28.] RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENT. 



29 



is weak and most* unsatisfactory, we have his authority 
for the good sense there is in pretending to demonstrate 
at least one matter of fact. 

§ 24. He opens his argument in the following manner. 
" Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a 
u contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, 
" implies a contradiction." Both these propositions are 
granted to the fullest extent. But that which follows, — 
" Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive 
61 as non-existent" — is most completely to be denied. He 
appeals to the constitution of the human mind : " What- 
:: ever we conceive as existent, WE can also conceive as 
" non-existent." Now, what this constitution is, in re- 
ference to the point at issue, let us call in a few witnesses 
to depose. 

§ 25. " I demand of any one to remove any part of pure 
" space from another, with which it is continued, even 
n so much as in thought" 64 I would fain meet 

with that thinking man, that can, in his thoughts, set 
;< any bounds to space, more than he can to duration : 
;< or, by thinking, hope to arrive at the end of either." 
Locke's Essay, B. II. ch. xiii. § 13. 21. 

§ 26. " As the order of the parts of time is immutable, 
" so also is the order of the parts of space. To remove 
<; these from their places, is to remove them from them- 
" selves." Newton *s Principia : Schol. ad Befin. 8. 

§ 27. " He that can suppose eternity and immensity 
" * * * removed out of the universe ; may, if he 
" please, as easily remove the relation of equality be- 
" tween twice two and four." Dr SI. Clarke' # " Demon- 
<£ stration," under Prop. III. 

§ 28. u We find within ourselves the idea of infinity, 
" f. e. immensity and eternity, impossible, even in imagina- 
il tion, to be removed out of being. We seem to discern 

B 



30 RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENT. L Part I 



" intuitively, that there must and cannot but be some- 
" what, external to ourselves, answering this idea, or 
" the archetype of it. 1 ' Butler's Analogy, Part I. ch. vi. 

§ 29. 64 We cannot conceive space possible to be* 
44 created, since we cannot conceive it as non-existent and 
44 creatable, which may be conceived concerning every 
44 created being. Nor can we conceive it properly as 
44 annihilated or annihilable" Dr I. Watts' 1 Philosophical 
Essays, Essay I. Sect. iv. 

§ 30. 64 We find that we can with ease conceive how 
• 4 all other beings should not be. We can remove them 
44 out of our minds, and place some other in the room of 
44 them; but space is the very thing that we can never 
44 remove and conceive of its not being. It is self-evident, 
44 I believe, to every man, that space is necessary" JRev. 
Jonathan Edwards' Notes. 

§ 31. " We see no absurdity in supposing a body to be 
44 annihilated ; but the space that contains it remains ; 
44 and to suppose that annihilated, seems to be absurd.^ 
Dr Beid's Essays, Essay II. chap. xix. 

§ 32. £t It is certain that where the notions of magni- 
44 tude and figure have once been acquired, the mind is 
44 immediately led to consider them as attributes of space 
44 no less than of body ; and (abstracting them entirely 
44 from the other sensible qualities perceived in conjunc- 
44 tion with them) becomes impressed with an irresistible 
4; conviction that their existence is necessary and eternal, 
" and that it would remain unchanged if all the bodies 
44 in the universe were annihilated." Bugald Stewart's 
Elements, Vol. II. chap. ii. § 3 & 3. 

§ 33. Now, here we have, just by way of specimen, 
eight individuals of the utmost veracity and intelligence, 
asserting in express terms, or in terms from which the 
inference is necessary, that they cannot conceive the non- 



§§ 29-37. } RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENT. 



31 



existence of space. To those authorities, we shall add 
only one more. 

§ 34. " The first proposition, — ' Infinity of extension is 
" c NECESSARILY existing, 9 — it would be absurd in the ex- 
" treme to deny. No more can we imagine any limit 
•' prescribable to extension, than we can imagine the out- 
" side of a house to be in the inside of it." Antitheos. 
u Refutation," Chap. VI. par. 3. 

§ 35. " What, now, is the utmost value we can set upon 
k; the argument a priori for the being and attributes of 
" God \ Does it possess any value whatever \ If it does, 
M it has yet to be shown, for in the hands of the great 
4i Rector of St James's, it only proves that something 
*' must have existed from all eternity ; and in those of a 
" learned and eminent logician of our northern metropolis, 
" nothing more than the necessary existence of infinite 
" space and duration : none of which propositions were'' 
[or was] " ever disputed.'" Antitheos. 6< Refutation," 
Chap. XIII. par. 1. 

§ 36. " To add any thing to the foregoing" authorities 
" were perhaps superfluous." They are " clear and satis- 
factory." Mr Hume, therefore, is entirely wrong in 
appealing to our mental constitution, when he says : 
" Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also con- 
" ceive as non-existent." We cannot conceive space as 
non-existent. His proposition, therefore, must undergo 
this modification at least. — whatever, with the exception 
of space, we conceive to exist, we can also conceive not 
to exist. The conclusion from his argument, — " Conse- 
M quently there is no being whose existence is denion- 
" strable," — must therefore be limited to this extent, (if 
no farther ;) consequently there is no being, except space, 
or, if space be not a being, the being which it necessarily 
supposes, whose existence is demonstrable. 

§ 37. Now, as that exhibition of the a priori argu- 



32 



RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENT. [Part I. 



ment for the being of A Deity which we are concerned 
to defend, t lays hold on space as its foundation, or ground- 
work ; //"infinite space be a property, or mode of existence, 
as theologians express themselves, of a Supreme Mind, 
then, unless we cannot ascend from the property to the 
substance invested with it, the being of a Supreme Mind 
is a thing demonstrable, is a necessary truth, OUR ATHEIST 
HIMSELF BEING JUDGE. 

§ 38. What has become now of Mr Hume's argument 
against any a priori argument for any matter of fact ? It 
has turned out to be indeed the farthest thing possible 
from being clear and satisfactory. And no wonder, when 
such a one as our atheist appeared as an evidence 

AGAINST IT. 

§ 39. So much has this gentleman turned the tables 
upon himself by venturing to appropriate the reasoning 
which to him seemed so irrefragable, and upon which he 
shewed no disinclination to peril his cause. What will 
he do now ? It is easy to see what he should do. 

§ 40. Although the <c reasoning of the reviewer" ap- 
peared to our author to be " clear and satisfactory," yet 
he follows it up by a remark of his own, which we shall 
notice. " Men have often been made to suffer severely — 
;< on some occasions to the loss of life — for denying the 
" being of a God. * * * But was ever any one put to 
" death, or sent to the pillory, for denying that twice two 
" make four ? The idea, indeed, is ridiculous ; but where- 
" fore should it be so ? Simply because it is not possible 
i: there should be any difference of opinion about the mat- 
46 ter." (Par. 13.) Surely it is possible to deny, that 
twice two make four ; though it is not possible to con- 
ceive the denial to be correct. And 'tis not to be taken for 

t It is the only proper exhibition. And on this subject I would, 
with all humility, refer to " Division II." of the " Introduction" to the 
" Argument," especially, to the 3d section of that Division. 



§§ 38-42.] RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENT. 



33 



granted, without 2 Jroo fi that no one ever denied that 
twice two is four : Things as absurd have been said.+ 

§ 41. There may be assigned another reason why the 
civil magistrate in no country ever put any one to death 
for telling a certain lie, and denying that two and two are 
four : which reason is this, — a lie of that kind could injure 
no one's morals ; it could only shew the already wretched 
morals of him who uttered it. A denial of that arithme- 
tical truth could go no way to undermine and loosen the 
foundations of civil society, as some other denials have been 
supposed to tend to do.% In fine, to say that twice two is 
not four, can never inflict a wound either on public or 
private morality. 

§ 42. It must be granted to Antitheos, that it is not 
possible to conceive the denial of the proposition, that 
twice two make four, to be correct. But at the same time 
we must take care to remember this, that there are truths, 
as well as that arithmetical one, which, to use Antitheos'' s 
language, " it is not possible there should be any difference 
" of opinion about." To instance in the case of the truth, 
There is infinite space ; that there is necessarily such, 
" is one of the first and most natural conclusions, that 
" any man, who thinks at all, can frame in his mind : 
" And no man can any more doubt of this, than he can 
" doubt whether twice two be equal to four. 'Tis possible 
" indeed a man may in some sense be ignorant of this 
" first and plain truth, by being utterly stupid, and not 
" thinking at all : (For though it is absolutely impossible 
44 for him to imagine the contrary, yet he may possibly 

t Vide Part. XL § 18. not. %—quoq; Part. XII. Not. CC. 

% " — Those whoso principles dissolve the first bonds of association, 
" and society, the Atheists and dcsj/isers of God andrcliyion." — War- 
Uurton's Divine Legation of Moses, B. II. sect. iv. With reference to 
the subject before us, consult the whole of Books I. II. III. of that 
stupendous work. 



34 



RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENT. 



[Part I. 



" neglect to conceive this : Tho 1 no man can possibly 
; ' think that twice two is not four, yet he may possibly 
" be stupid, and never have thought at all whether it be 
46 so or not.)' ? "f* 

§ 43. I grant all this, Antitheos will say. But what of 
that 1 I was insinuating, not that the propositions con- 
cerning two and two making four, and concerning the 
existence of space, were not on a footing as to real un- 
deniableness, but that the former of the propositions, and 
the one affirming the being of a God, are not on such a 
footing. 

§ 44. The following is the reply which is to be made to 
what Antitheos has been* supposed to advance : — Though 
it may require some thought and painstaking to rise 
from the truth, that space is necessary, to the Being who 
is, so to speak, the substratijpi, or, as logicians would say, 
the subject of inhesion, of space, and to the other properties 
or attributes of that Being ; still IF we can so ascend, by 
legitimate ratiocination, then the proposition affirming 
the being of a God is on the same footing as to true 
undeniableness with that maintaining, two and two are 
equal to four, — Antitheos being to judge, for, as we have 
seen, he has lent his hand to constitute, and make firm 
for ever, the pillar which sustains the weight of the edifice. 
The steps in the reasoning may be many ; the demon- 
stration long : But the length of a demonstration is not 
allowed to be a presumption against its validity in ma- 
thematical affairs : Is there any reason why it should be 
so here ? The truths of mathematics are not all intuitive 
or self-evident. To demonstrate the greatest mathema- 

t These words are from Clarke's " Demonstration," under Prop. 
III. They are here used only as accommodations. What the Doctor has 
in view, is somewhat different from what I am upon. But I could not 
think of words better adapted to express my meaning in this place 
than those of his. 



§§ 43-47.] RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENT. 



35 



tical certainties, requires much thought, labour, and time, 
for the demonstrations can be effected only by means of 
perhaps some thousands of intermediate ideas. 

§ 45. Our atheist, after making the observation we 
have thus noticed, proceeds in this way : "If, however, 
" the dogmas of theology, or even say the primary one," 
(which is the one that maintains the necessary existence 
of space,) " were capable of demonstration as mathema- 
" tical doctrines are, there could be no difference in the 
" respect due to doubts and denials in either case ; or 
" rather, it would be impossible to find doubters and 
" deniers in the one more than in the other.'' A senti- 
ment this with which we must entirely agree. If the pri- 
mary dogma of theology be not capable of being demon- 
strated, it is because it is rather of the class of self-evident 
truths, and so stands in need of no demonstration : as 
we adduced eight witnesses, and one over and above, to 
depose to. 

§ 46. So much for the " irrelevancy of the argument ;" 
but the chapter treats of something more ; it considers 
" the character" of the argument. 

§ 47. " The argument in question," says Antitheos, 
" is nothing else than an attempt to establish the appli- 
" cation of mathematical reasoning to * * real exist- 
" ences."-f- This is the character Antitheos gives of the 
argument : It employs mathematical reasoning, says he. 
How sad a misapplication of a word ! Mathematical ! 
What can any branch of the mathematics have to do in 
the case ? Arithmetic or Algebra ? You jest ! Geometry ? 
Nonsense ! How can lines and angles and segments come 
this way ? " How vain and preposterous the attempt," 
indeed, to apply mathematics to the proof of real exist- 
ences ! 

t These words have been already adduced. Vide siq/ra, § 6. Our 
purpose now is different. 



36 RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENT. [Part I. 



§ 48. It may here be mentioned, that this curious mis- 
application of the word " mathematical" is to be found 
not only several times in this chapter, but very frequently 
throughout the " Refutation, t" 

§ 49. If Antitheos will point out one line, only one line, 
wherein mathematical reasoning is employed to prove a 
real existence, in the whole of Br Clarke's " Demonstra- 
tion, 1 ' or of " the Argument, a priori, for the Being and 
" Attributes of God ;" I shall hold myself as wholly and for 
ever refuted, and reduced to so desperate a condition by 
my rout, as to be incapable of ever again taking up a 
weapon in the cause. 

§ 50. I cannot do better than here quote a passage 
from the Quarterly Review for February, 1836. The 
article is on Lord Brougham's Preliminary Discourse. 
" It is quite absurd to apply the phrase { mathemati- 
" cally impossible' to a matter of fact." " Clarke might 
" believe, that the existence of Deity is as certain, by 
" metaphysical evidence, as any proposition in Euclid is by 
" mathematical evidence ; but to speak of the existence 
" of the Maker of the universe as mathematically possible 
" or impossible, is of all incongr uities the most extravagant 
" and ridiculous.''' P. 401. J 

t Vide infra, % 57—quoq; Part. VIII. § 9. et Part. VI. § 2.—$c. 

J All men err at times : And Clarke himself, in a moment of forget- 
f ulness, lost his sense of the fitness, or rather unfitness, (not of things 
— for he never forgot that — but) of words, for he speaks of the " Ma- 
u thematical certainty, which in the main Argument was there easy to 
" be obtained." — Evidences : near beginning. 

The simple truth is, this great man should have spoken, not of 
" mathematical certainty," but of a certainty equal in naked demon- 
strative force to mathematical, — of a certainty which, as well as ma- 
thematical certainty, flows from, yet always rests on, what Stewart 
would designate " an ultimate and essential law of human thought." 
( See Philosophical Essays. Essay II. ch. ii. sect. 2.) 

But though Clarke gave, once, a wrong character to his Demon- 



g§ 48-55.] RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENT. 37 

f § 51. The truth is, to give the truth in one word, our 
atheist has mistaken metaphysical reasoning for mathe- 
matical. 

§ 52. One great distinction between these two species 
of reasoning is the following. Metaphysical reasoning 
may be exerted, to some extent, on almost any subject : 
Mathematical, that is, geometrical, reasoning, is appli- 
cable to one subject only. 

§ 53. Geometry is the science of abstract magnitude, 
or, of partial considerations of bare extension. In one 
sense, it respects not any thing really existing ; for the 
points, and lines, and superficies, and figures, from which 
it starts, can no where be found in the domain of nature : 
they exist only as conceptions — But indeed we really have 
no ideas corresponding to a line without breadth, and a 
point without magnitude. Etc. etc.f 

§ 54. — L No reasoning can be mathematical which does 
not refer to what we may call the subjects of the science, 
the angles, the triangles, the squares, the circles, &c. 
&c. &c. 2. And no reasoning, even though occurring in 
a professedly geometrical book, can be mathematical, 
unless it works by means of some of those subjects. 

§ 55. Metaphysical reasoning, not unfrequently, is to 
be met with in mathematical authors. Many instances 

stration, this, in sooth, has no mathematics in it. Begging pardon of 
the Archbishop of Dublin for saying so : for this accomplished Lo- 
gician, speaks of " the futility" (better, if he had spoken of the non- 
existence) "of the attempt of Clarke * * to demonstrate (in the mathema- 
" tic Aii sense) the existence of a Deity." Logic. B. IV. ch. ii. § 1. 
(Sixth Edition.) 

Br Whatehj, who writes so much about " ambiguous terms," may 
set one word more among his number, in the next edition. 

t This assertion may seem odd, and may shock a mathematician's 
ears. But it is true. And not much reflection will be required to 
6hew that it is so. Of course, there is no need to prove here the truth, 
or, if you will, the falsehood, of the assertion. The matter between 
me and Antitheos has nothing to do with that. 

C 



38 RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENT. [Part. £ 

of this might be given,f were these at all necessary. And 
a metaphysician may occasionally turn mathematician. 
But the boundaries of the two sciences remain always 
well-defined. No two things can be more distinct than 
the two species of reasoning. 

§ 56. Thus have we examined what our author has 
advanced on the " character and irrelevancy of the argu- 
ment." There are various other topics touched upon in 
the first chapter, which shall all be considered in their 
proper places. On one only of these topics shall we say 
something at present. 

§ 57. " Here, indeed, the grand secret, in managing 
" the argument before us lies. It affixes a partial and 
" out-of-the-way meaning to words, especially those upon 
" which the whole question turns, and so, misconstrues 
" and misapplies general language. Necessity, for in- 
" stance, which by the way is the key-stone of the struc- 
" ture, is different from what it is found to be any where 
" else, except, perhaps, in some other region of mere 
" speculation. In the premises, it is attenuated to the 
" utmost fineness of its mathematical"" (metaphysical) 

t Ex. gr. Take the first Note (the Note on the first Definition) in 
Wallace's Play fair's Euclid's Elements. (Eighth Edition.) The rea- 
soning is pitiable : And the Grecian Geometer's definition, in spite of 
the Commentator's assault on it, has as much propriety as ever. 

"Who could have suspected it 1 But the reasoning in the Note in 
question might be employed, with some success too, in behalf of the 
doctrine of unextended human spirits,^ — as well as in behalf of other 
vagaries, as wild, (but hardly any wilder,) and accompanied by still 
worse results. 

How often one falls upon Mathematicians out of their road ! And 
the grand misfortune is, your genuine mathematicians never go out of 
their road, but to be busied about what is sure to land in mischief. 
If the scales and compasses drop down from their hands, and an ill 
wind should blow any thing past problems and theorems up into 
their heads ; then let us look to the consequences. 

X Vide Part. III. § 34. et seq.—quoq; Part. VIII. Appendic. B. § 24. et Part, IX. 
§ 39. not. f 



§§ 56-61.] RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENT. 39 

" acceptation, although the weight of its common and real 
" meaning is essential to the validity of the conclusion." 
(Par. 11.) 

§ 58. A single remark here in passing. Our atheist 
will find that necessity r , and all the cognate words, are, 
by his opponent, used always in the same sense ; in the 
premises they mean what they mean, and nothing more 
than they mean, in the conclusion. Let him detect me 
in an inconsistency in this matter, let him seize me falling 
fairly asleep between my premiss and my conclusion, 
and forgetting when I awaken and proceed to the latter, 
the sense in which I had used my words in the former ; 
and I shall grant that the day is his. 

§ 59. It will be a good thing to take the present op- 
portunity to inform my opponent, once for all, what, and 
what only, is to be understood by necessity, and by neces- 
sary existence. In settling these points, we shall be 
affording the materials for answering the question, What 
is, in propriety, to be understood by an a priori argument 
for the being of A Deity ? A question which here to 
decide is of the utmost importance, for a reason that 
will be immediately gathered. 

§ 60. When Antitlieos says : " Up starts the logician 
4i of the ne^soliool * * It is irrefragably to be 
" proved, not only that a God does exist, but that he must 
" exist, and that too as necessarily as that two and two 
" make four ; — that his non-existence, in short, cannot 
*' even be conceived." * * * "A being existing by 
" necessity is sought for ; that is (according to the new 
" logic) one whose non-existence it is not in the pow r er 
" of man to imagine." (Par. 5 k> 6.) When, I say, 
Antitheos writes in this manner, he gives the true state of 
the case, he words it as if he knew well enough what 
ought to be understood by an a priori argument. 

§ 61. But when, no more than three pages down, he 



40 RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENT. [Part I. 



quotes, with the utmost approbation, a writer who, as we 
observed, f states the question in this way : (C The ques- 
" tion as to the being of a God, is purely a question of 
" fact: HE either exists or he does not exist. J" When, 
I say, Antitheos does this, he seems to have forgotten 
what he himself had laid down. By forgetting the ne- 
cessity, he has suddenly lost his knowledge of what an a 
priori argument is. In fine, his own representations are 
quite inconsistent with each other. 

§ 62. Since, therefore, our atheist's views of an a priori 
argument seem so confused and inconsistent, seem 

" Neither sea, 
" Nor good dry land,"|| 
it becomes highly necessary to attempt setting him in the 
way to bring congruity and order out of the chaos. The 
disorder which exists among his ideas affects the very 
vitals of the subject in controversy.^ 

§ 63. What, then, is necessity ? In what direction is it 
that we are to look for necessity ? 

t Supra, § 14. 

X In the very second paragraph (as we have quoted therefrom — 
supra § 5.) the same sort of representation occurs. Indeed, throughout 
the " Refutation," sometimes the one sort of representation, some- 
times the other, is to be met. A singular confusion of ideas ! or, a 
singular way of making a present point good ! Whatifcrer be the cause, 
the confusion does no insignificant service to our atheist. But its 
services he must henceforth dispense with : The consequences of the 
confusion are not to be allowed. 

il Milton. 

U It is not a singular thing not to have clear conceptions as to what 
a priori argumentation for a real existence is. Nay, to labour under 
a sad delusion upon this subject, is not an uncommon case. Many 
persons know not what is the proper meaning of the thing. And 
finding absurdities in their conceptions regarding it (no mighty matter, 
perhaps, after all), they fall to arguing, and to railing, against the 
production of their own fancy. But let them only banish the ugly 
thing that distracts them, and they may be presented with a more 
sightly shape. What that is which those persons have poured their 
wise contempt upon, they perhaps do not yet best know. 



§§ 62-68.; RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENT, 41 



§ 64. Necessity does not concern things in themselves. 
Necessity is no predicate of a thing, any farther than it 
expresses a certain quality of our conceptions regarding 
the existence of the thing. In fine, necessity lies not in 
the objective reality, but in the subjective mind. 

§65. To illustrate this doctrine by an example taken 
from the science of magnitude. That the three interior 
angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles, is 
a truth which, if the demonstration has been followed, 
cannot but be believed, when the subject is thought on. It 
is therefore pronounced a necessary truth. But the ne- 
cessity that is in the case is not to be found anywhere but 
in the mind of the demonstrator. One very good proof of 
which is, that — not the visible representatives of the ma- 
thematical lines, and angles, and triangles, but — the 
real mathematical lines, and angles, and triangles them- 
selves, can exist nowhere but in our conceptions. (Ut 
supra, § 53.) 

§ 66. In the next place, What are we to understand 
by a necessarily existing being ? A necessary being, is 
one whose existence is necessarily believed by us ; — a 
being, in a word, whose non-existence we cannot conceive. 
But is this all that is meant by a necessary being 1 It 
is indeed all : any thing more is inconceivable. 

§ 67. It will now be very obvious what an a priori 
argument, 4hat is, an argument from the necessity of the 
case, is. It is an argument drawn from those conceptions 
of the human mind of which it cannot be divested. In 
its essential parts, it founds on nothing but those ideas 
which arise in the mind in the very act of thinking, those 
ideas which are the sine qua non of all other ideas. 

§ 68. I shall conclude what I have to say on this 
topic, by an extract from an article in the Quarterly Re- 
view, to which we have been already indebted. (Supra 
§ 50.) " The arguments which have been adduced by 



42 



RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENT. 



[Part I. 



" theologians in favour of Deity, have been generally 
" considered to be of two kinds, viz. arguments a priori, 
" and arguments a posteriori. In the strictly logical" 
[or rather, etymological] " sense of these terms, neither 
" of these modes of reasoning is applicable to the ques- 
" tion. For to reason a priori is to argue from the cause 
" to the effect : this evidently is to assume the cause, the 
" existence of which is the very point which is here to 
" be proved. To reason a posteriori, is to argue from 
4C the nature of the effect to that of the cause. But this 
" argument, if applied to the question, would assume the 
" world to. be an effect, a point equally necessary to be 
" proved before the argument can be legitimately ap- 
" plied. Though this is the strict and logical" [etymo- 
logical] " meaning of the terms, they are often employed, 
" the former to denote speculative or abstract reasoning, 
" the latter, that which is founded on facts or experience." 
— P. 399-400. t 

f " To confine — " says Dr SI. Clarke, " the use of the term [a priori], 
u to argumentations about such things only, as have other things prior 
" to them in time ; is only quibbling about the signification of words." 
Ans. to 7th Letter. 



43 



PART II. 



THE " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, FOR THE BEING AND ATTRI- 
BUTES OF GOD," AN IRREFRAGABLE DEMONSTRATION. 

§ 1. Having considered the relevancy of a priori argu- 
mentation, when directed to the most important of all 
matters of fact, (the most important fact, if it be a fact at 
all,) we proceed to examine whether Antitheos has been 
at all successful, or signally unsuccessful, in his attempt 
to exhibit any specific fallacy in the " Argument, a priori , 
" for the Being and Attributes of God." Unless we mis- 
take the matter very much, it will be discerned, both 
easily and obviously, that the gentleman in question has 
failed, failed in the most egregious manner, with regard 
to what he undertook to accomplish. 

§ 2. 44 Mr Gillespie's argument, * * * *" our atheist 
assures us, " is perhaps as well as can be expected of a 
" work of the sort, and may probably supersede every 
" thing of the kind that has gone before it." (Ch. V. 
par. 1.) Of the sort, says he : willing to hint, the best 
of any kind is bad enough. If Antitheos is disposed to see 
no force in a priori reasonings for A God, he is, if any thing, 
less inclined to set value on the a posteriori method. " The 
" argument a posteriori" he remarks, " relies on experi- 
" ence, and deduces causes from their effects. This pro- 
44 cess, however, is quite illogical. * * It takes for granted 
" the existence of an agent capable of producing the effects 
" contemplated as the source of the argument — which of 



44 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI;' IRREFRAGABLE. [Part II. 

" course is begging the principle.'" (Ch. I. par. 4.)f There 
can be nothing worse in argument, than to take for 
granted the principal thing to be proved. In fine, " the 
" approval of the argument a priori by * * * the most 
" erudite and enlightened — of the Christian world," (ch. i. 
par. 1.) makes it evident, that the strength of the cause 
is held (by the best judges) to lie in the direction, not 
of the a posteriori method, but of the other. And since 
this is so, it is to the latter quarter that atheists must point 
their most formidable artillery. — Upon the whole, we may 
not unnaturally expect that our antagonist will bring all 
his powers to bear against Mr Gillespie's exhibition of 
the argument a priori for the existence of Deity. 

§ 3. It is in his fifth chapter that the author of the 
" Refutation" begins to consider his present opponent^ 
work. Antitheos is, in that place, in a sort of rambling 
vein, and he stumbles over a good many matters, in a way 
that shall draw none of our attention at this time. There 
is, however, a certain thing propounded in the chapter 
referred to, which it will be well to take the opportunity 
now presented to set forth. 

§ 4. 66 Our metaphysical opponents," says our anti- 
theist, are always for stealing h>march upon us. " * * * * 
" If Mr Gillespie had even told us what he meant by 
" the word being, which he so frequently makes use of, 
" we should have been able to say whether it could be 
" proved necessarily to exist or not." % — The truth in this 
affair is, that Mr Gillespie\\ has told what he meant by 

t See, to the same effect, Chap. II. last par. 

% The same sort of thing is iterated in another place. — " Mr Gilles- 
li pie talks of a substance, it is true, a being of infinity of expansion, 
" &c. ; but why has he neglected to tell us of what sort this substance" 
[or being] « is V y Ch. XII. par. 2. 

J| We shall occasionally speak of Mr Gillespie in the third person* 
to avoid the too frequent recurrence of a certain personal pronoun, and 



§§3-4.] " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI" IRREFRAGABLE. 45 

the word Being, and that as soon as ever he made use of 
it. Vide Part. XI. § 15. not.\ " If a mere abstraction," 
viz. a mere thought of your mind, or of mine, (vide part. i. 
§ 8.) " is represented by it, we can have no quarrel with 
" any kind of demonstration about it he pleases. * * *" 
— And no wonder. — 44 Should it, on the contrary, refer 
'•' to an agent of any kind — something possessing power — 
" something that acts — a thing, in short, having a real 
" existence^ in the same sense as that in which we apply 
" reality of existence to common objects, there can be 
44 no objection to his free use of the term. The author's 
61 subsequent reasoning involves the latter construction 
- l (which construction, I may mention once for alt, I shall 
' ; uniformly adopt.)" — Par. 4. Who now is the stealer of 
marches ? Mr Gillespie, in Book II. seeks to prove, that 
the Being treated of in Book I. is necessarily an Intelli- 
gent, an All-powerful, and a Free Being. To give it in 
Antitheos' 's words. 64 This grand argument is laid out 
" in two books. In the first, the metaphysico-theologian 
M endeavours to prove that some being exists which is the 
:4 sine qua non of every other thing in existence. It con- 
4: sists of three parts, or series of propositions, maintain- 
44 ing, first, that Space is this being ; second, that Dura- 
44 tion is also a being of the same kind ; and third, that 
e: these are npt different, but identical. The second 
" book'ascribes to the subject of the fore-mentioned proofs, 
44 the Divine attributes of omniscience,% unlimited power, 
44 and freedom of agency." (Ch. VI. par. 1.) And could 
Mr Gillespie assume, that the Being he treats of is a Mind, 
possessing power, and freeness, before he had said one 

perhaps to steer clear of inconvenient circumlocutions in addition to 
the appearances of an offensive monosyllable. The separate, or the 
conjoined, presence of some third reason at times, may be detected. 
The reader is to determine. 

\ The word in the text of the " Refutation" is, 44 Ommjyri'sence," but 
this, I take it, is an error of the press. 



46 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part II. 

word by way of proof ? How would this have been con- 
sistent with that " precision of purpose and exactness of 
44 arrangement' 1 which Antitheos found to be present in the 
work we have him now commenting on ? (See Ch. V. 
par. 1.) No : Mr Gillespie proceeded not to his business 
so illogically. But, quoth our atheist, I shall argue, ay, 
and uniformly too, against my opponent, as if he had done 
a thing so illogical, as if he did 44 refer to * * * some- 
44 thing possessing power — something that acts" — before 
he had offered aught towards proving the possession of 
power, and of agency. Is not this stealing a march with 
a vengeance \ If Antitheos be entitled to steal such a 
march, then one entertaining the whimsical wish to find 
flaws in Euclid's demonstrations, may accuse the Elements 
for not assuming the third book in the second, or the last 
in the first ; one desirous of catching Aristotle at a disad- 
vantage, may censure the Analytics because they do not 
take for granted the doctrine concerning valid syllogisms 
ere that of single propositions has been gone over. An- 
titheos had truly good reasons for calling his production 
a refutation, if his opponent " makes intelligence, and 
44 power, and freedom of agency, part of his argument," 
(ch. v. par. 4.) before producing any reasons for what he 
does. 

§ 5. The secret is this : Our atheist is quite unable to 
overturn Mr Gillespie's 44 Argument," and therefore, as 
he must needs overturn it, he turns it over, and places the 
tail of it where the head should be. But as often as we 
find Antitheos busying himself at this play, we shall run 
to the rescue, and lose no time in setting things in their 
natural positions. 

§ 6. The paragraph in Chapter V. from which we have 
been quoting concludes as follows, the words being con- 
nected with the passage we have cited at large. 44 For 
44 the tenability of his position, however, respecting the 



§§ 5-8.] " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. 47 

" necessary existence of such a being, according to his 
" own view of necessity, I would refer him to what has 
" been stated in the first chapter of this Refutation." 
Here he refers to something supposed to be established 
in a previous portion of his work. And in our turn, we 
would point to what the reader will find advanced in re- 
lation to that portion in Part I. 

§ 7- " It is more easy to censure an argument in ge- 
" neral terms, than to meet all its particular parts on fair 
" and open grounds." So says Antitheos (ch. i. last par.), 
and we shall not quarrel with what he says. It may be 
more easy to do one thing than another, while to do, with 
propriety, either the one thing or the other, is very far 
from being easy. In Part I. we have considered the ge- 
neral censure, and our present business is to inquire whe- 
ther or not our atheist has met, on fair and open grounds, 
the particular parts of the " alleged demonstration." That 
the grounds on which he has met these are any thing 
but fair, will, we are confident, be very apparent by and 
bye. But we shall have, or we are mistaken, but little to 
complain of on the score of the grounds not being open 
enough. 

§ 8. " We shall take," says our author, " the most 
" laborious, and, at the same time, least advantageous 
11 way-f* of combating Mr Gillespie *8 principles, — book 
" by book, and proposition by proposition. This course 
" is the more necessary, as the argument a priori, un- 
" like that derived from experience, depends upon a 
" chain of reasoning, — not upon the pointed putting of a 
" single case, or the tautological repetition of a thousand." 
Ch. VI. par. 2. " This labour, *" he informs us in 
another place, " I cheerfully undertake, that there may 

t Why the " least advantageous way" 1 (Would any way have 
been advantageous X) Has Antitheos his own defeat in view, and is 
there a willingness on his part to make us anticipate it 1 



. 48 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part II. 

" be nothing left to suppose on the score of disingenuous- 
" ness," &c. — Ch. I. par. 14. Because the argument 
a priori depends on, or rather consists of, a chain of rea- 
soning ; this appears of itself a sufficient reason why it 
should be examined link by link. But Antitheos had as- 
signed another reason for his doing that which leaves 
nothing to be supposed on the score of disingenuousness. 
" Authors," he had remarked, " are peculiarly jealous of 
" their privileges, and tetchy and froward with regard to 
44 any freedom used in the treatment of their expressions." 
Ch. VI. par. 2. Especially — (it is worth while to notice 
it — ) where the freedom used extends so far as to turn 
the end round upon the beginning. Vide supra, § 5. 

§ 9. Our atheist is now come to the first of Mr Gillespie'' s 
Propositions. — " The first Proposition, — 4 Infinity of ex- 
44 tension is necessarily existing,' — it would," Antitheos 
declares, 44 be absurd in the extreme to deny," &c. &c. 
Vide Part. I. § 34. 

§ 10. But let us analyze that Proposition, and view 
attentively what it affirms, or, at least, involves. It lays 
down, there is necessarily infinity of extension. And in 
laying down that, it virtually lays down, there is exten- 
sion. To which we direct attention for reasons that may 
be forthcoming afterwards. 

§ 11. Thus Antitheos admits, to the fullest extent, the 
truth of Proposition I. To me, this is a most important 
admission. For if that Proposition is granted (and who 
can rationally deny it ?) I undertake to make out all the 
rest, by necessary consequence. The other Propositions are 
necessarily true, if this one is so. 

§ 12. As, therefore, the first Proposition is of such vital 
importance, we shall adduce what is said in connection 
with it in the 44 Argument." 

§ i3. 44 Proposition I. Infinity of Extension is neces- 
44 sarily existing. For even when the mind endeavours to 



§§ 9-17.1 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI'' IRREFRAGABLE. 49 



:i remove from it the idea of Infinity of Extension, it can- 
" not, after all its efforts, avoid leaving still there, the 
" idea of such infinity. Let there be ever so much en- 
" deavour to displace this idea, that is, conceive Infinity 
" of Extension non-existent ; every one, by a review, or 
" reflex examination of his own thoughts, will find, it is 
" utterly beyond his power to do so. 

§ 14. "*Now, since even when we would remove Infinity 
" of Extension out of our mind, we prove, it must exist 
" by necessarily leaving the thought of it behind, or, by 
" substituting, (so to speak,) Infinity of Extension for In- 
" finity of Extension taken away ; from this, it is mani- 
" fest, Infinity of Extension is necessarily existing : For, 
" every thing the existence of which we cannot but believe, 
" which we always suppose, even though we would not, is 
v necessarily existing. 

§ 15. " To deny that Infinity of Extension exists, is, 
" therefore, an utter contradiction. J ust as much a con- 
" tradiction as this, 1 is equal to 1, therefore 1 is not 
" equal to 1, but to 2 ; 2 not being identical with l.f 
" As thus : Infinity of Extension is ever present to the 
" mind, though we desire to banish it ; therefore, it can 
" be removed from the mind. This is just an application 
" of the greatest of all contradictions, A thing can be, 
" and not be, at the same time." 

§ 1G. Antitheos, then, allows the full truth of Proposi- 
tion I. " The same unqualified assent, however, cannot," 
he alleges, " be accorded to proposition the second ; 
M namely, that ' Infinity of Extension is necessarily indi- 
u visible. 1 " Ch. VI. par. 3. 

§ 17. We shall immediately proceed to examine whe- 
ther he has offered any thing of worth to support this 
assertion. For a moment, we turn rather aside, to say 

t " A contradiction which we can no more believe than that 1 is 
M equal to 1, therefore 1 is not equal to 1," &c. Note in " Argument." 



50 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part II. 

something as to the importance of the second Proposition, 
as a step in the reasoning. 

§ 18. " It would be of no great consequence" our atheist 
maintains, " although the second proposition were as ir- 
" refragable as the first. 1 , Why so \ " For it bears 
" upon nothing at all applicable to any being, whether 
" real or imaginary." Ch. VI. par. 6. Bravely said. Let 
the reader note the reason well. 'Tis natural to demand, 
What is the proof which Antitheos has given of his bold 
allegation \ When we mention, that he has not even 
attempted to offer a single word of proof, we imagine the 
surprise into which our readers shall be thrown. The 
second Proposition of no great consequence ! No ? Why 
we have but to turn over a few pages of the " Refutation" 
to perceive that it, subsequently, rose to be of no little 
consequence, even in our atheisfs eyes. " The fourth pro- 
" position of this 4 Argument' — that 4 the Being of In- 
" 4 finity of Extension is necessarily of unity and simpli- 
" 4 city, 1 — is founded upon * * extension" (it should 
" be " infinity of extension," vide infra, § 23.) " being 
44 indivisible," &c. i. e. is founded upon Proposition II. &c. 
(Ch. VII. par. 1.) Is Proposition IV., too, of no great 
consequence ? If so, May not every Proposition in the 
alleged demonstration be of no great consequence, in like 
manner ? And a convenient mode of setting aside the 
whole argument, in an easy way, be at once happily fallen 
upon ? 

§ 19. The truth is, a great part of the reasoning in the 
44 Argument" is built upon the second Proposition, in 
spite of its being now pronounced to be of no great con- 
sequence. The Proposition in question is founded on, to 
prove, not only that 44 the Being of Infinity of Extension 
44 is necessarily of unity and simplicity" but that — But to 
go over all that it is founded on to prove, would be to in- 
troduce no small portion of the work referred to ; as the 



§§ 18-24.] " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI:' IRREFRAGABLE. 



51 



reader may easily satisfy himself by turning it over, and 
glancing at the references occurring at the bottoms of the 
pages. 

§ 20. Thus much as to the relative importance of Pro- 
position II. Antiiheos saw proper to be but brief with his 
objections to it. And his having seen that to be proper, 
might be the reason why he has chosen to say, its con- 
sequence is not great. An insignificant matter had no 
right to detain him long. 

* § 21. And next for the objections themselves. We 
shall find them to be poor indeed : as weak as they are 
brief. But the brevity, great though it be, is out of 
proportion, when compared with the want of strength. — 
However, by reason of a certain interposed discussion, 
(with which Part III. shall be entirely occupied,) and 
because our antitheist has, in a small space, done a great 
deal to involve matters in confusion, (an easy undertaking, 
since 'twas rightly gone about,) a considerable time must 
elapse before we get to the end of those objections. It 
may be thought incumbent on us to unravel the whole 
perplexed clew, — and it cannot be so simple a business to 
get Antitheos^s reader clear of the labyrinth, as it was for 
Antiiheos to weave it for him. 

§ 22. That the reader may be able, the more readily 
to pass just judgment upon those objections, we shall pre- 
sent him with what the " Argument''' offers under the 
second Proposition. The great consequence, too, of the 
Proposition, (under Antitheos's leave be it spoken,) affords 
a warrant which would not otherwise exist for making 
the citation. 

§ 23. " Proposition II. Infinity of Extension is ne- 
" cessarily indivisible. That is, its parts are necessarily 
" indivisible from each other. 

§ 24. " Indivisible in this proposition means indivisible 
11 either really or mentally : For there can be no objection 



52 



ARGUMENT, A PRIORI;' IRREFRAGABLE. [Part II. 



" to a real, which does not apply to a mental divisibility; 
" and a mental divisibility, we are under the necessity of 
" supposing, implies an actual divisibility, of Infinity of 
" Extension. 

§ 25. " The parts, then, of Infinity of Extension are 
M necessarily indivisible from each other really or men- 
" tally. 

§ 26. " For that which is divisible really, may be 
" divided really : and a thing which is actually divided 
" from another must have superficies of its own, every 
" way, and be removed or separated from that other thing, 
" be it by'ever so little a distance. If any one should say 
" that things really divided from each other have not 
" real superficies of their own. every way ; to be able to 
" believe him, we must first be able to believe this, that 
" a thing can be, and not be, at the same time : And if 
" any one should say that things which are really divided 
" from each other, which have real superficies of their 
" own every way, can possibly be conceived without a 
" certain distance, however little, being between them ; 
" as this, it could as soon be believed that in a good 
" syllogism of the first figure, the conclusion does not ne- 
" cessarily follow from the premises. Being really divided, 
" and being really separated, mean, thus, the same thing, t 

27. " Now, divisibility meaning possibility of separa- 
61 tion : As it is an utter contradiction to say, Infinity of 
" Extension can be separated ; that is, a part of Infinity 
" of Extension separated, by a certain distance from In- 

f" A division by mathematical lines, (which are lines of length with- 
" out breadth,) of the real existence of Infinity of Extension, does not 
" infer a greater absurdity than a division of a mathematical line by 
" something really existing : if the division by mathematical lines 
" mean any thing more than a partial apprehension or consideration of 
" Infinity of Extension : which is allowed to be possible, just as it is 
" possible to consider length without breadth, or depth witJwut breadth 
" or length." Note in " Argument." 



g| 25-30.] "ARGUMENT, A PRIORI" IRREFRAGABLE. 53 

" finity of Extension ; there remaining Infinity of Extension 
i: after part of it is taken away ; the part of Infinity of 
" Extension so removed, being removed from the remain- 
a ing parts to these very same parts ; the part, thus, being 
" at rest while it is taken away ; the part so moved away, 
" being moved away from itself ; it still remaining, inas- 
" much as there is necessarily Infinity of Extension ;f 
£: that is though moved away, being not moved away : 
<; Which could not be, unless it be false, that whatever is, 
" is : As it is, thus, an utter contradiction to say Infinity 
64 of Extension can be separated, so it is an utter contra- 

diction to say it is not indivisible." 

§ 28. It will not be amiss to adduce the authority of 
a name than which there is none greater among metaphy- 
sicians ; as to the propriety of the doctrines insisted on 
(we speak not of the truth demonstrated) in the passage 
which has just been quoted from the " Argument." 

§ 29. k£ The parts of pure space are inseparable one 
" from the other ; so that the continuity cannot be sepa- 

rated, neither really nor mentally. * * * To divide 
" and separate actually, is, as I think, by removing the 
" parts one from another, to make two superficies, where 
" before there icas a continuity : and to divide mentally, is 
" to make in the mind two superficies, where before there 

was a continuity ; and consider them as removed one from 
" the other ; which can only be done in things considered 
" by the mind as capable of being separated ; and by 
" separation of acquiring new distinct superficies, which 
Ci they then have not, but are capable of : but neither of 
" these ways of separation, whether real or mental, is, as I 
u think, compatible to pure space. 

§ 30. " It is true, a man may consider so much of such 
" a space as is answerable or commensurable to a foot. 

t u Prop. I." Note in u Argument." Vide siq>ra § 14. 

D 



54 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part II. 



" without considering the rest, which is, indeed, a partial 
44 consideration, but not so much as mental separation or di- 
44 vision : since a man can no more mentally divide with- 
44 out considering two superficies, separate one from the 
" other, than he can actually divide without making two 
44 superficies disjoined one from the other : but a partial 
" consideration is not separating. 11 " Essay concerning 
44 Human Understanding." Book II. chap. xiii. § 13. 

§ 31. Again : " Expansion and duration have this 
" farther agreement, that though they are both con- 
" sidered by us as having parts, yet their parts are not 
44 separable one from another, no not even in thought." 
Ibid. chap. xv. § 10. 

§ 32. 44 Here,' 1 it is thus that Antitheos unmasks his 
battery, 14 the author has given up his abstract necessity, 
" and looks for something like experiment as alone capa- 
44 ble of satisfying him : for" (the proof we shall see is very 
notable,) 44 notwithstanding some unmeaning talk, in- 
44 tended to explain away this desertion of his own prin- 
4< ciples, he evidently insists upon a real division — an 
44 actual separation of parts, with some distance, however 
44 little between them, as that which he means by divisi- 
44 bility. 11 Ch. VI. par. 4. Unmeaning talk : That's com- 
plimentary. Unmeaning talk, to explain away the deser- 
tion of my own principles : Better and better : The com- 
pliment, like a rolling snow-ball, grows as it advances. 
Why is Mr Gillespie to be brought in guilty of uttering 
unmeaning talk % Because he cherished the felonious 
intent of explaining away a desertion of his own principles. 
But what is the evidence of the felonious intent ? Because 
he gives up abstract necessity, and looks for experiment. 
How is it proved that he does so ? The answer is truly 
marvellous. Mark it closely. 44 He evidently insists upon 
44 a real division — an actual separation of parts," &c. 
44 as that which he means by divisibility. 11 Where, in 



§§ 31-33.] " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI." IRREFRAGABLE. M 

the name of wonder, does he perpetrate such an offence \ 
Insists, evidently insists, upon divisibility meaning real 
division — actual separation ! In what words does the 
author of the " Argument 11 attempt to set forth so re- 
markable a paradox ? Present them to us, and we shall 
leave him to enjoy his paradox, undisturbed by any sug- 
gestions of common sense. Mr Hume was thought to 
have uttered a bold enough paradox, when he laid down, 
as a maxim, (that was the best of it,) " that an object may 
44 exist and yet be no where" (" Treatise of Human Na- 
ture." Part IV. sect, v.) But this paradox of the 
metaphysical theist, that bare divisibility means an actual 
separation of parts, with some distance between the parts, 
is, every inch of it, as original and striking as that of the 
writer of the " Treatise of Human Nature. 11 If Antitheos 
had said, Mr Gillespie insists on a real divisibility as that 
which he means by a real divisibility, or on a real division 
as that which he means by a real division, (and it may be 
mentioned, that Mr Gillespie knows of no divisibility but 
a real, that is, a true, divisibility, and of no division but 
a real, or true, division :) Antitheos had not spoken so far 
amiss. 

§ 33. No : Mr Gillespie never did insist, either evi- 
dently or secretly, on any such paradox. And his adver- 
sary might have known that well, had it pleased him to 
know it. As the reader is by this time fully aware ; what 
•the former insists on, and that evidently enough, is this : 
" That which is divisible really, may be divided really f 
And this: " A thing which is actually divided from another 
" must * * * * be removed or separated from that 
44 other thing, be it by ever so little a distance." Vide 
supra § 26. With Mr Gillespie, in a word, divisibility is 
divisibility and not division ; and to be actually divided, 
is something more than a mere capacity of being divided. 
Antitheos" s cranium, we need have no doubt, is divisible 



*56 "ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part II. 



into two. Is it therefore really divided, actually separ 
rated ? If so, we may continue the " Examination," but 
there will be no Antitheos to read what shall be written. 
But notwithstanding the divisibility of his encephalon, we 
have hopes of obtaining him for a critic. 

§ 34. Our author's next words are the following : " If 
Mr Gillespie pleads not guilty to this charge ;" the charge, 
to-wit, of evidently insisting upon a real division as that 
which he means by divisibility, and, as a consequence, of 
giving up abstract necessity, and looking for something 
like experiment to satisfy him. Of this reasoning, the 
major, or the suppressed proposition, — To insist evidently 
upon a real division being meant by divisibility, is to give 
up abstract necessity, &c. The minor, — Mr Gillespie 
evidently insists upon a real division being meant by divi- 
sibility : The conclusion, — Ergo, he gives up abstract 
necessity, &c. : — Are all Antitheos' s own. Nobody but 
our atheist can claim them. Grant, argues Antitheos, that 
Mr Gillespie gives not up his favourite necessity. Yea, 
and it shall be granted. 

§ 35. Did our atheist not understand what he read ? 
or is it that he only pretends not to have comprehended ? 
'Tis difficult to say. For that his opponent gives not up 
necessity, must be as manifest as any thing can be, to him 
who at all weighs the words which have been quoted from 
the " Argument." These words contain the following 
reasoning.' — Divisibility is another expression for capa- 
bility of division. That which is actually divided from 
another, must be removed, or separated, from that other 
thing : To be really divided being the same thing as to 
be really separated. Now, therefore, since it is proved, 
that the parts of Infinity of Extension are necessarily in- 
separable, it is proved, that those parts are necessarily 
indivisible : That is, that the Infinity of Extension has 
no parts in the sense of capability of being divided. 



§§ 34-40.] u ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. 



57 



§ 36. The proof that the parts of Infinity of Extension 
are necessarily inseparable, the reader has had above, in 
the twenty-seventh section. 

§ 37- And, by the way here, Antitheos has not ventured 
to breathe a syllable tending to call that proof in question. 
On the contrary, (and it is worthy of remark in this 
place,) he avows his belief in the entire validity of the 
proof. " In the discussion of his second proposition, the 
" author, 1 ' says our antitheist, " makes manifest the ab- 
" surdity of supposing space really divisible." Ch. VII. 
par. 4. 

§ 38. I must own, in passing, that I cannot, by any 
means, reconcile the passage which has just been quoted, 
wherein it is admitted, that it is absurd to suppose space 
divisible, with what the author of the " Refutation*" has 
advanced elsewhere, namely, that it is not to be accorded, 
infinity of extension, or space, is necessarily indivisible. 
Vide supra § 16. Let him who can, reconcile the two i 
statements. I must confess, that, to me, they look ex- 
ceedingly like an arrant contradiction. 

§ 39. Our author, I repeat, has not called in question 
what goes to prove, infinity of extension cannot be sepa- 
rated. By the very nature of infinity of extension, divi- 
sibility, or the possibility of division, is excluded. If 
infinity of extension were divisible, really or mentally, it 
would not be infinity of extension. " Indeed, that dki- 
" sibility implies finiteness in extension, in the very notion 
" of it, will be evident to every one who considers the 
" relations of his clear ideas." " Argument, a priori'' 
&c. Prop. II. § 7. % 

§ 40. To return. Divisibility implies capacity of sepa- 
ration : Therefore, infinity of extension is, of necessity, 
indivisible. This is the reasoning which, Antitheos 
alleges, renounces abstract necessity, and appeals to ex- 
perience — to prove (I fancy) the necessary indivisibility 



58 " ARGUMENT, A PBIOBI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part II. 

of infinity of extension. Verily if this be so, "'twould be 
hard to say what keeping by abstract necessity, and look- 
ing in another direction than to experiment, could be, 
when one would prove, that " Infinity of Extension is ne- 
" cessarily indivisible," or that 44 its parts are necessarily 
44 indivisible from each other." 

§ 41. When Locke argued as follows : " To divide and 
" separate actually, is, * * by removing the parts 
" one from another, to make two superficies, where before 
44 there was a continuity : and to divide mentally, is to 
" make in the mind two superficies, where before there 
" was a continuity ; and consider them as removed one 
«■ from the other." * * - * Therefore : " The parts 
44 of pure space are inseparable one from the other ; so 
" that the continuity cannot be separated, neither really nor 
" mentally." ( Vide supra, § 29.) When, I say, the 
author of the 44 Essay concerning Human Understanding," 
argued in that manner, did the idea ever enter his mind, 
(and we all know, how preciously fond he was of every 
sort of idea,) that he was looking 44 for something like 
44 experiment as alone capable of satisfying him" as to 
the necessary inseparableness of the parts of pure space ? 

§ 42. When our atheist said : 44 The author" (of the 
44 Argument") " makes manifest the absurdity of supposing 
44 space really divisible, since that would be to suppose 
44 the parts separated without having any space between 
44 them." Ch. VII. par. 4. (The force of the reason 
shall be examined afterwards. Vide Part. IV. § 15.) 
That is, when our atheist employed this enthymeme : to 
suppose spac<|jpally divisible, is to suppose its parts se- 
parated, &c. ; therefore, to suppose space really divisible 
is absurd : The suppressed premiss of which expression of 
reasoning, being, To suppose the parts of space separated, 
&c. is absurd : — Did it really enter his brain, to fancy he 
was looking 44 for something like experiment as alone 



§§ 41-45.] « ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. 59 

" capable of satisfying him," that 'tis absurd to suppose 
space is really divisible ! 

§ 43. If, in Proposition II., there is any appeal made 
to experience, is the appeal made for the purpose of 
proving, that infinity of extension is necessarily indivisible ? 
Nonsense this would be. If to experience any appeal be 
directed, it is only for the sake of getting an explanation 
of divisibility \ divided, division. And to what other quar- 
ter than experience, or use, one could go for an explana- 
tion of what is understood by certain English words, it 
would be difficult to say. It would be impossible to say, 
with any sense. 

§ 44. We have considered the antecedent of the hypo- 
thetical proposition : " If Mr Gillespie pleads not guilty 
u to this charge. 11 We now pass on to the consequent : 
11 (If Mr Gillespie pleads not guilty to this charge,) I 
" would ask him how mathematicians . have always re- 
" garded the smallest particle of matter divisible to in- 
" finity ?" Ch. VI. par. 4. Here he asks me to account 
to him for a thing alleged to be a fact. But the fact 
itself deserves to be looked into. Mathematicians very 
rarely condescend to treat of matter. It is not the pure 
Mathematician, but the Natural Philosopher, who con- 
siders the question, Is matter divisible infinitely I The 
question which the mathematician undertakes to decide 
is this, Are the parts of bare extension infinitely divisible ? 
The two questions are commonly confounded. Very un- 
fortunately. For thence no small portion of the confusion 
into which the subject has been thrown. The questions 
differ in most material respects. 

§ 45. The great majority of natural philosophers have 
determined that matter is divisible infinitely. And all 
mathematicians are of opinion, that bare extension must 
be divisible infinitely. We take upon us, to make mani- 
fest, in opposition to both, that matter is not, and that 



60 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part II. 

mere extension cannot be, infinitely divisible — A bold 
undertaking, considering the overwhelming majority in 
the one case, and the entire unanimity in the other. To 
run counter to a thing which has, again and again, been 
demonstrated, and is received almost as an axiom, by 
mathematicians, needs some courage. To boast that 
they shall be utterly overthrown by our opposition, seems 
to be the height of towering temerity. But patience : — 
the task will be easy and successful in proportion to the 
apparent difficulty of the enterprise. 



61 



PART III. 

THE NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY OF EXTENSION AND OF 
MATTER. 

§ 1. The propositions, then, which we have undertaken 
to establish are these : — That matter is not divisible to in- 
finity : And, That extension cannot be divisible to infinity. 
In the one case we have to do with the men of experi- 
ments. In relation to the other, we have to engage with 
those who confine themselves to the properties of bare 
extension. We shall take the second proposition first 
in hand. 

§ 2. — I. " No priestly dogmas, invented on purpose to 
" tame and subdue the rebellious reason of mankind, ever 
" shocked common sense more than the doctrine of the in- 
" finite divisibility of extension, with its consequences ; 
" as they are pompously displayed by all geometricians 
" * *, with a kind of triumph and exultation. A * 
11 quantity, infinitely less than any finite quantity, con- 
" taining quantities infinitely less than itself, and so on 
" in infinitum ; this is an edifice so bold and prodigious^ 
" that it is too weighty for any pretended demonstration 
" to support, because it shocks the clearest and most natural 
lt principles of human reason." Inquiry concerning Hu- 
man Understanding. Sect. XII. part ii. So says Mr 
Hume, and who can refuse his assent to every word \ 
" But," continues he, and at this point the sceptic and 
we diverge into different routes, " what renders the matter 

E 



62 



NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. [Part III, 



" more extraordinary is, that these seemingly absurd 
" opinions are supported by a chain of reasoning the 
" clearest and most natural ; nor is it possible for us to 
" allow the premises without admitting the consequences." 
Ibid. What ! absurd opinions supported by the clearest 
and most natural reasoning ! the clearest and most natural 
premises leading to the most absurd conclusion ! Well 
might the sceptic when contemplating a matter so extra- 
ordinary (the epithet how appropriate !) as that which 
here filled his view, proceed to infer : " Reason here seems 
" to be thrown into a kind of amazement and suspense, 
" which, without the suggestions of any sceptic, gives her 
" a diffidence of herself, and of the ground on which she 
" treads. She sees a full light, which illuminates certain 
" places ; but that light borders upon the most profound 
" darkness. And between these she is so dazzled and 
" confounded, that she scarcely can pronounce with cer- 
" tainty and assurance concerning any one object. 1 ' Ibid. 

§ 3. It admirably suited the sceptic to speak thus ; to 
involve, and to lose, the whole subject in the most profound 
darkness. " His aim," as says a much admired writer, 
" was," at all times was, " not to interrogate Nature, with 
" a view to the discovery of truth, but by a cross-examina- 
" tion of Nature, to involve her in such contradictions, as 
" might set aside the whole of her evidence as good for 
t4 nothing." Philosophical Essays by Dugald Stewart. 
Essay II. chap. i. And therefore, it was quite in accord- 
ance with Hume's object, to make one part of our nature 
jar with the other, and, by way of illustrating the con- 
tradictiousness of the decisions to which our faculties 
come, to make a proposition shocking and prodigious, 
follow, by necessary consequence, from propositions most 
clear and natural. This, we say, was in perfect harmony 
with Hume's grand purpose, and excites no surprise : but 
to find those who profess no scepticism, staid and sober 



|£ 3-7.] 



NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. 



63 



mathematicians, rule-and-compasses-men, to find them 
backing the strongest effort of the sceptic, assisting him 
to lay the foundation for universal doubt ; this, this is 
the matter for marvel. And it is matter for great mar- 
vel. 

§ 4. But what can we do ? However absurd the opi- 
nion be, that extension is infinitely divisible, still Mr Hume 
contends, it is supported by a clear and natural chain of 
reasoning, and the Mathematicians make their appear- 
ance to assure us, that it is even as he maintains. It is 
fortunate for us, that they bring their demonstrations 
along with them. For this circumstance puts it in our 
power to see whether or not common sense and our powers 
of reasoning are here to be set by the ears, as the Sceptic 
would have it, and as his supporters the Mathematicians 
seek not to hinder him from having. 

§ 5. Now sundry demonstrations have been offered by 
geometricians in proof of the divisibility of extension to 
infinity. We shall select the demonstration propounded 
by the celebrated Enter. This demonstration requires no 
previous mathematical knowledge. It is simple and plain. 
And it is easy to see, that if it be not a good demonstra- 
tion of the problem, how to divide extension infinitely, 
there cannot be a good demonstration any where else. 
In fine, 'tis the best that could be had for our purpose. 

§ 6. " In geometry," 1 said that eminent mathematician, 
" it is always possible to divide a line, however small, 
" into two equal parts. We arc likewise, by that science, 
" instructed in the method of dividing a small line, as a e,t 
l< into any number of equal parts at pleasure, and the con- 
" struction of this division is there demonstrated beyond 
11 the possibility of doubting its accuracy. 

§ 7. " You have only to draw a line A I parallel to a i 
" of any length, and at any distance you please, and 
" to divide it into as many equal parts AB, BC, CD, 
t See diagram, next page. 



64 



NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. 



[Part III. 




DE, &c. as the small line given is to have divisions, 
say eight. Draw afterwards, through the extremities 

A, a, and I, i, the 
straight lines A a O, 
I * 0, till they meet 
in the point : and 
from draw toward 
the points of division 

B, C, D, E, &c, the 
straight lines OB? 
OC, OD, OE, fee., 
which shall likewise 
cut the small line a i 
into eight equal parts. 
§ 8. " This operation may be performed, however small 
the given line a % and however great the number of 
parts into which you propose to divide it. True it is, 
that in execution we are not permitted to go too far ; 
the lines which we draw always have some breadth* 
whereby they are at length confounded, as may be seen 
in the figure near the point O ; but the question is not 
what may be possible for us to execute, but what is 
possible in itself. Now in geometry lines have no 
breadth, and consequently can never be confounded. 
Hence it follows that such division is illimitable. 

§ 9. " If it is once admitted that a line may be divided 
into a thousand parts, by dividing each part into two 
it will be divisible into two thousand parts, and for the 
same reason into four thousand, and into eight thousand, 
without ever arriving at parts indivisible. However 
small a line may be supposed, it is still divisible into 
halves, and each half again into two, and each of these 
again in like manner, and so on to infinity. 
§ 10. " What I have said of a line is easily applicable 
to a surface, and, with greater strength of reasoning, to 
a solid endowed with three dimensions, length, breadth, 



§§ 8-12.] NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. 65 

" and thickness. Hence it is affirmed that all extension 
" is divisible to infinity, and this property is denominated 
" divisibility in infinitum." Letters to a German Princess. 
Dr H. Hunter's translation. Vol. II. Letter viii. 

§11. So we have had a demonstration of the infinite 
divisibility of extension, a demonstration referring to a 
diagram, according to wont. But whatever Eider may 
have imagined, there is a possibility of doubting the ac- 
curacy, not of the construction of the figure indeed, but of 
the statement of connection between the construction and 
the thing to be shewn thereby. 

§ 12. " You have only," says the demonstrator, " to 
" draw a line A I parallel to at" (A I) " of any length, 
M and at any distance 1 '' (from at) 41 you please, and to Di- 
u vide it into as many equal parts AB, B C, CD, DE,&c, 

as the small line , given is to have divisions, say eight. " 
To divide a line into eight parts, is to make eight lines of 
one line, each of the eight being removed or separated from 
the rest, be it by ever so small a distance. Vide Part. 
II. § 2G. et 29. Without removal or separation of parts, 
there can be no division of one line into eight lines : there 
can be nothing but the partial consideration of so much of 
the line to the exclusion of the rest, eight times. Uuler, for 
all mathematicians, has said : " In geometry lines have 
" no breadth." How then can geometrical lines divide 
any thing ? since division implies some breadth or interval 
between the things divided. Where there is no breadth 
or distance between things, there is no division of the 
things. They are one and the same thing : That is, we 
were mistaken when we said, there were more things than 
one. In short, a i " the small line given" has no divisions 
at all. How then can it have eight ? The demonstration 
of infinite divisibility, has never touched one instance of 
division, and, to speak plainly, is no demonstration at all 
of the proposition with which it is connected. 



66 



NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. 



[Part III. 



§ 13. But mathematicians are to be held as busying 
themselves not with real, but with mental divisions. But 
still the same sort of objection falls to be made to a de- 
monstration of the infinite divisibility of extension, when 
a mental divisibility only is concerned, as falls to be made 
to a demonstration of such divisibility, when a real divi- 
sibility is spoken of. To divide a line mentally into eight 
parts, is to conceive eight lines made out of one line, each 
of the eight being considered as separated from the rest. 
And as geometrical lines have no breadth, they cannot 
be conceived as dividing any thing. And since they can- 
not he conceived as dividing any thing, they cannot be 
conceived as dividing " the small line 11 a i. 

§ 14. So much for Eider's demonstration. We shall 
now demonstrate, in our turn, that the extension with 
which mathematicians have to do, is not divisible to in- 
finity, and that for this plain reason, that it. is not divisi- 
ble at all. Our demonstration must have one quality 
which Eider's has not. . 

§ 15. Were the lines and figures of which the geome- 
trician treats, some more some less elastic and compres- 
sible, no dependence. could be placed on his science. Take 
an example for illustration. If in any right-angled tri- 
angle, the side subtending the right angle were compres- 
sible, then a square described on that side might or might 
not be equal to squares described upon the sides which 
contain the right angle : For it has not been proved that 
if the hypotenuse of the triangle be compressible, the base 
and perpendicular are, in proportion to the respective 
length of each, equally so, that is, it has not been proved, 
that equal spaces in the base and perpendicular are com- 
pressible in the same degree as equal spaces in the hy- 
potenuse are. The lines and figures of geometry, then, 
are no.t elastic or compressible. But all matter is com- 
pressible. The extension, therefore, on which mathema- 



§§ 13-17.; 



NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. 



67 



ticians superstruct their science is not such extension as 
matter has. What extension can it be then ? 

§ 16. In answering this question, we shall be under the 
necessity of forestalling, in some degree, what we' have to 
say in another place ; but there appears to be no help for 
it, and a good thing will bear to be told oftener than once. 
The reader has had it shewn, that there is necessarily in- 
finity of extension, (vide part. ii. § 13, etseq.) and has had 
it proved, that the parts of infinity of extension are ne- 
cessarily indivisible, (vide part. ii. § 23, etseq.) Now the 
parts of matter, or the material universe, are divisible from 
each other. Then, the parts of infinity of extension be- 
ing necessarily indivisible from*each other ; and it being 
intuitively evident, that the substratum of infinity of ex- 
tension, if it have a substratum, can be no more divisible 
than infinity of extension itself ; and the parts of matter 
being, on the contrary, divisible from each other; and it 
therefore following, that the material universe is not the 
substratum of infinity of extension, but is finite in exten- 
sion : — (For were it truly of infinity of extension, it would, 
unquestionably, be the substratum thereof :t But it be- 
ing not that substratum, therefore it is not of infinity of 
extension : — ) Here are two sorts of extension. The 
one sort, that which matter has : And the other, the ex- 
tension' of infinity of extension. And as infinity of exten- 
sion is necessarily existing, and as the material universe 
exists in the extension of infinity of extension ; a part of 
this {part, bu£in the sense of partial consideration, for 
otherwise infinity of extension can have no parts — vide 
part. ii. § 27.) must penetrate the material universe, and 
every atom, even the minutest atom, of it. 

§ 17. It will be proper, therefore, to distinguish be- 

■f u Upon the hypothesis of substance being infinitely extended, wo 
" may regard it as 'the substratum of infinity of extension.' " — Refute- 
lion." Chap. VHI. par. 3. 



68 



NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. 



[Part III- 



tween those two kinds of extension. And accordingly, 
confining to matter, namely, to the distance of the extre- 
mities of matter from each other, the name extension ; let 
us apply to the extension of infinity of extension, the name 
expansion, or space. \ 

§ 18. In answer then to the question, What is the ex- 
tension on which geometry is superstructed ? the reply is, it 
is the extension of space, the extension which is of in- 
finity. For we know of no other sort of extension but 
that of matter, and that of space ; or at least if we know 
of any other, it is altogether beside the purpose. Space, 
then, is the extension on which Geometry is superstruct- 
ed. But the parts of space are indivisible. ( Vide Part 
II. 27- et supra § 17- locis collatis.) Therefore mathe- 
matical extension is indivisible. 

§ 19. Thus have we accomplished what we took in hand, 
and proved, in opposition to the Mathematicians, that 
mere extension, or space, cannot he infinitely divisible. 
There is no " strength of reasoning,' , greater or less, in 
their demonstrations. And, in the next place, we have 
positively, rigidly, irrefragably, made manifest the con- 
trary. 

§ 20. Should it be argued, that when our mathemati- 
cian speaks of divisions, in demonstrating the infinite di- 
visibility of extension, he does not mean divisions at all, 
but only partial apprehensions or considerations, which 
are not so much as mental divisions : as if he had said, it 
is demonstrable that extension is capablH of being par- 

t " To avoid confusion * * , it were possibly to be wished, that the 
e< name extension were applied only.to matter, or the distance of the 
" extremities of particular bodies ; an<*the term expansion to space in 
et general, with or without solid matter possessing it, so as to say, 
" space is expanded, and body extended. But in this every one has 
(< liberty ; I propose it only for the more clear and distinct way of 
c speaking." Locke's Essay, B. II. ch. xiii. § 27. See also Ch. xv. § 1. 



§§ 18-22.] 



NOX-IXFINI TE DIVISIBILITY. 



69 



tially considered, in the way of consideration of so much 
extension, and then of consideration of so much of that 
extension, and so on, in infinitum, or rather, without ever 
coming to any stage where the process of diminishing the 
extension by considerations must stop : Should this be 
argued, the reply is two-fold. 

§ 21, — 1. If our mathematician thought, that the di- 
visibility of extension in infinitum, is an empty chimera, 
and never intended to demonstrate any such divisibility, 
his words are exceedingly bad indices to his thoughts, 
but his thoughts are good, as we have made manifest. If 
he, as standing for all mathematicians, take the divisi- 
bility of extension in infinitum to be a vain fancy, the 
point is given up in our favour, and we are entirely 
agreed with him. 

§ 22. — 2. If Eulef s demonstration is to be viewed as a 
demonstration, that we can consider partially, by consi- 
dering and again considering, so much extension, without 
ever being under a necessity of arriving at any termina- 
tion to the process ; in this case, his demonstration must 
stand good, for any thing we have to advance against it. 
We never engaged to do aught requiring that we should 
find a flaw in any demonstration of such a kind. What 
we took upon us to do was, to make manifest, that ex- 
tension cannot be divisible to infinity. Vide Part. II. 
§ 45. et supra, § 1. It may be, or it may nob be, that 
Eider has strictly demonstrated the possibility of partial 
considerations of so much extension, in infinitum : But 
as we did not undertake to throw our authority, such as 
it is, or our arguments, upon either side of that topic, so 
we shall not now do what we never promised to do.-f- 

t Perhaps, had it been our business to try to discover flaws in Enltr'a 
demonstration, considered as a demonstration of the possibility of 
partial considerations of a certain extension infinitely, we could have 
stumbled against enow. We shall drop only this one hint. No num- 



70 



NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. 



[Part III 



§ 23. One thing, however, we shall permit ourselves to 
say upon that subject. Whether or not we can consider 
partially, by considering and again considering, so much 
extension, without being obliged to terminate the process 
somewhere ; this very plainly seems to be capable of a 
test at least as good as any to be had in virtue of a mere 
geometrical demonstration. The test referred to is the 
testimony of our powers of conception, applied immedi- 
ately to the subject ; applied in asking an immediate an- 
swer to the question, Can we, or can we not, consider a 
certain extension without coming to any point where we 
must halt in the business of considering, and again con- 
sidering, and considering yet again, and again, and 
again ? We either can, or we can not, have considera- 
tions and sub-considerations without end, and to appeal, 
for the decision of the affair, somewhere else than to a 
diagram, and a relative demonstration, seems at least as 
natural a course as any other. As natural, did we say \ 
Nay, (since we are upon the subject,) may we not, with 
all safety, affirm, that it is a very unnatural, and a very 
unexpected mode, of going to work, to set out to demon- 
strate, by the interposition of a geometrical construction, 
that our minds can have considerations and sub-consider- 
ations of a certain extension, without limit ? And it may 
be worth while for one who is presented with a geometri- 

ber of mathematical lines, laid alongside each other, can compose 
what has any breadth. Take the smallest line we can draw (for it would, 
be taking too much for granted, here, to say, the smallest line we can 
conceive). Conceive that line crossed by only a million of mathemati- 
cal lines — for we shall be moderate with our number. Does that en- 
able us to consider, in the smallest line we can draw, a million of dif- 
ferent, distinct parts % If not, does the interposition of any number of 
mathematical lines go any way to help us to consider partially, in in- 
finitvm, the least extension Ave can draw \ We might prosecute, with 
some advantage too, the hint, which we have thus dropt, but having 
opened up the road, we refrain from following it out. 



23-27.; XON-IXFINITE DIVISIBILITY. 



71 



cal demonstration that we can consider so much exten- 
sion partially, without ever halting with the diminutions, 
to ask this question, Is the pertinency of a geometrical 
W demonstration in the case to be admitted, without proof ? 

§ 24. To him who should happen to be presented with 
a demonstration of that nature, (we cannot help saying 
it,) we would suggest, that there is another question 
which he might advantageously ask himself; which is 
this, Admitting the pertinency of a demonstration of such 
a character, does not the thing demonstrated run counter 
to the testimony which my mind bears as to what it can 
do ? And if consciousness gives the lie to the conclusion to 
which the demonstrator reaches, what can his demon- 
stration be good for ? — But these are matters that lie 
entirely out of our way here. — > 

§ 25. — Much of what has here been urged in relation 
to a . mathematical demonstration of the possibility of 
partial considerations, infinitely, of so much extension, 
might be advanced concerning a mathematical demon- 
stration of the possibility of mental divisions, and indeed 
of divisions simply, of extension, in infinitum. — 

§ 26. — IT. We come now to the consideration, and the 
proof, of the first of the two propositions, the proposition 
which asserts, that matter is not divisible to infinity. 

§ 27- There are two great arguments which are con- 
stantly employed, when the opinion of those who deny the 
infinite divisibility of matter, is attempted to be reduced 
to an absurdity, or a contradiction. And as those argu- 
ments may rightly be pronounced the chief causes of the 
prevalence of the doctrine maintaining the infinite divi- 
sibility of matter ; if we can succeed in entirely breaking 
their force^ or rather in exposing their want of all force, 
we shall be paving the way for a cordial reception to a 
doctrine of an opposite description. To bring into com- 
plete discredit what has been mainly relied on as giving 



72 



NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. [Part III. 



support to the sentiment we dissent from, is by no means 
to attain to the position we would reach, but it is to re- 
move an obstruction lying in the way. 

§ 28. We shall make the distinguished author of the *M| 
Letters to a German Princess furnish us with that exhi- 
bition of the arguments referred to on which we shall 
comment. The mode of stating those arguments may be 
a little different when it is another than Enter who brings 
them forward, but we may always recognise the pith of 
the arguments under any covering. 

§ 29. But ere we encounter the two arguments as ex- 
hibited by Euler, it is necessary to admit, there are suf- 
ficient grounds for thinking, that this writer, when he 
uses the words which shall all before long be quoted, sup- 
poses that he is treating concerning that extension the 
divisibility of which to infinity he had demonstrated (in 
such a way as we have seen). For those words imme- 
diately succeed to the demonstration, in which he was 
busied about geometrical extension ; and in the letter 
which follows the one containing the demonstration, he 
expressly considers " whether this divisibility in infinitum'"* 
(such divisibility as geometrical extension was demonstrated 
to have) " takes place in existing bodies existing, for 
Euler held the strange, the monstrous opinion, 44 that 
' 4 simple extension, as considered in geometry, can have 
" no real existence" it being " merely a chimerical object, 
" formed by abstraction.'' Let. ix. True, when we com- 
pare this with what is subsequently advanced, that " as 
44 geometry is, beyond contradiction, one of the most use- 
" ful of sciences, its object cannot possibly be amerechime- 
" ra ;" that " there is a necessity, then, of admitting, that 
" the object of geometry is at least the same apparent ex- 
44 tension which those philosophers allow to body." Let. x. 
He is alluding to the monadists ; who, it seems, gave to 
body no more than a quasi, or as-it-were extension, af- 



§§ 28, 29.: 



NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. 



73 



firming that bodies are not extended, but have only an 
appearance of extension. When, I say, we compare the 
assertions together, we find ourselves at a loss what to 
make of Euler. The one declaration seems to contradict 
the other. First, that extension which is the object of 
geometry has no real existence ; it is a mere chimera. 
Next, the object of geometry cannot possibly be a mere 
chimera ; the object being at least the same extension 
which the monadists allowed to body. It is a pity that 
the author of the Letters should have left us under the 
necessity of groping, in so much darkness, for his real 
opinion : his words (we say not his sentiments) contra- 
dicting each other. But when we have pondered the mat- 
ter a good while, and considered the thing on all sides, 
we begin to perceive that probably Euler s opinion at bot- 
tom was this : — The object of geometry can have no real 
existence as a separate entity : The notion of it is gotten 
by abstraction, and in this sense it is a chimerical, or a 
slwdowy object : But tho 1 the object of geometry exists 
not separately, it has a true existence, as true an exist- 
ence as the extension of body, which undoubtedly exists, 
tho' it exists not by itself. This statement concerning 
what Euler s sentiments at bottom were, derives strength, 
or perhaps it becomes certain, when we consider other 
passages which are to be found in the Letters. " All ge- 
" ncral notions are as much abstract beings as geometrical 
" extension." " Extension is undoubtedly a general idea, 
n formed in the same manner as that of man, or of tree 
" in general, by abstraction ; and as man or tree in ge- 
" neral exists not, no more does extension in general ex- 
u ist. You are perfectly sensible, that individual be- 
" ings alone exist, and that general notions are to be 
" found only in the mind." Letters vii. & ix. General no- 
tions, if we would speak with modern propriety, should not 
be designated abstract beings, nor beings of any kind. They 



74 



NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. 



[Part III. 



have being, but they are not beings. To have being, and 
to be a being, are by no means identical. All states or 
operations, all modes or qualities, have being, but not- 
withstanding, none of them constitutes a being, t — Exten- 
sion is not undoubtedly a general idea, nor is it an idea at 
all. Of extension undoubtedly, we have an idea ; whe- 
ther the idea be a general idea, or not. But the idea, 
and that about which the idea is employed, the extension 
to-wit, are very different. — I cannot be even so much as 
positive that we have the idea of man, or of tree in gene- 
ral. How then can I be positive how the idea is formed ? 
— Though extension in general exists not externally, still 
extension exists externally. — I am certain, not only that 
" general notions" are only in the mind, but that what 
Eider (Let. vii.) and others call " individual notions" are 
to be found nowhere else. — These remarks, in connection 
with the citations last made, appeared to be necessary, 
before saying, as we now say, that to Enters sentiments 
as we have explained them, his own words enforcing the 
explanation, we can give our most cordial assent. The 
object of geometry is an object having a real existence. 
The object is extension. But mere extension cannot 
exist separately. } The object of geometry is, then, only 
a mode. These are exactly our sentiments. — To return 

t It must be conceded, that some of the older authors were accus- 
tomed to apply, on certain occasions, the term being to a mode or pro- 
perty, as well as to a substance. Dr Watts and Br Berkeley may be 
given as instances. Vide Part XI., §§ 33, 35, et % 39, not. t Yet 
" few writers," the first (not in consequence) of these Doctors is con- 
strained to admit, " allow mode to be called a being in the same per- 
" feet sense as a substance is." Loyic, Part I. ch. ii. sect. 1. A sub- 
stance is a being : But to say that a mode is a being, is about all one 
with saying that a mode is a — substance, or a — something more than 
a mode. 

I "To me nothing seems more absurd, than that there should 
" be extension without anything extended." Br Reid's Essays, Es- 



NON INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. 



75 



from this digression, which will not be without its use : 
Though it is supposed by Euler, that in the words 
about to be quoted, he is treating of the extension the 
divisibility of which to infinity he had demonstrated, 
still he is to be held as speaking rather of the extension 
of bodies, i. e. of matter. The words in which he ex- 
presses himself in the passages to be cited, refer far more 
naturally and properly to the extension of bodies than to 
that of space. For instance : To speak of " particles 
attained by dividing a thing, and of the " division of an 
inch", surely savours much more of what relates to matter 
than of what relates to pure expansion. And true it is 
that Eider's passing continuously from the extension of 
space to the extension of matter, without remarking any 
transition, will not appear at all so wonderful when we 
consider, that at times he expressly confounds the two 
kinds of extension. For example, he says : " The object 
u of geometry is at least the same apparent extension which 
; ' those philosophers," the monadists, " allow to body." Tit 
supra. — We said, he confounds the two species of exten- 
sion at times. For on other occasions he speaks thus : 
" The object of geometry, therefore, is a notion" — The 
object of geometry is not a notion. The object of geo- 
metry is space. Fide su/jra § 18. We have a notion of 
the object of geometry, but space is not a notion — 
" The object of geometry, therefore, is a notion much 
" more general than that of body, as it comprehends not 
" only bodies, but all beings simply extended without im- 
" penetrability, if any such there be." Let. vii. — The 
author of the Letters, we repeat, sometimes quite con- 
founds the two species of extension. And therefore when, 

say II. ch. xix. Reid is speaking of extension, having matter in his 
eye. But it may be demanded : Out of matter, as well as in it, can 
bare extension exist without any thing extended? 



76 



NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. 



[Part III. 



on an occasion, he is dealing with the one species, he may 
well think he is also dealing with the other. But tho" 1 
Euler has confounded the extension of matter with that 
of space, there is no good reason why we should imitate 
his example. 

§ 30. But even though Euler 1 s words be held as being 
properly applicable to the simple extension of geometry ; 
what matters it ? 'Tis not of the least consequence to 
us on what principle they ought, as they stand in the 
Letters, to be construed. If they apply to the extension 
of space more naturally than to that of matter, all that 
our readers have to do, is to consider them in the light 
in which we have represented them. When set in that 
light, they contain the marrow of the two arguments 
which are so much relied on by Natural Philosophers, on 
behalf of their favourite dogma of the infinite divisibility 
of matter. And it is with these arguments that our bu- 
siness lies. 

§ 31. First argument. " Whoever is disposed to deny 
" this property of extension," (matter,) — the property 
denominated, divisibility in infinitum — " is under the ne- 
" cessity of maintaining, that it is possible to arrive at 
" last at parts so minute as to be unsusceptible of any 
" farther division, because they ceased to have any extension. 
" Nevertheless all these particles taken together must re- 
" produce the whole, by the division of which you ac- 
" quired them ; and as the quantity of each would be a 
" nothing or cypher 0, a combination of cyphers would 
" produce quantity, which is manifestly absurd. For you 
" know perfectly well, that in arithmetic, two or more 
" cyphers joined never produce any thing. 

§ 32. " This opinion that in the division of extension, 
" or of any quantity whatever, we may come at last to 
"particles so minute as to be no longer divisible, because 



§§ 30-35.] 



NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. 



77 



" they are so small, or' 1 (which is far from being the same 
thing) " because quantity no longer exists, is, therefore, a 
" position absolutely untenable." Let. viii. 

§ 33. I am " disposed to deny" the infinite divisibility 
of matter, and am " under the necessity of maintaining. 
" that it is possible to arrive at last at parts so minute 
" as to be unsusceptible of any farther division " that 
44 * * we may come at last to particles so minute as 
" to be no longer divisible f but I do not allow this is, 
" because they ceased to have any extension," " or because 
" quantity no longer exists." Those who deny the in- 
finite divisibility of matter, are under no necessity of 
assigning any such reason for their doctrine. Eider, for 
those whose sentiments he would represent, and does mis- 
represent, covertly assumes, that what is not extended is 
not divisible. For the causal proposition, Certain par- 
ticles are unsusceptible of division, because they have not 
any extension ; involves the principle, that what has no 
extension is not divisible. Which principle is indeed to 
be admitted. But though we admit the principle, we 
cannot allow that it is at all applicable in this case : We 
cannot grant, that the reason why the minute particles 
are no longer divisible is because they have no quantity. 
In other words, we admit the truth of the major, we deny 
the truth of the minor premiss, of the syllogism : W e 
deny, that certain particles have not any extension. 

§ 34. It is to be granted, we repeat, that what has no 
extension is not divisible. And for this simple reason ; 
what has no extension is nothing. 

§ 35. On this subject we shall cite a passage from the 
M Introduction" to the " Argument." We have nothing 
better to say now. " Can there be conceived a greater 
t; absurdity than the assertion, that a substance, cogita- 
'* tive or incogitative, * * * may be without any fex- 
" tension whatsoever ? To believe this indeed defies hu- 

F 



78 



NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. 



[Part III. 



" man nature. If reason can, with certainty, pronounce 
" any thing, it may pronounce this decision, that exten- 
44 sion and existence are so necessary to each other, that 
" there can be no existence without extension. Talk of 
" a substance which has no extension : you present us 
44 with words of amusement. 

§ 36. 44 If there be a subject on which authority should 
"be of weight, such a subject, 'tis plain, is the debate, 
44 whether we must conceive, that to deny extension is to 
4 4 deny existence. And, 'tis well, that in behalf of the 
"' position, that existence cannot be without extension, 
" there are two as great authorities, in speculations of 
44 this nature, as can any where be found. 

§ 37. " ' Perhaps, * * *' (says Mr Locke,) 4 it is 
4: 4 near as hard to conceive any existence, or to have an 
44 4 idea of any real being, with a perfect negation of all 
44 4 manner of expansion ; as it is to have the idea of anfi 
e< 4 real existence, with a perfect negation of all manner 
44 4 of duration. 1 Essay concerning Human Understand- 
44 ing, B. II. ch. xv. § 11. And to have the idea of any 
44 real existence with a perfect negation of all manner of 
44 duration is, surely, impossible. 

§ 38. 44 The Cartesians make mind and matter to be 
4: different in their essence ; and make extension (the 
44 correction of Des Cartes' 's opinion is, solid extension, t) 
44 to be the essence of matter : Consequently, with them, 
44 a thinking substance cannot be extended. Mr Locke 
44 wrote at a time when these Cartesian opinions were 
44 generally received. But yet, (we see,) he held, that, 
44 without extension, it is impossible to conceive exist- 
44 ence. ,, 

§ 39. We shall here introduce a sentence from a dif- 
ferent part of Mr Lockers work. 44 He that considers 

t " This correction is by Dr Isaac Watts. See Philosophical Essays/' 
Note in " Introduction." 



$9 36-42.1 



NOX INFINITE DIVISIBILITY- 



79 



44 how hardly sensation is, in our thoughts, reconcileable to 
" extended matter ; or existence to any thing that hath no 
44 extension at all. will confess, that he is very Tar from 
44 certainly knowing what his soul is. * * * On which 
44 side soever he views it, either as an unextended sub- 
44 stance, or as a thinking extended matter ; the difficulty 
44 to conceive either, will, whilst either alone is in his 
44 thoughts, still drive him to the contrary side." B. IV. 
ch. iii. § 6. 

§ 40. (Ought not the difficulties attending the hypo- 
thesis of unextended substance, or of thinking matter, 
have driven Mr Locke, not from the one side to the other, 
from Scylla to Charibdis, alternately, but to a third hypo- 
thesis attended with no apparent inconvenience ? The 
difficulties attending either of those hypotheses — difficul- 
ties, do we call them ? the utter absurdities rather. Sure 
we are, that there is no proper difficulty at all accom- 
panying the opinion of unextended substance ; for no 
man can possibly conceive such a thing. And if the 
thing cannot be, it cannot have any consequences. Ought 
not the impossibility of believing either of those hypo- 
theses, have made the author of the Essay concerning 
Human Understanding to renounce both, and come over 
to the doctrine, that the soul, being really a substance, is 
extended, and, being a thinking substance, is immaterial ?) 
We return to our 44 Introduction." 

§ 41. 44 4 Extension does not belong to thought,'' (these 
44 are the words of Dr Samuel Clarke^ 4 because thought 
4 4 4 is not a Being ; But there is need of extension to the 
4 4 4 existence of every Being, to a Being which has or has 
•'' 4 not thought, or any other quality whatsoever.' Se- 
44 cond letter to Joseph Butler, afterwards Bishop of 
44 Durham. 

§ 42. 44 'Tis true, that in these words, Dr Clarke does 
44 not say, that he cannot conceive the existence of a Being 



80 



I^ON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. [Part III 



" without extension, but that, 'tis certain, is what he 
" means." Division III. 

§ 43. To these authorities, but for one reason, I might 
add another ; the authority of Euler himself. In the 
passage last quoted from the " Letters," he assumes that 
to be unextended is to be nothing. His words are : 
" The quantity of each," to-wit, of the " particles," 
" would be a nothing" Why ? " They ceased to have 
" any extension." With Euler, then, to cease to have 
any extension, is to cease to be any thing, is to become 
nothing. 

§ 44. The reason why we cannot safely add Euler to 
those authorities is this : Though in that passage, as well 
as in many other passages, he reasons as if to be unex- 
tended were to be nothing, or have no existence, still in 
other places, he speaks of real existencies on which he 
bestows not the attribute of extension. To give just one 
instance : " Monads" says he, " having no extension, must 
" be considered as points in geometry, or as we represent 
" to ourselves spirits and souls." Let. xiv. In spite of 
all that the panegyrists of Eider have ever said, he is, on 
many occasions, any thing but a consistent reasoner, he 
is, too often, guilty of consequentially contradicting his 
own positions. But there is an excuse for him in the 
present affair. When he reasons as if there can be no 
existence without extension, he is off his guard. But 
when he talks of substances which have no extension, he 
is in a situation which must prove dangerous to a weak 
reasoner, he is a partisan of a favourite hypothesis, the 
foolish, the absurd, hypothesis of unextended spirit. 

§ 45. What has no extension, then, is nothing. And 
nothing cannot be divisible. So, what is unextended 
cannot be divisible. 

§ 46. When Euler gives as the reason why the minute 
particles are no longer divisible, the position, The parti- 



§§ 43-49.: 



NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. 



81 



cles have no extension ; he may be giving what the fol- 
lowers of the famous Leibnitz, in particular his distin- 
guished disciple Wolff, the partizans of unextended 
monads, (things which made so much noise in their day.) 
gave as the reason why the minute parts of bodies are 
unsusceptible of division beyond a certain point ; but he 
is very far from giving the reason why any rational sup- 
porter of the doctrine of ultimate particles holds, that 
bodies are not divisible in infinitum. 

§ 47. To speak of dividing extension into two non-ex- 
tensions, that is, something into two nothings, is to mount 
to the highest pinnacle of absurdity. And it is precisely 
for this reason we deny, that the minute parts which we 
contend are no longer divisible, have ceased to have any 
extension. We cannot, then, by any process of division 
arrive at last at particles that have ceased to have any 
extension. And if we cannot arrive at them, if, in other 
words, they cannot exist, they cannot be unsusceptible, 
anymore than they can be susceptible, of division. Upon 
the whole, the absence of extension can never be the 
reason why any particles are no longer divisible. 

§ 48. Agreeing with Eider, we grant it is " manifestly 
absurd" to suppose, that a combination of nothings can 
produce something, or that a combination of non-exten- 
sion with non-extension can produce extension. And this 
is just the reason, only viewed from a station different 
from that which it was viewed from before, why the mi- 
nute particles which with us are unsusceptible of farther 
division are not altogether unextended. 

§ 49. In fine, to be indivisible and to be unextended, 
are not admitted to be necessarily convertible. Every 
thing unextended is, for that reason, indivisible. But 
every thing indivisible is not therefore unextended : At 
least this has not yet been shewn. And it has not been 



82 



NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. [Part III. 



proved, that there is any other reason why every thing 
indivisible is unextended. 

§ 50. No doubt, the advocates of the doctrine of the 
infinite divisibility of body, are in the habit of taking for 
granted, that what admits of no farther division has no 
extension. " Let us suppose," says Eider, " a line of an 
" inch long, divided into a thousand parts, and that these 
" parts are so small as to admit of no farther division ; 
" each part, then, would no longer have any length, /or" 
[the proof is just the thing to be proved, in a different 
expression,] " if it had any, it would be still divisible" 
Let. viii. What is indivisible is unextended. Why \ 
Because, whatever is extended is divisible. But this is 
exactly equivalent to the point that was to be proved. 
And how is this, in its turn, to be proved \ Because, 
what is indivisible is unextended. And this is the con- 
venient circle in which the advocates of that doctrine go 
round. They reduce indivisibility to unextendedness, 
and prove unextendedness by indivisibility. That, then, 
which they are in the habit of assuming, to-wit, that no- 
thing can admit of no farther division but what has no 
extension, we must deny their right to assume, till they 
produce a better title to the right than they do when 
they take for granted a thing precisely equivalent to the 
point to be proved. 

§ 51. But in discussing the proof given of the assump- 
tion, that what is indivisible must be without extension, 
we have been betrayed into something like an anticipa- 
tion of the consideration of the second argument : which 
is the following. " Finally" says the author of the Let- 
ters, " however far you may have already carried, in 
a imagination, the division of &ninch, it is always possible 
<c to carry it still farther ; and never will you be able to 
" carry on your subdivision so far, as that the last parts 



§§ SMB.] 



XOX -INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. 



•• shall be absolutely indivisible These parts will un- 
i; doubtedlv always become smaller, and their magnitude 
" will approach nearer and nearer to 0, but can never 
" reach it." Let. viii. 

§ 52. The former argument consisted of the assignation 
of a false ground for the doctrine of ultimate particles : 
(Xon causa pro causa.) This is composed of an entire 
begging of the question : ( Petitio principii. ) The thing 
in debate is, whether is the division always capable of 
being carried farther : And this argument says : " It is 
alleys possible to carry it still farther." The question 
under discussion is, ichether do the parts always become 
smaller • And this argument declares : 44 These parts 
will undoubtedly always become smaller." This argument, 
then, takes entirely for granted, the thing that was to be 
proved. 

§ 53. We shall indulge ourselves so far as to give, in 
addition to Eider s exhibition of this argument, the vulgar 
method of stating it. The man of Natural Science usually 
speaks after this manner : " Certainly every portion of 
* ; matter, however minute, must have two surfaces at least, 
• : and then * * it follows of course that it is divisible ; 

that is, the upper and lower surfaces may be separated." 
Rer. J. Joyce's Scientific Dialogues, p. 5. So convincing 
is this reasoning esteemed, it is all that is said on the 
subject ; so plain is it held, it is the pupil, and not the 
preceptor, who falls in with it. The question for resolu- 
tion is, has every portion of matter, surfaces that are di- 
visible \ The resolution is : To have surfaces does imply 
being divisible. The question is, has every particle an 
upper and an under surface separable from each other I 
The resolution says : To have an upper and an under 
surface does imply having separable surfaces. Why, the 
resolutions do no more than bare-facedly assume the very 
positions which the opponent of the dogma of infinite di- 



84 



NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. 



[Part III. 



visibility would ask proof for. The best that can be said 
on behalf of that sort of argument which begs the ques- 
tion is, that it is at hand in every case, and therefore 
can never be utterly overcome, as 

When a battle's won, 
The war's as far from being done.t 

§ 54. Having thus removed an obstruction that lay be- 
tween us and the position we would reach ; an obstruction 
which, indeed, we might have made a circuit round, or 
have stepped over, but still an obstruction ; we shall 
evince, that as by the two arguments which have been 
considered, it has not been proved that in dividing a body 
we may proceed in infinitum, so it will never be proved 
that we can go on to infinity, a satisfactory proof of the 
contrary being to be had. 

§ 55. The question, Is matter, to-wit, any particular 
piece of matter our thoughts may be occupied about, di- 
visible to infinity ? may be more conveniently, not to say 
more properly, stated in another way : Can we divide any 
particular particle without coming to any point in our 
divisions and subdivisions where we must stop ? Which 
question may be divided into two branches. The question 
which the first of the two composes is this : In dividing 
any particle by a real process, is it true that we can carry 
on the process without ever arriving at any point beyond 
which it is impossible for us to go ? The second question 
is the following : If there be indeed a limit past which 
we cannot perceive any division of a body, cannot we con- 
ceive, at any rate, the divisions and subdivisions to go on, 
without our coming to any termination in the business ? 

§ 56. The answers which are to be given to those ques- 
tions will determine the controversy, whether matter is 
infinitely divisible. We have seen that philosophers have 
made the attempt to determine it otherwise than by ap- 

t Hudibras. Part III. Canto iii. 



I \ 

§§ XON INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. 85 

pealing to what may be really perceived, or at most ima- 
gined, — in other words, otherwise than by appealing to 
facts and experience. But such an attempt is vain in 
the extreme. If it be not competent to the senses, or at 
least to the imagination, to decide the controversy, then 
the decision of it falls under the cognizance of no tribunal 
that we know of. The topic, without doubt, is to be dis- 
cussed on no very abstract grounds, if we are to discuss 
it with any properly founded hopes of bringing it to a de- 
terminate conclusion. 

§ 57- Now as far as the topic is to be decided on by 
an appeal to observation, there will be very little difficulty 
in the case. We may boldly pronounce, without fear of 
any contradiction, that no one ever perceived the division 
of any piece of matter carried beyond a certain point. 
Our senses conduct us to fixed limits in our divisions and 
jfe subdivisions. Observation, then, so far as it goes, does 
the very contrary to establishing the doctrine of the in- 
finite divisibility of matter. 

§ 58. For the sake of those who are disposed to be 
more moved by authorities, than by any appeal to facts, 
we adduce the following testimonies. 

. § 59. " There is a limit beyond which we cannot per- 
" ceive any division of a body. The parts become too 
" small to be perceived by our senses." Reitfs Essays. 
Essay II. ch. xix. 

§ 60. " We must allow that there are physical points, 
" that is, parts of extension, which cannot be divided or 
" lessened, either by the eye or" — &c. Hume's Inquiry 
concerning Human Understanding. Sect. XII. Part ii. 
Note. 

§ 61. "In speaking of the divisibility of body, we must 
" carefully distinguish what is in our power, from what 
" is possible in itself. In the first sense, it cannot be cle- 
" nied, that such a division of body as we are capable of, 

G 



86 



NON INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. 



iPart III. 



" must be very limited. ^ — " After having, for example, 
:i divided an inch into a thousand parts, these parts are 
" so small as to escape our senses, and a farther division 
" would to us, no doubt, be impossible." Eider s Letters. 
Vol. II. Let. xi. & viii. 

§ 62. The first question, thus, falls to be answered in 
the negative. In really dividing any particle of matter, 
we are unable to go on with the process past a certain 
stage. 

§ 63. But though there is a limit beyond which we can- 
not perceive any division, can we not, at all events, con- 
ceive of divisions and subdivisions without end I We 
shall make Mr Hume's words answer this interrogatory 
for us. 

§64. " The imagination * * may raise up to itself 
" an idea, of which it cannot conceive any subdivision, 
" and which cannot be diminished without a total anni- 
" hilation. When you tell me of the thousandth and ten 
" thousandth part of a grain of sand, I have a distinct 
" idea of these numbers and of their different proportions ; 
" but the images which I form in my mind to represent 
" the things themselves, are nothing different from each 
" other, nor inferior to that image, by which I represent 
" the grain of sand itself, which is supposed so vastly to 
" exceed them.-f* * * * Whatever we may imagine 
" of the thing, the idea of a grain of sand is not distin- 
" guishable * * into twenty, much less into a thou- 
" sand, ten thousand, or an infinite number of different 

t We may have distinct enough, or it may be confused enough, 
ideas of any two or more numbers, or sets of numbers, and of their re- 
lative proportions; say, of ten, as standing for the parts of an inch, and 
of the 1,000,000th, and 1,000,000,000,000th parts of the 10th of an inch. 
And is not the mistaking these ideas for the ideas of something per- 
taining to an actual inch, a wide cause of the vain supposition, that 
we can frame images of real things as minute as the millionth and 
billionth part of the tenth of an inch % 



§§ 62-65.] 



NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. 



87 



" ideas." — " 'Tis therefore certain, that the imagination 
" reaches a minimum.'''' Treatise of Human Nature. B. I. 
Part ii. Sect. 14 

§ 65. 'Tis true, that there are equally strong assertions 
on the other side of the question. And were the asser- 
tions simply given, were a direct appeal made to con- 
sciousness for the truth, we should be obliged to admit, 
there were no alternative for it but to let each one declare 
himself for that side of the question he beforehand 
was inclined to adopt. Even, however, in the case con- 
templated, one view only of the matter (be this remem- 
bered) could be just. But there is this difference between 
the opposing assertions. Whatever Mr Hume may have 
done in other places, whatever inconsistency he may be 
guilty of in the affair ; the words we have but now cited 
from the " Treatise," and we in making them the vehi- 

\ In quoting from the " Treatise of Human Nature," a few remarks 
are necessary. That work was the first of Hume's publications. In 
the Advertisement prefixed to the " Inquiry concerning Human Un- 
derstanding," the Sceptic says : " Most of the principles and reason- 
f ings contained in this volume were published in a work in three 
" volumes, called A Treatise of Human Nature. * * * * He 
u (the author) cast the whole anew in the following pieces ; where 
" some negligences in his former reasoning, and more in the expression, 
" are, he hopes, corrected. * * * * * Henceforth the Author 
" desires, that the following Pieces may alone be regarded as contain- 
" ing his philosophical sentiments and principles." Ilume^himscU', 
thus, disowned the reasonings of the " Treatise." No one need con- 
demn what is repudiated by its author. To do so, were to challenge 
an enemy who confesses himself already vanquished. But should I 
be pleased with a particular passage in the " Treatise," what harm 
can there be in citing it, to convey my sentiments 1 Sometimes there's 
no great necessity for speaking for ourselves when words that are at 
our hand express exactly what we have to say. What a certain wri- 
ter says of minutes, is much truer with regard to sentences. "A writer 
" often does more good by shewing the use of some of those many 
" volumes which we have already, than by offering new ones ; though 
" this be of much less advantage to his own character." Law's Pre- 
face to King's Origin of Evil. 



88 



NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. 



[Part III. 



cles of what we had to convey, do simply appeal to what 
consciousness testifies on the subject ; and we are content 
to leave the matter there, without seeking to go any far - 
ther : While those who range themselves on the opposite 
side do not lay down their position as any thing like self- 
evident. They do not say, we can conceive divisions and 
subdivisions without end, and this fact is decisive of the 
point at issue. But they offer proof why we must he able 
to conceive the thing : Which is a very different matter. 
Could they think, that their position needed no evidence 
to support it, when they set out in search of proof % And 
if their position needed proof, it cannot altogether be a 
fact testified immediately by consciousness. The plain 
testimony of consciousness, as to what falls within its pro- 
per province, is the strongest and the most direct, as well 
as the most easily reached evidence we can have. 

§ 66. To refer to Euler. When he said : " However 
" far you may have already carried, in imagination, the 
" division of an inch, it is always possible to carry it still 
" farther ; and never wjjl you be able to carry on your 
" subdivision so far, as that the last parts shall be abso- 
" lutely indivisible," &c. vide supra, § 51. When he said 
that, was he contented with the evidence to be had in- 
tuitively of the proposition which he brought forward ? 
Not toinsist on this, that he gives elsewhere, as we have 
seen, (vide supra, § 31. etS2.) a detailed argument to 
prove, that it must be always possible for us to carry the 
division forward, or on any consideration of that nature ; 
the author of the Letters produces you an especial rea- 
son, when he thinks the proper time is come, to shew that 
by the imagination " the division of an inch" may always 
be carried still farther. " After having, for example, 
" divided an inch into a thousand parts, * * * * 
" you have only," says he, " to look at this thousandth 
" part of an inch through a good microscope, which mag- 



§§ 66-68.] 



NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. 



89 



; ' nifies, for example, a thousand times, and each particle 
" will appear as large as an inch" [does] " to the naked 
" eye ; and you will be convinced of the possibility of 
• ; dividing each of these particles again into a thousand 
4£ parts : the same reasoning may always be carried for- 
" ward, without limit and without end." Letter viii. 

§ 67- We have little or nothing to do with Eider's 
proof, that the imagination shall never be able to carry 
on its subdivisions so far, as that the last parts shall be 
absolutely indivisible. Our attention just now is engaged 
with something else. It is only with the fact of there 
being a proof that our present business lies. Neverthe- 
less, we shall say one word upon the proof, in passing. 

§ 68. The reason why the imagination can always carry 
still farther than it has yet done, the division of an inch, 
is that a microscope which magnifies a thousand times 
will make the thousandth part of an inch appear as large 
as an inch does to the naked eye. The microscope, with 
Eider, enlarges our imaginative powers. But, in reality, 
the microscope only enlarges the rays of light that flow 
from each particle. It is not the rays, it is the rays di- 
lated, that we see by the aid of the microscope. Does 
the microscope make the thousandth part of an inch to 
be an inch ? As the microscope is, beyond contradiction, 
one of the mo.-t useful of curious instruments, it is not 
the cause of so amazing an absurdity, as the making of 
an inch out of the thousandth part of one. That instru- 
ment by no means enables us to perceive a less extension 
than we can see by the naked eye. It does not destroy, 
it does not at all affect, the minuteness of any particular 
extension. To spread a ray of light out to a greater ex- 
tent than the ray filled according to our unassisted powers 
of vision ; to make a thousandth part of an inch look as 
if it were an inch ; is very far from making the least 
perceivable extension to be more extended than it was 



90 



NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. 



[Part III. 



perceived to be : The possibility of so spreading out a 
ray of light, is the farthest thing possible from being a 
datum by help of which any natural philosopher can make 
out, that we can conceive the divisibility of matter in 
infinitum. In conceiving the division of the rays of light 
flowing from the thousandth part of an inch, as seen 
through a microscope the magnifying power of which is 
a thousand times, we are, after all, only conceiving the 
division of an inch of extension. 

§ 69. We shall next refer to the procedure of another 
author who declares himself an advocate for the doctrine 
o*f infinite divisibility. " The parts," these are Dr BeicTs 
words, become too small to be perceived by our senses ; 
" but we cannot believe that it [the body] becomes then 
" incapable of being farther divided, or that such division 
" would make it not to be a body. 

§ 70. " We carry on the division and subdivision in 
" our thought far beyond the reach of our senses, and we 
" can find no end to it : Nay, I think we plainly discern, 
" that there can be no limit beyond which the division 
" cannot be carried. 

§71. " For if there be any limit to this division, one 
" of two things must necessarily happen : Either we have 
ki come by division to a body which is extended, but has 
" no parts, and is absolutely indivisible ; or this body is 
" divisible, but as soon as it is divided, it becomes no 
" body. Both these positions seem to me absurd, and 
" one or the other is the necessary consequence of sup- 
" posing a limit to the divisibility of matter." Dr ReicTs 
Essays. Essay II. ch. xix. 

§ 72. We may just notice, in our way, that the first of 
the two alternatives, namely, that we come to a body 
extended but indivisible, is no consequence whatever of 
the doctrine, that in dividing any body we may come to 
bodies extended but indivisible. This alternative is the 



69-74.] 



NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. 



91 



doctrine itself : And he who puts it, does little else than 
say, If there be any limit to the division of a body, there 
is a limit to the division of a body- As for the other al- 
ternative, namely, that by dividing a certain body, the 
body becomes no body, whether or not it be any conse- 
quence of the doctrine, that in dividing a body we may 
arrive at indivisible bodies 'it must be granted to be quite 
as absurd as it appeared in Dr ReicFs eyes. ReioVs se- 
cond alternative is just tantamount to Enter s first argu- 
ment. Vide supra, § 31. 

§ 73. " We carry on," says the Doctor, " the division 
<; and subdivision in our thought far beyond the reach of 
" our senses, and we can find no end to it" Well, (/"con- 
sciousness say so, should not the matter be allowed to 
rest there \ Certainly : otherwise there would be a ne- 
cessity for a proof, that the thing which consciousness 
testifies is, must be. But is the matter allowed to rest 
there, in token of consciousness saying so ? By no means. 
44 Nay," continues the Doctor, " I think we plainly dis- 
" cern, there can be no limit beyond which the division 
" cannot be carried. " And then follows the proof. From 
all which, you see how ill satisfied the Doctor was with 
the unsupported testimony of consciousness, if conscious- 
ness said, we caffi find no end to the division and subdi- 
vision : Although Consciousness was, as all know, a great 
favourite with him, it being exalted in his system of 
mental philosophy to the rank and dignity of a separate 
and original power of the mind. So, he did not intend, 
am more than Euler did, to appeal to Consciousness for 
a favourable answer to the question, Can we divide and 
subdivide in our thoughts, without finding any end, k ' in 
" wandering mazes lost V'"f 

§ 74. There was, indeed, this reason for giving a proof 
why it is necessary that in our thoughts we find no end 

t Milton. 



92 



NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. [Part III. 



to the division and subdivision, — that, in point of fact, in 
our thoughts we can find, can shortly find, an end to the 
division and subdivision. 

§ 75. And, of a truth, if it had not been for the reason 
of the absence of an end to the divisions, we should never 
have heard of the absence itself o£ an end. (On this ac- 
count it was that we entered on the two arguments com- 
monly employed in behalf of the dogma we have opposed.) 
Had it not been, we say, for the must be, the is had neyer 
reached our ears. For every one has it in his power to 
satisfy himself, that in conceiving the division of a particle 
of matter, the imagination will ultimately reach an image 
which cannot be lessened, which to lessen would be to 
annihilate. 



* 



93 



i PART IV. 

THE " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, FOR THE BEING AND ATTRI- 
" BUTES OF GOD," AN IRREFRAGABLE DEMONSTRATION. 

§ 1. After so extensive an incursion into the territory 
of the Mathematician, and that of the Natural Philoso- 
pher ; to which we were invited by having had the dogma 
of infinite divisibility cast in our teeth ; we return with 
good will to the words of the " Refutation." We intro- 
duced, and have most fully answered, A ntitheos's question : 
' ; I would ask * how mathematicians" (natural philo- 
sophers) " have always regarded the smallest particle 
" of matter divisible to infinity V'f It is thus Antitheos 
follows up that question : " Do they ever contemplate 
" actual separation of parts in such cases 9" Ch. VI. par. 4. 
Most assuredly they do. In such a case as where Natural 
Philosophers are considering the division, or even but the 
divisibility. — whether to infinity, or to finity, is of no con- 
sequence, — of any piece of matter ; to a certainty, they 

t As our author seems to favour the doctrine affirming the infinite 
divisibility of matter, he should have stood aloof from the smallest 
particle of " matter," which, unfortunately for him, he has fallen in 
with. For what is the smallest particle of matter'? That which can- 
not be diminished, that which cannot be divided into smaller particles. 
But if, with such a one as Antitheos, any particle of matter is so small 
as that it cannot be diminished, or divided into smaller particles, if, 
in other words, there is a smallest particle ; is the divisibility of matter 
in infinitum, in no danger of disgrace % Yea, it runs imminent risk of 
being maltreated, past remedy, by its friends, and should cry out lustily, 
Murder! my advocates ar.e for putting me beyond the pale of existence. 



94 



" ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part IV. 



cast an eye on actual separation, or at all events capacity 
of actual separation, of parts. But how does our author 
reply to the question, Do mathematicians, or at least 
natural philosophers, contemplate actual separation, or 
rather capability of actual separation, of parts, when they 
are discussing the topic whether matter be divisible in 
infinitum? ' 4 No ;" says he boldly ; " but parts * * * 
" in the sense of partial consideration only" Now were 
a geometrician, or a man of natural science, who was in- 
structing a pupil in the sublime, as well as curious, doc- 
trine of the infinite divisibility of matter, proceeding to 
illustrate the first approaches to the infinity-)- by directing 
the pupil's attention to the divisibility of a New-York 
pippin into two ; where is the necessity of there being 
halves " in the sense of partial consideration only V 
What if the philosopher, to cut the knot for our atheist, 
(for he would have us believe it is a real Gordian one,) 
were to slice the apple through the middle, and present 
one-half to his pupil in order to being divided again, and 
eat the other himself? As Antitheos himself has said 
elsewhere, (whether with entire propriety or not, is an- 
other question — mole infra, § 7.) " If it be of any speci- 
"fic body we speak," a New-York pippin for instance, 
" we can, in reality, separate one part from another." 
(Ch. VII. par. 4.) What good reason, nay what specious 
reason, can be assigned why philosophers should not ever 
contemplate parts in any sense but the sense of partial 
consideration only, even parts in the sense of capability 
of actual separation, when they are regarding the divisi- 
bility, the infinite, or the finite, divisibility, of any piece 
of matter ? Is the piece of matter not capable of having 
its parts actually separated from each other ? Or are 
the philosophers obliged to choose to confine themselves 
to partial considerations which are not so much as mental 
t Vide Appendicem. 



g§ 1-3.; "ARGUMENT, A PRIORI? IRREFRAGABLE. 9,5 



divisions ? If this be so, whence the obligation I Let 
us know its source, that we may be put into a condition 
to see a little farther into so strange a thing. 

§ 2. In giving our author's reply to his question, se- 
veral words were omitted, as the asterisks denoted. 
' ; Parts — ," the passage runs in this way, " as Mr GU- 
" lespie himself has it — in the sense of partial considera- 
" tion only." When Mr Gillespie speaks of parts in the 
sense of partial consideration only, he has something in 
his view very different from the parts of matter, which 
all, so far as not already divided, are divisible, or may be 
conceived as divisible, from each other, which, therefore, 
are parts in another sense than by partial consideration 
only ; he has in his view the parts of the extension which 
is of infinity, which parts, both really and mentally, are 
necessarily indivisible, and, so, are parts only in the sense 
of partial considerations or apprehensions. Of this no 
one who has perused the " Argument" can be presumed 
ignorant, and therefore our antitheist must be supposed 
to have known of it well when he penned the words upon 
which we are animadverting. What judgment, then, are 
we to pass on Antitheoss mode of speaking : Is it calculated 
to convey a correct representation of matters ? In giving 
a misrepresentation of the case, can our atheist be reckon- 
ed perfectly honest ? 

§ 3. After replying to his own question, in his own 
way, A ntitheos puts another interrogatory. " When they,'' 
the antecedent is, mathematicians, "When they,'' ask he, 
speak of the hemispheres of the earth, divided either by 
the plane of the equator, or that passing from the me- 
" ridian of Greenwich to the 180th degree of longitude, — 
" are they necessarily guilty of speaking unintelligibly V 
By no means, answer we. But nevertheless, if mathe- 
maticians, geographers rather, speak of hemispheres of 
the earth, of hemispheres divided by an imaginary plane 



96 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part IV. 

which they denominate the equator, or by a plane passing 
through the first meridian and the 180th degree of lon- 
gitude, a plane every square foot of which is as ideal as 
any foot in the plane of the equator ; if, in other words, 
geographers employ the term divided in one, and that 
perhaps not the best, of its second intentions ,*t they can 
as readily, and quite as rationally, speak of their being 
able to conceive the earth as divided into two by a real 
process, of the earth as being divisible in the sense of ac- 
tual separability of parts. Geographers speak, we grant, 
of halves and divisions of the earth when they mean no 
more than considerations of so much of it to the exclu- 
sion of the rest, for the time. And geographers have 
a sufficient right to use, when they please, any word in 
a technical sense, in a sense of their own, if they but 
use the same word always in the same sense. This qua- 
lification is necessary for a good reason : To be consist- 
ent with regard to the language we employ, as it is a 
great, so it is an indispensable step towards being com- 
pletely intelligible. Geographers, we repeat, talk of di- 
visions, when they do not mean divisions strictly speak- 
ing ; but then they can also talk, to good purpose.it may 
be, of divisions in the proper sense of the term. 

§ 4. To render the distinction between geographical 
divisions and true and real divisions yet plainer, by a fa- 
miliar illustration. Let a plane, called, if you choose, a 
geographical plane, about six feet long and some two feet 
deep, and of no breadth, be passed through the middle of 
a living human body. And indeed — if this consideration 

t We would recommend to Antitheos's attention, first and last, (and 
our recommendation he may turn, if he likes, to some advantage, for 
the future,) a caution given by a very eminent Logician. " The ut- 
most care is requisite," in these words the present Archbishop of Dublin 
warns us, " to avoid confounding together, either the first and second 
" intentions, or the different second intentions with each other." See 
Whately's Elements of Logic. Book III. § 10. (Ed. 6th.) 



§§4-5.] " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. 97 

will enable one to transmit the plane more easily — ana- 
tomists and physiologists are accustomed to treat of the 
halves of the human frame, when they tell us that as a 
whole it is symmetrical, the one-half forming in the main 
a counterpart to the other. What if we were to desig- 
nate the transmission a dividing I Would he who was 
subjected to the act eat his next meal at all the worse 
for it I W ould he breathe less, or walk less, or sleep less ; 
Would any function be destroyed, or impaired in the 
smallest \ That gives us as an idea of the geographical 
mode of dividing. But were one to turn to division of 
the right sort, and threaten in good earnest to divide in 
a real manner a living man into halves ; the well-founded 
and salutary laws of the land would be apt to interfere, 
and shew how wide they regard the difference to be be- 
tween a merely geographical method of dividing any ob - 
long solid, and a mode of dividing, at least somewhat 
similar to that which, so far dozen, was practised by num- 
bers of our heavy-handed dragoons when they were last 
in the Netherlands. 

§ 5. Proper divisions, in short, are toto coslo different 
from geographical ones. Geographical divisions are in- 
deed partial considerations. But the grand distinction 
(let us not by any means lose sight of it) between geo- 
graphical partial considerations and our partial consider- 
ations of infinite extension, lies in this, that whereas we 
can make the ordinary subjects of the former kind of con- 
siderations undergo divisions in our thoughts after ano- 
ther sort than that effected by bare partial apprehension ; 
it is quite out of our power to subject the parts of that 
extension which is of infinity to any other divisions by the 
mind than such as we denote by partial apprehensions or 
considerations. It is with no propriety, as I have fre- 
quently observed, that we bestow the name of division 
upon a mere partial apprehension. 



98 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI;' IRREFRAGABLE. [Part IV. 



§ 6. If geographers are not guilty of speaking unin- 
telligibly when they say, that the equator divides the 
globe into the northern and southern hemispheres, &c, 
" How is it," demands our atheist, " that extension is ne- 
" cessarily indivisible V I really do not know. I never 
pretended to be able to tell why extension is necessarily 
indivisible. I never said even so much as that it was so. 
The " Argument" says no more than that " Infinity of 
" Extension is necessarily indivisible.' 1 And really one 
would think, that any extension, unless it compose part 
of the extension which is infinite, is divisible to all intents 
and purposes, so far from being necessarily indivisible. 
If the author of the " Refutation 1 ' should incline to urge, 
that by " extension 1 ' he meant infinity of extension, when 
he asked how it is that extension is necessarily indivisi- 
ble, then we would refer him, for an answer to his ques- 
tion, to Part II. § 27., and to his own comment on the 
proof there occurring, as the said comment is to be met 
in the 37th section of the same Part. Ad hose, infra 
§ 15. et seq. Nay, demonstration apart, is it not a truth 
immediately self-evident, that infinity of extension, or space, 
is necessarily indivisible ? Let Antitlieos answer this ques- 
tion. " I grant, 1 ' admits he, " that we may conceive of 
" an absolute separation,' 1 and therefore separability, " of 
" substance generally, which we cannot do in the case of 
" extension." Ch. VII. par. 4. Here by " extension 11 
he means infinity of extension, or space. Else, where the 
sense of the antithesis between " substance" and " exten- 
sion V Not to say that the context binds " extension' 1 
to that meaning. We might have allowed Mr Locke to 
reply to that question ; who, whenever he has informed 
us what division implies, lays it down as a truth intuitive- 
ly perceivable, not by deduction necessary, that pure space 
is indivisible even so much as in thought. Pure space, 
with him, is the extension distinct from the extension of 



§§ 6-8.] - ARGUMENT, A PBIORi; 9 IRREFRAGABLE. 99 



matter, is the extension which is of infinity. Vide Part. 
II. § 29. et § 41. 

§ 7. Antitheos proceeds : "It may be said, perhaps, 
" that although matter is, mentally, easy enough to di- 
vide" Doubtless one would think it is easy enough to 

divide matter mentally. But by the bye, we must not 
forget, that 'tis easy enough to divide much that falls un- 
der the description of matter otherwise than only by the 
mind. Our atheist has observed (as we noticed before :) 
" If it be of any specific body we speak, we can, in reality, 
" separate" or divide " one part from another." Now 
this is going even further than we feel disposed to .go. 
Is the Dog-star a specific body V It will probably be 
allowed by Antitheos that it is so, as no present ob- 
ject is to be attained by a denial, — at least, no object 
at all worth the cost of a shamefully obvious falsehood. 
Can we separate or divide one part of the Dog-star from 
another, in reality f Ah, no. Sirius is too distant, and 
too big, for us to split it into pieces. To sum up what we 
have advanced : If it be of any specific body we speak, we 
can in reality, or, if not in reality, at least in imagina- 
tion, divide the parts from each other. — But possibly, 
or probably, Antitheos, by 16 any specific body," meant any 
specific body upon this earth \ If so, — let him take out 
a patent for his discovery, that men " can, in reality" 
or by manual instrumentality, " separate one part from 
another." 

§ 8. Our author has often reasons for his forms of ex- 
pressions. And he happens to have an excellent reason 
for declaring, that it is easy enough to divide matter men- 
tally. The reason makes its appearance in a subsequent 
chapter. We may gather what it is from the following 
assertion. " That matter is divisible, (on a certain and 
" special construction of terms,) no one will deny ; but that 
" it is absolutely so, is not true/ 1 Ch. VII. Par. 4. What 



100 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part IV. 



that certain and special construction of the term divisible 
is, when we say with truth, matter is divisible, we may 
learn from words occurring in the same paragraph. " We 
" can divide substance," Antitheos informs us, " by ab- 
" straction that is, I humbly apprehend, by a partial 
consideration, which happens to be no true division at 
all. But we can do more than divide substance by ab- 
straction. For again : " We may conceive of an absolute 
" separation," and, a fortiori, separability or divisibility, 
" of substance generally" — (supra § 6.) Words which 
richly deserve to be weighed most attentively. With our 
antitlieist, substance and matter mutually exhaust each 
other, that not being admitted, by him, into the rank of sub- 
stance which is not material. What that certain and spe ■ 
cial construction is, we may learn also, may we not ? from 
the words which, in our regular progress, we are examin- 
ing — " Matter is, mentally, easy enough to divide." Accord- 
ing to our atheist, then, the reason why it is easy enough to 
divide matter mentally is, that it is difficult enough, in- 
deed altogether impossible — not for us only, but — for any 
power, or (if Antitheos would prefer another word) for any 
chance or accident, absolutely to divide matter, at least mat- 
ter " generally." And, in truth, it must be confessed, 
that the position, Matter " generally" is divisible only 
mentally, is a good consequence from the position, Matter 
u generally 11 is divisible, but is not divisible absolutely : a, 
good consequence, at all events, on the supposition, (the 
only one possible, if we would preserve Antitheos' 's cha- 
racter for never being without a meaning,) that " abso- 
lutely" as contradistinguished from " mentally," means not 
mentally. If matter generally is divisible at all, and be 
not divisible out of the mind, it is wonderfully probable, 
that it is divisible in the mind. Our atheist's reason, in 
fine, may be admitted, with considerable safety, to be a 
good reason^ if it constitute a good and a true position in 



§§ 8-9.] " ARGUMENT. A PRIORI;' IRREFRAGABLE. 101 

itself. But is it true, that matter generally, or, as a whole 
— for this, I conceive, is what Antitheos means when he 
says, " We may conceive of an absolute separation of sub- 
stance" or matter " generally ' — Is it true, that matter 
as a whole is not divisible absolutely, or out of the mind ? 

§ 9. What if absolute divisibility (we say not absolute 
division — far from it — ) follows from the admission, for-* 
tunately so liberally furnished by our author, of mental 
divisibility 1 If we can divide all that is matter by a men- 
tal process, how can any one make it appear, it is impos- 
sible in the nature of things that all matter should be di- 
vided by a real process ? Can w T e, in this case, infer the 
existence of an impossibility outwardly, from the exist- 
ence of a possibility inwardly ? an impossibility in things, 
from a possibility in our conceptions regarding the things ? 
Nay, what criterion of possibility, and impossibility too, 
can we have but that which arises from our conceptions ?t 
What we conceive to be possible, is possible. Which, in- 
deed, is virtually saying nothing more than this, What 
we conceive to be possible, is possible to us. And this 
proposition, in its turn, may be transmuted into another, 
even into this most undeniable, yet important proposition, 
Whatever we conceive to be possible, we really do con- 
ceive to be possible. We conceive a thing to be possible 
m reality : We judge a thing to be possible in reality : 
The thing is possible in reality : What are these but dif- 
ferent ways of setting forth the same position ? The 
grand element in the affair, in each of the three expres- 
sions, is, the conception of real possibility. Whatever, 
then, we clearly conceive to be possible in reality, is pos- 
sible in reality. + And therefore, as we do (having Anti- 

t " We can judge," says Archbishop Kino, " of things no otherwise 
" than from our conceptions." Origin of Evil. Chap. I. Sect. ii. & 2. 

I Perhaps Hume never wrote a better passage than the following, 
whether we regard the acutencss or the cogency of the reasoning. 

TT 



102 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part IV. 



theos's leave) clearly conceive matter as a whole to be sus- 
ceptible of division absolutely, or in reality, we cannot be 
wrong in affirming, that matter as a whole is capable of 
being divided absolutely, in reality, as in itself. 

§, 10. So much as to that divisibility which matter is 
subject to. Tho" we never add another syllable, 1 twill 
not be of great consequence : We have by this time put 
affairs into the proper train. But we may have occasion, 
some time or other, to speak again regarding the real di- 
visibility of all matter : a topic upon which our author 
(in his seventh chapter, as well as in his sixth,) has gone 
wrong altogether, confounding as he does, in grand style, 
divisibility with division (things usually the same with 
Antitheos^X) separability with separation, the conception of 
a vacuum with the existence of a vacuum externally, and 
drawing inferences from these indifferently, sometimes to 
his own inexpressible comfort and satisfaction, and some- 
times, and as frequently, at the expense of landing him- 
self, and us, were we not sufficiently reluctant to let him 

" Whatever can be conceived by a clear and distinct idea, necessarily 
u implies the possibility of existence ; and he who pretends to prove 
tC the impossibility of its existence by any arguments derived from the 
" clear idea, in reality asserts that we have no clear idea of it, because 
" we have a clear idea. 'Tis in vain to search for a contradiction in 
" any thing that is distinctly conceived by the mind. Did it imply 
u any contradiction, 'tis impossible it could ever be conceived." Trea- 
tise of Human Nature. B. 1. Part ii. Sect. 4. Videnotam (J) apud § 64. 
partis in. It will be observed, that the author of the Treatise goes 
further than we have gone. We aver, Whatever we conceive to be 
possible, is possible : He avers, Whatever we conceive, is possible. 
But perhaps the latter maxim differs very slightly at bottom from the 
other. The learned Cudworth says : " Whatsoever is possible, that 
" is, whatsoever is conceivable * * ; the very essence of possi- 
" bility being no other than conceptibility." True Intellectual Sys- 
tem of the Universe. Book I. ch. v. Birch's Edit. Page 647. — As 
Hume's is the greater, ours the less, if his maxim be true, ours must 
therefore be so too. 
t Vide Part II. § 32, 



§§10-11.1 u ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. 103 

be our conductor whithersoever he would, amidst the 
turnings and windings of a worse than Cretan labyrinth. 

§ 11. At length we shall permit our atheist to termi- 
nate the sentence in the middle of which we broke in, 
hoping as we do that for what of rudeness there may have 
been in the interruption, the weightiness of that which 
we had to deliver will be accepted as an apology. " It 
" may be said, perhaps, that although matter is, mentally. 
" easy enough to divide, it is impossible to apply the same 
" process to extension.'''' Par. 5. For my part, I see no 
impossibility in the case ; unless by " extension" be meant 
the extension, or part of the extension, which is infinite. 
And indeed we may opine with much probability, that 
such extension was that which was in Antitheos's view ; 
for the very next sentence uses " space 1 ' 1 to stand for the 
l< extension'' of its predecessor. " But is not the space oc- 
" cupied by the earth, — or say, its useful little repre- 
" sentation, a twelve or a twenty-inch globe, — as easily 
" conceived to be divisible" or perhaps divided " by a ma- 
" thematical plane, as the globe itself, which is not really 
" but only mentally divided V In answer to which ques- 
tion : — 1. Why is the globe, the little globe, or 

The great globe itself, 
" not really * * divided ?" Not because it is no. 
really divisible. For that it is really or in the nature of 
things divisible, is sufficiently proved by our being able to 
conceive the thing possible. Vide supra, § 9. — 2. As to 
whether the space occupied by 

The great globe itself, 
Yea all which it inherit, 

or by a representation of it twelve inches, or it may be 
twenty inches, in diameter, (it is right to be exact with 
an admeasurement ;) I say, as to whether that space can 
be conceived divided, or even, if you please, but divisible. 



104 " ARGUMENT, A PBIOBI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part. IV. 

by a mathematical plane : let us ask, What is a mathe- 
matical plane I Our author informs us correctly ; though 
he has encumbered his information with a good deal of 
inanity. " A mathematical point," he advances to the 
information thus, " has no dimensions" — Why discard 
magnitude, the usual word \ — " A mathematical point has 
" no dimensions, because whatever possesses dimensions 
" must possess figure, and that which has figure cannot 
" be a point." That which has figure cannot be a point. 
But why ? The " Refutation'" supplies not the reason. 
So that, as to why a point has no figure or dimensions, 
we are left within a little of where we began. Our author 
had spoken better, if he had simply said, A mathematical 
point has no dimensions, because that which has no di- 
mensions is the definition given by mathematicians of a 
point. " In like manner," he goes on, " a plane cannot 
" have thickness, since whatever is of the smallest thick- 
" ness is not a plane but a solid." Par. 5. Could he not 
just have said, A plane is defined to be a surface having 
length and breadth but no thickness : as that which has 
the three dimensions is defined to be a solid ? — " A plane," 
then, " cannot have thickness :" " whatever is of the 
smallest" or of 'any " thickness is not a plane." How, 
then, can we conceive the space Antitheos speaks of, or 
indeed any space whatever, divided, or divisible, by a 
mathematical plane ? A division by a mathematical plane 
is no division at all. That which divides matter, or space, 
or any thing our atheist likes, must have some thickness, 
tho 1 the thickness should be "of the smallest." But as 
touching this, an ample sufficiency has been already set 
before the reader. Vide Part. II. § 26. notamq; et § 29. 
Partemque III. § 12. <Sfc ~—ln fine, the space filled by the 
earth, or its " little representation," is not as easily con- 
ceived to be divided, or divisible, as the great globe, or 



§§ 12-13.] " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. 105 



any small one, can be conceived to be divided, or divisible. 
For that space cannot be conceived to be divided or di- 
visible at all. 

§ 12. " In dividing space by abstraction, " or by a par- 
tial consideration, " therefore, there is no necessity, as 
" our author would have us believe, of falling into the ab- 
" surdity of space divided by actual separation of the 
" parts, leaving no space between them. 1 ' Par 5. As our 
author would have us believe, says Antitheos. Now the 
author alluded to would have no one believe any thing by 
the sixtieth part of a degree so absurd. How could, and 
where did, the author of the " Argument," in treating of 
partial considerations of infinite extension, expansion, 
space, which he, after the example of Mr Locke, allows to 
be quite possible ; how could he, and where did he, in 
granting that we may for a time consider so much space 
to the exclusion, as it were, of the rest, fall into the 
" absurdity" (word w r ell chosen) of supposing space divided 
by actual separation of parts, when the very thing which, 
with all his might, he DEMONSTRATES TO BE IMPOSSIBLE, 
is this very thing, to-wit, that the parts of infinite extension, 
or space, are susceptible of actual separation ? 

§ 13. Our atheist concludes what he has to urge in op- 
position to Proposition II. in this way. 41 If Mr Gillespie's 
" indivisibility be understood in an abstract sense, his 
" proposition is not true ; if, in reference to actual experi- 
" ment, he may be applauded for having recourse to in- 
" ductive instead of a priori reasoning, [but*h] he need 
" not so soon have neglected the principles upon which 
" he started, without intimating some ground for the 

t This word is supplied from a copy of the u Refutation," presented 
by its author to a Jew (according to the flesh) — Who, with true Jewish 
foresight and discretion, wrote on the title-page : " The fool hath said 
" in this book, There is no God.'' The but is Antitheos's autograph. 
The copy in question composes one of the volumes in the Philalethean 
Society's Library. 



106 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part IV. 

" change." Par. 6. After what has been so fully ad- 
vanced in Part II. the reader needs no guide to lead him 
through this maze. Mr Gillespie recognises but one kind 
of proper divisibility, (and who ever heard of any other ?) 
and has demonstrated, that infinity of extension is not 
divisible, in the proper sense of the word. Therefore, 
" his proposition IS * true." 

§ 14. And that we have great authority to vouch for 
the validity of Mr Gillespie '« demonstration, even the 

AUTHORITY OF OUR ATHEIST HIMSELF, shall now be 
evinced past the possibility of room for doubt. 

§ 15. In the discussion of his second proposition," says 
Antitheos, as before we heard, ( vide part. ii. § 37 et § 42 J 
" the author makes manifest the absurdity of supposing 
" space really divisible, since that would be to suppose 
" the parts separated without having any space between 
" them." We agree with Antitheos, that the author of 
the " Argument" makes manifest the absurdity of sup- 
posing space, or rather " infinity of extension," which is 
all one with infinity of space, ( vide part. Hi. § 17.) to be 
really divisible ; but we can never grant, that it is absurd 
to suppose space is really divisible for the reason which 
Antitheos assigns. The reason given by this gentleman 
why there is absurdity in supposing space really divisible 
is this, to suppose space really divisible would be to sup- 
pose the parts separated without having any space between 
them. Now, to say that to suppose space really divisible 
is to suppose the parts thereof separated, or divided, is to 
confound two things which are entirely different, divisi- 
bility and division. We have seen that our atheist charges 
Mr Gillespie with confounding these two distinct things, 
(vide part. ii. § 32. et § 34.^) and here Antitheos exposes 
why he was so ready to charge such a procedure on 
another : Antitheos confounds the two things himself. The 
cloven foot has made its appearance. 



§§ 14-18.] ARGUMENT, A PRIORI" IRREFRAGABLE. 107 



§ 16. Our author has quite reversed matters. He who 
supposes, if any orte can suppose, (as it is certain no one 
can.) that the parts of space are separated, or divided, 
presupposes the separability, or divisibility, of the parts. 
But he who supposes (and the person who supposes must 
just be nobody at all,) the divisibility of space, by no 
means thereby supposes, either first or last, the division 
of space. 

§ 17. In a word, we agree with our atheist as to the 
fact, we differ from him as to the reason of the fact, that 
under the second Proposition of the " Argument' " is made 
manifest the absurdity of supposing-f infinite extension, 
or space, to be divisible. Had Antitheos said that Pro- 
position II. manifests the absurdity of supposing space 
really divisible, since to suppose it really divisible is to 
suppose its parts separable, we should have agreed with 
him as to the reason of the fact too : so far at least as 
the absurdity of the supposition, that the parts of space 
are separable, is a reason of the absurdity of the supposi- 
tion, that space is really divisible : for, in truth, the sup- 
positions look as if they were no more than barely tanta- 
mount to each other. 

§ 18. We shall turn our antitheist's admission on all 
sides, and make every conceivable supposition, to shew 
that viewing the admission in what light one pleases, it 
is all that our hearts could wish. Should the author of 

t We use the words supposing oy suppose, here and elsewhere, in the 
same sense as that in which Mathematicians speak, when, in a proper 
redvxtio per impossibile ad abmrdum, they ask us to draw an absurd 
consequence from a supposition which is to be set aside. The suppo- 
sition in one sense, and that one the best of senses, is really impos- 
sible. We cannot clearly conceive the truth of it to be a possible 
thin», and this even before the contrary to it is establish"? in due geo- 
metrical style. But the case is argued "s if the impossible supposi- 
tion were conceived to be true. We may deduce an inference from a 
supposition which we can make only relatively, as we may say. 



108 " ARGUMENT A PRIORI;' IRREFRAGABLE. [Part IV 



the * Refutation" be inclined to allege, that by " divisible" 
he meant divided, never intending to admit more than 
that the " Argument" had manifested the absurdity of 
supposing that space is really divided ; then, as we shall 
leave him no cloor to creep out by, away from us, we have 
these two considerations to urge. They will be found 
adamantine impediments to an escape. 1. The first con- 
sideration will have respect to the good faith in which an 
allegation of that description could be offered. Antitheos 
is speaking in relation to the " second proposition," and 
the second Proposition, as it occurs in the " Argument" 
runs thus : " Infinity of Extension," (which is the same 
as space,) " is necessarily indivisible." It does not run 
this way : Infinity of Extension is really undivided. But 
to pass over the faith in which such an allegation would 
need to be made, as a circumstance of trifling moment, we 
have to say, that the thing alleged, were it alleged, to be 
meant by our antitheist, would be altogether as accept- 
able as the sign of his meaning. For 2. If Mr Gillespie 
manifested no more than, or rather so much as, the absur- 
dity of supposing that space is really divided, if, in other 
words, he demonstrated 'that space is really not divided, how 
could he have done so but by demonstrating that space 
cannot be really divided ? We demonstrate that a thing is 
not, only by proving that it cannot be. And if Mr Gil- 
lespie demonstrated that space cannot be really divided, 
he must have demonstrated that space is really indivi- 
sible. For to say, that space cannot be divided, and to 
say, that it is indivisible, are one and the same. So that 
if Mr Gillespie demonstrated that space is really not di- 
vided, he has demonstrated that space is really indivisible. 
And therefore even if " divisible" in the passage in 
question, be to stand for divided, and our atheist be to 
be held as admitting nothing more than that Proposi- 
tion II. manifests the absurdity of supposing that space is 



§§ 19-21.] " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. 109 



really divided ; we have, contained virtually in an admis- 
sion to that effect, his authority for it that Mr Gillespie 
has demonstrated the real indivisibility of space. 

§ 19. To conclude this part of the subject, let the ad- 
mission of our antitheist be regarded in any sense one 
likes, to a certainty we have, as we affirmed, his autho- 
rity to vouch for the validity of the demonstration, that 
infinity of extension, or space, is indivisible. 

§ 20. And since the author of the " Refutation" has 
passed his word in sincerity for the truth of Proposition 
II., let us rest contented, without bearing him any grudge 
for what besides may have fallen from his pen. What 
matters it, though he cried out, at the first glimpse of the 
affair, " unqualified assent * cannot be accorded to 
" proposition the second, 1 ' if, on second thoughts, (second 
thoughts are the best,) he saw a sufficient reason for de- 
claring, that his opponent " makes manifest the absurdity 
" of supposing space really divisible," his opponent's 
highest aim being to demonstrate that space, infinite space, 
is really indivisible ? Whatever difficulties Antitheos as- 
serted to be in the way ; — if ultimately he proclaims that 
the road is thoroughly clear, we may know he was only 
making as if he would cause us a little, a very unneces- 
sary, affrightment. However it comes about that the 
second Proposition is true, it suffices that it is so. 

§ 21. We can now proceed to judge in a certain affair, 
with capital authority at our elbow for the decision we 
%hall pronounce. At the beginning of Chapter VII. of 
his work, A ntitheos says : " The fourth proposition * * 
¥ is founded upon the baseless fabric of extension" (he 
should have said, " infinity of extension") " being indivi- 
sible,** &c. ; and in the fifth paragraph of Chapter VI. he 
had more than merely hinted, that Proposition II. con- 
stitutes a gratuitous fallacy. Whether the necessary in- 
divisibility of infinite extension be a baseless fabric, 

1 



110 "ARGUMENT, A PRIORI" IRREFRAGABLE. [Part IV- 



whether the declaration that " infinity of extension is 
" necessarily indivisible," be a gratuitous fallacy, admits 
not now of the possibility of a doubt. We have had our 
atheist's word for it, that the " Argument" has demon- 
strated, infinity of extension is really indivisible, and what 
more could be necessary to shew that the indivisibility of 
infinite extension is no " baseless fabric" ? that the posi- 
tion which affirms infinity of extension to be necessarily 
indivisible, is never to be reckoned in the number of 
" gratuitous fallacies V 

§ 22. So far, then, as we have gone yet, all is well. " It 
" would be absurd in the extreme to deny" Proposition I. 
And, in spite of himself, Antitheos has accorded " the 
" same unqualified assent" to Proposition Il.t 

§ 23. The words which next occur in the " Refutation" 
bring us to a new subject. " A corollary is here intro- 
" duced, asserting the immoveability of extension." Oh. VI. 
par. 7- There happens to be no corollary of the kind in 
the " Argument." A Corollary there is indeed. But it 
is in the following terms. " Corollary from Proposi- 
" tion II. Infinity of extension is necessarily immoveable" A 

f In spite of himself, in his book, — but only there. For in a letter ad- 
dressed to Mr Gillespie, so lately as the 15th of January, last, "Anti- 
theos," in the contemplation of a second edition of the " Refutation," ad- 
mits that he " would have to alter" his reasoning " with respect to the 
" indivisibility of extension." "No one I presume," writes " Antitheos," 
" ever thought of denying the applicability of infinitude, either to space or 
" duration, or of imagining the separability of their parts." So 
that out of (though only out of) his book, the first edition of it at any* 
rate, Antitheos has, spontaneously, " accorded to proposition the second" 
" the same unqualified assent" which was accorded to Proposition the 
first. Now, let us remember that " a great part of the reasoning in 
" the ' Argument' is built upon the second Proposition," and that 
" to go over all that it is founded on to prove, would be to introduce 
" no small portion of the work referred to" — (vide part. ii. § 19.) let 
us, I say, but keep this in mind, and we shall be at no loss to perceive 
that the letter by " Antitheos" constitutes a very precious document to 
the lovers of the " Argument, a priori." 



§§ 22-23.] "ARGUMENT. A PRIORI;' IRREFRAGABLE. Ill 



matter this, widely different from what Antitheos repre- 
sents it to be. " It is true," proceeds he, " that either 
" finity or infinity of extension can never be supposed 
" capable of motion ." Bare finity of extension is not 
capable of motion ; but then every thing of finity, of finity 
only, in extension, is so. " Space cannot," continues our 
atheist, " be carried out of itself." Very true. That is 
equivalent, so far as it goes, to what the Corollary de- 
clares. " Nor," adds he, byway of illustration, " can those 
" parts of it occupied by Mont Blanc, for example, and 
" the Peak of Teneriffe, ever be imagined to change 
" places." Precisely so. But the Mountain and the Peak, 
themselves, may be imagined to change places. And the 
distinction well deserves observation. " To the truth of 
" what is here maintained, therefore," concludes he, " we 
•• must gite unreserved assent, independent of its nominal 
" connection with the false doctrine immediately going be- 
" fore." Ibid. The "false doctrine" is that which sets forth 
that " Infinity of Extension is necessarily indivisible*." That 
false doctrine we have witnessed the author of the " Refuta- 
tion" transforming into a perfectly true one. Vide supra. 
§ 15, et seq. The " connection," which is called a " no- 
minal" connection, (for what reason it is easier to search 
than to find,) is established, under the " Corollary," in the 
following manner. " Infinity of Extension is necessarily 
" immoveable. That is, its parts are necessarily immove- 
" able among themselves. For, motion of parts supposes, 
* " of necessity, separation of the parts. He who does not 
" see that motion of parta supposes, of necessity, separa- 
" tion of the parts, neM never be expected to see that 
" because every A is equal to B, therefore some B is equal 
" to A. And Infinity of Extension being necessarily in- 
" capable of separation, is, therefore, necessarily immove- 
" able, that is, its parts are necessarily immoveable amonjj 
" themselves." tk 



112 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI" IRREFRAGABLE. [PartV. 



§ 24. The connection we speak of is set forth by Mr 
Locke in these words. " The parts of pure space are 
" immoveable, which follows from their inseparability ; mo- 
" tion being nothing but change of distance between any 
" two things : but this cannot be between parts that are 
" inseparable ; which, therefore, must needs be at perpetual 
" rest one amongst another." Essay B. II. ch. xiii. § 14. 

§ 25. We were finding some fault in our author's con- 
clusion, but since, according to it, " unreserved assent" 
" must" be given to the truth maintained in the Corol- 
lary, we need, after all, have no quarrel with any thing 
that accompanies the unconditional admission. 



113 



PART V. 



THE " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, FOR THE BEING AND ATTRI- 
" BUTES OF GOD," AN IRREFRAGABLE DEMONSTRATION. 

§ 1. " But we now come," such are the words which 
follow those last quoted from the " Refutation, 1 "' " But we 
" now come to a proposition which may be said to carry 
" with it all the strength, if it has any, as well as the weak- 
" ness, of Mr Gillespie's i Argument.' " Ch. VI. par. 8. 
'Tis well that Antitheos attaches some importance to the 
Proposition he has now in his eye ; for the preceding one 
was treated as if it were '*' of no great consequence." 
The Proposition which, as our author will have it, has all 
the strength, or the weakness, of the " Argument, 11 " is, 11 
that gentleman correctly remarks, " the third in number. 
" and announces that ' There is necessarily A Being of 
" Infinity of Extension.' " Ibid. 

§ 2. " If we had not already seen" continues Antitheos, 
" that the author's reasoning leads us to conclude that 
" his Being is to be regarded as something substantial" — 
Where did we see what, in his own sense of it, Antitheos 
says we have seen ? Nowhere else but in the fourth para- 
graph of Chapter V., where we saw it stated (the state- 
ment being according to truth) that Mr Gillespie's ' sub- 
' SEQUENT reasoning' ' makes intelligence, &c. part of his 
argument ;' and where we saw our atheist lay down a de- 
termination to hold Mr Gillespie as making intelligence. 
&c. part of his argument ab ovo usque ad mala- — 1 UN I- 



114 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI" IRREFRAGABLE. [PartV. 



formly; Vide Part. II. § 4. We promised to run 
to the rescue whenever Antitheos was detected turning 
matters upside down, and this is the first opportunity we 
have had of making good our promise. We should not 
regret if we never had a second. But things do not al- 
ways fall out according to one's wishes. .And our wishes 
in this respect, run a great chance of being disappointed : 
Antitheos threatened us with uniformity as touching the 
affair of putting things topsy-turvy. 

§ 3. So much as to where Antitheos and his reader had 
seen that Mr Gillespie s reasoning leads to the conclusion, 
that his Being is substantial, in our antitheist's sense of 
" substantial, 5 , as it occurs in the passage we are criti- 
cising. As it occurs in that passage, we say ; For our 
author is not always consistent in his procedure, he be- 
ing accustomed to use substantial, and its cognate, sub- 
stance, in more senses than one. Ex. gr. At one time, 
** substance" with him, is that only which " possesses at- 
traction,"" which " is observed under a thousand varie- 
" ties of figure, density, colour, motion, taste, odour, com- 
" bustion, crystallization, &c." which is capable of being 
" weighed," and " analyzed," and of having " its elements 
u reduced to gas." ( Vide Part. XII. §§ 1, 4J While, 
in the case before us, " something substantial," with our 
atheist, stands for nothing more than 44 an agent of any kind 
" — something possessing power — something that acts" — 
something that has " intelligence, and power, and free- 
" dom of agency." (Compare Chap. VI. par. 9. with Chap. 
V. par. 4.) Nothing more : For there is no mention of 
attraction, figure, density, colour, motion, taste, odour, 
combustion, crystallization, &c. weight, gaseousness, &c. 
as among the essential acts, properties, or capacities, of 
that which is substantial. 

§ 4. No doubt, Antitheos would say, were the question 
put to him, that every thing which has " intelligence, and 



3-5.; « ARGUMENT, A PRIORI;' IRREFRAGABLE. 115 

a power, and freedom of agency," can attract and be at- 
tracted, has figure, density, would have colour if exposed 
to the rays of the sun, moves, may be supposed to have 
a certain taste, and a certain smell, may be set on fire, 
may be crystallized, and weighed, and analyzed, and re- 
duced to elementary gases. Such, however, is not the 
matter for consideration here. That composes the ques- 
tion respecting local conjunction, the question as to what 
qualities are inseparably associated in the same subject. 
It may be, or it may not be true, that intelligence, and 
power, and freeness, are never to be found but in a sub- 
ject having figure, and density, and colour, and motion, 
and taste, and odour, &c. &c. ; but whether that be true, 
or whether it be false, concerns us not at present. On 
the contrary, the following are the questions which arise 
out of our atheist's procedure, as we have noticed it. Is 
that which possesses attraction, &c. &c. a substance ; a 
substance because it has the capacity of attracting, and of 
being attracted ? And again : Is that which has intelli- 
gence, &c. to be pronounced a substance ; to be pro- 
nounced a substance just because it has the property of 
intelligence \ Is that which is of intelligence, therefore to 
be denominated a substance ; without our waiting to de- 
termine the point as to how many properties or qualities 
must keep company with intelligence as mutual occupiers 
of the subject of inhesion ? Which Antitheos decides in 
the affirmative. Vide § prwced. 

§ 5. When I observed, our author would hold, that 
every thing having intelligence, &c. can attract, and has 
figure, density, &c. &c. &c. I bore in mind what he in one 
place says : " It (extension) is also conceivable as one of 
" the properties, if not the only indispensable property of 
" matter Ch. VIII. par. 3. By which if the unwary 
reader should understand that Antitheos means to make 
even ' k a very clever approach" (to employ our author's 



116 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part V. 
9 

racy languaget) to the Cartesian doctrine, that extension 
is the essence, itself, of matter, i the reader would be much 
mistaken indeed. What our atheist means, in spite of 
his own words, amounts only to this : that whereas a par- 
ticular piece of matter may be without some one quality 
which some other piece has ; ex. gr. the book called " Re- 
futation" may well be supposed to be without that weight 
which even one solid Argument would impart to it ; that 
whereas, in fine, each of the other properties ever found 
in matter may be absent, one after another, from a thing, 
and matter yet remain behind : we cannot take away all 
extension, without taking away all matter too. The sen- 
tence itself from which those words are taken, commences 
thus : " Although extension may be conceived of as a 
" pure abstraction :" that is, I fancy, as existing separately, 
or by itself; as in the case of pure space. From which 
clause we see how very far Antitheos was from going into 
the doctrine of Des Cartes. — After all, it must perhaps be 
granted, that it is no easy task to reconcile the beginning 
and end of this sentence : " Although extension may be 
" conceived of as 2^ pure abstraction, it is also conceivable as 
44 one of the properties, if not the only indispensable pro- 
44 perty of matter." If extension can exist by itself, and 
our antitheist says it can, without thereby being matter, 
how can extension make any approach, unless a stupid 
one, to being the only indispensable property of matter ? 
In short, there is " a very clever approach" to a contra- 
diction. The end of the sentence and the beginning can 
never exist together in perfect harmony ; the sooner, 
therefore, they separate for ever, the better. — We have 
only farther to remark, that tho' in this passage Antitheos 
speaks of extension as perhaps being the only indispen- 
sable property of matter, yet the whole scope of his book, 

t Last Chapter, ninth paragraph. 
% Vide Part. III. § 38. 



§ 6.] " ARGUMENT, A Pi?/0i?7," IRREFRAGABLE. 117 

where it at all bears on the topic of what matter is, runs 
counter to that sentiment. The exception to the general 
strain is a solitary one. 

§ 6. But not only have we " already seen" in the "Re- 
futation," that Mr Gillespie s reasoning leads to the con- 
clusion that his Being is " something substantial" but, 
the author of that production throws out, we may see the 
same thing in a different quarter altogether. <£ If," says 
he, " we refer to the third Division of his Introduction, 
" we find him contending that the necessary Being must 
" be of the character now ascribe-d to that subject. At 
" the twenty-third section" — &c. &c. Ch. VI. par. 9. 
Now what is this that we have here ? The " Argument, a 
" priori, for the Being and Attributes of God," " pro- 
" fesses to demonstrate that matter by the most rigid ra- 
" tiocination." ( Vide Prwfationem.) To be complete 
in itself, is one of the necessary prerequisites of a demon- 
stration. The work alluded to, accordingly, never refers 
to the " Introduction" — Which is so distinct from the 
" Argument" that this might have received — and may 
yet receive, (for the special benefit of refutation-makers, 
now that Antitheos has put into my head the propriety of 
letting it receive, — ) publication separately, and be, not- 
withstanding, a finished treatise, wanting nothing neces- 
sary in order to the presence of the most perfect unity of 
execution. The " Introduction," in a word, is in no re- 
spect any part of that which the Society of Atheists which 
fixed on our author as its champion, was challenged to 
answer and refute. Doubtless, I might have challenged 
that Society, had I liked, to overturn the reasonings which 
compose the three Divisions of the " Introduction." And 
it may be noticed, that no proof has been adduced to 
evidence that, if it had been so challenged, it could, by 
means of this champion, or of any champion, have suc- 
cessfully overturned any of those reasonings. But as the 



♦ 



118 " ARGUMENT, A PlilOBI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part V. 



case is, the Society was challenged to do no more — and 
no less — than answer and refute the reasonings contained 
in the " Argument, a priori," &c. Vide Prcefat. 

§ 7. To enable our readers, the more perfectly to un- 
derstand with what grace Antitheos in his " Refutation" 
of the " Argument, a priori,'''' &c, brings in quotations 
from the " Introduction," to find of what character the 
" Argument" makes the necessary Being it discourses of 
to be ; we shall enumerate the topics of which the " In- 
troduction" consists. " Division I. An Inquiry into 
" the defects of mere a posteriori arguments, for the being 
" of A Deity. Chapter I. Of the Argument from Expe- 
" rience. Chapter II. Of the Argument from Miracles." 
" Division II. A Review of Br Samuel darkens De- 
" monstration of the Being and Attributes of God." 
" Division III. Necessary existence implies infinite 
" extension. 11 The first section of which Division com- 
mences thus : " Supposing, that there is a necessarily 
" existing substance, the intelligent cause of all things." 
Division III., so far from being taken up in an attempt 
to do aught towards proving a necessarily existing sub- 
stance, the intelligent cause of all things, sets out with 
the express supposition that there is such ; and is 
wholly employed in endeavouring to deduce a certain 
consequence from that supposition. In fine, the contents 
of the Division we speak of, are truly summed up in what 
may be drawn from its title : If necessary existence be 
supposed, then that is supposed, which implies infinite ex- 
tension. Marvellously good indeed is the grace with 
which our atheist, at the place where he stands, and for 
the purpose which he has to serve, quotes from " the third 
" Division" of the " Introduction. 1 ' 

§ 8. Well then : here we have our antitheist going 
" out of the record, 1 ' to use a legal phrase which he has 
adopted. (" Preface. 11 ) We referred lately to his deter- 



* 



§§ 7-9. « ARGUMENT, A PRIORI*' IRREFRAGABLE. 119 



mination to turn matters upside down, or rather, to turn 
the end round upon the beginning. Vide supra, § 2. 
With regard to the case before us, we can acquit him of 
any charge of placing the tail where the head only should 
be. His conduct now is of a different character from 
what it was in the former instance : At present, he is 
seeking to introduce into the beginning, neither end nor 
middle, but only something entirely distinct, alike from 
beginning, and from middle, and from end. But we shall 
not copy the bad example, nor follow our atheist through 
those sentences, vicious as at the present stage they must 
be, which respect something avowed in the third " Divi- 
sion." Not that there is any thing contained in those 
sentences, nor any thing about them, except the confusion 
which follows in their train, that we need to fear : As 
might easily be shewn, were this a fit opportunity. But 
anxiously do we desire, we acknowledge, to keep clear of 
the confusion which very naturally would result from a 
present consideration of the sentences under notice. In 
short, Antitheos had his reasons for what he has done. 
And we have ours for reprobating his exceedingly un- 
warrantable procedure. 

§ 9. " If we had not already seen that the author's 
" reasoning leads us to conclude that his Being is to be 
" regarded as something substantial" — W ell, what follows 
from such a supposition \ " We should have been at a 
" loss what to make of the subject of the above predicate. 
" As a logician would say, it is not distributed." Par. 9. 
The non-distribution of a subject can never be any reason 
why one shouh^be at a loss what to make of it. A non- 
distributed subject, is, " as a logician would say," a sub- 
ject made to stand for a part only of its significate. And 
did ever any logician worthy of the name, assert that we 
should be at a loss what to make of a subject because it 
is taken in a part only of its extent ? Logicians are quite 



120 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part V. 

as fond of undistributed, as of distributed subjects. And 
as an evidence, there are in the field of logic as many 
particular propositions as there are universal ones : The 
non-distribution of the subject being that which fixes 
the particularity of the proposition. But our aim is not 
to rectify Antitheos^s logic, except where the badness of 
his logic is made a prop to the goodness of his cause ; 
and to pass over a matter which 5 after all, is of little 
moment in the present business : Afititkeos^s logic in the 
preceding portion of the passage, finds me totally at fault. 
What does he make the subject to be, to-wit, in the Pro- 
position, " There is necessarily a Being of Infinity of 
" Extension V The word Being. But how " Being" can 
be regarded as the subject, our atheist has not conde- 
scended to declare, neither is he at all able to declare. 
To me indeed it appears, that " Being" in that Proposi- 
tion is syncategorematic, i. e. constitutes a part only of the 
complex term* composing the subject : which I take to be, 
fii 7 A Being of Infinity of Extension :^ r " there is necessarily,' ' 
being the predicate, or, if you will, the copula and the 
predicate together. But to settle what is the right 
subject, and, by consequence possibly, what is the right 
predicate, of the Proposition, is, as well as the other 
thing, but a mere trifle, not worth vexing ourselves about ; 
as shall be perceived in the eleventh section. Though 
Antitheos has called things by their wrong names, it may 
turn out that the slip in logic will not afford him even a 
semblance of support. 

§ 10. " Relative," says the author of the " Refutation," 
after presenting us with the sentences which respect 
something avowed in " Division III.'" of the " Introduc- 
tion " Relative to a Being of this sort, thevF — that is, 
relative to a Being of the character spoken of in that 
" Division," to-wit, " a necessarily existing substance, 
" the intelligent cause of all things." (Vide supra, § 7-) 



§§ 10-12.] " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI" IRREFRAGABLE. 121 



But here we can have nothing to do with the assumed 
Being which " Division III. 11 treats of. Our atheist 
himself seems to have had his misgivings as to the 
propriety of the " then" for he immediately goes on to 
say : " At all events, relative to a substantial being 11 — 
A substantial being ! Why not a being (t. e. an existing) 
substance ? Is not a substance identical with a being ? 
Why distinguish them ? What is an unsubstantial being ? 
A shadow that proceeds not from any substance is not 
more a non- entity than an unsubstantial being. A sub- 
stantial being is a substantial — substance ; or a being 
that has — being. What nothingness has a non-being 
substance which an unsubstantial being has not ? 

§ 11. " Relative to a (substantial) being, the truth of 
" the predicate" Antitheos proceeds, " is what we have 
; ' now to try. 11 Par. 11. As he made " Being" to be 
the subject, so now he takes " Infinity of Extension" to 
be the predicate, in Proposition III. Our atheist would 
represent Being as something already got at, and the aim 
of that Proposition to be, to invest the Being with infi- 
nite extension. Quite contrary to the truth : A Being 
is not something which the " Argument," as yet, holds 
us in possession of. The object of the Proposition, in 
fact, is neither more nor less than to arrive at a Being ; 
a Being, indeed of infinity of extension : but the Propo- 
sition by no means considers " Being" and " Infinity of 
" Extension," first separately, afterwards proceeding to 
work out a conjunction of them. In a word, " Infinity of 
" Extension" is not the predicate. " The truth of the 
" predicate is what we have now to try, 11 says Antitheos. 
The truth of Proposition III., at any rate, he is going to 
try. And that is sufficient comfort for us. 

§ 12. We shall make it our business to examine every 
item and iota of the ordeal : Because, the Proposition, if 
successfully established, goes near to be decisive, in our 



122 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part V. 



favour, of the whole controversy ; and if objected to, on 
sufficient grounds, the whole demonstration, the whole of 
the merely pretended demonstration, must go for nothing. 
Our atheist rightly holds the Proposition in question to 
be of very high importance in the affair ; whether or not 
it carries with it all the strength of the " Argument. " 

§ 13. " The evidence in support of the third proposi- 
" tion is stated," our author remarks, " in the form of a 
" dilemma" Par. 11. And then he quotes § 1, and 
part of § 2,-f- and § 4. The words he has quoted are as 
follows. 

§ 14. " Either, Infinity of Extension subsists, or, (which 
45 is the same thing,) we conceive it to subsist, without a 
" support or substratum ; or, it subsists not, or we con- 
4C ceive it not to subsist, without a support or substratum. 

§ 15. " First, if Infinity of Extension subsist without 

" a substratum," [or, if it have not a substratum,] " then, 

" it is a substance." 

****** * * * ****** 

§ 16. " Secondly, If Infinity of Extension subsist not 
44 without a Substratum," [that is, if it have a Substra- 
tum,] " then, it being a contradiction to deny there is 
" Infinity of Extension, J it is a contradiction to deny 
" there is a Substratum to it." 

§ 17. " The conclusion deduced from the latter alter- 
" native," says Antitheos, " besides appearing lame and 
" impotent, is somewhat laughable. \\ But allowing its logic 
" to pass, it may be worth while, if only for amusement, 
" to try the force of this, the negative horn of the di- 
44 lemma, by ascertaining what it is made of." Par. 12. 
Why is this pronounced to be the negative horn ? 'T would 
require more than an Aristotle to tell how it could pro- 

t Antitheos does not signify, he has omitted any thing. 

X " Prop. I." Note in " Argument." Vide Part. II. § 15. 

|| Vide Part. XII. § 8. 



§§ 13 -18.] « ARGUMENT, A PRIORI;' IRREFRAGABLE. 123 



perly be pronounced so. But though Aristotle cculd not, 
yet possibly Antitheos can inform us, why " this" is pro- 
nounced the negative horn. 'Tis perhaps probable, that 
Antitheos calls the alternative spoken of, " the negative 
" horn of the dilemma, 1 ' because that alternative contains 
the word " not" At least, I cannot think of any better 
reason he could have. With regard, then, to the ques- 
tion, whether the word " nof causes the member in which 
it occurs to be truly negative : the word " without," in 
the alternative, appears to be a negative one, to all intents 
and purposes. And if so, the alternative will be affirma- 
tive, so long as two negative words, (" not," and " with- 
out,*') — which affect the same thing — are equal to a positive. 
— Be " this" horn of what sort it may, it is a horn which 
Antitheos would, if he but could, get quit off But how- 
ever negative the horn may be, 'tis a positive truth that 
Antitheos has been fairly stuck upon it : , and can by no 
struggling take himself off. We shall observe, in good 
time, how he winces. 

§ 18. But whether " this" be the negative horn, or not, 
let us witness in what manner the force of it is tried. 
" The primary signification of the word substratum is, a 
" thing lying under something else. Supposing, for in- 
" stance, a bed of gravel to lie under the soil, gravel is 
" the substratum of that soil ; if there be sandstone below 
" that, the sandstone is the substratum of the gravel ; if 
" coal be found beneath the rock, coal is the substratum 
" of it, and so on as far as we can penetrate. To say, 
" therefore, that space must have a substratum, is nothing 
u less than saying that it must have something to rest 
" upon ; something to hold it up. That is, — Space must 
" have limits ; and there must be something in existence 
" beyond its limits to keep it from falling — out of itself! 
" If this be not the acme of absurdity, a ship falling over- 
t Vide Part. XL § 21. 



124 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part V. 



" board, as our sailors' jest goes, is no longer a joke ; and 
" the clown who boasted that he could swallow himself, 
" boasted of nothing that he might not bef reasonably bef 
" expected to perform." Ibid. These are capital jests. 
And had they bat come in at a proper place, we should 
have " laughed consumedly." The misfortune is, they 
are not in season. 

§ 19. " The primary signification of the word substra- 
" turn is," 7 6ur philologist informs us, " a thing lying under 
" something else." So it is. Substratum is a participle 
from the verb substernor, Anglice, to be strowed or strewed 
under. But, alas ! the primary signification of the word 
substance is very similar to that of the word substratum. 
The primary signification of substance, is, standing under : 
It being nothirfg but a derivation from the participle 
substajis-X But Antitheos is remarkably enamoured of the 
word substance, and therefore he has a respect for its 
primary signification, never bringing this in sight. But 
then he bears (with ample reason too) substratum a ter- 
rible grudge, and thinks nothing of exposing its primary 
signification to well-merited derision. 

§ 20. A fine affair truly here. Strange work, work 
" passing strange," might our atheist make of our Eng- 
lish tongue, were he to go on at this rate. At what 
point in its history could any language bear to pass 

t One of the be.s is an error of the press. But to say which, would 
be to interfere with the style. 

t From the neuter plural, Home Tooke says. — It is curious, or per- 
haps it is not curious, that the two words in our language correspond- 
ing to sub and stans, to-wit under and standing, should, when joined in 
one word, constitute a term denoting what is very usually reckoned 
the superior portion of the mind. Our materialist would busy us 
about substance as not reaching to aught beyond body. So that there 
is some necessity for our refusing to quit the English, for the Latin 
preposition. And accordingly, we are resolved to stick by the under- 
standing. Surely it, in good English, does not so naturally mean body, 
as substance may stand for mind. 



19-24.] :i ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. 125 



through the primary-signification-alembic S Because the 
meaning of a word, considered as to its etymon, is so, 
therefore it is just the same so now — clean contrary per- 
haps to the incontestable fact : Is not that a grand con- 
clusion to come to ? 

§ 21. But Antitheos is not alone in the world, in the 
use of such reasoning. Before him, a very celebrated 
philologist and freethinker went very far in the primary- 
signification-track. J£ 

§ 22. " True," says John Home Tooke, "is * a 
" past participle of the verb * * To Trow." * * * 

§ 23. " True, as we now write it ; or Trew, as it was 
64 formerly written ; means simply and merely — That 
" which is Trowed. And, instead of its being a rare com- 
M modity upon earth ; except only in words, there is no- 
" thing but Truth in the world. ., 

§ 24. " That every man, in his communication with 
" others, should speak that which he troweth, is of so 
' great importance to mankind ; that it ought not to sur- 
" prize us, if we find the most extravagant and exaggerated 
" praises bestowed upon Truth. But Truth supposes 
" mankind: for whom and by whom alone the word is form- 
" ed, and to whom alone it is applicable. If no man, no 
" truth. There is therefore" [Save the mark! There- 
fore !] M no such thing as eternal, immutable, ever- 
" lasting truth ; unless mankind, such as they are at pre- 
M sent," [and, of course, unless " Truth," " the third 
" person singular of the Indicative Trow,"] " be also 
<l eternal, immutable, and everlasting. Two persons may 
" contradict each other, and yet both speak truth : for 
" the truth of one person may be opposite to the truth 
" of another. To speak truth may be a vice as well as 
" a virtue : for there are many occasions where it ought 

not to be spoken." " Diversions of Purley" Part II. 
Chap. v. 

K 



126 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part V. 



§ 25. 44 Right is no other than RECT-tam (Regitum), 
" the past participle of the Latin verb Regere." 

§ 26. " In the same manner our English word Just is 
" the past participle of the verb jubere." 

§ 27- 66 It (Law) is merely the past tense and past 
44 participle of the Gothic and Anglo-Saxon verb 

u and it means (something or any thing, Chose 

44 Cosa, Aliquid) Laid down." 

§ 28. %A Right and J ust action is, such a one as is 
44 ordered and commanded.'" 

§ 29. 64 It appears to me highly improper to say, that 
" God has a Right : as it is also to say, that God is 
" Just. For" [Mark the — reason .'] " nothing is ordered, 
44 directed or commanded concerning God.' 1 

§ 30, " I follow the Law of God (what is laid down by 
44 him for the rule of my conduct) when I follow the Laws 
44 of human nature ; which, without any human testimony, 
" we know must proceed from God : and upon these are 
" founded the Rights of man, or what is ordered for man." 
Part II. Chap. i. 

§ 31. " Those sham Deities Fate and Destiny — ali- 
" quid Fatum, quelque chose Destinee — are merely the past 
" participles of Fari and Destiner." 

§ 32. " Chance * * * and his twin-brother Ao 
" cident, are merely the participles of Fscheoir, Cheoir, 
" and Cadere. * * To say — * It befell me by Chance, 
" or by Accident,' — is absurdly saying — 'It fell by fall- 
" ing. 1 " Ibid. Chap. ii. 

§ 33. But what need to multiply quotations I though 
" Home Tocike" as one not incorrectly says, " has fur- 
" nished a whole magazine of such weapons for any So- 
44 phist" [wise man, etymologically,] 44 who may need them." 
Whatelfs Logic, B. III. § 8. 

§ 34. Now hear the opinion of one who was no bad 
judge in an affair like that to which he is addressing him- 



25-37.; ; - ARGUMENT, A PRIORI:' IRREFRAGABLE. 127 

self. ' : It is in this literal and primitive sense alone/ 1 
we are citing the words of Dugald Stewart, " that, ac- 
" cording to him, (Mr Tooke,) a philosopher is entitled to 
; ' employ it, (any word,) even in the present advanced 
*' state of science; and whenever he annexes to it a mean- 
:i ing at all different, he imposes equally on himself and 
" on others. To me, on the contrary, it appears, that to 
" appeal to etymology in a philosophical argument, (ex- 
" cepting, perhaps, in those cases where the word itself 
" is of philosophical origin) is altogether nugatory ; and 
ifc can serve, at the best, to throw an amusing light on the 
' ; laws which regulate the operations of human fancy. v 
Philosophical Essays. Essay V. ch. ii. 

S 35. We might favour our readers with a good many 
passages from Stezcart which have no tendency to with- 
draw from the literal-and-primitive-sense-method any por- 
tion of the respect which is due to it. But we decline to 
put this philosopher upon the task of further, and in de- 
tail, as it were, slaying the slain. It is only necessary to 
state some things, to render a fuller refutation than the 
statements themselves contain in gremio, wholly a work 
of supererogation. 

§ 36. The author of " The Diversions of Purley" at 
the end of his First Part, assures his readers : " I know 
" for what building I am laying the foundation : and am 
• ; myself well satisfied of its importance.'' It must on all 
hands be admitted, that to work in the dark as to the 
result of one's edification (to pay in coin that should pass 
here, if any where,) is not the most pleasant thing in the 
world, even though what we are building be castles in the 
air. 

§ 37- Thus much as to Home Toohtfs extravagancies. 
And thus much indirectly, at the same time, as to Anti- 
theos's argument derived from the " primary signification 



128 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part V. 

" of the word substratum?'' The thing is verily nothing 
less than " the acme of absurdity." 

§ 38. But our atheist knew well enough what he was 
about. He understood assuredly that the " Argument," 
which maintains that " Infinity of extension," or space, 
i6 is necessarily existing" did not afford any premiss from 
which it could be inferred, by any stupidity, that " Space 
" must have limits and that " there must be some- 
" thing in existence beyond its limits" Antitheos was dis- 
tinctly aware, that he could advance nothing stronger 
than a rush to beat down the reasoning under Proposi- 
tion III. : and therefore, (like many dishonest sophists, 
in circumstances so far analogous,) precisely because he 
could do nothing in the way of refuting, he raises a — a — 
primary signification — a — man of straw, that no one 
could have imagined was ready for the occasion, and laughs 
heartily, he pretends, at the effect this appearance has on 
him, calling on his readers to laugh too. 

Spectatum admissi risum teneatis amici % 

Ars Poetica. 



129 



PART VI. 

THE " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, FOR THE BEING AND ATTRI- 
" BUTES OF GOD," AN IRREFRAGABLE DEMONSTRATION. 

§ 1. We shall suppose that the merriment, whoever 
joined in it, has subsided. And truly with Antitheos it 
lasted not long. The words which we next come to in 
the " Refutation" are far from laughing themselves, what- 
ever the very gravity of some of them may force us to. 
The words alluded to, whenever we enter upon them, ex- 
pose the fact, that, so little satisfied was Antitheos with 
the argument from " the primary signification of the word 
" substratum" the ground he had taken is deserted as 
utterly untenable. 

§ 2. " Should it be contended that the term ought to 
" be understood in its secondary acceptation," — the only 
acceptation, we may mention once for^all, the author of 
the " Argument" ever thought of putting upon it, as An- 
titheos must have been thoroughly assured, — " and that 
" the substratum of the infinity of extension subsists with- 
" in itself, as any material body is said to be the substra- 
" turn of its own extension: — I would remark, that we 
t; know of nothing possessing extension except matter, — 
" nothing else that can stand as an object to which ex- 
" tension may be ascribed as a property ; and that matter, 
" not existing by mathematical" [the word should be me- 
taphysical — vide part. i. § 47, et seq.] " but only by physi- 
u cat necessity, cannot be the substratum referred to. 11 



130 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI? IRREFRAGABLE. [Part VI. 

Ch. VI. Par. 13. Matter, says our atheist, exists by 
physical necessity, that is, it exists because it exists. But 
such necessity is no necessity at all, as might be evident 
even to the understandings of asses, as the Epicureans said, 
on a certain occasion ; and therefore, there is no real ne- 
cessity that we should dwell upon the point. It perfectly 
suffices us, that matter does not exist by metaphysical ne- 
cessity, to-wit, in the sense of it being a contradiction to 
suppose it not to exist. " We know of nothing possess- 
" ing extension except matter," — we were informed, — 
" nothing else that can stand as an object to which ex- 
44 tension may be ascribed as a property." " Material 
44 bodies," as the next sentence has it, (there being many 
of Antitheos's sentences that serve, as a chorus,) 44 mate- 
" rial bodies, comprising all that we do know, or can know 
44 of Being." All easily said. None of it so easily proved 
nevertheless. And whether easily proveable or not, the 
assertions assume the very thing to be proved. But has not 
Antitheos offered us evidence of his right to make the as- 
sumption, that we know of nothing but matter which has 
the property of extension, or that we know of no Being 
but a material body % Not a jot of evidence does he even 
pretend to afford. Then, the thing remains a barefaced 
assumption of the^est part of the whole matter in debate, 
remains, to use an expression of his own, nowhere more 
applicable, "an unproved extravagance. " (Oh. II. par. 15.) 

§ 3. " Hence it is evident, 11 continues our atheist, " that, 
44 in material bodies, comprising all that we do know, or 
44 can know of Being, it is impossible to find any thing that 
44 will serve Mr Gillespie's purpose." Par. 13. Mr Gil- 
lespie will cheerfully admit, that because 44 matter * * 
44 cannot be the substratum referred to" by him, it is quite 
impossible to find any thing that will suit his purpose in 
material bodies. And it is the business of a certain part 
of his work to demonstrate the impossibility. His first 



§§ 3-5.] " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI? IRREFRAGABLE. 131 



Scholium being partly taken up with proving, that " the 
44 Material Universe cannot be the Substratum of Infinity 
" of Extension Supposing the material universe to exist, 
for the Scholium does not assume the thing, except in the 
case (a common — but not a universal — caset) where it 
is admitted ; the Scholium beginning thus, " If, then, it 
" should be maintained, that the Material Universe is the 
" Substratum of Infinity of Extension" — And it cannot 
be maintained that the material universe is that substratum, 
or any substratum, or any thing, unless it be first assumed 
that matter exists. 

§ 4. " Even this impossibility overlooked, however," 
Antitheos goes on, " what is it that next meets our view ? 
" — One substance occupying infinite extension, and ano- 
M ther occupying part of this extension, if not also the 
M whole of it ; in other words, two things at the same 
" time occupying the same space. Theology always 
" entangles its advocates in inextricable absurdities." 
Par. 13. To the same purpose our author writes, farther 
on. " The real existence of matter brings along with it 
" what he,' 1 Mr Gillespie, " is so much afraid of 11 [icken 
there is a good reason] " — namely, the absurdity of two 
M beings at the same time occupying the same space. On 
" this ground let it be remembered that it is not requisite 
" we should demonstrate the infinite extension of the ma- 
" terial universe. In so far as it does extend, it occupies 
4; space ; and, the infinitely extended substance occupying, 
" of course, the whole of space, must occupy that of the 
u material universe as well as any other, — if any other 
" there be. 

§ 5. " Let us suppose for a moment," our antitheist 
continues in the chapter from which we are now quoting, 

t Few, indeed, and those few atheist*, or, at best, but half-thcists, con- 
tend for the existence of matter, in the sense which Antitheos puts 
upon matter : who, by matter, means something which is in no sense 
dependent for its existence on mind. 



132 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part VI. 

44 the being of a substance of infinite expansion, the in- 
44 telligent agent in the production of all things — and all 
^ this is contended for in the 4 Argument 1 " [at the pro- 
per time and place] — what was it to do when perform- 
44 ing the * * feat of creating the universe out of 
44 nothing ? Was it to annihilate so much of its own sub- 
44 stance as would be necessary to make room for matter, 
44 in order to give it verge and scope enough ?t If not, 
44 either matter could not be brought into being, or we 
44 must suffer ourselves to be driven to the conclusion 
44 already shown to be necessary in admitting the very 
44 palpable doctrine of the actual existence of matter." 
Ch. IX. par. 10, 11. 

§ 6. From the work of a very celebrated atheist, cited 
as it is on one occasion, and borrowed from on many 
more, by Antitheos, we shall extract a sentence or two 
which exactly chime with the passages which we have 
just set before the reader. 44 I shall inquire, 11 says the 
author of the famous Systeme de la Nature, 44 if matter 
44 exists ; if it does not at least occupy a portion of space ? 
44 In this case, matter, or the universe, must exclude every 
44 other being*who is not matter, from that place which 
44 the material beings occupy in space." Vol. II. ch. ii. 
Again : 44 Matter certainly occupies a part of space, and 
44 from that part, at least, the Divinity must be excluded." 
44 Appendix 11 to the 44 System of Nature." Ch. xx.| 

§ 7- In all these passages, whether those of Mirabaud 
or rather D^Holbach, or those of Antitheos, it is coolly taken 
for granted, that it is absurd to have (in the words of the 
first of the passages from the 44 Refutation 11 ) 44 two things 
44 at the same time occupying the same space. 11 But this 
which is so conveniently assumed, happens to be the very 

t Give ample room and verge enough. 

Grayh Bard. 

% Vide Appendicem. 



§§ 6-11.] " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. 133 

thing which lay — yea, and still lies, — at our atheist's door 
to be proved. To evince it by arguments which would 
place it beyond the reach of rational question, is abso- 
lutely necessary if atheism be to stand. 

§ 8. We shall at once admit " the absurdity" (we quote 
again from Antitheos) " of two beings at the same time 
" occupying the same space," in the same respect. For 
this would be all one with two beings which were but one 
being : the quality and unity being confounded. A great 
enough absurdity truly. 

§ 9. But that two things may occupy the same space 
at the same time, in different respects, is, I hope, very far* 
from being absurd to suppose. But be it what it may, 
it is nothing less than what the " Argument" has under- 
taken to demonstrate, 

§ 10. But the " Argument" does not set about demon- 
strating that, till it has gotten the length of the second 
Scholium under Proposition IV. And Antitheos himself, 
as we have seen (vide part. ii. § 4.), gives the " Argument -0 
credit for " precision of purpose and exactness of arrange- 
" ment." And therefore, if we, who are standing over 
against nothing farther on than Proposition III., now let 
our readers know how the work in question demonstrates 
that two substances may fill the same space, at the same 
time, but in different respects, it is not because we are under 
any strong necessity of doing so, but only because there 
is nothing to hinder us from following out a thing which 
our atheist has started, out of season as it happens, and 
in an evil hour for himself. 

§ 11. The secret, indeed, has already been divulged : 
and of a truth it will never be easy to make a secret of 
that which must stare one in the face if he but opens his 
eyes and turns them in the proper direction. But in place 
of repeating the words which our reader has been pre- 
sented with in Part III. § 16, we shall here cite the 

L 



134 " ARGUMENT, A PBIOEi;' IRREFRAGABLE. [Part VI. 



ipsissima verba of the Scholium to which reference has 
just been made. 

§ 12. " Scholium II. The parts of Infinity of Exten- 
" sion, or of its Substratum, if it have a Substratum, 
" being necessarily indivisible from each other" (vide 
part, ii. § 27. et part. Hi. § 16.) «****. an a the parts 
" of the Material Universe being divisible from each 
" other * * * : and it, therefore, following that the 
" Material Universe is not the Substratum of Infinity of 
" Extension * * * : Here are two sorts of extension. 
" The one sort, that which the Material Universe has : 
»" And the other, the extension of Infinity of Extension. 
" And AS Infinity of extension is necessarily existing," 
(vide part. ii. § 14. necnon § 9.) " and as the extension 
" of the Material Universe must exist, if it exist, in the 
" extension of Infinity of Extension ; a part of this, or 
" of its Substratum, if it have a Substratum, (part, but 
" in the sense of partial consideration ;" — vide part. ii. 
§ 27. et part. Hi. § 16.) " must penetrate the Material 
44 Universe, and every atom, even the minutest atom, 
" of it." 

§ 13. So, we see how it is easily and very palpably de- 
monstrable, that two things must fill the same space at 
the same time, if matter exist. The two things fill the 
same space in different, in very different respects. They 
fill the same space, the one by penetrating, the other by 
being penetrated : this, (to discriminate nicely, and not too 
nicely,) by filling or occupying the space, that, by con- 
stituting it. 

§ 14. When Antitheos lays down, that it is absurd to 
have in our view " two things at the same time occupy- 
*' ing the same space," he makes no mention of the doc- 
trine of penetration. If he took care to make no mention 
of it, he may justify his silence by pointing to an excel- 
lent reason which was in existence : all the absurdity, if 



§§ 12-19.] " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. 



135 



there was any, disappears whenever penetration is intro- 
duced. There cannot be complete penetration without 
two things filling the same space at one and the same 
time. 

§ 15. Antitheos, we repeat, takes no notice of the doc- 
trine of penetration. He did this, either advisedly, or 
because he could not help it. 

§ 16. If he could not help what he has done, or rather 
what he has not done ; in this particular matter, he was 
not so clear-sighted as was an author whose ideas are not 
seldom turned to good account in the " Refutation." 
M They (the theologians) will * insist," remarks D^Hol- 
bach, " that their God, who is not matter, penetrates that 
" which is matter." System of Nature. Vol. II. ch. ii. 

§ 17- [Our readers may naturally, and very laudably, 
be desirous of being informed what objections the French 
atheist has to urge against the doctrine of the Deity's 
penetrating matter. It is all the more proper to supply 
the information, that our British atheist, so far from ob- 
jecting to the doctrine, does not so much as think it right 
to notice it. In fine, we may with some advantage be- 
stow a little consideration on what the foreigner had ad- 
vanced in opposition to our tenet. 

§ 18. Objection. "It must be obvious, that to pene- 
" trate matter, it is necessary to have some correspondence 
" with matter, consequently to have extent ; now to have 
" extent, is to have one of the properties of matter. 11 — 

§ 19. Reply. But is it proved anywhere in the " System 
of Nature," that because extension is one of the properties 
of matter, therefore whatever has extension — extension, 
which is a true sine qua non of every substance — attri- 
buted to it, is material \ No indeed. Has a vacuum 
(and D^Holbach speaks of a vacuum as quite a possible, 
if not also a really existing thing ;) has a vacuum extent I 
Then, according to the leaning of the objection, a vacuum 
is a plenum. 



136 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part VI. 



§ 20. Objection. " If the Divinity penetrates matter, 
" then He is material/' — 

§ 21. Reply. Any reason given ? None. Then there 
is none to be examined. The assertion itself may very 
correctly be designated, in Antitheos's nervous language, 
" an unproved extravagance. 1 ' Why, if matter is per- 
fectly penetrated by a distinct substance, the presump- 
tion, till something to the contrary be established, seems 
all to be in favour of the penetrating substance being im- 
material. 

§ 22. Objection. " By a necessary deduction He is 
" inseparable from matter." — 

§ 23. Reply. He is not separated from matter, of 
course, so long as HE penetrates it, that is, so long as it 
continues in existence. But no longer. Matter has not 
been proved to have necessary existence. 

§ 24. Objection. " Then if he is omnipresent, he will 
" be in every thing. This the theologian will not allow." 
" System of Nature." Vol. II. ch. ii. 

§ 25. Reply. The theologians of B'Holbactis book 
may not allow it ; but, for all that, every consistent theo- 
logian, and, what is more, every rational man, will allow 
the necessity of the consequent. 

§ 26. And thus we have gone over, and, on his own 
ground, replied to all that the French atheist has object- 
ed to the Deity's penetration of matter. No mighty 
things verily those objections. But since they are all 
that so ingenious and so zealous an objector could bring 
forward, we may depend on't they constitute the full 
strength of his bad cause. 

§ 27- I am led to make a reflection, which seems to 
arise, not altogether so unnaturally, out of the considera- 
tion with which we have just been occupied. What indeed, 
but a passion for atheism, should incite certain to inveigh 
so mightily against the doctrine of penetration in general ! 
And as we are upon the subject, it may not be amiss to 



§§ 20-30.] - : ARGUMENT, A PRIORI? ' IRREFRAGABLE. 137 

observe, that it can but ill become modern natural philo- 
sophers to incline determinately to look with an unfa- 
vourable eye on the doctrine of the penetration of one 
substance by another, even though this latter should be, 
if any thing, immaterial : Modern Natural Philosophers, 
none of whom has yet proved, while many of them are 
confident, it is not proveable, that light itself is material : 
Modern Natural Philosophers, whose experiments and 
investigations have led them to a full belief, that the elec- 
tric fluid is a substance most intimately pervading every 
material substance. Let Antitheos, in the character of a 
natural philosopher, represent the whole body of the phi- 
losophers spoken of. Hear him discourse of the electric 
fluid. 

§ 28. " Should it be demanded — as it is always com- 
" mendable to do on such occasions — what the substance 
" is which we deem to be present in what is usually de- 
" nominated a vacuum, — we may reply — the electric fluid. 
" No substance is capable of excluding it. As water seeks 
" its level, the fluid in question presses every where, that 
M it may be every where present ; and with this ten- 
" dency, IT penetrates, in a manner the most irresistible, 
" every thing that can be opposed to its course." Ch. VII. 
par. 6. 

§ 29. The substance recognised by the name of the 
electric fluid penetrates every material substance. Does 
not this lead the way to help us somewhat to conceive how, 
as it were, it may be that a part of the infinite extension, 
OR of its immaterial substratum, penetrates every sub- 
stance, light and the electric fluid with the rest, which can 
in any manner fall under the cognizance of sense ?] 

§ 30. Whether or not Antitheos saw, 'tis nothing very 
wonderful that he speaks — he does speak — as if he saw 
not, how it is that two things may, without any absurdi- 
ty, be held to occupy the same space at the same time. 



138 " ARGUMENT, A PBIOEI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part VI. 



The demonstration of the penetration of matter, where 
matter exists, is the very Hercules of his Lernsean Hydra. 
Not to see that demonstration in the " Argument," or 
altogether to forget its being there, though the demon- 
stration figures in a scholium of its own ; either of these 
is bad enough. 

§ 31. And there is something else which is as bad ; very 
likely, worse : The doctrine of the penetration of matter, 

is dedutible, by UNDENIABLE CONSEQUENCE, FROM OUR 

atheist's tenets, as they are given by himself. Unfor- 
tunate Antitheos! though one door was somehow shut, 
(at least Antitheos does not say, he saw it open,) to have 
the enemy enter by another, which is not to be closed so 
easily. 

§ 32. We shall produce our antitheist's tenets, and 
afterwards address ourselves to the necessary conse- 
quence of them as associated. 

§ 33. In the first place, then, as specimens of one class 
of tenets, take the following. " Infinity of extension is 
" necessarily existing, — it would be absurd in the ex- 
" treme to deny." Etc. fyc. Vide Part. I. § 34. Again : 
" Take away matter, and you effect the taking off of 
" every thing of which we can form the slightest idea. 
" All is annihilated except space and duration. "t Ch. II. 

t This passage leads me to quote a sentence from a Review of the 
(i Argument, a priori" &c. which made its appearance in a No. of 
" The United Secession Magazine." " Were our minds," says the 
Reviewer, " to make the most extravagant of all possible supposi- 
" tions, and compass the idea of all the material universe, and even 
" (let it be said with deep reverence ) God himself being annihilated ;| 
" still we know it is certain that ' infinity of extension and infinity 
" 1 of duration' would continue to exist.",. " Both these are, in their 
" very nature, independent of all being, even of God himself." The 
author of which may write " Atheist" on his forehead, as soon as he 
can, without running any risk of writing a lie. If we can conceive 
God Himself — to speak with seme, for reverence is altogether out of 

\ Behold another Reviewer harping on the same string in Part I. § 14. 



§§31-34.] • ARGUMENT, A PRIORI" IRREFRAGABLE. 139 



par. 26. Again : " Matter may be regarded as eternal 
;t and space infinite. We must, it is true, award both 
" attributes to the latter." Ch. III. par. 8. To the 
like effect : " We have * a something * * * * 
44 whose non-existence, * * * and so forth, CAN- 
44 NOT BE CONCEIVED : a something, in short, that an- 
u swers to our notions of space." Ibid. par. 12. To the 
same purpose : 44 It is not necessary — not absolutely neces- 
44 sary — that even extension, or space, should have any 
44 substratum or support to its existence whatever." 
Ch. IX. par. 2'.- Also : 44 To make sure of the necessity so 
44 much desired, Mr Gillespie lays hold of the only two 
' : things to which it can at all be made applicable — dura- 
44 tion and space." Ch. XIII. par. 4. Finally, take this : 
44 The NECESSARY existence of infinite space and duration : 
44 none of which propositions were" [or was] 44 ever dis- 
" puted." Vide Part, I § 35. t Thus, infinity of ex- 
tension, infinite space, is plenarily admitted by our author 
to have necessary existence. 

§ 34. We shall, in the second place, bring forward a set 

the question — to be annihilated ; if, in other words, it infer no contra- 
diction to say, He exists not ; and if there be any one thing which 
exists quite independently of God ; what is there in Theology worth 
caring about \ Theology itself becomes a phantasm. 

As another suitable opportunity of noticing that criticism may never 
fall in my way, and as assuredly 'tis worth nobody's while to search 
for one, I shall not quit this disagreeable subject till I deliver some- 
thing of my mind concerning the performance generally. 

Two remarks could not miss occurring to every sensible reader of 
that deplorable Article. The first is, that the Reviewer sticks at no 
dishonesty, however gross. The most shameful misquotations are 
never boggled at ; even though the want of all good faith should shine 
clearly through. The other is, that the writer has no head (any more 
than a heart) equal to such discussions. Every one who has a capa- 
city for topics of that nature, will make the discovery, ere any two 
sentences be read, that, whoever has, the wretched critic has not. 

t See. also, " Refutation," Chup. X. par. 7. 



140 " ARGUMENT, A PMIOBI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part VI. 

of passages that speak a very different language. Accept 
first : " A being existing by necessity is sought for ; that 
"is * * * one whose non-existence it is not in the 
" power of man to imagine * * * * * To seek 
" in nature for such a being ; to ransack the whole universe 
" for it were vain. Among real and known existences 
" it was NO WHERE TO BE found." Ch. I. par. 6. Next 
take : "If such a condition as necessary or self-existence 
" really exists, * * Why can it not be made appli- 
" cable to the material universe" ? Oh. II. par. 21. To 
a similar effect : " Matter does not exist by that necessity 
" which alone is admitted in the argument a priori" 
Ch. V. par. 5. And this : " We may as well go into the 
" hypothesis of a vacuum at once * * * What, 
" then, is a vacuum ? It is space, I presume, without any 
" matter being present at all." Ch. VII. par. 5. Once 
more : " It is as easy to conceive of the non-existence of 
" the thing supposed," (to-wit by Dr Clarke,) " as to 
£c conceive of the non-existence of that of which we are 
" ourselves made up, together with the world we inhabit, 
" and the countless suns and systems occupying space in 
" all directions." Ch. XIII. par. 3. Again : " Gods 
" and devils, angels and spirits, heaven and hell, — sup- 
" posing them all to exist — -could have no claim to ne- 
" cessary existence, since it implies no contradiction to 
" imagine them not to exist" Ch. II. par. 20. And in 
fine: " We can conceive matter not to EXiST."t 
Ibid. Thus, matter is by our atheist completely deprived 
of true necessary existence. 

§ 35. To collect into a focus the very dissimilar, yet 
congruous rays, emitted by that body of light, the " Re- 
" fetation,'' which sends forth no clearer beams than are 
here : In the one set of positions, we have an extension 

f Consider, likewise, Chap. II. par. 24, and Chap. IX. par. 10. 



§^ .3-5-39.; • ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. 141 



which is necessary; in the other set, an extension not 
necessary. 

§ 36. We hasten to the consequence resulting from the 
conjunction of the two kinds of positions. We have an 
extension which is NECESSARY, and we have an extension 

which is NOT NECESSARY. We HAVE, THEREFORE, TWO 
EXTENSIONS WHICH CANNOT BE THE SAME. TWO EX- 
TENSIONS THE ONE WHEREOF CANNOT BE ANY PART OF 

THE OTHER. But a non-necessary extension cannot by 
its presence annihilate any portion of a necessary exten- 
sion. And therefore ; matter — which has the non- 
necessary extension — existing along with, if not contained 
in. the extension which is of infinity — the necessary 
extension ; the infinite extension, or space, must PENE- 
TRATE ; matter must BE PENETRATED, tota, et totaliter. 

§ 37. Such, then, is the conclusion to which we are 
compelled to come by Antitheos's express tenets. And 
wherein does that conclusion differ from the conclusion 
of " Scholium II. V Not in any point at all. 

§ 38. Let the reader give his utmost attention to what 
we have here been urging. For, the doctrine of pene- 
tration demonstrated, atheism falls down, dead as a stone. 
And Antitheos knows this, else he knows but little of any 
moment in the affair. And the best of all, is — never let 
us forget it — the doctrine of penetration necessarily fol- 
lows from his own principles. 

§ 39. So that, to speak in allusion to our atheist's 
words, as they occur in the first of the passages on which 
we have been animadverting, Theology has not entangled 
its advocate in an inextricable absurdity. There is no 
absurdity in the case, but one ; which is this, that our 
author should stand up for the atheistical hypothesis, and 
hold principles from which the first grand principle which 
conducts to Theism, and to nothing else, follows by com- 
plete necessity. 



142 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI? IRREFRAGABLE. [Part VI. 

§ 40. After the words referred to in the preceding 
section, Antitheos goes on thus : " A religious friend who 
" has corresponded with me upon this point, alleges that 
" the substance of the substratum of infinite extension is 
" not material" — Ch. VI. par. 14. To be religious ac- 
cording to our atheist's mode of reckoning, nothing more 
is requisite than to be a theist. On this understanding, 
I can easily help him to another religious friend (a friend 
in the very best sense) who alleges the same thing, name- 
ly, that the substance of the substratum of infinite exten- 
sion is immaterial. And this friend is no other than the 
Author of the " Argument"" himself, who, though, t to 
speak truth, he has not alleged that the substance of the 
substratum of infinite extension is not material, has, if he 
be not sadly mistaken, done much more than merely allege 
that which implies the immateriality of the substance of 
the substratum in question ; and who will persist in think- 
ing he has done so, till some one shall evince, by truly 
valid arguments, that the thought is erroneous. As for 
the " Refutation, ^ of arguments, except those which are 
" a very clever approach"' to shockingly bad ones, it con- 
tains none. The Author of this production, himself, shall 
witness for us, that the " Argument" has undertaken to 
demonstrate what involves the immateriality of the sub- 
stratum of infinity of extension, or expansion. " Admit- 
" ting his (Mr Gillespie's) substratum of space * * * 
" No reason can be assigned why infinity of expansion 
" * * * * should have an immaterial something to 
" keep it in existence, that would not prove" — &c. &c. 
Ch. VII. par. 13. Here it is tacitly assumed, that the 
" Argument'' seeks to reach an immaterial substratum 
of infinity of expansion. So that the " religious friend" 
introduces Antitheos to the front of what may be held, in 
a certain and a good sense, and to his opprobrium, alas ! 
as the very asses' bridge of the demonstration. Observe, 



§§ 40-41.] " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. 143 



then, Antitkeos's " footing" and bearing, as he prepares 
to make the leap, and pass the bridge. Get clear of it 
he must ; or else it will roll over on him, and crush his 
atheism into powder. Observe, I repeat, how the passage 
is to be effected. Behold, he springs aloft — •" But this 
? is mere babble.'''' Immediately I hear all my readers 
loudly accuse me of having omitted something. But I 
assure you, not one word has been missed. Then surely 
something follows. True ; but what is to come you will 
not think mends the matter. — 44 This is mere babble ; 
4k something he has been taught to repeafc, — not the dic- 
44 tate of his sounder judgment." — And why so ? — •" Sub- 
44 stance and matter are the same. The words are syno- 
44 nymous and convertible" — in the sense of the words 
mutually exhausting each other, Antitheos means. Yes, 
the words are convertible in that sense, IF the barely 
assuming the thing our atheist had to prove, the mere 
uttering of an 44 unproved extravagance," be all that is 
necessary to be done in the affair. Vide supra, § 2. 
44 When," our antitheist proceeds, 44 used otherwise" (than, 
to-wit, as merely convertible words) 44 they become unin- 
44 telligible ; inasmuch as we might, then talk of an unsub- 
44 stantial substance and immaterial matter." Par. 14. 
ZTw-substantial substance ; namely, substance that is not 
substance ! Tw-material matter ; to-wit, matter which 
is not matter ! Unintelligible indeed. And as such we 
hand them over to our materialist's tender mercies. 

§ 41. (One word in relation to the latter unintelligibi- 
lity. There is no opinion, however extravagant, but has 
had its advocates in the world, no assertion so wild as 
not to have been made by some philosopher. t Antitheos 
holds, and who is he who will think, Antitheos does not 
rightly hold ? that to talk of im-material matter is to talk 
unintelligibly. But attend. A very celebraflfjd main- 

t Nihil est tarn absnrdum quod non aliquix £ Philo$o]>hi$ asserat. — Tully. 



144 " ARGUMENT A PRIORI;' IRREFRAGABLE. [Part VI- 

tainer of the materiality of mind, had also been an advo- 
cate for the immateriality of matter. Dr Priestley, in his 
" History of Discoveries relating to Vision, Light, and 
" Colours," declares for the " scheme of the immate- 
" riality op matter, as it may be called" And we shall 
not take upon us to say, that he so declares himself with 
less reason on his side than he has when he appears, and 
he appears throughout his " Disquisitions on Matter and 
" Spirit" as a sworn friend to the materiality of mind. 
From matter \ this Doctor says, in the latter work, (vol. i. 
p. 144, 2d edit.) he has " wiped off the reproach" [a long 
standing one] " of being * * absolutely incapable of 
" intelligence." Which perhaps he had accomplished all 
the more easily, if matter be immaterial,) 



\ 



145 



PART VII. 

THE " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, FOR THE BEING AND ATTRI- 
" BUTES OF GOD," AN IRREFRAGABLE DEMONSTRATION. 

§ 1. The next paragraph in the '^Refutation" com- 
mences thus : " But, to refer to the first Proposition, — 
" has it not been demonstrated that infinity of extension 
" exists necessarily ? — that it exists, per se, by the most 
" abstract and metaphysical necessity ?" Ch. VI. par. 15. 
By the way, here we have the right word, i. e. " meta- 
physical" : Though no farther back than the thirteenth 
paragraph, we had " mathematical," the wrong one. Vide 
Part. VI. § 2. Antitheos in a certain place speaks of a 
" magic rod" possessed by " the reasoners for the being 
" of a God according to the argument a priori who 
are said to " work miracles with" " necessity" which is the 
name of the rod. (See last Chapter, sixth paragraph.) 
A magic rod it must be : and no mistake. But I am of 
opinion, that our author's magical powers, whether they 
are centred in a rod or no, should be presumed, notwith- 
standing his confirmed distaste to the supernatural, to be 
nowise inferior to those resident in the rod of the a priori 
reasoners noticed. To turn, when one likes, what is me- 
taphysical necessity into " mathematical," and the mathe- 
matical back again into " metaphysical necessity" ; im- 
plies, me think s, a stretch of power equal, and indeed su- 
perior, to the virtue ascribed by him to our magic rod. 



146 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI;' IRREFRAGABLE. [Part VII. 

We, he says, " work miracles" Whereas, he works an 
impossibility, and that's more than a miracle. 

§ 2. It has been demonstrated, that infinity of exten- 
sion exists necessarily. So the first question is answered. 
It has not been, and what is more, it never will be, de- 
monstrated that infinity of extension exists per se. So 
Antitheos has his second question replied to, but not affir- 
matively. " The first Proposition" maintains the neces- 
sary existence of infinite extension ; but determines no- 
thing concerning the topic whether that extension exists 
by itself or not. In the language of the note upon Pro- 
position I : " The proposition affirms that there is Infi- 
" nity of Extension, but affirms nothing more?' 1 See " Ap- 
pendix" to the " Argument." t 

§ 3. After putting the two interrogatories which we 
have answered in so satisfactory a manner, our atheist 
asks : " In what sort of predicament, then, must that 
" reasoning appear, which gives up a leading and univer- 
" sally admitted truth by placing it in a questionable 
" position ?" The reasoning that does so must appear, 
and, which is more, must really be, in an ill predicament 
indeed. This much may be held as settled. But the 
" then ;" the significant particle which insinuates that 
" that reasoning" is Mr Gillespie's ; — " there's the rub." 
But we come to the proof of the justness of the insinua- 
tion. " Mr Gillespie s dilemma recognises, at least, the 
" possibility of infinite extension requiring a substra- 
" turn to support it — infinite extension, which is itself 
" necessary !" Yea : Mr Gillespie s dilemma, or dis- 
junctive proposition, does recognise such a possibility ; 
and, what is a longer journey in the same direction, the 
first Proposition of Part III. is, inter alia, taken up in 
demonstrating that " Infinity of Expansion" or Extension 
" cannot exist by itself," that, on the contrary, " Infinity 
t Puta Part. X. § 88. not. f. 



2-4.] • ARGUMENT, A PRIORI" IRREFRAGABLE. 147 

" of Expansion subsists not without a Substratum or 
" Being." Mr Gillespie, then, in his dilemma, and out 
of it too, fully " recognises, at least, the possibility^ of in- 
;1 finite extension," " which is itself necessary," " requir- 
ing a substratum" — We shall not say a " substratum 
" to support it," that is, a substratum to be a substratum. 
Infinite extension is itself necessary. But then, it is not 
necessary that infinite extension exist per se : At least, 
this has not been shewn to follow from the other posi- 
tion ; or, moreover, from any thing else. The positions. 
Infinity of extension exists necessarily, and, Infinity of 
extension exists per se ; though it has pleased Antitheos 
to treat them as if they expressed much about the same 
thing, are positions of a widely different character. The 
latter one is no more necessarily Wke because the former 
is so, than it is necessary, that because there are such 
things as vain assertions cemented together so as to form 
weak arguing, therefore the vain assertions should exist 
per se. Only conceive vain assertions that never proceeded 
from any idle tongue, or unfortunate pen ! that never 
existed, consequently, but by themselves ! hanging in the 
pure per se state — wherever you please ! without even a 
Refutation to reside in ! The 

Words congeal'd in northern air/f 

are not so badly off, though they must submit to be heard 
at the thaw, as those assertions must be. Words frozen 
in the atmosphere must first have been uttered. And 
yet, though there cannot be vain assertions that never 
were made, it is perfectly true there is an abundance of 
the commodity in the world — to try our patience. Some 
very vain assertions are not so far to seek either ; al- 
though we mention no place. 

§ 4. u Mr Gillespie 's dilemma recognises, at least, the 
t Hudibras. Part I. Canto i. 



148 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part VII. 

" possibility of infinite extension requiring a substratum 
" to support it — infinite extension, which is itself neces- 
" sary ! How is this V I think, we have told him. And, 
for his comfort, he shall be told yet farther. 

§ 5. " Was it found," demands our antitheist in con- 
tinuation, " that although space possessed a few of the 
" Divine attributes, it did not possess all, nor any thing 
" like all that were deemed needful to constitute a 
" respectable deity ? Notwithstanding appearances, I 
" should hope not. But. at any rate, we are again landed 
" in a quagmire of absurdity — the absurdity of supposing 
" a thing to be dependent and independent at the same 
- ' time. If space must be conceived a priori necessary, to 
" talk of a substratum being necessary in the same sense 
" of the word is nonsense." Par. 15. What (ioesAnti- 
theos here understand by the word " space V Without 
an accompanying word, or phrase, to determine the ex- 
act sense it is to bear, space always is rather an ambigu- 
ous term. Different schools of philosophy have employed 
it to stand for very different things. 

§ 6. And it will be of singular use in clearing matters, 
if we present an enumeration of the different things un- 
derstood by philosophers when they are treating of space. 
— In explaining the various ideas which have been enter- 
tained, one thing shall be carefully attended to : We shall 
take pains not to represent those opinions from which we 
dissent through the medium of our own belief on the sub- 
ject. The inquiry is to be, What do philosophers mean 
by space ? And should we presuppose, at least should 
our exposition assume, that space stands for some parti- 
cular thing exclusively, the representation of the senti- 
ments of certain could hardly be given with fairness. In 
fine, though we have a fixed bias in this matter, we shall 
endeavour, while we deliver what others think, to proceed 
as if we had no preconceived notions at all. 



§3 5-7.] " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. 149 



§ 7. A few remarks, also, shall be thrown out, intended 
to shew that of the various opinions some approach nearer 
to the truth than do others. Where notions are most 
completely opposed, the object viewed by the minds in 
possession of them cannot possibly be the same, or if there 
be not more objects than one, the sentiments cannot pos- 
sibly all be correct. 'Tis certain enough, that the reports 
brought us, as to what space is, disagree in the most fun- 
damental points. — With regard to the exposition, we shall 
not take space to stand for any one thing more than for 
any other. But when we pass to the animadversions, we 
shall, on the contrary, by all means assume that space is 
space ; that space is nothing more than space, and no- 
thing less. An assumption which, doubtless, we are well 
entitled to make : And one that will be found to carry a 
great deal with it — A thing you may naturally incline to. 
consider as remarkable. But true it is, that so simple 
an act as holding so many of the conceits concerning 
space up to the light of the axiom, space is space, is to 
lay bare their extreme emptiness. — The digression as a 
whole, in short, will be useful, inasmuch as it will go to 
determine whether there be in nature space without 
matter, and. if there be, what space without respect to 
body is. And besides the general purpose it is designed 
to serve, parts of the digression (we seek not to conceal 
it) will be attended with no inconsiderable collateral ad- 
vantage to our cause. 



M 



150 



OF THE SENTIMENTS OF PHILOSOPHERS CONCERNING 
SPACE. — M. DES CARTES, MRS. COCKBURN, ETC. 

§ 8. — I. Some philosophers have considered Space to 
be a substance. These may be divided into two classes. 
First ; those who hold Matter and Space to be the same. 
Second ; those who contend that Space is a substance, 
and is distinct from matter. 

§ 9. — 1. Des Cartes having defined extension to be the 
essence of matter, and thus made extension and matter 
to be the same, could admit of no space void of body, 
could not admit, in other words, of there being space 
which is not material. A consequence of the definition 
is, that the material universe is infinitely extended : The 
idea of the infinity of extension no man who reflects on 
the subject can get quit of ; and, therefore, if extension 
be matter, matter is without bounds. " Puto" says Car- 
tesius, " implicare contradictionem, ut mundus sit finitus." 
["I take it to involve a contradiction to say, the material 
" universe is finite," i. e. in extent.] Epist 69. Partis 
prima?. And to reduce the position, Matter is finitely 
extended, to a contradiction, this ingenious theist had 
nothing but his own vain definition, namely, Matter is 
extension, and extension is matter. What else under 
the sun, or above, could he have ? 

§ 10. We shall introduce a passage from a rather in- 
genious author. " Some (I^nean Des Cartes and his fol- 
" lowers) confounding the ideas of extension and body have 
" by this * * been led to assert the absolute infinity 
" even of the material universe ; tho' they could not but 



§§ 8-12.] SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 151 

" at the same time be sensible that their hypothesis in 
" some sense rendered matter or body a necessary being. 
" by depriving the Deity both of the power of creating 
" a finite whole at the first, and of afterwards annihilating 
" any part.'' ; ' An Impartial Enquiry into the Existence 
" and Nature of God," &c. By S. C. (S. Colliber.) 
B. II. Part ii. ch. 2. — I add, that if extension, or space, 
and matter are to be confounded, matter must have been, 
as well as must be, eternal, and is also necessary in the 
sense of it inferring a contradiction to say, it does not 
exist ; unless we will have it, that all extension began 
sometime to be, and can be imagined not to be at all. 
There can be space without matter, or body : else, body 
is eternal, nay necessarily existing, that is, cannot be sup- 
posed non-existent. 

§ 11. — 2. The opinion has been entertained by some, 
that there is Space apart from matter, and that Space 
without matter is, itself, a substance. Under this head, 
we may notice, in the first place, their notion who tell us, 
that Space void of body is a kind of intermediate sub- 
stance ; neither body nor mind, but a something between 
the two. And in the next place, the sentiment of those 
who are willing to be held as maintaining, that Space is 
God. 

§ 12. — (1.) The notion that Space is a peculiar sort of 
being, a substance between body and spirit, has been 
adopted by divers writers of no very remote period. A 
distinguished female metaphysician expresses herself in 
the following manner. " I see no absurdity in supposing, 
" that there may be other substances, than either spirits 
" or bodies. ******** There should 
" be in nature some being to fill up the vast chasm be- 
" twixt body and spirit. * * * * What a gap be- 
: ' twixt senseless material, and intelligent immaterial sub- 
" stance, unless there is some being, which, by partaking 



152 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



[Part VII. 



" of the nature of both, may serve as a link to unite them, 
" and make the transition less violent ? And why may 
u not Space be such a being ? Might we not venture to 
" define it, an immaterial unintelligent substance, the place 
" of bodies, and' of spirits, having some of the properties 
" of both V* Mrs Cockburris Works. Birch's Edit. vol. i. 
p. 390-l.t 

§ 13. This lady writes as if body and spirit were two 
distinctly different kinds of substance, and as if intelligence 
was the peculiar attribute of spirit. Senseless material 
substance, and intelligent immaterial substance ; thus she 
distinguishes : And alluding as she does to the violence 
of that transition which passes from the one substance to 
the other, she represents the substances as being sepa- 
rated by a mighty and irremoveable gulf. She, good 
woman, had not learned the secret (it was yet — possibly, 
it still is — undivulged) how to wipe off from matter the 
reproach of being miserably ill qualified for sustaining 
the heavy burden of thought. ( Vide Part. VI. § 41.^ 
Her distinction and representation we are disposed to 
commend. And as for her ignorance of the secret ; — 
probably she was wiser without the knowledge. 

§ 14. But now to what is to us the important part in 
the quotation, the statement, to-wit, of her opinion, that 
space is a substance, an unintelligent substance, yea an im- 

t Mrs Catherine Cochburn was the author of " A Defence of Mr 
Locke's Essay," and other acute and excellent performances. The 
Defence was much prized by the incomparable author defended. She 
was also in high favour, on account of her writings, with Dr Thomas 
Burnet, Bishop of Salisbury, and the giant-minded Warburton : — Each 
of these Prelates supplied a preface to a production of her pen. Dr 
Thomas Sharp, Archdeacon of Northumberland, carried on a contro- 
versy with Mrs Cockburn, as to the true foundation of morality. She 
surely was an honour to her sex. — The words quoted in the text, oc- 
cur in her " Remarks upon some writers in the Controversy concern- 
" ing the Foundation of Moral Virtue and Moral Obligation." 



§§ 13-17.] SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 153 

material substance. (Of a truth, that space void of matter 
— which is what she means by space — is ^Tra-material, 
none can deny.) By what arguments does Mrs Cockburn 
pretend to evince, that her opinion has foundation in the 
nature of things ? I find only one argument in that pas- 
sage, and no more than one other in all her writings. 

§ 15. The argument occurring in the passage quoted, 
infers the truth of the hypothesis embraced, from the ad- 
vantage attending it. Space, argues Mrs Cockburn, u by 
" partaking of the nature of both" " senseless (or unin- 
" telligent) material, and intelligent immaterial sub- 
" stance" 

§ 16. But we must break in, to remark how it comes 
about that Space is invested with " some of the proper- 
" ties of both" spirit and body. Why is Space thus in- 
vested ? Because it is immaterial and unintelligent. Had 
it been said, that, seeing Space is not matter, and is des- 
titute of intelligence, an attribute this of spirit, Space is 
not body and lacks a property of spirit ; there had been 
nothing very objectionable. But as the lady's words 
stand, the only ' property' bestowed on spirit is ^-mate- 
riality — a cold negation ; and the only 1 property 1 thrown 
over to body is ^-intelligence — a mere privation too. 
To return from this interruption, which, we may say, was 
forced upon us, and for which we humbly beg pardon of 
Mrs Cockburn : — 

§ 17. She argues, we repeat, that Space, by partaking 
of the nature of both unintelligent material, and intelli- 
gent immaterial substance, is useful in the realm of na- 
ture, inasmuch as it serves as a connecting link, and takes 
off all that can be taken from the violence of the transi- 
tion, between substances separated by such a " vast 
chasm." — Space, in short, connects intelligence and non- 
intelligence, matter and not-matter. But if there be a 
connecting link between matter and no matter, intelli- 



154 SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. [Part VII. 



gence and no intelligence : why might we not extend the 
principle, and introduce a connecting link between exis- 
tence in general, itself, and non-existence ; by way of ren- 
dering the transition from the one to the other less vio- 
lent ? But shall we indeed be ever able to say, without 
violence to truth, that the great gulf betwixt non-exist- 
ence and existence 

Tamely endured a bridge of wondrous length 1 f 

§ 18. The other argument to which allusion was made, 
is not, indeed, intended to evidence, that Space is an un- 
intelligent substance : and as for immateriality, space 
without matter is immaterial all the world over. This 
second argument is intended to evidence no more than 
that Space is a substance. But then, if it really render 
this much apparent, it will do a great deal. The argu- 
ment in question is contained in these words : " The idea 
" of space is not the idea of extension, but of something 
" extended" % Remarks. 

§ 19. Now if this argument be to go for any thing at 
all, it will obviously go for something very weighty. Thus 
it deserves our serious consideration. 

§ 20. Space , the argument implies, is not extension, but 
something, that is, a substance, extended. 

§ 21. But if Space be an extended substance, Duration 
may be, on the same ground, an enduring substance. The 
two things are in the same predicament. Space and 
Time are each a sine qua non of every thing else. The 
non-existence of either cannot be conceived. They are 
both limitless. They are, in fine, on a footing of equality 

t Paradise Lost. B. II. „ 

\ Who shall decide, when doctors disagree 1 
And who shall decide, when Doctors differ from ladies % " If Space 
" and Dm-ation * * * be not (as His plain they are not) themselves 
" substances'" — Br SI. Clarke's Ans. to 5th Letter. 



§§ 18-25. 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



155 



in every essential respect. And if bare space be a sub- 
stance, it will be necessary to assign a sufficient reason 
why bare duration is not. It will be consequentially ne- 
cessary, and absolutely impossible. 

§ 22. This is an argument from the consequence. The 
next shall be an argument from the state of the fact. 

§ 23. Space is a substance having extension : This the 
lady's argument involves. Now the hypothesis, that ex- 
tension is an attribute of space, takes, of necessity, cog- 
nizance of two things, — the substance extended, and the 
extension thereof. But though the hypothesis does so, 
do we ? This is an appeal to consciousness, and as the 
court applied to is competent to take the case in hand, 
so, it need scarcely be said, no other tribunal is qualified. 
Do we (I say) in conceiving space, — as we conceive a thing 
being, do we conceive, in addition, a thing having, exten- 
sion ? How, and wherein is space, the substratum ex- 
tended, distinguishable from extension, the property of 
space \ The plain and simple truth is, space, the sub- 
stratum, and extension, the property, are not distinguish- 
able at all. W^sonceive only one extension, only one 
space. 

§ 24. So much for the argument from the fact. Now 
for an argument from the icord. 

§ 25. Space just means extension or expansion. " The 
M words Space, Extension, Amplitude, and Expansion 
" are," says the author of the Impartial Enquiry, " no- 
** thing different, neither in their genuine signification 
M nor in their original use" 1 ' — " whatever distinction is 
" wont to be assigned is merely arbitrary." See his Dis- 
course concerning the Nature of Space. 

§ 25. Sjiace, then, is merely another term for extension. 
And therefore, to say, Space is something which is extend- 
ed, or which is extension, is all one with saying, Exten- 
sion is something which is space. Which propositions 



156 SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. [Part VII. 



are indeed nothing more than the truth, in one view of 
matters, viz. that in which the propositions are beheld as 
truisms : But, according to our lady's mode of reckoning 
what are equivalents, are tantamount to these proposi- 
tions : — Space is something (in the former equivalent pro- 
position it ran, which is — but now it becomes) which has, 
or possesses, extension ; and, Extension is something (for- 
merly, which is — at present) which has, or is invested with, 
space. But if simple space (in short) be not only exten- 
sion, or space, but likewise a something or a substance 
possessing space ; then, assuredly, simple space is some- 
thing more than simple space. And we have already ar- 
ranged, that we are not to permit any person to depart 
from us with the impression, that space is any thing more 
than space. Vide supra, § 7- 

§ 26. It may be remarked, in approaching the termi- 
nation of this department of the subject, that space or ex- 
tension without any matter filling it, may by all means 
he connected with a substance. But if it be, the circum- 
stance will not make out, that mere space is, of itself, a 
substance. The very reverse, indeed. S^ace supposing a 
substance, is another thing, truly, from space being one. 

§ 27- Space, then, so far forth as it is space only, can- 
not be a substance. To elevate it to the rank of sub- 
stance, is to change its identity. Before the dignity at- 
taching to the nature of substance will sit easy upon space, 
we must metamorphose that which is space into that 
which space resides in. 

§ 28. We have, in all this, confined ourselves to one 
line of arguing. But the reader may consider, at this 
point, something which occurs in the third section, above. 

§ 29. — (2.) As the notion which we have just consi- 
dered regards Space as unintelligent, so the opinion next 
to be noticed views it as an intelligent substance. 

§ 30. Dr SI. Clarke has an observation on " the weak- 



§§ 26-30.] 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



157 



" ness of such, as have presumed to imagine Infinite Space 
11 to be a just representation or adequate idea of the Es- 
" sence of the Supreme Cause." t The observation oc- 
curs under his 4th Proposition : Which runs thus : — 
" What the Substance OR Essence* of that Being, 11 [or Sub- 
stance — Vide Part. V. § 10.] " which is Self-Existent, 

t Is there no confounding here of the objective and subjective \ 
of space and our idea of it 1 To fail in preserving the distinction be- 
tween object and subject, was no uncommon thing in the Doctor's age. 
The full consequences of the failure were rendered very apparent in 
the age which preceded ours. But though the Doctor sometimes un- 
fortunately lost his ideas in things, and changed, in spite of nature, 
things into ideas, yet, set him upon it, he could condemn all confusion 
in regard to the external and internal. The following passage may 
be admired, consistently, by the most finical stickler for the metaphy- 
sics which proceed " on the principles of Common Sense." — " The 
u principal occasion or reason of the confusion and inconsistencies, which 

• appear in what most writers have advanced concerning the nature 
" of Space, seems to be this : that (unless they attend carefully,) men 
u are very apt to neglect that necessary distinction, ^without which 
" there can be no clear reasoning,) which ought always to be made 
" between Abstracts and Concretes, such as are Immensitas and Immen- 
" sum ; and also between Ideas and Things, such as are the notion 
u (whicii is within our own mind) of Immensity, and the real Immensity 

* actually existing without us." Correspondence with Ldbnitz. Note in 
5th Reply. 

X The Doctor employs these two words as perfectly synonymous, 
and entirely convertible. This will be very plain to him who reads 
what is under this 4th Proposition. In which, the Doctor, when 
speaking in relation to God — the Self-Existent, Necessarily-Exist- 
ing — Supreme Being — Substance — Cause, — uses, no less than five 
times, (as we have denoted,) substance and essence as expressing exac tly 
the same thing : To say nothing of his employing, more than once, 
the two words indifferently, when treating concerning other things or 
beings. So that we may cite, as completely applicable to the present 
case, a marginal note in his Preface to " The Evidences of Natural 
u and Revealed Religion." — " In this whole question, the word Es- 
u sence is not to be taken in the proper metaphysical sense of the word, 
" as signifying that by which <i thiny is what it is. * * * * But Essence, 
" is all along to be understood, as signifying here the same with Sub- 
u stance." 

N 



158 SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. [Part VII. 



" or Necessarily-Existing, is ; we have no idea, neither is 
" it at all possible for us to comprehend it." The pro- 
position lays down, that of the substance of God we have 
no idea : The observation sets an eye on those who, con- 
trariwise, imagined that we have an idea of such sub- 
stance ; — that our idea of infinite space — not infinite 
space itself, as Clarke has it — is the idea of the substance 
of God. The great Rector of St James's, then, knew of 
persons who laboured in trying to represent space to be 
the substance of the Divine Being. 

§ 31. " Some," says Leibnitz, " have believed it (real 
" absolute space) to be God Himself.' 1 Third Paper to 
Clarke, 3. 

§ 32. And Bishop Berkeley, good Bishop Berkeley, ,t no 
bad judge he of the sentiments of others, and -no lover of 
language deficient in precision, speaks of " that danger- 
" ous dilemma, to which several, who have employed their 
" thoughts on this subject, imagine themselves reduced ; 
" to-wit, of thinking either that real space is God, or else 
" that there is something beside God which is eternal, 
" uncreated, infinite, indivisible, immutable." — "It is cer- 
" tain," continues the Bishop, " that not a few divines, 
P as well as philosophers of great note, have, from the 
" difficulty they found in conceiving either limits or an- 
" nihilation of space, concluded it must be Divine" viz. 
a Divine Substance : for, observe, his view here is directed 
to those who put forth, " that real space is God. 11 " And 
" some of late have set themselves particularly to shew, 
" that the incommunicable attributes of God agree to it.' 1 
Principles of Human Knowledge, Sect. OX VII. Thus 
far Bishop Berkeley. 

§ 33. We shall seize this favourable opportunity, to 
vindicate the memory of a writer not so much known now 

t To Berkeley, every virtue under heaven. 

Pope — Epilogue to the Satires. 



§§ 31-35.] SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



159 



as once he was. Against the respectable author whom 
we have in our eye, has a serious accusation been brought 
by Dr Isaafr Watts. A great lover of truth was the 
Doctor : And if he be detected making a wrong state- 
ment, we can have no difficulty in ascribing the false re- 
presentation to the true source, and may rest most tho- 
roughly contented that he knew no better himself. 

§ 34. The charge which the Doctor's pen was trusted 
to drop flows in this manner : — " Mr Raphson, a great 
" mathematician, has written a book on this theme, De 
M Spatio Reali,f wherein he labours to prove that this 
" space is God Himself, going all along upon this suppo- 
;; sition, that space is and must be something real ; and 
" then his reason cannot find an idea for it below God- 
" head." Philosophical Essays. Essay I. Sect. iv. 

§ 35. But this testimony is not borne out by the fact : 
Mr Raphsons book neither labours to prove, nor so much 
as simply affirms, a thing so very absurd as the assertion, 
that space is God. The 13th proposition in Mr Raph- 
soii's demonstration concerning space is : " Spatium est 
" attributum (viz. immensitas) Prima Causa?" [" Space 
•• is an attribute (or it is the immensity) of the First Cause."] 
See Cap. V. And it is not in one place only of his book, 
this great mathematician maintains, that space, infinite 
space or immensity, is nothing more than an attribute of 
the Supreme Being. J So very far was he from giving 

t Published at London, in mdcxcvii. 

X The following words occur in the Dedication : — " Dc Spatio Reali 
u * * mbseqvens tract atvs ayit ******** (ptatenus 
" * Suprerni Entis infinitum sit ct antemum Attributum." In Cap.vi. 
these passages are to be found : " Sjiathim reale et infantum, seu invisi- 
** bilem Mam et incorporearn tS Infinite extensionem, ipsam immensitatem 
" esse Prima Causa," &c. " Amplitudo extensionis infinita, immaisam in 
" Prima. Causa essendi diffusionem, seu infinitam illius, vereq; intcrmina- 
" tarn, essentiam, cxprimit." 



160 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. Part. VII. 



any countenance to the monstrous position with which 
Dr Watts has connected his name.t 

§ 36. Before losing sight of our mathemafician, and of 
our metaphysician, we shall note, by way of setting mat- 
ters farther right, that the Reverend accuser (at least 
during one stage of his life — vide part. x. § 57-) went 
nearer than Joseph Raphson did, to making Space to be 
God. In the very same paragraph wherein the mathe- 
matician's sentiment is misrepresented, the metaphysi- 
cian hath these words : " Indeed, if space be a real thing 
" existent without us, it appears to bid fair for Deity." 
See also the title to the Essay. Vide Part. X. § 10. 
Vide quoq; § 24. et § 34. ejusdem Part. 

§ 37. All this trouble, a desire to do justice, and a 

regard to truth, compelled us to take. 

§ 38. We have shewn, that Space cannot be a Sub- 
stance. Vide supra^ § 21. et seq. usq; ad § 28. inclus. If 
Space cannot be a Substance, it cannot be a substance in 
possession of intelligence. All that we shall now do, is, 
to add something additional, upon the topic of the impos- 
sibility of Space having intelligence, or being God. 

§ 39. By God, — at the very least we must mean, if we 
mean any thing, an intelligent, moral Being, or a Being 
with the attributes of intelligence, wisdom, goodness, holi- 
ness, &c. &c. How, then, can Space be God ? how can Ex- 

t Watts has fallen into another mistake : and as we are in the way 
of rectifying blunders at any rate, we shall not leave his readers on a 
wrong scent as to a second notorious misconception in relation to 
Raphson's book. Wherein, affirms the Doctor, the author goes " all 
" along upon this supposition, that space," to-wit, space distinct from 
matter, " is and must be something real." But what is the truth 1 
Hear Mr Raphson speak for himself. The title of " Cap. IV." is as 
follows : Ci Spatium reale a materia distinctum in rerum naturd dari, 
" rationibus e naturd mundi materialis, i$c. petitis, demonstratur." And 
the Chapter commences in this manner : " Hisce proemissis, ad rem ip- 
" sam (soil, spatium reale a materia distinctum) evincendam tandem 
" venimus." &■ c. $ c. 



§§ 36-10.] 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



161 



tension without matter, be wise and good ? Space, for 
aught that has been proved, or that appears, to the con- 
trary, may COEXIST with those attributes : It may be the 
mode of a Substance, of which they are modes too. But 
how can space, extension void of body, vacuum, be intel- 
ligent, and wise, and good, and holy % To say, that space 
is intelligent, wise, good, holy, is to say what virtually 
implies, that space, and intelligence, and wisdom, and 
goodness, and holiness, are coexisting things, but it is 
not to say what implies any thing more — if the assertion 
is to be supposed to have really any proper meaning. 
Space is nothing but Space. But Intelligence is some- 
thing which is NOT Space. Therefore, if space itself 
were intelligence, space would not be space. Though 
Space and Intelligence may well be allowed to be coexist- 
ences, you cannot sink and lose the one in the other, 
without absurdity. But you sink and lose them in each 
other, whenever you make them more than coexistences. 
And they are more than coexistences, if space is intelli- 
gence. And Space is Intelligence, if it be true that space 
is intelligent, true, in any other sense than that involved 
in the position, They are coexistences. 

§ 40. " Space," observes Clarke, " is not a Being, an 
M eternal and infinite Being, but a property, or a conse- 
" quence of the existence of a Being infinite and eternal. 
" Infinite Space, is Immensity : But Immensity is not 
" God: And therefore Infinite Space, is not God." Third 
Reply to Leibnitz, 3. Again. " Infinite Space, is nothing 
** else but abstract Immensity or Infinity ; even as Infinite 
" Duration is abstract Eternity. And it would be just 
" as proper, to say that Eternity is the essence," [or sub- 
stance — vide supra not. + apud § 30.] " of the Supreme 
" Cause ; as to say, that Immensity is so." Demonstra- 
tion : under Prop. IV. — These observations are deserving 



162 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. [Part VII. 



of being pondered, and with the reflections to which 
such observations should give birth, we cannot be too fa- 
miliar. 

§ 41. In connection with what we have said, that, for 
aught which has been shewn, or appears, to the contrary, 
space — we shall here say, infinite space — may co-exist 
with intelligence, wisdom, &c. ; we are desirous of answer- 
ing a question put forth by Antitheos, whom, in the mean 
time, we would not forget altogether. " How infinite ex- 
" tension," these are Antitheos's words, " or infinite dura- 
" tion, or a compound of both — if a compound of this 
" nature can be imagined — "(I am sure it cannot — ) " or 
" how even a substratum of these abstractions^ — supposing 
" such substratum — can afford a medium for the exist - 
" ence of intelligence, power, and freedom of agency, 
" passes all understanding." — " Can we describe," de- 
mands our atheist, " how it is possible for intelligence to 
ei pervade all space — 9 * * * * * 

" Mr Gillespie talks of a substance, it is true, a being of 

" infinity of expansion, &c." . Chap. XII. par. 1 

& 2. To Antitheos , s question, How can intelligence per- 
vade all space ? I shall respond by a counter interro- 
gation. But first, I must set down two or three words 
of his own, by way of a sort of fulcrum, whereby and 
wherefrom to loosen the foundations of his materialism, or, 
should these remain unshaken, it will be because his 
atheism totters to its base. " Intelligence *, speaking ge- 
" nerally, is," asserts Antitheos, in the 4th paragraph of 
Chapter XI. " nothing more than an accidental property 
" of matter." Now my question is this : Does matter pos- 
sess extension ? No doubt, — • Antitheos has already in- 

t The word in the " Kefutation" is " attractions obviously a mis- 
print. The sense (perhaps the nonsense — vide part. i. § 8.) requires 

abstractions. 



§§ 41-44. 1 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



163 



formed us. Vide Part. VI. § 2. Wherefore, intelligence 
being a property of what has extension, intelligence per- 
vades what has extension. For how can intelligence be 
a property of matter, but by pervading matter ? The 
thing is clear enough. But what is meant by pervading 
matter, is, co-existing with matter. 

§ 42. Then — (I see Antitheos tremble for his atheism, 
as well he may — ) if intelligence can co-exist with matter, 
or solid extension, why, why can intelligence not pervade, 
or co- exist with, extension without solidity, with pure 
space ? Certain it is, the solidity does indeed seem to be 
no furtherance, but an impediment rather, to thought. 

§ 43. Will Antitheos be disposed to allege, that it is the 
infiniteness of space which presents the barrier in the way 
of the co-existence of Space and Intelligence ? If he will, 
then we shall let Leibnitz furnish the ground- work for an 
unanswerable reply. " Supposing the sensorium (of the 
" soul) to be extended, * * * the question returns. 
". Whether the soul be diffused through the whole exten- 
" sion, be it great or small. For, more or less in bigness, 
" is nothing TO the purpose here." Fifth Paper, 98. — 
In fine, why may not intelligence pervade all space, as 
well as all a brain, or all of any portion of a brain ? 

§ 44. We shall finish what we have to urge in relation 
to the opinion, that pure space is a substance, as well as, 
indeed, in relation to our first head generally, by putting 
before our readers two passages in Mr Locke.f And had 
these passages, or such passages as these, been sufficiently 
digested (and Bacon himself could not point to much that 

t The passages referred to (for that matter) might be quoted, and 
not to bad purpose either, in relation to any of our great heads, — nay, 
in relation to almost any part of this digression. So that, if the 
reader will carry the contents of the passages about in his mind, till 
he get to the end of what we have to say regarding space, he will do 
what will oblige us, and be useful to himself. 



164 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. [Part VII. 



was worthier of undergoing the whole process), we should 
never have heard of such a fantastic hypothesis as that 
which maintains that space is a substance — an unintelli- 
gent substance, or an intelligent one — For neither branch 
of the hypothesis is one whit more ridiculous than the 
other. " Space, considered barely in length between any 
" two beings, without considering any thing else between 
" them, is called distance ; if considered in length, breadth, 
" and thickness, I think it may be called capacity ; the 
" term extension is usually applied to it in what manner 
" soever considered." Essay. B. II. ch. xiii. § 3. "Whe- 
" ther we consider, in matter itself, the distance of its 
" coherent solid parts, and call it, in respect of these solid 
" parts, extension ; or, whether considering it as lying 
" between the extremities of any body in its several di- 
" mensions, we call it length, breadth, and thickness ; or 
" else considering it as lying between any two bodies, or 
" positive beings, without any consideration whether 
" there be any matter or no between, we call it distance. 
a However named or considered, it is always the same 

" uniform simple idea of SPACE — : whereof having 

" settled ideas in our minds, we can revive, repeat, and 
64 add them one to another, as often as we will, and con- 
" sider the space or distance so imagined, either as filled 
" with solid parts, so that another body cannot come there 
" without displacing and thrusting out the body that was 
" there before ; or else as void of solidity, so that a body 
" of equal dimensions to that empty or pure space, may 
" be placed in it without the removing or expulsion of 
" any thing that was there." Ibid. § 27. 



165 



PART VIII. 

OF THE SENTIMENTS OF PHILOSOPHERS CONCERNING 
SPACE. — NEWTON, CLARKE, BUTLER, PRICE, LOCKE, 
ADDISON, TILLOTSON, MILTON, ETC. 

§ 1. — II. Other philosophers mean by Space nothing 
more than a mode, property, quality, affection, of a sub- 
stratum or substance. The philosophers we now speak of 
may be ranged into two divisions. The first division may 
consist of those who allow of no vacuum in nature, who, 
in other words, hold matter to be infinitely extended. 
The second will be composed of those who maintain the 
existence of vacuum, or space without matter. 

§ 2. — 1. As to those philosophers who fall to be ranked 
under the first division : These, in affirming matter to be 
limitless, not having it to say, (they being no Cartesians,) 
that matter, because the same with extension, cannot be 
conceived to be finite ; have one only decent pretext for their 
conduct. Their pretext is this, — they please arbitrarily to 
make the affirmation. Now, because they have no better 
reason to give, we are inclined to believe, their assertion 
agrees not with the nature of things. That, in point of 
fact, matter is infinitely extended, — that, in point of fact, 
there is no such thing as vacuum any where amidst bo- 
dies^ or beyond all matter, (there being no beyond in 
relation to all matter, %) as to so gratuitous an assertion, 

t Vide Appendic. A. \ Vide infra, §§ 11. 12.— Etc. 



166 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. [Part VIII. 



it is nowise necessary that we give it a farther considera- 
tion. Our readers shall have dwelt upon the subject 
long enough, by the time they have fully comprehended 
the elements constituting the assertion. 

§ 3. — 2. We, therefore, pass on to the philosophers of 
the second class, the philosophers who admit that there 
is Space distinct from matter, considering this Space to 
be no more than a mode or property of a substance or 
substratum. 

§ 4. " Deus * * * 11 says the great Newton in his 
celebrated Scholium, " Non est ceternitas vel infinitas, sed 
" ceternus et infinitus ; non est duratio vel spatium, sed 
" durat est adest. Durat semper, et adest ubique ; et ex- 
" istendo semper et ubique, durationem et spatium, wterni- 
" tatem et infinitatem constituit." " [The Deity is not 
" eternity nor infinity, but HE is eternal and infinite ; HE 
" is not duration nor space, but HE endures, and is ex- 
" panded.f He endures always, and is present every 
" where ; and by existing at all times and in all places, 
" he makes duration and space, eternity and infinity, to 
" be."t] Princip. Mathemat. Schol. general, sub finem. 

§ 5 Those who are acquainted with Clarke's Demon- 
stration, and his Letters to Butler, are well aware what 
his sentiment is.t We shall select a passage from a 

t " Sir Isaac Newton, in his famous Scholium, * * supposes God 
u to be extended," or expanded. Br Watts' Inquiry concerning Space. 
Sect. v. — " Sir Isaac Newton thought, that the Deity * * * consti- 
" tutes * space." Dr Reid. Vide Part. IX. § 17- 

% § 1. « They" (" Eternity" and " Immensity") " seem both to be 
" but modes of an Essence or Substance." Demonstration, under 
Prop. IV. — " Space, is a property, or mode, of the self-existent Sub- 
" stance." " The self-existent Substance * * is itself (if I may 
ie so speak) the Substratum of Space." Ans. to the 3d Letter. 

§ 2. " Though his" [Dr Clarke's] " adversaries (see Chev. Ramsay, 
" book i. prop. 8. Schol.) charged him with adopting the Diffusive 
" Ubiquity, he is," says Henry Lord Brougham, or Sir Charles Bell, or 
say both, " plainly not subject to this observation.'' Illustrative Note 



§§ 3-8.] 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



167 



different quarter of his writings. " Space void of body, 
" is the property of an incorporeal Substance." % Again : 
" By void Space, we never mean Space void of every thing. 
" * * In all void Space, God is certainly present," &c. 
&c. Papers which passed between Leibnitz and Clarke : 
Clarke 's 4th Reply, § 8 & 9. A hundred quotations to 
the same effect might be made. 

§ 6. " We seem," these are the words of Butler, " to 
" discern intuitively, that there must and cannot but be 
" somewhat, external to ourselves, answering this idea," 
" the idea of infinity, i. e. immensity and eternity,'' " or 
" the archetype of it. And from hence (for this abstract, 
'* as much as any other, implies a concrete) we conclude, 
" that there is and cannot but be, an infinite, an immense 
44 eternal Being existing.■' , Analogy of lleligion Natural 
and Revealed. Part I. chap. vi. 

§ 7. " It is," says Dr Price, " a maxim which cannot 
" be disputed, that time and place are necessary to the 
l - existence of all things. Dr Clarke," continues Dr Price, 
" has made use of this maxim to prove that infinite space 
" and duration are the essential properties of THE DEITY, 
" and I think he was right." 

§ 8. If I dared to introduce the author of the " Argu- 
ment" among such illustrious company, I should notice 
that his sentiment is the same as theirs, and that he has 

on the 9th paragraph of Ch. xxiv. of Brougham and BelVs Paley's 
Natural Theology. 

§ 3. Amazing assertion! How can Clarke make immensity, or 
boundless space, 1 to be a mode of God's Substance : How can Clarke 
maintain the Deity to be the Substratum of Space : Unless Clarke do 
adopt diffusive ubiquity, 2 and be, very plainly too, -subject to the 
charge brought against him by the Chevalier'? 

1 " To say that immensity does not signify boundless space, * ♦ * * is 
" (I think) affirming that words have no meaning." Clarke's 5th Reply to Leibnitz. 

2 What is ubiquity which is not diffusive 1 The same tiling that unextended ex- 
tension is. Vide Appendic. li. § 10. 11. &c. 



168 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. [Part VIII. 



attempted to demonstrate (what, by the bye, none of the 
others ev%r thought of doing) that space, infinity or im- 
mensity, or what you will, is only an attribute or mode. 
Vide Part. VII. § 3. 

§ 9. After these references to the opinion of Clarke 
and Butler, Sec, we shall be able duly to appreciate the 
justness of something put forth by Antitheos, almost at his 
outset. " It could not," this gentleman declares, in the 
seventh paragraph of his first chapter, " It could not escape 
" observation among minds of an abstract and reflective 
" turn, that space possesses some of the attributes commonly 
" ascribed to Deity, such as infinity, and, of course, om- 
" nipresence ;-|" immateriality, and so forth : that duration 
" cannot be supposed to have had a beginning, or to be 
" within the possibility of ever coming to an end. It 
" must thus have appeared to the metaphysical theist, 
" exceedingly desirable to bring these idle and unappro- 
" priated attributes into more useful play, and in a man- 
" ner the most advantageous to the common faith. Clarke 
" and Butler, and all their followers, have accordingly 
" talked much of these matters, and evinced a strong 
" predilection for them in selecting examples wherewithal 
" to illustrate the absolute and infinite perfections of the 
" Divine nature. These metaphysicians, in short,'' [ob- 
serve, it is " metaphysicians,"] " have made space and 
" duration usurp the station and dignity of a Divine Being. 

t § 1. If we would speak with strict correctness ; to be infinitely 
extended and to be omnipresent, — to have infinity, viz. of extension, 
and to have omnipresence, — are the same. Omnipresence is no con- 
sequence {Antitheos would have it a consequence) of infinity, or infinite 
extension. Omnipresence is just infinite extension, and infinite ex- 
tension is just omnipresence. 

§ 2. It is not very correct to say (though Antitheos says) that infinity, 
to-wit, of extension, or space, is an attribute of space : Unless a thing 
may be an attribute of itself. Space is infinite : and infinite space is 
no attribute of infinite space. 



§§ 9-il: 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING- SPACE. 



160 



" They have taken this empty and inanimate fabrication, 
44 and set it up in a newly-erected shrine of curiously 
" mathematical construction, and fallen down to it as the 
" God of their idolatry/' (The " mathematical" shrine, 
— not the " metaphysicians," t but — our magician must 
haye constructed. Newly erected is the shrine : and if 
suddenly erected, no wonder, since it arose by magic. Vide 
Part. VII. § 1.) With Clarke and Butler, and their fol- 
lowers as to this affair, infinite space and infinite duration 
are no more than modes or properties of the existence of 
God. With Antitheos — Clarke and Butler, and their fol- 
lowers, make space and duration to be God Himself. 
As arrant a piece of nonsense as could be put into their 
mouths. And we know hoic honestly put. 

§ 10. The same sort of thing is set forth in other places 
too. For instance : — In Chapter VI. paragraph 15, our 
atheist speaks, as we have heard, as if Mr Gillespie had 
represented space to be Beity. Vide Part. VII. § o. 
And in Chapter XII. paragraph 2, A ntitheos hints broad- 
ly enough, (and falsely enough,) that the same gentleman 
" makes space into a God altogether/' Read, also, the 
12th paragraph of Chapter III. 

§ 11. We shall in this place take notice of Mr Locke, 
who seems undetermined — not so much what to think, 
as — what to say, as to whether space be a substance or a 
mode. This solid thinker belieyed the material uniyerse 
to be finite. " If," he says, " body be not supposed in- 
44 finite, which, I think no one will affirm" fyc. Essay, B. II. 
ch. xiii. § 21. And the like in numerous places. And 
as he believed matter to be finite, so he belieyed, and 
could not but believe, space to be infinite : 44 This," he de- 
clares, 44 is certain, that whoever pursues his own thoughts, 
44 will find them sometimes launch out beyond the extent 

t Law notices " the great confusion caused by a jumble of Mathe- 
" matics and Metaphysics together." — Notes to Kino. Note (6.) 



170 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. [Part VIII. 



" of body, into the infinity of space or expansion.' 1 '' Ibid. 
Ch. xv. § 4. To the same effect he speaks in many pas- 
sages. Locke believed, we say, that body is finite, and 
space infinite : Consequently, that there is space without 
matter. And though he determines not, at least does 
not determine explicitly, whether space void of body be 
a substance, or only the property of one ; — ( space void of 
body, or beyond body, can be no third tiling ; it cannot be a 
relation of bodies to each other ;) — he shews a decided lean- 
ing to the sentiment, that such space is no more than a 
mode. 

§ 12. This most judicious philosopher gives no obscure 
intimation of what was his opinion, in the following pas- 
sages. " Whatever men shall think concerning the exist- 
" ence of vacuum, this is plain to me, that we have as 
" clear an idea of space, distinct from solidity, as we have 
" of solidity, distinct from motion, or motion from space. 
" We have not any two more*distinct ideas ; and we can 
" as easily conceive space without solidity, as we can con- 
" ceive body or space without motion, though it be never 
" so certain, that neither body nor motion can exist with- 

" out space. But whether" after all he had said to 

evince, that motion proves a vacuum to be in the neigh- 
bourhood of bodies,t and that there is vacuum, infinite 
vacuum, beyond the utmost bounds of body ; after all he had 
said, J in a word, (and before all he had to say||) to make 

clear, that there is extension independent of matter 

" Whether any one will take space to be only a relation 
" resulting from the existence of other beings at a dis- 
" tance, or whether they will think the words of the most 
" knowing King Solomon, ' The heaven, and the heaven of 
" 4 heavens, cannot contain Thee or those more emphati- 
" cal ones of the inspired philosopher, St Paul, ' In him 

t Vide Appendic. A. % See B. II. ch. xiii. § 21, Etc. 

|| See B. II. ch xvii. § 4, Etc. Etc. 



§ 12.] SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE, 171 

" 4 we live, and move, and have our being,' are to be under- 
u stood in a literal sense, I leave every one to consider ;t 
44 only our idea of space is, I think, such as I have men- 
" tioned, and distinct from that of body.'"' B. II. ch. xiii. 
§ 27- Again : 44 It is true, we can easily, in our thoughts, 
44 come to the end of solid extension ; the extremity and 
44 bounds of allT)ody, we have no difficulty to arrive at ; 
u but when the mind is there, it finds nothing to ^hinder 
44 its progress into this endless expansion ; of that it can 
44 neither find nor conceive any end. Nor let any one say, 
44 that beyond the bounds of body there is nothing at all, UN- 
" 4 LESS he will confine God within the limits of matter. 
" Solomon, whose understanding was filled and enlarged 
44 with wisdom, seems to have other thoughts, when he says, 
4 4 4 Heaven, and the heaven of heavens, cannot contain 
44 4 THEE;' and he, I think, very much magnifies to him- 
44 self the capacity of his own understanding, who per- 
44 suades himself, that he can extend his thoughts farther 
;t than God exists, or imagine any expansion where HE IS 
44 NOT." Ibid. ch. xv. § 2. Again : 44 God * * fills 
" eternity ; and it is hard to find a reason, why any one 
44 should doubt that HE likewise fills immensity. His 
44 infinite BEING is certainly as boundless one way as ano- 
u ther ; and methinks it ascribes a little too much to mat- 
44 ter, to say, where there is no body, there is nothing." 
Ib. § 3. Again : 44 — The boundless invariable oceans of 
■ duration and expansion ; which comprehend in them 
• 4 all finite beings, and in their fall extent, belong only to 
' 4 the Deity." Ib. § 8. Again : 44 Motion cannot be 
44 attributed to God, not because he is an immaterial, 
44 but because HE is an infinite, spirit." li. II. ch. xxiii. 
§ 21. Again : 44 God is * * everywhere. 1 ' Ib. 
ch. xxvii. § 2. 

t Vide Appendic. B. 



172' 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



[Part VIII. 



§ 13. See also, to the same purpose, B. II. ch. xvii. 
§ 20. B. II. ch. xxiii. §§ 33. 34. 35. 36. Etc. etc. 

§ 14. Why this great philosopher did not speak out 
still more unequivocally in this case, reasons might be as- 
signed. That he had something in his mind as to which 
he did not, for certain causes, speak fijlly out, we may 
see (as from the two first citations in § 12. above, so) 
from certain rather mysterious words in the passages to 
be presently cited from the Essay : Words which do hint, 
not too darkly either, that this wonderful man had the 
solid foundations of the a priori argument from Space and 
Time — or Immensity and Eternity — to the existence of 
God, settled and firmly fixed in the deep recesses of his 
mind : — To which conclusion we shall be the more led, 
when we reflect, that Locke, in his correspondence with 
his friend Limborch, distinctly states his belief, that the 
Existence and Unity of Deity are completely proveable 
a priori. 

§ 15, a Je crois" so writes Locke to that correspondent, 

" que quiconque rtflecliira sur soi-meme, CGnnoitra evidem- 
" ment sans en pouvoir douter le moins du monde, quHl y a 

eu de toute eternite un Etre intelligent. Je crois en- 
" core quil est evident a tout homme qui pense, quil y a 
u aussi un Etre infini. Or je dis quil ne pent y avoir 
" qu'un Etre infini, 8? que cet Etre infini doit etre aussi 
44 VEtre eternel ; parce que, ce qui est infini doit avoir 
" {ti infini de toute eternite, car aucuns additions faites 
" dansle terns, ne sauroient rendre une chose infinie, si elle ne 
" Vest pas en elle-meme, 8f par elle-meme, de toute eternite. 
" Telle I taut la nature de r infini qu'on rfen peut rien oter, 
" <$f qu'on n'y peut rien ajouter. Lfoii il s'ensuit que Vin- 
"fini ne sauroit etre separe en plus cPun, ni etre quun.^ 

§ 16. " Cest-la, selon moi, UNE PREUVE A PRIORI 

" QUE L'ETRE ETERNEL INDEPENDENT N EST QU'UN : # si 

" nous y joignons Videe de toutes les perfections possibles, 



§§ 13-19.] 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



173 



" nous axons ahrs Videe oVwa DiEU eternel, infini, omnis- 
" cient, <$■ tout -puissant, &c." From Locke's letter to Limr 
borch of 21st May, 1698. Consult also Locke to .Lim- 
borch of 29th Oct. 1697, and of 2d April 1698. 

§ 17- The very important passages to which we refer- 
red so recently are the following. " To conclude : eoc- 
c< pansion and duration do mutually embrace and compre- 
" hend each other ; every part of space being in every 
" part of duration ; and every part of duration in every 
" part of expansion.^ Such a combination of two distinct 
" ideas, is, I suppose, scarce to be found in all that great 
" variety we do or can conceive, and may afford mat- 

" TER TO FARTHER SPECULATION." B. II. ch. XV. § 12- 
And again: " The idea whereof," viz. " infinity of space 
'''' or expansion" " is distinct and separate from body, 
4i and all other things : which may (to those who 

" PLEASE) BE A SUBJECT OF FARTHER MEDITATION.'' 

Ib. §4. 

§ 18. However, we shall not get leave to keep Locke of 
our party, without a struggle. But as the very name of 
the author of the " Essay concerning Human Under- 
u standing" will frighten many of the timid and weak 
philosophers over to the side he espouses ; will enable not 
a few among the irresolute philosophers to make up their 
minds with whom to range themselves ; and will be sure 
to throw a damp over any ardour which opposing philo- 
sophers may possess : we shall make good our right to re- 
tain Locke among our numbers, by the irresistible force 
of fair means. 

19. Reid it is who disputes our claim to Mr Locke's 
authority in the present case. " Locke" remarks the 
Doctor, " has reduced all things to three categories, viz. 

t " Cum unaquce'i; Spatii jxirticula sit semper, if unnuiquocbj; Dura- 
" tionis indivisibile momentum ubique" — Sir Isaac Newton, Schol. Ge* 
nerale. 

() 



174 SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. [Part VIII. 



44 substances, modes, and relations. In this division, time, 
44 space, and number, three great objects of human thought, 
44 are,' 1 the Doctor declares, 44 omitted." Analysis of 
Aristotles Logic. Chap. II. sect. ii. 

§ 20. Does Dr Reid put forward any thing to support 
the declaration I No. Then that is so far well : We 
have not to set out to overturn aught given as proof of 
his assertion ; consequently, there's nothing to prevent 
our proceeding straightway to the proof of our own, viz. 
that Mr Locke took pure space to be a mode of existence. 

§ 21. Reid is quite correct in saying, that the profound 
reasoner he mentions reduces all things, all the objects 
of thought, to the three categories, substances, modes, and 
relations. The subject of Modes is taken up by Mr Locke 
first of all. The Chapter (it is Chapter XIII. of Book II.) 
in which he begins to treat of modes, is occupied with 
44 the simple modes of space."" A great portion of the 
Chapter is occupied in proving : 44 Extension and body not 
44 the same" — (§ 11 — ) " A vacuum" or, as he elsewhere 
calls it, 44 pure space," 44 beyond the utmost bounds of body" 
— (§ 21.) Etc. etc. etc. Vide supra, §§ 11. 12. quoq; 
Part. II. §§ 29. & 30. So that if the author of the 
Essay omitted to place among modes pure space, that 
great object of human thought at sundry times, and of 
Dr Reid's when he set space betwixt time and number (as 
above ;) it was not because Locke had not brought modes 
and pure space into the closest juxtaposition. Farther, 
if it had been omitted to class pure space, and duration, 
(or time, as Reid has it,) with modes, Locke could hardly 
fail to observe the omission, considering that 4 chapters 
&re mostly taken up in treating of those two things ; 
4 chapters, not one of which is one of Locke? s short ones ; 
4 chapters, which together constitute no inconsiderable 
part of the whole Essay. And if he had noticed any 
omission of the kind, he would certainly (for Locke was 



§§ 20-23.] 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



175 



an honest man) have done something to remedy the 
mighty defect in the principle or the application of his 
classification. But if so very palpable an omission as the 
omission must have been, if it existed at all, were made 
and were not observed, it is far, far indeed, from being 
what one would have reasonably expected from so capa- 
cious and observing a mind. 

§ 22. But not to insist solely on these considerations, 
convincing though they are, we shall hear Mr Locke speak 
for himself, directly on the subject of what Space is : for 
with Space only we have here to do. — Remember, that 
our controversy at this time is with Dr Reid : who has 
asserted, that Mr Locke neglected to put space under any 
of his three predicaments, — say, under either of the two 
predicaments, Substance and Mode. (Vide supra, § 19.) 

§ 23. After having (in the 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 
& 16th sections of the thirteenth chapter of Book Second) 
distinguished pure or simple space from body, by and bye 
(§ 17) he puts this question into the mouth of an ob- 
jector : — " If it be demanded (as usually it is) whether 
M this space, void of body, be substance or accident ?" 
Here is a question which, of itself, furnishes an experi- 
mentum crucis for the determination of the point whether 
or not Locke inclined to take space for an accident, that 
is a mode. When that acute philosopher made space to 
have an existence distinct from matter, he saw, he must 
have seen, that the question would be raised, What is 
pure space ? How then does the author of the Essay 
answer the very natural interrogatory ? By saying that 
space is not a substance, and not a mode ? By no 
MEANS. But here was an opportunity of the fairest kind 
he could ever have, to declare that space was not a mode 
or accident, and not a substance, if he took it to be neither. 
How answers he, then, the question, Ts space, void of 
body, substance or mode 2 "I shall readily answer," 



176 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. [Part VIII- 



he replies, " / know not" — I know not which For he 
does not say: I know not whether pure space be any 
thing at all — And indeed how could he ? SINCE he ■ex- 
pressly declares that space void of body is not nothing at 
all. " Nor let any one say," is his caveat, " that beyond 
" the bounds of body there is nothing at all," Sfc. tyc. ut 
supra, § 12. To the same purpose is the following : — 
" When men pursue their thoughts of space, they are apt 
" to stop at the confines of body, as if space were there at 
" an end too, and reached no farther. Or if their ideas, 
46 upon consideration, carry them farther, yet they term 
" what is beyond the limits of the universe, imaginary 
" space ; as if it were nothing, because there is no body 
" existing in it."f B. II. ch. xv. § 4. Etc. etc. — But the 
reply has not yet been all given, and what is to come is 
the better portion : "I know not : nor shall be ashamed 
" to own my ignorance, till they that ask, shew me a 
" clear distinct idea of substance." Then I shall tell them, 
whether space void of body be a substance : Substance or 
mode pure space must be, as it is certainly a something. 

§ 24. I know that an exception will be taken to what 
has just been urged, and that the two sections of the 
Essay which do all but immediately succeed the words 
last quoted, will be especially appealed to by thosj who 
may be anxious to tear Mr Locke from the company of 
those with whom pure space is a mode, or accident, of a 
substance. In those sections it is said : — " Substance and 
" accidents of little use in philosophy. — " (§ 19.) " Were 
i ' the Latin words, inhwrentia and substantia, put into the 
" plain English ones that answer them, and were called 

t " The Ancients did not call all Space which is void of bodies, but 
a only extra-mundane Space, by the name of imaginary Space. The 
" meaning of which, is not, that such Space is not real ; but only that 
<' we are wholly ignorant what kinds of things are in that Space." 
Clarke's 3d Beply, 2. 



§§ 24-26.] SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 177 

" sticking on, and under-propping, they would better dis- 
" cover to us the very great clearness there is in the doc- 
" trine of substance and accidents, and shew of what 
" use they are in deciding of questions in philosophy."'" 
(§ 20.) Etc. 

§ 25. Mr Locke is ridiculing something here. It is 
granted. But what is that which he ridicules ? Not 
substances. \ Not modes, or accidents, if this word be pre- 
ferable. For he makes all things, " as they are in them- 
" selves," (b. ii. ch. xxv. § 1.) to be either substances or 
modes, i. e. accidents. t Vide supra, § 19. et § 21. A 
good jest indeed it would be, to behold Locke ridiculing, 
here or there, substances and modes ! or the ideas (for 
Locke was particularly fond of the ideas) of substances 
and modes ! Locke divides all things, as in themselves, 
into modes and substances — and ridicules modes and sub- 
stances ! Incredible. Impossible. 

§ 26. But of a certainty, Mr Locke is ridiculing some- 
thing. What he ridicules, there are words within the 
boundaries of those two sections which will shew us. 
And it is well we are not left to mere inference, but have 
evidence of the express sort. " They who first ran into 
4: the notion of accidents, as a sort of real beings, that 
44 needed something to inhere in, were forced to find out 
" the word substance, to support them. Had the poor 
" Indian philosopher (who imagined that the earth also 
11 wanted something to bear it up) but thought of this word 

t This is declared by Locke himself, in his second Reply (or third 
Letter) to the Bishop of Worcester. 

I '• The adequate division of being comprehends but these two mem- 
" bers" i. e. " substance" and " mode." — Bayle. Crit. Diet. P. 3003. 
u Unquestionably, whatsoever is, or hath any kind of entity, doth 
11 either subsist by itself, or else is air attribute, affection, or mode 
" of something, that doth subsist by itself." Cudworthh Intellectual 
System. Chap. v. Birch's Edit. P. 709. Vide Part. X. % 10. notamq; 
relat. 



I 



178 SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. [Part VIII. 

" substance, he needed not to have been at the trouble to 
" find an elephant to support it, and a tortoise to support 
" his elephant ; the word substance would have done it 
" effectually." (§ 19.) Etc. 

§ 27. Here you have the key to expose what Mr Locke 
laughs at : which is, The notion of accidents as beings 
having a real existence, distinct from substances. The 
illustration shews this clearly : Locke secretly (yet mani- 
festly) compares the Indian philosopher's earth to an 
accident, and his elephant to a substance ; while, again, 
the elephant and the tortoise being viewed in relation to 
each other, elephant is transformed into accident, tortoise, 
at the same time, stepping into the elephant's shoes, and 
becoming substance. But the earth is notoriously a dis- 
tinct thing from the elephant 

With Atlantean shoulders fit to bear 
The weight of mightiest monarchies ; 

and the elephant is different from the tortoise. There- 
fore accident, — set forth by the earth and the metamor- 
phosed elephant, — is an entity separable from substance, 
— represented by the first elephant and the tortoise. But 
this is absurd. And also very ridiculous. So Mr Locke, 
a tolerably grave (he was a very vivacious) gentleman in 
general, takes a hearty laugh at it. And we may well 
join him in his merriment, for the " notion of accidents, 
" as a sort of real beings," having the same relation to 
substances that the earth- has to the Indian philosopher's 
elephant, or the elephant to the tortoise, may provoke a 
smile from the severest countenance. 

§ 28. In accordance with what we have now said, 
Watts writes : — " Mr Locke has happily refuted that un- 
" reasonable notion of substance in general, which makes 
" it to be some real thing in nature, different from all the 
" united qualities, the supposed properties and powers" 
[ Why supposed f are they only supposed ? are they not 



§§ 27-29.] 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



179 



true and" real properties and powers ? properties and 
powers] " of body or spirit, and he has exposed it to a 
" just ridicule, as in Book II. chap. xiii. sect. * 19, 20." 
Once more : " Mr Locke would seem to exclude and aban- 
" don any general notion of substance, as another real 
" physical distinct heing, provided to support all its real 
" or supposed accidents or qualities, and seems to banter 
" it by the Indian's * * tortoise — which supports the 
" elephant — which supports the world." — Philosophical 
Essays. Essay II. sect, i-t 

§ 29. Finally, I would just ask any one to lay his hand 
upon his head, and, for Dr JReid, to reconcile the words 
of Mr Locke, as quoted in the twelfth section, above, with 
any other hypothesis than that which makes endless ex- 
pansion, or space, to be a mode of the existence of God. 

t Prudence dictates that I should use the precaution of begging it to 
be borne in mind, that I am not to be held as doing more than agree- 
ing with Watts upon the point as to which he is cited. Watts thinks 
that : " As solid extension" — (" solidity and extension considered in body, 
" are but as one thing" — Essay II. sect. iv. — ) " and a power of thinking 
" have this one character of substance, that they are sufficient sup- 
" ports for qualities, modes or accidents ; so they have the other 
" property of substance also, viz. that they subsist of themselves, in- 
f* dependent of any created being." — (Essay II. sect. ii. And see that 
Essay throughout.) Now all this seems to me to be very absurd ; 
especially the latter part. Is power not a relative thing \ can a power 
of thinking really subsist of itself 1 Ability, capacity, — power, — seem 
unavoidably to imply a subject of them. 

" I have never," says Watts, " seen sufficient ground to abandon all 
u his (" Des Cartes's ) scheme of sentiments of the nature of mind or 
' spirit" — &c. Essay V. sect. i. See Preface to his Essays : especially 
the 5th paragraph. 

" Nullo writes Locke, with his eye directed towards Des Cartels 
scheme as to mind, " Nullo * moth mini in animum inducere possum cogi- 
u tationem per se existere, sed rem vel substantiam, cogitantem," — &c. Let- 
ter to Limborch, of 4th and 18th Oct. icm. 

In the same strain Reid declares : " We take it * as a first prin- 
" ciple * * * * that thinking supposes a being that thinks." — 
Essay I. ch. ii. 



180 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. [Part VIII. 



§ 30. But indeed the thing is very clear. And what 
could have induced the author of the " Analysis of Aris- 
totle s Logic" to trust to the world so unguarded and 
groundless an assertion as that which we have been weigh- 
ing, it would not be easy to discover : unless it were that 
he really thought as he wrote, and could not help it. 

§ 31. Before quitting the philosophers who consider 
pure space to be the property of a substance, we shall 
gratify our readers with a paragraph from the pages of 
our worthily admired Addison. 

§ 32. 44 If," says this sensible and elegant writer, in 
one of his Essays on the nature of the Supreme Being, 
44 If we consider him (our maker) in his omnipresence, 
e4 his being passes through, actuates, and supports the whole 
44 frame of nature. His creation, and every part of it, is 
44 full of him. There is nothing HE has made that -is 
44 either so distant, so little, or so inconsiderable, which 
44 he does not essentially inhabit. His substance is within 
44 the substance of every being, whether material or im- 
44 material, and as intimately present to it as that being 
1 4 is to itself. It would be an imperfection in HIM, were 
4k HE able to remove out of one place into another, or to 
44 withdraw himself from any thing he has created, or 
"from any part of that space ivhich is diffused and spread 
44 abroad to infinity" Spectator, No. 565. See the re- 
mainder of that most beautiful paper. 

§ 33. Tillotson, as a Divine, was held in warm admira- 
tion by Addison. But that is not the only reason why we 
shall bring forward a sentence from the Archbishop : who 
was, according to the opinion of Dr Samuel Clarke, — 
himself no mean judge in such matters, — 44 of far better 
44 understanding and judgment" than the generality of the 
Schoolmen. 

§ 34. 44 By the immensity of God, I mean," Archbishop 
Tillotson tells us, 44 that his being hath no bounds or limits, 



§§ 30-35.; 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



181 



" but doth EVERY WAY SPREAD AND DIFFUSE ITSELF be- 

" yond what we can imagine The presence of another 

r * being, even of a body, which is the grossest substance. 
" doth not exclude him ; the whole world doth not con- 
" fine him ; but he fills all the space which we can 
" imagine beyond this visible world, and infinitely more 
" than we can imagine." — Sermon OLIV. : on the im- 
mensity of God. 

§ 35. I shall finish this head with the words of England's 
immortal Epic Bard : who 

Rode sublime 
Upon the seraph -wings of Extasy, 
The secrets of th' Abyss to spy. 
He pass'd the naming bounds of Place and Timet 

The esoteric philosophical theology of the following pas- 
sage in the Paradise Lost is not a whit behind the best in 
all the world. 

— Thou, my Word, begotten Son, by thee 
This I perform ; speak thou, and be it done ! 
My overshadowing Spirit and might with thee 
I send along ; ride forth, and bid the deep 
Within appointed bounds be heaven and earth ; 
Boundless the deep, because I AM, wlio fill 
Infinitude; nor vacuous the space, 
Tlunigh 7, v.ncircu inscribed myself, retire, 
And put not forth my goodness. 

Book VII. 

t Gray's Progress of Poesy. 



P 



182 



PART IX. 

OF THE SENTIMENTS OF PHILOSOPHERS CONCERNING 
SPACE. — ANTITHEOS, REID, GLEIG, GASSENDUS, EPIS- 
COPIUS, LEIBNITZ, ETC. 

§ 1. — III. Thus far as to those who will have Space to 
be a Substance, and those who take it to be only a Mode- 
The third grand hypothesis is that of such as lay down, 
that space is space, or what is tantamount to such propo- 
sition. The philosophers we are now come to, are in- 
clined to allow, that there is Space, without matter, in 
the universe : And while they do not allege that Space is 
aught less than Space, they will not suffer more to be 
affirmed concerning it, than that it exists where body ex- 
ists not. As a matter of course, therefore, — maintaining, 
as they do, that Space is neither a substance nor the pro- 
perty of one, but is, notwithstanding, a somewhat really 
existing, — they are for making it out to be some third 
thing. Though indeed, to speak truth, these philosophers 
do not so much assert that space belongs to some third 
class of entity, (viz. something distinct from substance, 
and from property,) as virtually refuse to proclaim what 
Space is. In short, the fair amount of their notion, so 
far, at least, as they let it come before the world, is con- 
tractible to this, Space is Space. 

§ 2. — 1. The philosopher of this class whom we shall 
advert to first, is Antitheos himself. 

§ 3. This gentleman admits, in the most distinct man- 



§§ 1-5.] SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 183 



ner, and to the fullest extent, that there may be space 
without matter. Of this our readers are perfectly aware. 
According to Antitheos, we can conceive the non-existence 
of the whole material universe. Vide Part. VI. § 34. 
But though we conceive matter away, we cannot, our 
atheist largely, and satisfactorily, insists, conceive the 
non-existence of Space. Ibid. § 33. Pure space, or va- 
cuum, then, is, with our antitheist, a possible thing. 

§ 4. To advance to a second admission : — " I grant," 
says Antitheos, — -and the admission has already been re- 
ferred to as being of the utmost importance (vide part. w. 
§ 8 — ) " I grant that we may conceive of an absolute se- 
" paration of substance 11 [by substance he means matter] 
" generally," or as a whole — (Ibid.) Now, as often as we 
conceive an absolute separation of matter, as a whole, so 
often do we conceive, that matter is finite ; — separability, 
and, a fortiori, separation, implying finiteness {tide part, 
ii. § 39. — ) and that, consequently, there is pure space in 
nature. Whenever, in fine, we conceive a separation of 
matter absolutely, we conceive what involves the exist- 
ence of pure space. But we can easily conceive a sepa- 
ration of matter absolutely. We can easily, therefore, 
conceive that vacuum exists. 

§ 5. But not only does Antitheos contend that we may 
conceive — and that we may easily conceive what involves 
— the co-existence of the absence of body and the pre- 
sence of space : he is of opinion that perhaps there has 
always been a vacuum in nature. " We cannot prove," 
he correctly observes, " that it" (" matter") " is infinite- 
" ly extended. The fact is, we cannot say whether mat- 
" ter be infinitely extended or not." Chap. V. par. 7- 
And therefore, we cannot be sure but that there now is, 
in point of fact, extramundane space. If the world is 
finitely extended, (and Antitheos grants, we cannot be 
certain that it is not,) there is empty space beyond its li- 



184 SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. [Part IX. 



mits. " If the material universe is * * finite ; there 
" cannot but be actual * * extramundane space." t 
For our atheist, like a reasonable man, admits it is absurd, 
to suppose, all extension itself to be bounded. Vide 
Part. I. § 34. et § 85. Etc. According to our atheist's 
doctrine, then, it may he that vacuum is a really existing 
thing. 

§ 6. But what need to speak of our antitheist's mak- 
ing vacuum to be possible, or conceivable, — nay easily 
conceivable, or very possible — perhaps a real existence I 
For do not his explicit principles imply all these things, 
and amount, besides, to a great deal more ? " Infinite 
" space," (the reader will find in* Part VI. § 33.) « is 
" plenarily admitted by our author to have necessary ex- 
" istence." " Matter is," (as we have seen in § 34. of the 
same Part,) " by our atheist completely deprived of true 
" necessary existence." Jhus according to Antitheos^s 
principles, 64 we have an extension' 1 [which is, and] " which 
" is NECESSARY, and we have an extension" [which is, 
but] which is not necessary" — vide part. vi. § 36. But 
that necessary extension is composed of vacuum, or pure 
space. Therefore, pure or simple space has real existence, 
yea necessary existence, in our atheist's universe : An ex- 
istence which by this time must have given, and which 
(irreversible Fate has decreed it) will continue to give, 
our atheist, the sorest, and a quite unbearable, annoy- 
ance. 

§ 7- " All Atheists," said one who was well acquainted 
with antiquity, and who knew right well how to turn his 
skill in the false, as well as in the true, philosophy of the 
ancients, to good account against the enemy : " All Athe- 
" ists are mere Corporealists, that is, acknowledge no 
" other substance besides body or matter. For as there 



t Clarke's 5th Keply. Note. 



§§ 6-10.1 SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 185 

" was never any yet known, who asserting incorporeal 
" substance," [or what implies incorporeal substance,] 
" did deny a Deity ; so neither can there be any reason, 
e< why he that admits the former should exclude the lat- 
" ter. Again, the same" dull and earthly disbelief or con- 
" founded sottishness of mind, which makes men deny a 
" God, must needs incline them to deny all incorporeal 
" substance" [and all that implies incorporeal substance] 
" also. Wherefore as the physicians speak of a certain 
" disease or madness, called hydrophobia, the symptom of 
" those that have been bitten by a mad dog, which makes 
" them have a monstrous antipathy to water ; so all 
64 Atheists are possessed with a certain kind of madness. 
" that may be called Pneumatophobia, that makes them 
" have an irrational but desperate abhorrence from spi- 
" rits or incorporeal substances," [or whatever implies as 
much,] " they being acted also, at the same time, with 
" an Hylomania, whereby they madly doat upon matter, 
" and devoutly worship it as the only Numen" Cud- 
worth's Intellectual System. Chap. III. and xxx. (Birch* s 
Edit. P. 135.) 

§ 8. True, the Democritic and Epicurean atheists did 
indeed admit the existence of space or vacuum, as a na- 
ture really distinct from body. But not very consistently 
with the general spirit of — we do not say, their philoso- 
phy, but — 'their atheism. Accordingly, " other Atheists 
" there were,'"' observes Cudworth, " who * 
" were sensible of the inconvenience of making space thus 
" to be a thing really distinct from body, (from whence 
" it would follow unavoidably, that it was an affection of 
" incorporeal substance.") Chap. V. (P. 770.) 

§ 9. And thus much as to the annoyance, or the in- 
convenience, which space hath caused, and will yet cause, 
our antitheist to experience. 

§ 10. To repeat something we have said: In Antitkeos's 



186 SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. [Part IX. 



universe, pure or simple space has real existence. Our 
next business must lie with the question, What does An- 
titheos make simple space to be ? And we shall find, that, 
with him, simple space is simple space : neither more nor 
less. 

§ 11. " We know," as we have heard our atheist de- 
claring — vide part. vi. § 2. — " of nothing possessing ex- 
64 tension except matter, — nothing else that can stand as 
" an object to which extension may be ascribed as a^ro- 
" perty." With Antitkeos, then, simple or pure space does 
not possess extension : in other words, extension is not a 
mode of Space. 

§ 12. And as extension is not a mode of Space, so 
Space (i. e. Extension) is made by Antitheos to be itself 
no mode of a substance. Why ? " Material bodies,"t 
Antitheos is ready to answer, " comprising all that we do 
. " know, or can know of Being," that is, Substance. Vide 
Part. VI. § 2. If bodies be the only substances possess- 
ing the attribute of extension, it is very plain that pure 
space cannot be the attribute of any substance. 

§ 13. In fine : Our Atheist's decision being this, That 
simple space is not a substance, and not a mode, — and 
not a relation of bodies to each other, (because, with our 
atheist, simple space is necessary, whereas bodies are not 
— vide supra, § 6) : Simple space remains, then, simple 
space. J And that, let me tell Antitheos, is saying, con- 
trary to what one might beforehand fancy, not a little 
but a great deal. Vide supra, § 6, et seq. 

§ 14. — 2. With no impropriety, but perhaps for one rea- 
son, may we bring Dr ReioVs opinion under this head. The 
Doctor says : " We call it (space) immense, eternal, im- 
" moveable, and indestructible. But it is only an immense, 
" eternal, immoveable, and indestructible void or empti- 
f Are tliere anywhere immaterial bodies 1 

\ Read the 9th par. of the concluding chap, of the " Refutation." 



§§ H-17.; 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



187 



" ness." Essays. Essay II. ch. xix. To say, Space is void 
or emptiness, that is, void or empty of every thing — but 
space, or what space or extension supposes, if it supposes 
aught : to say, we repeat, that space is void or empty of 
every thing — but space ; what is this essentially more 
than saying, Space is Space 1 — Vide Part. X. §§ 41. 47- 

§ 15. With which agrees, sufficiently, the passage in 
the " Analysis" already made use of by us. Vide Pari. 
VIII. § 19. If Space be not a substance, and be not a 
mode, and be not a relation, (as that passage implies,) 
pray, what can Space be — but Space 1 

§ 16. The reason why perhaps we cannot properly re- 
duce ReioVs opinion to this class, shall be perceived when- 
ever we recite a paragraph occurring in the Chapter M Of 
" Duration." 

§ 17- " Sir Isaac Newton thought, that the Deity, by 
" existing everywhere, and at all times, constitutes time 
" and space, immensity and eternity. This probably sug- 
" gested to his great friend Br Clarke what he calls the 
il argument a priori for the existence of an immense and 
" eternal Being. Space and time, he thought, are only 
" abstract or partial conceptions of an immensity and 
" eternity, which forces itself upon our belief. And as 
" immensity and eternity are not substances, they must 
" be the attributes of a Being who is necessarily immense 
" and eternal. These are the speculations of men of su- 
" perior genius. But whether they be as solid as they 
" are sublime, or whether they be the wanderings of ima- 
" gination in a region beyond the limits of human under- 
" standing, + / am unable to determine " Essay III. ch iii. 
• 

t Qiusritur : When my imagination, or that within me which con- 
ceives, does wander in a region whither my understanding, with the 
aid of that which conceives, whither, in other words, my imagination 
cannot wander; whither has imagination gone 1 by what instrumenta- 
lity was the journey accomplished ! how does imagination employ it- 



188 SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. [Part IX. 



§ 18. Of course, as Reid is unable to determine whether 
or no the sentiment of Sir Isaac Newton and Dr Clarke, 
that immensity, or boundless space, is the attribute of an 
immense Being, be a solid one ; he must be supposed un- 
able to determine, that space is not an attribute, or mode, 
of a substance. And space cannot be, in every sense, 
void or empty, if it is full of a substance. 

§ 19. Upon the whole, with regard to the sentiments 
of the Professor of Moral Philosophy, concerning space, 
we may safely take the following words (they are his own) 
as a satisfactory compendium. " We are at a loss to 
44 what category or class of things we ought to refer 
" them," i. e. time and space, (Chapter " Of Duration.") 
Well might Reid say so. 

§ 20. — 3. Under this head, we may notice, also the 
words of a Bishop of Stirling. 

§ 21. In the Chapter treating of " Space and its modes,' 1 
in our Bishop's treatise, the following is the title which 
serves for the exponent of several paragraphs : " Space 
" nothing but the possible existence of body." And in 
a succeeding paragraph, these words occur : " We con- 
" sider pure space as a mere notion relative to the exist- 
44 ence of corporeal substance, as in truth nothing more 

self in its new quarters 1 how long will imagination stay away 1 and 
will it communicate, on its return, what it has seen in its travels 1 and, 
if it does, will not such conduct amount to a betrayal of secrets 1 

What lies beyond the sphere of human understanding is that which 
is destitute of a foundation in intelligibility. No subject that we can 
think of, properly lies beyond the sphere of our understandings ; but to 
utter unintelligibilities, we may easily do. There are some philosophers 
who do solemnly caution us to beware of going beyond the reach of 
our faculties : to beware of exceeding our*faculties, by our faculties. 
The caution is to be wondered at, and neglected. There is no great 
danger in the matter ; there's only an impossibility. In the same 
hour in which men receive power to sink below themselves, they 
will (I prophesy) receive power to soar above or beyond themselves. 
At least there is a high probability. 



§§ 18-27.] 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



189 



" than the absence of body, where body is possible.'' 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 7th Edit. Art. " Metaphysics," 
p. 656. Thus Bp. Gleig. 

§ 22. Pity, if the Bishop did not bear in mind, that 
" WHERE" supposes, and perhaps presupposes, space. 

§ 23. Pure space is " a mere notion," says the Bishop. 
To which had he stuck, we should have been obliged to 
have set down his words elsewhere, even among the Kants 
and the Broughams of the affair. Fide Part. X. § 69, 
fyc. et § 63, 8fc. But the second clause seems intended 
to be exegetical of the first, and the Bishop drowns (and 
that pretty successfully) his notion in the ' boundless in- 
variable ocean,' as Locke would call it, of absence of body. 

§ 24. Now though Space were reduced to nothing but 
the possibility of body, nothing more than the absence of 
body (in SPACE, observe you,) where body is possible — 
[" Lusus merus non intellectorum xerborum — "*("] still, one 
may venture to hope, Space may turn out to be Space. 

§ 25. — 4. Gassendi's hypothesis, likewise, has a good 
claim to be ranged under this third great head. 

§ 26. Gassendus, who was the restorer of the Epicurean 
philosophy, or — if Epicureanism were too soundly asleep to 
be resuscitated — who at least strove to palliate the dogmas 
of Epicurus ; the celebrated Gassendus, we say, chose to 
maintain, that Space is not Spirit and not Body, is not 
Substance and not Accident. Here is a description by 
negatives, with a vengeance. What Space is, seeing it is 
neither mind nor matter, neither substance nor property, 
I cannot tell. Only I fancy, Space still is Space. Shade 
of the learned Gassendus ! what less, what more, what 
else, can Space be than Space \ 

§ 27. A certain middle nature ; something perfectly 

t (i attend. Physic, lib. 1 . The words in the text nre, in a good sense, 
quite as applicable to our Bishop's notion of Space, as to the School- 
men's notion of Time. 



190 SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. [Part IX. 



distinct from corporeal substance, and yet not an incor- 
poreal substance either — a somewhat between substance 
and accident : this is what Space is, would the shade re- 
spond, were Gassendi's shade to be faithful. Space a 
middle nature ! a real somewhat, neither spiritual nor 
material, neither a substance nor a mode ! Then, a — 
we knoiv not what.] In short, a nothing. Nothing, to- wit, 
but space. In fine, Space would continue to be Space, 
even though Space were ascertained to be nothing more 
than the certain middle nature. 

§ 28. Bayle (in Crit. Diet. p. 3083-4) characterized — 
and we cannot say, altogether without justice — Gassendi's 
procedure in the following manner : " Gassendus * * * 
" chose * to plunge himself into the most hideous 
" abyss of conjecturing, that," &o. &c. Whatever Gas- 
sendus conjecture is, of this we are confident, that Gassendi's 
space seriously constitutes a most hideous abyss. One into 
which we are desirous not to be plunged, — now, or at any 
future time. To contemplate a flight into " the vast im- 
" measurable abyss"} of infinite space, is always dreadful 
enough. But a survey of the secrets of space, the middle 
nature, would be, methinks, more awful still. But only 
— honesty compels me to confess — upon one condition, 
viz. that space, the middle thing, be any thing at all. 

§ 29. To every follower of Gassendus we say, accom- 
modating certain words of Bishop Berkeley to our use : 
" You may, if so it shall seem good, use the word" [space] 
4< in the same sense that other men use nothing, and 
" so make those terms convertible in your style." Prin- 
ciples of Human Knowledge. Section lxxx. 

t " Some Accident without a Substance, * * or some other 
" / know not whatP Leibnitz, 5th Paper, 119. But an accident with- 
out a substance is in rather better plight than a somewhat neither acci- 
dent nor substance, nor any thing else. 

X Milton. 



§§ 28-32.] 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



191 



§ 30. — 5. We shall take notice of one other hypothesis, 
as falling to be classed with those assemblages of letters 
which are tantamount to the position, Space is space. 

§ 31. That space is an external nothing, we have, we 
can say, the authority of a Divine, and no less a one than 
Episcopius. " Tot am atque omne Mud spatium quod EXTRA 
" hum mundum esse dicitur, nihil omnino reale est, sed pure 
" pute imaginarium, & PRORSUS NIHILUM." Instit. Theolog. 
Lib. iv. cap. xiii. The space which is said — ay, and 
(under Episcopius 's leave) which is thought — vide part. mii. 
§ 11, 12. — etc. — to be beyond the material universe, is 
ALTOGETHER NOTHING : this Episcopius has given out as 
his serious decision. And the grounds of his judgment, 
we, of course, need not seek to impugn, provided we be 
permitted to write after it a mere iota, which must be 
subscribed to, though it is not adscribed. Having, then, 
added an element entirely inconsiderable, we would ex- 
hibit Episcopius 's declaration. All and every part of 'that 
space which is said, and which is thought, to exist BEYOND 

this world is * * * * * altogether nothing 

but space. The addition is, no doubt, quite harmless, 
and, from the nature of the case, 'tis impossible you can 
take any exception to it, justly. So great a Divine, then, 
being judge, Space is nothing but Space. And so Space 
yet is Space. 



§ 32. — IV. Other opinions have been entertained, at 
least other forms of speech have been adopted, on the 
subject of Space. The opinions, or at any rate the ex- 
pressions, now lying in view, are only two in number: 
Though the small ness of the number is the least part of 
the evil. But it will be perceived, after a slight exami- 
nation, that each of those opinions (supposing each set of 
words to stand for an opinion,) falls to be resolved into 



192 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. [Part IX. 



one or other of the THREE hypotheses which we have gone 
over. 

§ 33. A fourth set, then, of words maintain, that Space 
is nothing but the relation, or rather the relations, of the 
bodies in the universe to each other, considered as exist- 
ing together. The name of the learned Leibnitz is con- 
spicuous among those who hold this opinion. An opinion 
which has become pretty common with persons who speak 
the language, if they do not meditate the truths, of philo- 
sophy. The doctrine may perhaps be pronounced the 
fashionable one, regarding Space. For what reasons, and 
by what means, it has become so prevalent among modern 
theologers, and certain descriptions of philosophers, is by 
no means perhaps so very obvious a thing. 

§ 34. But at all events, common and fashionable the 
doctrine is. And therefore, 'tis of consequence that it be 
well analyzed. Without any possibility of being mistaken, 
we shall witness it resolving itself (with, to be sure, a 
special bad grace,) into the magnificent declaration, Space 
is space : An axiom resting on the most indisputable 
basis — and as true as any other truism of them all. But 
this is rather forestalling matters. 

§ 35. We shall deliver the doctrine of the most distin- 
guished advocate, as well as in a manner the first setter 
forth, of the dogma, in the words of Dr Sam. Clarke's 
translation, a translation which was " made with great 
" exactness, to prevent any misrepresentation of Mr 
" Leibnitz's sense " See " Advertisement" prefixed to 
the " Collection of Papers which passed between the late 
" learned Mr Leibnitz and Dr Clarke" 

§ 36. " As for my own opinion," Leibnitz writes, 
" I have said more than once, that I hold Space to be 
" something merely relative, * that T hold it to be an 
" order of coexistences — * * For Space denotes, in 
" terms of possibility, an order of things which exist at 



§§ 33-39.. 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



193 



" the same time, considered as existing TOGETHER ; vvith- 
•• out enquiring into their manner of existing. And when 
" many things are seen TOGETHER, one perceives that 
" order of tilings among themselves Third Paper, 4. To 
the same effect, see Fifth Paper, 29. kc. Szc. 

§ 37- Elsewhere, Leibnitz says : 44 Space is that order, 
which renders bodies capable of being situated," &c. 
Fourth Paper, 41. And when Clarke, in his answer, ob- 
served : " What the meaning of these words is ; An order, 
" (or situation,) which makes bodies to be situable ; I under- 
I stand not," &c. (Fourth Reply, 41. — ) Leibnitz re- 
joined : 44 1 don't say, that Space is an order or situation, 

which makes things capable of being situated : This 
" would be nonsense." And hard upon this announce- 
ment, there follows the method by which the learned 
German chose to get quit of the nonsense. 44 I don't say, 
; * * that Space is an order or situation, but an order of 
44 situations" &c. Fifth Paper, 104. 

§ 38. Before analyzing the doctrine of those passages, 
in order to see what it is reducible unto, it may be well 
to take a look in the direction of results. To these we 
shall pay a regard which hardly could be bestowed, were 
we, in the first instance, to lay bare what the Leibnitzian 
dogma exactly amounts to. On the other hand, if the 
consequences inspire with horror — or with delight — the 
analysis will be followed with the intensest attention. 

§ 39. Two things necessarily follow from the supposi- 
tion, that Space is " something merely relative," i. e. to 
bodies, 44 an order of coexistences," i. e. of coexisting 
bodies. Bodies, we say. For should we ask a follower of 
Leibnitz, Why may not Space be the order of spirits (as 
well as of bod ies 44 existing t'>g»'th»-r tl^JLeib/dtzian 
is ready with his reply, That spirits have no extension, 
and, by themselves, have therefore nothing at all to do 



194 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. [Part IX. 



with space, t There are two things, we repeat, which 
follow necessarily from the supposition, that Space is 
merely relative to bodies, an order of coexisting bodies. 

§ 40. — 1st. It is thence deducible, that body or matter 
is infinitely extended. If matter is finite, there is extra- 
mundane or bodiless space, or extension ; inasmuch as 'tis 
absurd to suppose bounds set to all extension. And if 
there be no space but what is relative to bodies, body or 
matter must be infinite in extent. It must be granted 
that space, of some kind, is infinite. 

§ 41. It may be observed, that even though matter be 
made boundless, it would not be therefore completely in- 
finite : Complete infinity including fulness. Although 
matter have no general boundaries, it may have particular 
interstices. To give it in Clarke's language : " Though 
" matter had no limits, yet it might have within itself any 
" assignable vacuities." Dem. under Prop. VI. 

t " There is nothing simple, in my opinion, but true monads, which 
" have neither parts nor extension." Leibnitz's Fifth Paper, 24. And 
that a spirit or soul is a true monad : " Every simple substance, soul, 
" or true monad." Ib. 91. Again : " Thought and extended substance 
" have no connexion with each other, and are beings that differ toto 
" genere." Theodiccea. P. 172. See also, Third Paper, 12, and Fifth 
Paper, 48. 

Spirits have no extension : nothing to do with space. Was this the 
chimsera that led the way to another of the wonderful births in the 
Leibnitzian philosophy, namely, that there can be no spirits but what 
are associated with bodies, however subtile ; although a spirit is a 
simple substance ? " There are," so says our distinguished German, 
" there are no created substances wholly destitute of matter. * * * 
tl Angels or Intelligences, and souls separated from a gross body, have 
u always subtile bodies, though they themselves be incorporeal." Fifth 
Paper, 61. See also Third Paper, 9. And verily, if souls (to let 
angels alone) h^^ no extension, they stand in some need of being 
attended with matter, in order that they may not hopelessly elude our 
minds' perceptions, and conceptions too. Vide Part. III. § 34. et seq. 
— Vide quoq; Part. VIII. Append? c. B. § 24. 



§§ 40-45. ] 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



195 



§ 42. But if Space be the relations of bodies, matter 
is infinite, and infiniteness flowing from such a source 
cannot be of the complete kind. How can matter be com- 
pletely infinite, if there is Space (and Leibnitz contends 
there is), and if Space is different from Matter ? " I don't 
" say that Matter and Space are the same thing. * * 
" However, these things, though different, are insepa- 
" rable." Fifth Paper, 62. 

§ 43. — 2d. The second consequence from the supposi- 
tion in question, is : that as it follows that matter is with- 
out bounds, so it follows that matter could have had no 
beginning, and can have no end ; in fine, that matter is 
necessarily existing, f For according to the supposition 
we go upon, the non-existence of matter would involve 
the non-existence of all space. And no man ever did con- 
ceive, no man shall ever be able to conceive, the non-ex- 
istence of all space. Vide Part. I. § 25. et seq. 

§ 44. — 3d. We may add, that there is a third conse- 
quence resulting from the supposition, that Space is merely 
the order of co-existing bodies. The consequence is this : 
Were there only one body in the universe, the body would 
be necessarily immoveable : And, The material universe as 
a whole is necessarily immoveable. If space be no more 
than a relation of bodies ; no bodies, no space — no space, 
if but one body. And if there were no space, how could 
the sole body be moved \ how could the material universe 
be moved I 

§ 45. (The doctrine of absolute space infers that of the 
possibility of absolute motion. On the other hand, to deny 
the possibility of absolute motion, is to deny that there 
can be absolute space. And to deny the possibility of 
absolute motion, that is, to contend that all motion is 

t The reader may consider what will be found in Part VII. § lf>, 
as being suitable to present circumstances. The two cases are so far 
on one footing. 



196 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



[Part IX. 



merely relative, is to get (by another route) at the position, 
that if there were but one body, it would be immoveable. 

§ 46. " It doth not appear to me," says tne Bishop of 
Cloy ne, " that there can be any motion other than rela- 
" tive : SO that to conceive motion, there must be at least 
" conceived two bodies, whereof the distance or position 
" in regard to each other is varied. Hence, if there was 
" one only body in being, it could not possibly be moved." 
(Principles of Human Knowledge. § CXII.) 

§ 47- Those consequences, it is not to be doubted, will 
stagger those theists who have embraced Leibnitz's no- 
tion, and have any consistency left. 

§ 48. But then, the positions characterized as conse- 
quences will be greedily hailed by 

the atheist crew.t 

From which we may perceive how wise it was in our theo- 
logers to embrace the dogma out of which they arise. 
And as for the atheists, it will be time enough for them 
to glory in the notion, when they shall have made out 
the correctness of it — Which is something more than the 
theists who have inconsistently gloried in it have ever 
done. Before the atheists can push the dogma in our 
way, as an obstacle, they must be able to refute (and that 
not in the way of a mere "'Refutation"} all — but, for their 
comfort, no more than all — the first Part of the first Book 
of the " Argument ;" especially the two Scholia therein ; 
as well as be in a capacity to turn aside the edge of 

But we were going to anticipate what we have 

to advance. 

§ 49. We are now arrived at the place where we must 
put down our crucible, and set our face, right earnestly, 
towards an analytic process. Our design is, to try whether 
the Leibnitzian thing be precious metal or no : And shall 



t Paradise Lost, B. VI. 



§§ 46-51.] SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



197 



not our friends have good reason to congratulate us, if, 
immediately upon its being dropt into the vessel, it melts, 
and evaporates, and escapes in an unknown gas ; or, at 
best, turns out to be one of those worthless trifles] with 
which (as we must have observed — vide supra, § 21. etseq. 
atq; §-*31. — aliasq;) certain elderly children are, — to the 
discredit of their instructers and others, — but too fond of 
sporting themselves ? 

§ 50. When Leibnitz defines Space, " An order of CO- 
u existences" or "of things which exist at the same time, 
" considered as existing together ;" what are we to un- 
derstand by CO-, and together ? Nothing having re- 
spect to Time, for " time" is referred to in a clause of 
its own. What then ? We must by all means under- 
stand them as having regard to Space, which they sup- 
pose, or perhaps rather presuppose. And then, the defi- 
nition becomes equivalent to this, — Space is an order of 
things * * considered as existing together 

IN SPACE. A description which certainly looks more like 
banter than something designed to instruct us. 

§ 51. But to pass from this element in the description. 
What is Space ? I ask a Leibnitzian. A mere relation 
or order of bodies co- existing, he replies. But tell me, 
further, I insist, what you particularly mean by " relation" 
and " order I" Take them severally. — And first as to 
relation. When Space is said to be " something merely 
u relative" to bodies, that, will the genuine disciple of 
Leibnitz rejoin, is as much as to say, Space is nothing 
but the mere distance of bodies. And as to order : " Or- 
der," in like manner, just means distance. " Men ob- 
" serve in things a certain order of co-existence, accord- 
" ing to which the relation of one thing to another is more 

t Mr Locke has a Chapter on " Trifling Propositions." The " purely 
" identical propositions" receive the honour of being fust noticed. 
The honour is not undeserved. 



Q 



198 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. [Part IX. 



Cw or less simple. This order ; is their situation or distance? 
Leibnitz's Fifth Paper, 47. Space, then, is the distance of 
bodies from each other. 

§ 52. Space is distance. But distance is space. And 
what more does either of these positions amount to than 
this, Space is space I " Space" says Locke, " considered 
" barely in length between any two beings, without con- 
" sidering any thing else between them, is CALLED dis- 
" tance." B. II. ch. xiii. § 3, " But however named or 
" considered, it is always the same uniform simple idea 
" of space." Ib. § 27- To maintain, then, that space is 
distance, is virtually just to hold that space is space. 
And therefore, the Leibnitzian dogma is reducible to 
the edifying proposition which composes our THIRD great 
head. 

§ 53. We shall now sum up what we have to say in re- 
ference to the passage quoted in § 36, above. " When 
" many things are seen together, one perceives that OR- 
" DER of things among themselves :" this is the Cypher. 
When many bodies are seen together in space, one per- 
ceives that distance of bodies among themselves, which 
is SPACE : AND THIS IS THE KEY. 

§ 54. Before leaving this department of the subject, 
we had better notice, that the farther explanation or 
emendation (or whatever it be) of Leibnitz^s doctrine, (ut 
vide supra, § 37 ) consisting of these words, " Space is" 
" an order of situations,"" makes things much worse, if 
worse be possible, than it found them. Order, we have 
seen, is tantamount to distance, distance to space. And 
situations obviously suppose or presuppose space. So that 
the emendation amounts to this, Space is a space of 
spaces. 

§ 55. How long will it be ere the numerous followers 
of Leibnitz consent to learn, that they cannot deny the 
existence of real absolute space (as h has been called,) with- 



§§ 52-59.] 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



199 



out assuming in their denial the very thing they would 
deny ! Men cannot speak of aught which does not in- 
volve Space, even Absolute Space. Space is a sine qua 
non of all else. 

§56. In the observations which we have thus made in 
direct relation to the Leibnitzian doctrine, we have not 
(the reader is requested now to reflect) advanced one step 
beyond the words, or what is implied by the bare words, 
in which the doctrine is conveyed. But what if we were 
to advance beyond the words ? 

§ 57. Space is the relation, the order, the distance, the 
space, of, or between, bodies. But does not the space 
constituted by-the distance of any two bodies from each 
other, — the distance, let it be, of the Sun from the Moon. 
— appear to the human mind to be capable of exist- 
ence though those bodies were away ? That is, does it 
not seem to us to be a false assertion, That space is 
merely a relation or order of bodies, or the distance or 
space between them ? As touching this, however, we 
have merely to refer the reader to many previous por- 
tions of this work : to all those places which set forth tht j 
necessary existence of Space, and the non-necessary 
existence of Matter or Body. 

§ 58. It is false, then, tha*l Space is a mere relation of 
bodies. Space, unlike body, exists necessarily. What 
Space in itself is, — whether it be a substance, or a mode, 
or — space, — forms an inquiry which has received, we trust, 
a most satisfactory investigation in the course of thi^ 
long Digression. 

§ 59. There is perhaps no doctrine which has done 
more to embarrass a plain matter, than this doctrine, 
that Space is nothing but the relation of bodies to each 
other. And on this account, we must have cleared away 
a deal of cloudiness from affairs, by shewing that Leib- 
nitz's dogma naturally resolves itself into a proposition 



200 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



[Part IX. 



which is so «very simple, and so very free from all ambi- 
guity. 

§ 60. Before passing on to the last opinion concerning 
Space, we shall give a specimen of Lord Brougham? s in- 
anities occurring in the Section " Of the argument a 
priori" We have heard of Leibnitz's " distance," and 
submit to the temptation which seduces us to listen to a 
few particulars relating to Brougham's. The British dis- 
tance, to the disgrace of our country, will be found to be 
greater inferior to the German. 

§ 61. "Is distance, that is, the supposed movementt 
" of a point in a straight line ad infinitum, a quality ? It 
64 must be so if infinite space is Then of what is it a qua- 
" lity ? If infinite space is the quality of an infinite be- 
" ing, infinite distance must be the quality of an infinite 
44 being also. But can it be said to be the quality of the 
44 same infinite being ? Observe that the mind can form 
44 just as correct an idea of infinite distance as of infinite 
44 space, or, rather, it can form a somewhat more distinct 
t4 idea. But the being to be inferred from this infinite 
4 ' distance cannot be exactly the same in kind with that 
44 to be inferred from space infinite in all directions." 

§ 62. Observe, "that throughout this passage his Lord- 
ship distinguishes, and with*no little care either, between 
infinite space, and what he is pleased to call infinite dis- 
tance. He distinguishes, we say, between them : without 
hinting, however, at the ground for the distinction. Rea- 
sons are sometimes only difficultly got at — And in certain 
cases become dangerous to those who employ them (as 
elephants in an Indian army have been known to turn 
upon their own troops :) Wherefore, a degree of caution 
may be necessary in producing them. But what infinite 
distance can be, if (so far as the question, Can infinite 

t Distance is not a supposed movement. 



§§ 60-63.1 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



201 



distance be said to be the quality of the same infinite be- 
ing of whom infinite space is the quality ? is concerned,) 
if it be not the very same as infinite space, passes all com- 
prehension. " Space infinite in all directions" swallows 
up every " infinite distance. " Infinite distance stands in 
the same relation to space infinite in all directions, that 
any other less does to the greater which contains the less. 
— Infinite distance " cannot be exactly the same in kind," 
indeed, with space infinite in all directions ; but then this 
is because the one is the part of a thing, of which the 
other is the whole. Postulate space infinite in all direc- 
tions — and you cannot avoid postulating, at the very saifie 
time, space (or distance, if you will,) infinite in this, or in 
that direction. 

§ 63. The mind, says his Lordship, can form " a some- 
w what more distinct idea" of infinite distance than of in- 
finite space. This is bringing matters to the very top of 
their bent. For, in truth, infinite distance, after all that 
can be said about it, is a perfect contradiction. That to 
constitute distance, at least two fixed points, or (if you 
prefer it another way) two points considered as fixed, are 
necessary ; is a point which may be considered to be as 
fixed as either of the poles of heaven, t Infinite distance 
is an infinity that is finite, and a distance in which there 
are no distant things. 

t " Considering space as lying between any two bodies, or positive 
"beings, * * we call it distance." —Locke. Essay, B. II. ch. xiii. § 27, 
See also ibid, § 3. Vide Part. VII. % 44. 



202 



PART X. 

OF THE SENTIMENTS OF PHILOSOPHERS CONCERNING 
SPACE. LAW, WATTS, BROUGHAM, KANT, BERKELEY. 

§ 1. — V. We hasten to the fifth and last opinion, or 
Hither class of opinions : And shall make our notices with 
becoming brevity ; except some case requiring a longer 
consideration present itself. 

§ 2. We have seen, we have conquered, the foe in their 
outposts : the remainder resolve to defend themselves in 
the citadel. We have been upon the ground wherefrom 
Space, specially Space in the distance, appears an exter- 
nal nothing ; and it is our present misfortune that we ap- 
proach a territory, from which, if Space does not dis- 
agreeably resemble an internal nothing, 'twill be because 
it is covered by a conceit, perfect in its way. 

— Multo nebulae circum Deat fudit amictu, 
Cernere ne quis— « — 

The peculiarity of this case, is, that a concealment is ef- 
fected as entire as that of the ostrich, when it hides its 
head from its pursuers. Not to keep the reader too long 
in suspense (we can imagine, and do excuse, his anxious 

t The Goddess who must be understood here, is, without doubt, 
Dulness, u the mighty mother" whom the Dunciad sings. Under the 
influence of whose yawn, — whether or not sometimes 
Metaphysic calls for aid on Sense, 1 — 
Metaphysics never call on Common-sense, but to say, How much we 
despise you ! and every thing as natural as you ! 

1 Book IV. 1. 646. 



§§ 1-8.] SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



203 



uncertainty ;) The opinion which is now to be admitted 
to a hearing, modestly yet distinctly and firmly whispers, 
that space is a mere idea of the mind. 

§ 3. An idea of the mind : Then, upon my word, I 
think Space will turn out to be a Mode ; for an idea, as it 
is not a substance, so is very usually taken to be a condi- 
tion or quality of one. 

§ 4. But to descend to particulars, and submit to the 
drudgery of eyeing Space as it appears in the shape of 
this or that man's idea : — 

§ 5. — (A.) Bishop Laic. — The following passages are 
taken from the- Notes to Archbishop King's " Origin of 
" Evil." " There are * ideas, and simple ones too, which 
" have nothing ad extra correspondent to them, no proper 
" ideatum, archetype, or objective reality, and I don't see 
t; why that of space may not be reckon'd one of them." 
Chap. I. sect. 1, Note (3.) " — Pure extension, which 
" is an abstract idea, form'd by the mind itself, and, as 
" such, has no foundation anywhere else." " — Absolute 
" Space, which exists only in the mind." Note (6.) Con- 
sult also Note (7-) etc. etc. And as to Law's opinions 
farther, regarding Space, we beg leave to refer the curi- 
ous reader to the " Inquiry into the Ideas of Space, 
" Time," &c. — 1734. or 1735. A work this, not seldom 
named and quoted by writers of that period, and subse- 
quently, but now scarcely to be met with. 

§ 6. According to our Annotator, then, space is never 
an external existence, never an objective reality : It ex- 
ists only in the mind : It is, in short, an abstract idea. 

§ 7- And what, according to Edmund Latv, is an ab- 
stract idea ? at least, what is that abstract idea which 
composes, or is composed by, Space ? 

§ 8. An idea : an idea, even in the most unfavourable 
event. And Law agrees with Locke, in making idea stand 
for <; every thing about which the mind is conversant, or 



204 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. [Part X. 



" which can be the object of perception, thought or un- 
" derstanding." Note (2.) But we shall not pretend par- 
ticularly to declare here, what Locke took an idea to be. 
His " ideas? 'tis well known, are, upon the whole, the 
most perplexing words in his book : Sometimes, signify- 
ing one thing ; at other times, another ; and frequently, 
a third. But thus much we may safely remark,' — and it 
suffices, we do remark, — that, whatever Locke took idea 
to be, in rerum naturd he knew but of Substances, Modes, 
and Relations. Idea, therefore, must be one of these 
three. Vide Part. VIII. § 19. 21. 25. 

§ 9. — (B.) Dr Watts.—We shall be a little particular 
with the Doctor, as it has been said, that he 4£ has with 
" great ingenuity discussed all the several opinions about 
" space." Mrs Cockburn's Remarks. (Vol. I. p. 390.) 
This which has been said, is generally thought. 

§ 10. Watts' Essay on Space is entitled, " A fair in- 
" quiry and debate concerning space, whether it be some- 
" thing or nothing, God or a creature." Philosophical 
Essays — Essay I. 

§ 11. The Essay in question falls naturally to be di- 
vided into two well- denned parts : In the first of which 
the author shews that " space cannot be merely an exist- 
" ence in the mind," &c. (Sect. II.) In the ; /her, he 
labours to make out " the nihility of space" (sect, xi.) ; 
Space being 44 nothing real, but a mere abstract idea." 
(Sect. XII.) 

§ 12. 'Tis altogether unnecessary that we should mi- 
nutely regard all that, in propriety, appertains to the 
former portion. W e believe, most people may easily see, 
that in vain does Dr Watts attempt, in the second por- 
tion, to invalidate what, in the first, he advances on the 
topic of the external existence of space. 

§ 13. But to detail. Section I. explains the subject in 
general, " Void space," says Watts, " is conceived by 



§§ 9-15.] 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



205 



" us as scattered through all the world between bodies, 
u as interpersed through all the pores of bodies, and as 
" reaching also beyond all the worlds that God has made, 
" and extended on all sides without bounds. * * * 

" The grand inquiry is, What is this space V " Space 

14 is," concludes the Doctor, " either something or no- 
M thing : if something, it is either a mere idea in the mind, 
" or something existing without. If it exist without us, 
" it is a substance or a mode ; if a substance, it is created 
" or increated/'t 

§ 14. In Section II. the author makes plain, " that 
" Space cannot be a mere nothing," but, on the contrary, 
is a " sort of something that it " cannot be a mere 
" idea," but is " something without us." 

§ 15. In Section III. he endeavours to make it appear, 
that space is a substance. 

t § 1. With which agrees, so far, Dr Clarice's summary of concep- 
ti ms. " All the conceptions (I think) that ever have been or can be 
" framed concerning Space, are these which follow. That it is either 
" absolutely nothing, or a mere idea, or only a relation of one thing to 
" another, or that it is body, or some other substance, or else & property 
" of a substance." Note in 5th "Reply. Between the two Doctors, 
the agreement at bottom would seem to be complete as to fundamen- 
tals, but in one particular. The dissenting Doctor alludes not to the 
conception, in virtue of which space is only a relation, &c. But he had 
it in his power to assign a good reason for the omission. Elsewhere, 
he maintains that the fancy of space being only a relation, is unin- 
telligible. " Some philosophers, particularly Mr Leibnitz, have 
" fancied Space," these are our Doctor's words, " to be a sort of rela- 
" tive mode, and call it the order of co-existent beings or bodies, 

u which order is their general situation or distance Thus, after 

* a manner which is unintelligible to me, they go on to explain their 
" idea of Space." Sect. III. 

§ 2. Our own general division, and minor divisions, include (as the 
reader is by this time aware) all the members in Watts' divisions, and 
all the members in Clarke's division to boot. It may be to some pur- 
pose, to present, once for all, a table of our division, and subdivisions, 
of the opinions anent 1 Space. Vide Appendic. 

iThis word is 6et among David Hume's Scotticisms. 

R 



206 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. [Part X. 



§ 16. "If Space be something which has an existence 
44 without us, it must be either a substance itself, or a 
" mode or property of some substance ; for it is most evi- 
44 dent) that it must either subsist by itself, or it must sub- 
44 sist in or by some other thing which does subsist by it- 
44 self. -There can be no medium between subsistence in 
44 and by itself, and subsistence in and by another. 1 ' In 
all this, we think the Doctor is perfectly right. Vide 
Part. 14.— Atq; Part. VIIL § 25. f 

§ 17- But in what follows, we think he is perfectly 
wrong. Space cannot, he maintains, be a mode of a sub- 
stance. 44 That space cannot be a mode or property,''' 
he seeks to prove, by such arguments as these :■ — 

§ 18. (a.) 44 If space be a mode, where is the substance 
44 in which it is," fyc. ? — Answer. The substance is where 
the mode is, to be sure. 

§ 19. (b.) Wherein does the substance differ from the mode f 
— Answer. In this : whereas the mode is merely space or 
extension, the substance has extension and duration and 
many other modes. Vide Part. VII. § 39.— -Part. VIIL 
§ YJ.—Etc. 

§ 20. (c.) That Space is not an absolute mode, the Doc- 
tor would fain prove, and would prove thus : — 44 Space 
4< neither wants any subject to inhere in" c, - 44 it wants 
44 no other being that we can conceive to make it exist." — 
Answer. Whether this be truly so, or no, depends on what 
lies under 41 Space* 9 Vide PUrh VII. § 5. Et Part. 
XL §§ 1. 2. 3. 5. 7. . 

t " Is this vacuum,' or immoveable, indivisible, and penetrable ex- 
" tension, a substance or a mode ] It must be one of the two." — Bayle. 
Crit. Diet. p. 3083. Bmjl means a vacuum, said by others to exist. 
He means, that vacuum must be either substance or mode, if it be at 

all. If " Space is a nature distinct from body, and positively infinite, 

" it folloAvs undeniably, that there must be some incorporeal substance, 
« whose affection its extension is." " True Intellectual System of 
t< the Universe," p. 7G9-70. In the note to the twenty-fifth section of 
Part VIIL hereof, Cudivorth gives one-half of the reason. 



§§ 16-28.] 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



207 



§ 21. Other arguments, as we may say, are. spoken of. 
But they seeem far too wretched for serious notice. 
What, for instance, need one reply to such an argument 
as that which the next section shall set forth ? Remember, 
the thing to be proved is, that infinite space is a sub- 
stance. 

§ 22. (d.) " Space wants no created being to support 
" its existence." — Answer. We dare say, not. 

§ 23. The Section closes with these words : " All the 
" arguments that ever I read to disprove space to be a 
" substance, carry no force at all with them, and seem to 
" be mere assertions, not only without reason, but con- 
trary to it. 1 ' On which subject, see Part VII. § 21, 
and the following sections, to § 28, inclusive. 

§ 24. Section IV. It having been proved — in the 
manner which we have witnessed, but to the Doctor's 
satisfaction — that Space is a substance, he shews that 
" surely it cannot be a created substance." If so, no 
doubt " it appears to be God Himself. 11 

§ 25. Section V. evinces that " Space cannot be God. 11 
And in this we entirely concur with Isaac Watts. Vide 
PaH. VII. % 38. 39. 40. 44.— etc. But we're no^ sure, 
that he and we would agree, as to the arguments by which 
the mutually received proposition should be established. 

§ 26. The Doctors arguments are such as the follow- 
ing :— 

§ 27. (a.) " If Space be God Himself, then all bodies 
" are situated in God, as in their proper place — " x.r.X. 
One might answer : This cannot properly be an objection 
to the doctrine : 'tis the doctrine itself. 

§ 28. (/3.j " If Space were God, then the Divine Being, 
" though in its whole it be unmeasurable, 11 — [Mark that — ] 
" yet hath millions of parts of itself, really distinct from 
" each other, measurable — 11 x.r.X. If one bear in mind, 
that Space hath no separable) parts what Watts proceeds 



208 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. [Part X. 



to glance at,) and that finite can bear no proportion to 
infinite, he might well admit the strength of the position 
in the objection. For this position, also, is the doctrine 
itself. 

§ 29. (y.) A third " consequence of supposing Space 
" to be God, is this : Then every part of this divine space 
" will contain Divine Perfections in it complete, or only 
" some part of each of them." — x.r.X. For a reply to 
which, we shall turn to a place in Dr SI. Clarke's Answer 
to a sixth Letter. " The individual Consciousness of the 
" One Immense Being, is as truly one ; as the present 
" moment of time is individually one, in all places at once. 
" And the one can no more properly be said to be an ell 
" or a mile of Consciousness, (which is the sum of" [Dr 
Watts'] " objection,) than the other can be said to be an 
" ell or a mile of Time. This suggestion seems to de- 
" serve particular consideration." We are" confident, 
that this constitutes a basis for a triumphant reply. 

§ 30. (3.) If infinite space were God, God is infinitely 
extended. But God " is the most perfect spirit." And 
" a spirit is not extended." In reference to the first of 
whieh,propositions, consider Part VII. §§ 38. 39. 40. 44. 
etc. — And in reference to the third, consider Part III. 
§ 34. with the following sections — Ak. \ of Part VIII. 
Appendix B. § 24.— And Part IX. Note (t) to § 39. 

§ 31. The Section concludes thus : " The strongest 
arguments seem to evince this, that space must be God, 
" or it must be nothing." The strongest arguments seem 
to evince, as you, good Doctor, saw yourself in your second 
Section, that Space cannot be nothing. And if any ar- 
guments evince, or even seem to evince, that Space must 
be God, they are (we may depend on't) removed from 
the strongest arguments by the whole diameter of being. 

§ 32. One reason why we deemed it to be expedient to 
go over those four arguments intended to shew, that Space 



§§ 29-34] 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



20,9 



cannot be God, the reader may gather, if he ponders the 
word3 instantly to be quoted. They occur in the same 
Section. The remark contained in them appears t(j be 
in all respects just. " Most of the inferences which I 
" drew from the supposition of Space being God, are just 
" and natural, if Space be God's immensity," &c. 

§ 33. In Section VI. the Doctor gives " a review and 
" recollection of the argument." 

§ 34. Well was he entitled to proclaim : " We enter 
" into the abyss of space, infinite and eternal space, and 
" our thoughts are lost and drowned in it." What he thus 
declared, reviewing as he was the first half of the way, 
he might as truly have cried out at any subsequent stage 
of his journey. At the very beginning of this Essay, the 
author had said : " Would any one imagine, that so 
" familiar an idea as that which we have of space, should 
" be so abstruse and mysterious, so difficult and unac- 
" countable a thing, as that it should be doubtful and 
" undetermined to this day, among the philosophers even 
" of this knowing age, what space is ; whether it be a 
" substance or mode, God or a creature, something or 
" nothing."" And in the Preface he had written to this 
effect : " It is strange that philosophers, even in this en- 
" lightened age, this age of juster reasoning, should run 
" into such wide extremes in their opinions concerning 
" space ; that while some depress it below all real being, 
" and suppose it to be mere nothing ; others exalt it to 
<; the nature and dignity of Godhead." Dr Watts, we 
say, had so written ; and, of a truth, even by the time he 
had gotten the length of Section VI., well was he entitled 
to demand : " After all our philosophy" [Something like 
half the word would have done.] " and toil of reasoning" 
[Such as it is, even with toil thrown into the scale, to 
make heavy weight.] " shall it be said that we know not 



210 SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. [PartX. 



44 whether space be a mere nothing, or whether it be the 
" true and eternal God V — " Are the eternal God and 
44 a mere empty nothing, so near akin to one another, 
44 that we cannot see the difference between them — that 
44 we are not able to tell whether space be God, or whe- 
44 ther space be nothing V Indeed, Reverend Doctor, 
appearances look threatening : And the very worst may 
be dreaded, unless some third road is before us (if we will 
but look for it,) by which we may escape from paths so 
fraught with deceit and danger. Meanwhile, we heartily 
join in your prayer, that the shadows of your thick dark- 
ness may be scattered, and that you may be led out of the 
labyrinth of gross ignorance and mistake, and helped to 
make your way through the abyss of night — and so on. 

§ 35. There appears to be, in the 7th Section, nothing 
worth our notice ; if one nothing be excepted. Space, 'tis 
now darkly surmised, may ultimately turn out to be " a 
" mere non-entity or nothing." The Proteus, after going 
through all his shapes, may 44 fix at last," and submit to 
exist without any shape at all, ay without even the 
shadow of a shape. And hereabouts lies the mystery. 

§ 86. The 8th Section compares Space to shadow or 
darkness. 44 Is not darkness extended beyond the utmost 

"bounds of the material ci^tionf 44 We can no 

<c more assign the limits of darkness, than we can the 
" limits of space. Again, as darkness hath a seeming im- 
44 mensity belonging to it, has it not an eternity also ?" 
Suppose that darkness is extended, infinitely extended, 
and is eternal : What can be inferred ? That extension 
or space is mere non- entity or nothing ? Nay, nay. 

§ 37- But has darkness, in reality, extension and dura- 
tion ? No : Darkness by itself is not long, nor broad, nor 
deep ; and as extent is not an attribute of darkness, so 
neither is time. The thing which is dark may have, or 



» 



§§35-41.] SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 211 



rather must have, these attributes or conditions. If you 
suppose darkness and absence of body to coexist, then 
you have dark space. {Vide Part. IX. § 24.) 

§ 38. In Section IX. the Doctor tries to take courage 
from the hint, that space — or bodiless extension — may be 
nothing but the absence of body — or bodiless extension. 
— that is, that extension without body may be extension 
without body ; as shade — or the absence of light — is the 
absence of light : and to raise some efforts of reasoning, " to 
" prove space to be nothing real/'t Space is inactive and 
impassive : Therefore, argues this Logician, it cannot be 
God nor a creature. Space cannot be God nor a crea- 
ture : And therefore, Space must be " non-entity or 
nothing." Such is Watts' reasoning. We answer: We 
are not at all disposed to dispute either the premiss or 
the conclusion of the first enthymeme. But with regard 
to the second, while we go in with the premiss, we must 
cast out the conclusion, as well as (therefore) that pre- 
miss which the conclusion subsumes, viz. That what is 
not God Himself, nor a creature, is non-entity or nothing. 

§ 39. Section X. is " a re-examination whether Space 
" has any real properties. 1 ' 

§ 40. The first consideration advanced here may be 
said to be, that space is " emptiness, or absence of body or 
matter'" — x.r.X. And as touching this, see Part IX. 
§ 14. and § 24. 

§ 41. The second consideration says, in reference to 
Space's supposed "capacity to receive bodies into it," " that 
" space is no otherwise capable of receiving body into it 
" than as the emptiness of a vessel makes it capable of re- 
" ceiving liquor" — x.r.X. Wh,ich is cordially granted. 
Emptiness is either space without matter, or space with 

t " Or no real being," adds the Doctor. But I hope, that there is 
a medium between no real Being, and nothing real ; as I would not 
wish my thoughts to be nothing real — which yet, arc not real Beings. 



212 SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. [Part X. 



thin and subtile matter. Verily, Space is no otherwise capa- 
ble of receiving body into it than as the space within an 
empty vessel (vacuum, for all practical purposes,) makes 
the vessel capable of receiving any sort of substance which 
is no larger than the space. Space, in fine, is no other- 
wise capable of receiving body, than as space is capable 
of receiving body. 

§ 42. The third consideration consists of this : " Space 
" can never penetrate matter * * wheresoever mat- 
" ter is, there Space is not.*' 1 — •" Space is no more, and is 
" entirely lost, when body is placed in the room of empti- 
" Ms. 11 Relatively to the topic of penetration, consult 
Part VI. § 12. and down to the end of § 36. 

§ 43. The fourth consideration may be said to be : The 
infinity of space is not an infinity of fulness. As to which, 
weigh what occurs in Part IX. § 57. Etc, 

§ 44. Fifth consideration : Infinite space is really divi- 
sible, and indeed divided, by the bodies situated in it. 
This is the same sort of consideration as the preceding. 
Space is not full, because there are bodies in it : Space is 
divided, because there are bodies in it. The considera- 
tions resting on the same bottom ; to. remove the bottom 
from the one, is to remove the bottom from the other. 

§ 45. Sixth Consideration. " The true reason why 
" space appears to want no cause, is not that it has such 
" a real and substantial essence as is too big to be produced 
46 by any cause, but that it is such a subtile, tenuious, unes- 
" sentzal, or imaginary thing, that has not essence, nor exist- 
4 ' ence, nor reality enough to want a cause, or to be pro- 
" duced, or caused." We are happy at leaving this ex- 
actly as we found it. 

§ 46. Seventh Consideration. Space has not necessary 
existence : it can be annihilated. The reader has had 
too much on this subject in the course of our work, to 
leave it anywise necessary to add aught in this place. 



§§ 42-52.] 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



213 



§ 47. The rest of the Section is taken up in illustrating 
a parallel between space and emptiness. And as emptiness 
involves space, we can have no objections to offer to the 
institution of the comparison. — There may also be as 
much analogy between space and shade, that is, dark space, 
as ever the Doctor likes. 

§ 48. In the 11th Section is answered an objection 
against the nihility of space. 

§ 49. The objection amounts to this : "20 miles of 
" space between 1 '' any " two bodies" — or, if you please, 
20 nonillions of miles of space between any two points 
— " cannot be mere nothing." For if the miles of space 
be nothing, the bodies, — or points, — are M close toge- 
" ther, or touch one another." Rather a shrewd objec- 
tion indeed, and 'tis not so easy to see how it is to be 
got decently over. 

§ 50. The reply consists of 4; a round denial" of the 
truth ofcthe consequence in the proposition, If there be no- 
thing between the bodies, or points, then they are close 
together : Were the miles nothing, the bodies, or points, 
would not therefore touch. Emptiness would be between. 
Emptiness, that is Space. But Space is nothing. — No- 
thing would be between. But what would the between 
be ? Nothing. Therefore, between the bodies, or points, 
there would be a nothing which was a nothing. 

§ 51. Alas ! we have nothing to bring against the round 
denial, unless it were something not very unlike the square 
or the cube of the miles of space. But the calamity to which 
we are subjected is, that space, or emptiness, is of no use 
in such a case : Except to keep bodies from dashing against 
each other, when a better preventive of collision is not to 
be had. 

§ 52. The nihility of Space having been so satisfacto- 
rily established, the 12th and last Section evidences (in 
the best possible way,) that space is "nothing real." Well : 



214 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. [Part X, 



This tallies with its nihility. But the rubric immediately 
goes on to do more than merely insinuate, that Space is 
" a mere abstract idea." Indeed ! And is a mere abstract 
idea, an abstract idea, an idea, nothing real ? nihility ? 

§ 53. But not to be in too great a hurry. " After all 
" these debates, wherein we" such are the first words of 
the Section, " have been endeavouring to prove space to 
" be nothing real without us, yet perhaps we may allow 
" it to be an abstracted idea of the mind."t Nothing real 
without us : This, then, was what we had to understand 
by non-entity, or nothing, or nihility. Space is a non- 
entity, or nothing, or nihility, as far as 'without us is con- 
cerned. But as far as within us is concerned, Space is 
" an abstracted idea of the mind." Well for us, if after 
so much tossing by winds from all the quarters of the 
compass, we are now wafted into secure anchorage. 

§ 54. Dr Isaac Watts presently repeats and answers 
the arguments which, in the beginning of the &say, he 
had used to disprove Space to be a mere idea. 

§ 55. The first argument, as now noticed, is : Space is 
without bounds, and therefore is not a mere idea in our 
minds. A capital argument, in sooth ! And the answer ? 
'Tis this : " We can form an idea of infinite space of the 
' 6 ever-grow'^a kind, and it may be a mere idea still. Our 
" idea, indeed, is not actually infinite" — Good : very good. 
For an answer, it were capital ; were it not, that, however 
true the matter of the answer is, it is (by ill luck) nothing 
to the point. That we can form an idea of Space, does 
not — surely — prove, that Space is an idea, or that our 
idea is Space. Who but such dreamers as the worthy 
Doctor ever dreamt that our ideas of Space might run 
riot when they had lost and drowned themselves in the 
abyss, — enlarging and contracting themselves as Space 
grew from less to more, and shrank from more to less ? 
t See Essay II. Sect. iv. par. 9. Essay V. Sect. i. par 4. Et alibi. 



§ 53-58.] SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 215 



§ 56. The second argument now mentioned, as proving | 
that Space cannot be a mere idea, is as follows : Space 
" seems to have a necesssarij and obstinate existence. 1 ^ 
The answer being to this effect : Space has hardly so 
much external existence as certain mathematical truths, 
which the Doctor, who has a worthy object in view, calls 
external truths ; and, asks he in fine consistency, Have 
these external truths, which are nothing besides ideas, 
any real existence extraneous to the minds that con- 
ceive them I After all that we have written, we may 
safely leave it to the reader, to place himself between the 
argument and the answer, and judge which of them has 
the better cause by the hand. 

§ 57. " To conclude," says Dr Isaac Watts, in the last 
paragraph of his Essay, il after the laborious searches of 
" thought, reasoning and reading in several stages of 
" my life past, these are the best conceptions and senti- 
" ments that I can frame of space. 1 ' — The conceptions and 
sentiments bear very evident marks of having been framed, 
not only in several stages of his life, but in several, and 
totally opposite, states of his mind. — He proceeds : " I 
<; grant there may be some difficulties yet remaining, and 
" some darknesses which yet may hang over the subject. 
" Learned men have laboured hard to scatter them in for- 
" mer ages, and in the present too, without full success ; 
" yet, perhaps, in future time there may be a way found 
" out for adjusting all these difficulties to the more com- 
M plete satisfaction of some following age." — I must, of 
course, leave it to my readers to decide, whether I have 
not adjusted all the difficulties touching space ; but certain, 
at all events, I am of this, that there must be a way, to 
those who can find it, whereby to set right every thing that 
is wrong. % 

§ 58. If the Doctor, by " difficulties'' and 4< darkness- 

t Vide Appendic. 



216 SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. [Part X. 



es," means, in the most distant manner, difficulties and 
darknesses of an incomprehensible cast, we have unques- 
tionably a remark to offer. "Tis the height of absurdity 
to fancy, that the human mind can conjure up difficulties 
of the incomprehensible kind, which the human mind can- 
not solve. How could the mind know the incomprehen- 
sibilities to be incomprehensibilities, unless it had comfort- 
able glimpses of that higher region, wherefrom the in- 
comprehensible things appear indeed to be things incom- 
prehensible ? To comprehend that certain things are of 
an incomprehensible character, is at least to comprehend 
the things which are afterwards found to be incompre- 
hensible. And comprehending the things — is not that 
incompatible with the things being not of a comprehen- 
sible character ? Puta Part. IF. Appendic. § 7- — quoq; 
Part. IX. § 17. Not. t. 

§ 59. With Br Watts, thus, space is " an abstracted 
" idea of the mind." 

§ 60. And that he counts all abstracted ideas of the 
mind, and all ideas whatever, to be modes of a substance, 
the reader of his second Essay will perceive, by abundance 
of evidence. Referring to each of the four sections of that 
Essay, in particular, and to passages scattered through 
his volume of Essays, in general — we shall content our- 
selves with citing these four words : " Abstracted ideas 
" or modes." (Essay II. Sect, ii.) 

§ 61. Space is an abstracted idea of the mind. An 
abstracted idea of the mind is the mode of a substance. 
Therefore Space is a Mode. Thus Br Isaac Watts. And 
therefore we are under the painful necessity of sending 
him over to those who will have Space to be a Mode, and 
nothing more, and nothing less. The Doctor will agree 
with bis company, so far as antimodists are concerned. 
But the moment an investigation takes place with regard 
to the nature of the modality, Br Watts, and those of his 



§§ 59-63.] SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



217 



way of speaking, must retire within themselves, the rest 
of the company being all the while at liberty to expiate 
over the whole field of nature, and even to wander beyond 
the solar walk or milky way.f 

§ 62. — (r). . Lord Brougham. — In the " Preliminary 
Discourse," and in the Section already referred to, (vide 
part. ix. § 60.) the following words are to be found. " To 
" argue from the existence of space and time to the exist- 
" ence of any thing else, is assuming that those two 
" things have a real being independent of our conceptions 
" of them : for the existence of certain ideas in our minds 
' ; cannot be the foundation on which to build a conclusion 
" that any thing external to our minds exists. To infer 
" that space and time are qualities of an infinite and eter- 
u rial being is surely assuming the very thing to be proved, 
" if a proposition can be said to have a distinct meaning 
" at all which predicates space and time as qualities of any 
" thing. What, for example, is time but the succession of 
" ideas , and the consciousness and the recollection which we 
u have of that succession" ? — x.r.x. 

§ 63. In this passage if is not obscurely hinted, that 
his Lordship takes Space and Time to be conceptions or 
ideas in our minds. And of course, Space and Time can- 
not be " qualities of any thing," i. e. " any thing external 
" to our minds," if Space and Time be no more than 
conceptions or ideas — namely, conceptions or ideas of 
Space and Time. On Lord Brougham's hypothesis, which 
(forget not) makes Space and Time conceptions or ideas, 
that is, internal affections, — it is verily vain to speak of 
Space and Time as being qualities (or any thing else) of 
any object external to our minds. Our conceptions, in 
one word, cannot be external to us. 



t Pope— Essay on Man. Ep. 1 

■ 



218 SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



[Part X. 



§ 64. We have little to do with his Lordship's ima- 
ginings about Time, bat as " time" is introduced, we shall 
throw out a hint, which may have some claim to a brief 
consideration. % 

§ 65. Time, says his Lordship, is the succession of 
ideas. But is not Time (Br Price led the way, long ago, 
to the remark) presupposed by, or in, Succession ?t What 
were a succession that occupied no time, that had no du- 
ration ? A succession which will never succeed — in gain- 
ing any wise man's good opinion. The position, Time is 
a Succession, is, so far as this question is concerned, ex- 
actly the same as the position, Time is Time. And that, 
by the bye, is as true as the position, Space is Space. ' 

§ 66. But Time not only is the succession of ideas, it 
is the consciousness and recollection of the succession. 
Time is Time, and not only so, for Time is the recollec- 
tion of Time. Perhaps oar readers may be more able 
than we are, to help out*his Lordship at a dead lift. 

§ 67- It may be noticed, in connection with what is 
stated in the words under our examination, that they are 
amazingly inconsistent with what is conveyed at the con- 
clusion of the Section wherein they occur. Remember, 
that space and time, and, by consequence, infinite space 
and infinite time (or duration), that is, immensity and 
eternity, are ideas and conceptions " in our minds," and, 
therefore, are not any things " independent of our concep- 
" tions and " cannot be the foundation on which to 
" build a conclusion that any thing external to our minds 
" exists :" And then weigh the following particular 

t " We may measure duration by the succession of thoughts in the 
" mind, as we measure length by inches or feet ; but the notion or 
u idea of duration must be antecedent to the mensuration of it, as the 
" notion of length is antecedent to its being measured." Dr Reid. 
Essay III. ch. v. Writes he not well 1 



1 



§§ 64-69.] 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



219 



" eminent use" of " the argument a priori" : — " The fact 
6J of those ideas of immensity and eternity, forcing them- 
" selves, as Mr Steicart expresses it, upon our belief, seems 
" to furnish an additi(#ial argument for the existence of 11 

A mind in which " those ideas," or, as the other 

passage calls them, " conceptions," are ? That is not said. 

But (and pray mark it ) " an Immense and Eternal 

" Beings Etc. 

§ 68. Space with Lord Brougham is a conception or an 
idea. And gives he out aught as to what the conception 
or idea is \ The conception Space is not " independent of 
u our conceptions." The idea Space is an idea " in our 
" minds." So would his Lordship reply. And perhaps 
there might be good reasons why we should not press the 
subject farther. 

§ 69.— (a.) Kant.— The Father of Critical Philosophy 
makes Space, pure Space, to be a form of our sensibility 
— the original use of understanding itself — one of the rules 
of the transcendental aesthetic — only the original synthesis 
of the homogeneal, fyc. [For the benefit of those among 
our readers who may not be familiar with the Kantian 
terminology — as well as with what it stands for (when it 
stands for any thing ;) and who, therefore, have never 
gone as far, or 

as high 
As metaphysic wit can fly ; 

I have to say, that the words put into italics are not errors 
of the press — A thing which these readers, but for this 
assurance, might have been, well and wisely, ready to 
imagine ] That space, says the Professor of Konigsberg, 
in which all motion must be, (which itself is therefore 
absolutely immoveable,) is named pure or absolute space. 
Again : — We conceive an absolute immoveable, intrans- # 
poseable space, to which we in thought refer, at last, all 



220 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. [Part X. 



motion. — The conception of an absolute immoveable 
space has itself no object Absolute space, in fine, is but 
AN IDEA.*!* E tc - etc - etc - 

§ 70. Yet we must not neglect £o notice, that though 
Kant thus takes Space to be nought except an idea or a 
conception, he can turn a new leaf, and write in a quite 
different strain. 

§ 71. I ('tis Emmanuel Kant who speaks) by all means 
have a conception of Space and Time. Space and Time 
themselves are however not conceptions, though I have 
conceptions of them. Again : — I have a conception of 
wood: so have I too conceptions of space and time. But 
as wood itself is no conception, Space and Time are like- 
wise no conceptions. Etc. etc. etc. 

§ 72. In the first place, then, Space is a conception. 
But, in the second place, Space is not a conception — It is 
an external existence : wood exists externally. 

§ 73. After all this, it is almost a pity to be under the 
necessity of bringing a third philosopheme of Kant's be- 
fore the reader's eyes. A pity, I say — For the philoso- 
pheme next to be introduced, if it does not succeed in 
swallowing up the other two things, — 'twill not be on 
account of any lack of good intentions — The attempt at 
any rate will be made. 

§ 74. Our Professor has several kinds of nonentities or 
nothings. One of them, is the Nonentity or Nothing 
which has not the original use of understanding, reality, 
for a foundation — (nihil privativum.) Such is the con- 
ception of empty or pure space. J 

t Does absolute Space, in which all motion is said, by Kant, to 
be, contain the material universe 1 If matter be contained in an idea, 
is not matter too an idea 1 — How will Kant's followers answer \ 

% I am not sure, but what Kant rather makes pure space ens imagi- 
harium, i. e. an empty intuition without an object. See his " Prolego- 
mena." 



3§ 70-80.] 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



221 



§ 75. How these three very apparent contradictions are 
to be reconciled, we cannot stay to inquire. Perhaps 
they cannot be reconciled at all. 

§ 76. — (e.) Bishop Berkeley. — But we come, in the last 
place, to a writer who had fully as much reason as any of 
them to make Space an idea. 

% 77. " All extension," says the good Bishop, " exists 
" only in the mind. 11 Principles of Human Knowledge. 
Sect. LXVII. " That it (absolute space) cannot exist 
" without the mind, is clear upon the same principles, 
".that demonstrate/' &c. Ibid. Sect. CXVI. But to 
multiply quotations to the same purpose, would be, in all 
conscience, altogether a work of supererogation. t 

§ 78. Space exists in the mind. Space, extension, is 
in the mind " only by way of idea." Principles. Sect. 
XLTX. And elsewhere the same. Therefore Space, 
with Berkeley, is an idea. 

§ 79. And what does the Bishop of Cloyne take the 
idea to be ? A mode. But no ; not a mode, though cer- 
tainly something very like it. 

§ 80. The following passages might lead us to suppose 
ideas were modes or properties. '* The former (spirits) 
" are active indivisible, substances : the latter (ideas) are 
M inert, fleeting, dependent beings, which subsist not by 
u themselves, but are supported by, or exist in, minds or 

t " It is this circumstance that will be found, on examination, to 
" be the principal stumbling-block in the Berkeleian theory, and which 
" distinguishes it from that of the Himfoos, and from all others coin* 
" raonly classed along with it by metaphysicians; that it involves the 

annihilation of space as an external existence ; thereby unhinging com- 
" pletely the natural conceptions of the mind with respect to a truth, about 

" which, OF ALL WITHIN THE REACH OF OUR FACULTIES, we Seem tc 

" be the most completely ascertained ; and which, accordingly 
" was selected by Newton and Clarke, as the ground- work of their ar- 
" guraent for the necessary existence of God." Dugald St en-art's Phi- 
losophical Essays. Essay II. chap. ii. sect. 2. 

S 



222 



SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. [Part X. 



" spiritual substances." Principles. Sect. LXXXIX. 
" A spirit has been shewn to be the only substance or 
" support, wherein the unthinking beings or ideas can 
" exist." Ibid. Sect. OXXXV. " I know what I mean, 
" when I affirm that there is a spiritual substance or 
" support of ideas, that is, that a spirit knows and per- 
" ceives ideas." Third Dialogue. " That there is no 
" substance wherein ideas can exist beside spirit, is to me 
" evident." Ibid. Many are the similar passages. 

§ 81. Now what is a support but a substratum or sub- 
stance ? And what is a thing supported but a property 
or mode ? 

§ 82. But yet though Space is made an idea, and an 
idea is seen to be a thing supported, and Space, thus, is 
represented as very similar to a property ; Space is ra- 
ther in danger of being taken for a property or mode, 
than of being in reality a mode or attribute. 

§ 83. " Those qualities (extension and figure) are in 
" the mind only as they are perceived by it ; that is, not 
" by way of mode or attribute" &c. Principles. Sect. 
XLIX. " Look you, Hylas, when I speak of objects as 
" existing in the mind * * * * My meaning is 
" only, that the mind comprehends or perceives them ; 
" and that it is affected from without,-)* or by some being 
" DiSTiNCTt from itself." Third Dialogue. And the 
same sort of thing in other places- 

§ 84. Thus have we treated of every distinct opinion 
which can be entertained regarding Space. If any per- 
son can righteously add a member to our General Divi- 
sion, or can with the least propriety subdivide farther our 
subdivisions, he will cause it to be clearly understood, 
that we have not gone over all the various opinions. We 
have no objection to oppose, should any one desire to put 

t No assumption of Space here 1 



$6 81-89.] SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. „ 223 

upon trial what we have written, and subject it, in every 
possible respect, to the severest examination. 



§ 85. Before losing sight of our very long Digression, 
and turning once more towards the " Refutation," we 
shall improve the present opportunity, and remark one 
or two things which could not perhaps be more con- 
veniently noticed elsewhere. 

§ 86. Space being made by philosophers to stand for so 
many different things, the word being, therefore, of so 
ambiguous a description, the " Argument" never employs 
it, — but in one place, which is the " Appendix." The 
passage is as follows. 

§ 87. M ' Infinity of Extension is necessarily existing.' 
" Proposition. 

§ 88. " Let the extension be of space merely, or of 
u matter merely, or of space and matter together.'''' Etc. — 
tide Part. VII. § 2-t 

§ 89. Then — I hear an inquirer demand — if the term 
be so very ambiguous, how comes it to be used, so freely 
used, in the first Part hereof? The brief, the sufficient, 

t § 1. It did not suit our purpose, to take for granted (even so little, 
or — if you please — so much, as) the separate existence of pure space , 
i. e. space without matter. The " Argument" sets out from the thing 
denoted by the unambiguous word extension, infinite extension; not 
caring of what nature the extension is. That there is expansion, viz. 
pure space, infinite expansion, or pure space, distinct from the exten- 
sion of matter ; it is the business of the second Scholium under Prop. 
IV. Part I. to demonstrate. 

§ 2. In fact, had the first Proposition in the demonstration (in place 
of being, " Infinity of Extension is necessarily existing,") been in 
these terms — Infinity of Space is necessarily existing ; — it might have 
been objected : That it was — unwarrantably, for without proof — as- 
sumed, that in nature there is space where there is no matter — A po- 
sition, without doubt, of vast consequence, as against atheism (vide 
part. ix. § 6. 7. 8.J: and by no means to be laid hold of, before a right 
to possession be established. 



224 SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. [Part X. 

reply is, that space, in that Part, is employed in no tech- 
nical sense whatever — At least, if it ever occur in a truly 
technical sense, any other sense would, all things being 
considered, answer to the full as well. Let a man affix 
what idea to space he pleases, the grand purport and ob- 
ject of what is advanced in the Part we speak of, will 
not, in truth and reality, be at all affected thereby. We 
challenge our inquirer to make the experiment. 

§ 90. Nay, substitute for " space," on every occasion, 
(and the same observation applies to " magnitude," and 
" immensity,") the word extension — the sense may re- 
quire it to be, infinite extension — a word attended by no 
particular ambiguity ; and the meaning and force of the 
passage, properly understood, will remain untouched. 

§ 91. In fine, all that Part I. requires at bottom to 
be admitted, is, that something is necessarily existing, be 
the something space, or magnitude, or immensity, or sim- 
ply extension. 

§ 92. But I hear another inquirer address me. In the 
27th section of the same Part (so is the second inquiry 
prefaced) Br Isaac Watts is brought in, saying, that we 
cannot conceive Space non-existent, &c. But subse- 
quently, he denied the necessary existence of Space. 
ride supra, § 46. atq; § 56. — etc. etc. In these circum- 
stances, was it fair and altogether right, to apply the 
Doctor to that use which we find him forced to be of in 
that 27th section ? — My answer is quite at hand. 'Tis 
two-fold. 

§ 93. I ran upon Dr Watts the FIRST ; and with Dr 
Watts the SECOND, we had there nothing whatever to do. 
Fide supra, §§ 11. 12. 57. We have had indeed a good 
many things to say to Dr Watts the Second, (vide supra, 
§ 35, usq; ad § 57 ) but certainly the occasion had not ar- 
rived when we were no farther on than Part I. § 27. Per- 
haps a deal of remarkable attention has atoned for any 



§§ 90-94.] SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE. 



225 



delay which may have taken place in paying our respects 
to the last- mentioned Doctor, to-wit, the Doctor in his 
last-alluded-to character. 

§ 94. But, again, tho' it be true, Dr Isaac Watts, at a 
later stage of his life, denied that space has necessary 
existence — meaning, by space, an external something, dis- 
tinct in every respect from matter ; — still he does not, so 
far as I remember, exactly deny any where the necessary 
existence of extension of some kind. He no where af- 
firms of all extension whatsoever, that we can conceive it 
to be entirely blotted out of existence. And in the 27th 
section of Part first, extension — all extension — would have 
done as well as " space." Ut vide supra, § 90, 



220 



PART XI. 

THE " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, FOR THE BEING AND ATTRI- 
" BUTES OF GOD," AN IRREFRAGABLE DEMONSTRATION. 

§ 1. We must now request our reader to retrace his 
steps, and consider a second time the words quoted from 
Antitheos in the fifth section of our seventh Part. Taking 
for granted that the reader has reverted to those words, 
we repeat our interrogation, What does Antitheos under- 
stand by the word space, as it occurs in that passage ? 

§ 2. We have seen, that Space is Space, and neither 
more nor less, with our atheist. Vide Part, IX. § 10. 
et seq. Is the " space" with which at present we are 
concerned, to be held as denoting merely bare space or ex- 
tension? If so, " to talk of a substratum being necessary," 
even " a priori necessary," to space, is, I should hope, 
very far from being nonsense. Nay, that there is a Sub- 
stratum to infinite space or expansion, is, as we observed, 
demonstrated in " Part III." of the " Argument." {Vide 
Part. VIL § 3.) 

§ 3. If, contrariwise, by " space" Antitheos means the 
substance which space supposes, if it supposes such ; it is 
indeed nonsense to talk of a substratum to space being 
necessary a priori, or in any other sense of the word 
necessary : For, in the case contemplated, it is nonsense 
to talk of a substratum at all. 'Tis assuredly nonsense 
to talk of the substance to the substance, or of the sub- 



§§ 1-6.1 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. 227 

stratum to the substratum, of Space. . If space stands for 
substance, it stands for substratum. 

§ 4. Our atheist does not inform us, in so many words, 
in which sense he uses the term. But from the circum- 
stance of his making " space" take the place which <c in- 
" finite extension" occupied, we are entitled to conclude, 
he employed the term in the former of the two senses. 
The connection, in short, may be held to determine, that 
" space"'' stands for bare space. 

§ 5. Besides, is not as much as this indicated by the 
words which follow in the " Refutation V " On the 
" other hand," says our author, " if it (space) stands in 
" need of a substratum, the foundation-stone of this great 
" argument must crumble into dust, and be unfit to serve 
" as a substratum to any thing." As to which : If Space 
stands in need of a substratum, this must be because Space 
is a property. And if Space is a property — to give it a 
substratum (of which it will stand in need,) will indeed 
cause the foundation-stone, of an argument to crumble 
into dust, but the argument will be, not the " Argument 
tt * * f or ^ e B e i n g * * of God." but the argu- 
ment for the being of a Refutation. {Vide Part. XII. § 7- 
cum not. A A. et § 8.) A word in Antitheos^s ear, as to 
the foundation-stone of the great argument (by whomever 
handled) from Space, to the existence of Deity ; — The 
pillars of the world may shake, and fall too — (no contra- 
diction is involved in supposing that — ) but, though the 
pillars of the world fall, and the universe of matter be 
as if it had never been, — the foundation-stone of that 
great argument standeth sure. 

§ 6. A remark of somewhat the same nature as the 
remarks which our antitheist has in the 15th paragraph 
of Chapter VI., (all of which paragraph we have now gone 
over,) we meet towards the end of his volume. In his 
" retrospective and concluding remarks," he concentrates 



228 « ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part XL 

" into one view the chief features, the shortcomings, and 
" anomalies of" Mr Gillespie's " extraordinary attempt to 
" prop up, upon rational principles, what has nothing to do 
" with such principles, but which must for ever remain a 
" mere matter of faith." Chap. XIII. par. l.t — Ponder 
this ere proceeding farther, — 'tis our antitheist's assu- 
rance we have for it, that Mr Gillespie's attempt to call 
in rational principles to his aid, has failed. 

§ 7- In Mr Gillespie's case, " there is," says Antitkeos, 
now about the work of concentration, 44 there is an odd 
44 forgetfulness of first principles." (Par. 4.) — Wherein 
consists the oddness? — " Infinite extension and infinite du- 
" ration are either necessary of themselves — absolutely 
" so, or they are not." — Hitherto the ground is firm. 
Nothing can be more solid. — 44 If necessary of them- 
" selves, then is the introduction of Mr Gillespie's sub- 
44 stance or substratum gratuitous and absurd." — All firm 
footing as yet. — -Of themselves is pretty much the same, 
is it not \ as if we should say per se (in the plural.) If 
infinite extension and infinite duration necessarily exist 
per SE — that is, without substrata — then we cannot, with- 
out absurdity, introduce substrata, or even a substratum. 
All is well, then, up to this point. To go on with Anti- 
tkeos'' s words : — 44 If not necessary, — " — But where is the 
OF themselves now f Oh ! it was not convenient to 
carry about the PER SE any longer. Not for you, Anti- 
tkeos ! who have to conjure up short comings and anomalies 
in Mr Gillespie. But for me, who have to do nothing of 
the kind, who have to execute no greater a task than to 
exhibit such short comings and anomalies as the 44 Refu- 
tation" abounds with — of which the present anomaly 

t Lo ! the Atheist licks up the spittle of the Sceptic : — Antitheofs 
sneer is couched under language which forbids our not remembering 
Hume's — " Our most holy religion is founded on Faith, not on reason." 
— Essay on Miracles. Part ii. 



§§ 7-8.] « ARGUMENT, A PBIOJRI/' IRREFRAGABLE. 229 



and short coming (of two small Latin words, or the cor- 
responding ones in English,) is a very fair specimen : — 
For me, I say, it is quite convenient to keep the OF 
THEMSELVES in mind. I must have consistency in the 
matter of the PER SE. Well then: — " If not necessary, — " 
OF THEMSELVES — " the primary propositions in the argu- 
" ment are false and groundless." (Par. 4.) What argu- 
ment? It cannot be the " Argument, a priori" &c, be- 
cause, in it, the primary propositions do not concern 
themselves at all with the affair of PER SE. Fide Part. II. 
§ 13. et seq. Part. VII. § 2. 3. Part. X. § 88. not.\ But 
take the passage in the way Antitheos has it, (reading, 
simply, " If not necessary,") and nothing can be more in- 
disputable than that " the primary propositions in the" 
" Argument, a priori" " are false and groundless." But 
infinite extension or space, and infinite duration, are far 
from being NOT necessary : They ARE necessary. And 
what settles the point is, that we have Antitheos's autho- 
rity for it. Vide Part. I. § 35. But let us ever bear in 
mind, that though infinite space and infinite duration are 
necessary, it is not necessary that they exist PER SE. 
The farthest from it imaginable. — And this finishes our 
business, at this time, with the Chapter entitled " Retro- 
l * spective and Concluding Re^trks." 

§ 8. The 16th paragraph of Chapter VI. commences 
thus : — " But if we are dissatisfied with the author's sub- 
" stratum," — [And Antitheos, unless so dissatisfied, could 
be no atheist — ] " we are not much better situated with 
" the alternative left us ; for according to the dilemma he 
" has imposed upon us, we are obliged to conclude that 
u infinity of extension^ is itself a substance. 11 Yea : And 
a dilemma to Antitheos it will remain. If infinite exten- 
sion stand in need of no substratum, why then it can 

t The word in the " Refutation" is " existence' — evidently an error 
of the press. 

T 



230 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part XI. 

stand by itself. And if it can stand by itself, why then 
— however horrified Antitheos may be — it is a substance. 
But in reference, further, to this, see below § 21. and the 
subsequent sections, to the end of the Part. 

§ 9. We shall at all times be ready to grant, that in- 
finity of extension makes but an awkward substance — a 
very prodigy among monsters. But at whose door would 
the folly of creating such a substance lie, if it lay at any 
body's ? Not at Mr Gillespie's, for the " Argument" 
only says, " IF Infinity of Extension subsist without a 
" substratum, THEN, it is a substance" — (vide part. v. 
§ 15. — et infra, § 15. — ) never saying, that Infinity of 
Extension subsists without a substratum, saying as it 
does the very reverse. (Vide supra, § 2.) But the folly 
of making a substance out of infinity of extension, lies, 
(as is, indeed, evident enough, and as will be farther 
evinced below — vide infra, § 21. et seq. — ) lies, we repeat, 
at his door with whom infinite extension subsists without 

any substratum, quite by itself in nature only, nature 

repudiates such a subsistence And therefore, that piece 

of folly will likely be found near Antitheos 1 s threshold, 
since he is so " dissatisfied" with the substratum of infi- 
nite extension. 

§ 10. In reflecting #n " the dilemma" which is " im- 
posed," do not forget how sad a one it is for antitheists. 

§ 11. " I had thought," continues our atheist, " infinity 
" a mere nominal adjunct allowed to space, from the cir- 
" cumstance of our being unable to conceive limits to its 
" extent — " Here he makes infinity an adjunct, a mere 
nominal adjunct, to space. Elsewhere, he says infinity is 
an attribute thereof. We noticed, how incorrect this latter 
saying is. Vide § 2. notw \ apud § 9. Part. VIII. And 
probably the former one is still more objectionable. But 
it is not worth our while to write another syllable on the 
subject. I had thought so, quoth he, — " but the theist, 



§§ 9-11.] " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. 231 

" it seems, thinks otherwise. Infinity, with him, must be 
" a substance.' 1 — Only, if infinity exist per se. — " On the 
" same ground,"' — Antitheos goes on, — 4; we might contend 
" that finity is a substance too " — To be sure. If infinity 
can exist per se, why may not finity, likewise, exist per 
se ? If bare infinity be a substance, — on precisely the 
same ground, bare finity may be a substance too. In 
this, between the theist and the anti-theist there is, for 
once, a happy unanimity — and indeed the thing seems 
quite incontrovertible. " Supposing, however,'' 1 proceeds 
Antitheos, " that space infinitely extended is what he 
*' means," — by what? by infinity, I take it — " all that we 
" can say is, that if it" (" space infinitely extended 11 ) 
" be a substance it is no longer space, or extension, orj 
" any thing else than, — just a substance ; — unless it may 
P be both extension and substance at the same moment. 
" But these are profane thoughts. 11 — -They are, at all 
events, very empty words. As for thought, — whatever of 
this commodity is in them, is hardly equal to the task of 
rising to the profane. " If it," i. e. " space infinitely ex- 
tended," " be ja, substance it is no longer space" — Good. 
And, in like manner, if Antitheos, finitely extended, be a 
substance, he is no longer Antitheos. This every one at 
a glance sees to be — just nonsense. Again : " If it,-' 
i. e. "space infinitely extended," " be a substance it is no 
" longer * * * * any thing else than, — just a sub- 
" stance." — So, if the finite thing called a "Refutation" 
be a substance, it is no longer any thing else than — just 
a substance. This, however, is anything but nonsense, 

for it is sense, and good sense, and — just a truism ; 

" unless 11 (indeed; the " Refutation" " may 11 [not] ' 4 be 
both" a " Refutation' " and substance at the same mo- 
ment. 11 Certainly, Space cannot be " both extension 

" and substance at the same moment," if extension means 
^extension ana nothing more,\md if substance means some- 



232 "ARGUMENT, A PRIORI; 9 IRREFRAGABLE. [Part XI. 



thing more than /extension and nothing more.^ But, this 
can with difficulty be accounted a discovery. 

§ 12. " Perhaps" — our , atheist prosecutes the matter 
thus — " according to the new school of theology, not only 
" may a book be a substance, but its extension may also 
" be a substance, its weight another, its colour a third, 
" and so forth." Surely, — if the extension can exist 
per se, IF the weight can exist per se, if the colour can 
exist per se. And this, not only according to the new 
school of theology, but according to the old school of 
logic. 

§ 13. " Let us hear, however," (these are Antitheos's 
next words) " how the divine theory of infinity of exten- 
I " si on being a substance is to be sustained. — Mark with 
£t what boldness of reasoning it is brought out. The in- 
" fidel must look well to his footing and points of defence, 
" lest he be laid prostrate by its overwhelming force." 
Par. 16. Then Antitlieos proceeds to quote from " Pro- 
position III." The quotation we shall give, but we shall 
give, at the same time, what immediately precedes in the 
" Argument," that our reader may the better understand 
whereabout he is. Part of the passage he has had be- 
fore t — but no matter. 

§ 14. " Either, Infinity of Extension subsists, or, (which 
" is the same thing,) we conceive it to subsist, without a 
" support or substratum : or, it subsists not, or we con- 
"• ceive it not to subsist, without a support or substratum. 

§ 15. " First, IF Infinity of Extension subsist without 
'* a substratum, THEN, it is a substance. And" [now 
comes the portion cited by Antitkeos'] " ' IF any one 
" 6 should deny, that it is a substance, it so subsisting 
" (that is, without a support or substratum, i) ' to prove, 

t Viz. in Part. V. § 14. 15. mq; ac supra, % 9. 
J Observe the parenthesis is Antitheos's. 



12-17.; "ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. 



233 



" ' beyond contradiction, the utter absurdity of such de- 
" ' nial, we have but to defy him to shew, WHY Infinity 
" - of Extension is not a substance, SO FAR FORTH AS IT CAN 
" 4 SUBSIST BY ITSELF, OR WITHOUT A SUBSTRATUM. 5 "f 

§ 16. This, then, is what our atheist points to as bold- 
ness of reasoning. It must chagrin him, that he cannot 
find the weak side of the reasoning; — though certainly 
none can hinder him from being highly offended at its 
boldness. The boldness, and the reasoning to the bargain, 
he would sneer down. But the reasoning, whatever be- 
comes of its boldness, will never hang its head. 

§ 17. It is thus Antitheos follows at the heels of the 
passage cited by him : — " A new era has thus dawned 
" upon logic. A grand discovery is on the eve of ren- 
" dering her power irresistible, and her reign everlasting 
" and glorious. It is to be henceforth no longer neces- 
" sary for us to prove an affirmative : assert what we may. 

t § 1. The following paragraph is the one which follows, in the 
" Argument." — 

§ 2. " As, therefore, it is a contradiction to deny that Infinity of Ex- 
" tension exists, 1 so there is, on the supposition of its being able to sub- 
" sist wit/ioitt a substratum, a substance or Being of Infinity of Exten- 
" sion necessarily existing : Tho' Infinity of Extension and the being 
" of Infinity of Extension, are not different, as standing to each other 
in the relation of mode and subject of the mode, but are identical/' 
§ 3. If now my readers will turn to Part II. and § 4. they shall find 
our antitheist insinuating, that his opponent never told what he meant 
by the word being. (Look, also, at the 2d paragraph of Chapter XII. 
of the " Refutation.") In the passage just cited, that opponent (this 
being the first occasion of the " Argument's" using being,) makes 
Being to be the same as substance, and a substance to be wliat subsist* 
without a substratum. Is not this telling what is meant 1 Wo have 
yet to learn that Antiilieos could tell any thing better on the subject. 
Be this as it may, he has done the very thing Mr Gillespie has done, — 
•he has given existing by itself as a good enough explanation of substance. 
(Vide infra, § 43 J But present ends, you see, must be answered. If 
an inconsistency turns out to have been committed — why, in the cir- 
cumstances of the case, it could not very well have been avoided. 
' N Prop. I."— Note in " Argument." Vide Part. II. § 15. 



234 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part XI. 

" no one dare deny our assertions. For to prove beyond 
" contradiction the utter absurdity of such denial, we 
" have only to put a brave face on it, and throw a defiance 
" in the teeth of our opponent to prove the negative 
(Par. 18.) And in the Chapter wherein are concentrated 
" into one view the chief features" of Mr Gillespie 1 s " ex- 
" traordinary attempt,"! our atheist, writing in a similar 
strain, hath this sentence : — " He ( Mr Gillespie ) can 
" only insist dogmatically upon duration and extension 
" being recognized as substances, and in self-satisfied 
" proof, challenges any one, in the most braggart and impe- 
" rious tone, to show why they are not to be regarded as 
" substances !" Par. 5. 

§ 18. Mr Gillespie maintained, (and he yet maintains) 
that, to prove the utter absurdity of a certain denial, we 
have but to defy the denier to point to any sufficient 
reason for his denial. What is there that has not been 
denied by some one it Should the correctness of this 
algebraic expression be denied (a-f-a) :2a : : (2a — a) : a, 
what better could be done than challenging the denier, 
(not in a braggart imperious tone, but in a gentlemanly 
manner,) to produce a valid reason for his assertion, and 
thereby go far to shew us, that, like Hudibras, 

For every why he had a wherefore \ 
Mr Gillespie, of a truth, had thought, that if all men had 

t Vide supra, § 6. 

| We have atheistical authority for it. " Hobbes says, that if men 
" found their interest in it, they would doubt" [no — but they would 
say they doubt] " the truth of Euclid's Elements." This composes one 
of Diderot's notes to D'Holbach : The note being commendatory. 
Vide § 1. Appendic. Part. VI. And if Hobbes ever spoke as Diderot 
makes him speak, we have two atheists testifying at once. And we 
readily admit the atheistical authority to be high, in the present in- 
stance. It's extremely likely the pair kave spoken the truth. None 
better fitted to know what lengths certain men will go to, when they 
think their interests are at stake — 

—Men may mistake their true interests. 



«3 18-19.; £i ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. 235 

agreed on giving a certain name to each of the objects or 
things in which were fulfilled certain conditions ; no per- 
son could reasonably refuse to suffer the appellation to be 
bestowed on any one of the objects : and that if a mau 
was found so exceedingly singular as to recede entirely 
from common language, and universally received notions, 
the onus probandi (to take a phrase from the law) lay on 
him, to make good the new and unheard of position. 
That all men were at one as to the propriety of calling 
that a substance which exists without a substratum, Mr 
Gillespie had verily esteemed a circumstance sufficiently 
entitling him to call upon him who should decline to per- 
mit the term to be applied to that which does so exist, 
to call upon him (I say) to assign some ground for his 
refusal. No ! exclaims our atheist, such a circumstance 
is not sufficient to entitle Mr Gillespie to " throw a de- 
fiance," (" dogmatically," of course,) at the refuser, to 
shew why a thing existing without a substratum is not to 
be designated a substance. No, indeed ! exclaims our 
atheist, for that would be (here lies his mistake) to usher 
in the day of a grand discovery — the dawn of a new era 
— in logic. And there's no room for any grand disco verm- 
in logic : A new era would come too late. No ! no ! ex- 
claims our atheist. But why does he so ? After the 
chiding we have got, we dare never so much as think of 
defying him, but we politely ask him, Why ? He should 
be able, and willing too, on every occasion, to give a rea- 
son for the principle on which he acts. 

§ 19. Mr Gillespie contended, that we have only to 
defy any one (an atheist, for example, — and let the atheist 
be such an one as Antilheos, if this gentleman likes — ) to 
point to some good ground for denying the proposition, 
" If Infinity of Extension subsist without a substratum, 
" THEN, it is a substance" ; in order to make manifest the 
absurdity of a denial. And from this particular QaS6j 



236 " ARGUMENT, A PitfOiZJ," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part XI. 

Antitheos has drawn, as a specimen of Mr Gillespie 1 s logic, 
(which is the unrighteous part of the affair,) the universal 
proposition, To prove any affirmation, we have no more 
to do than, with " a brave face", to " throw a defiance 
" in the teeth" of all opponents to prove a negative : Hurl 
your defiance at a negative, and, lo ! the affirmative is 
proven. The author of the " Argument" speaks of a 
special instance, and the author of the " Refutation," by 
a skilful manoeuvre, forces his opponent to speak as if he 
inclined- to hold the special instance as the representative 
of any case whatsoever : as if he inclined to employ that 
procedure on every occasion, which he used on one only 
occasion, because no better could be done. This is the 
height of disingenuousness. This is wretched sophistry. 
But it is fortunate, that the sophistry is as- obvious as it 
is miserable. There is no mistaking it. 

§ 20. But after all : To lay down a thing, and defy all 
and sundry to shew a good cause for asserting the con- 
trary, — though it may not be a commendable method, 
must at least be granted to be an allowable method, of 
starting towards the determination of any controversy 
whatever. Every thing which begins to be must have a 
sufficient reason for its existence. Every affirmation, and 
every negation that ever was, began sometime to be. And 
if a person deny a position, without being able to assign 
a proper cause, we may be assured that the denial is im- 
proper, if not absurd. It must always be admitted, that 
the mere hurling of a defiance at an opponent, is not by 
itself sufficient to establish a doctrine : It is sufficient 
0niy when conjoined with the opponent's inability to fur- 
nish any just evidence for the truth of a contrary propo- 
sition. 

§ 21. But, all this while, we have been assuming, that 
men universally have consented to denominate that a 
substance which has been decreed to subsist by itself, 



§§ 20-26.] « ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. 237 



without a substratum, or subject of inhesion : Men uni- 
versally, with the exception of certain of the " atheistick 
" gang,"t who perceive themselve&Jio be under the ne- 
cessity of either contending that infinite extension, or 
space, exists barely by itself, without any substratum, or 
granting that infinite extension exists only by reason of 
the existence of something else quite irreconcilable with 
their atheism. And 'tis high time that we present our 
readers with the evidence of our title to make the as- 
sumption. 

§ 22. Our authorities shall be selected from the list of 
those who are, among us, the best known and received as 
writers on such topics. Our authors, in short, must be 
in common and good repute. 

§ 23. The first authority we shall adduce is Mr Locke, 
and as he is the first, so he will be the greatest^ 

§ 24. " The ideas of substances are such combinations 
" of simple ideas, as are taken to represent distinct parti- 
" cular things subsisting by themselves" — B. II. ch. xii. § 6. 

§ 25. Mode, on the other hand, he defines thus : 
" Modes * * * * contain not in them the 
" supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are consi- 
" dered as dependences on, or affections of, substances." — 
Ibid. § 4. 

§ 2G. In the 23d Chapter (same Book,) which expressly 
treats of our " ideas of substances," he hath these words : 
" The idea then we have, to which we give the general 
" name substance, being nothing but the supposed, but 
" unknown, support of those qualities we find existing, 

t These are Cudworth's words. 

\ " In intellectual philosophy, Locke's celebrated work * * * * 
" leave[s] all competitors behind by the common consent of man- 
" kind." So says Lord Brougham, an excellent judge of the amount 
of fame which authors have, — in one of his valuable and vera splendid 
" Dissertations." Vol. II. p. 113-4. Mucli in this 2nd vol. — how un- 
like much in the 1st! 



238 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part XI. 



" which, we imagine, cannot exist SINE RE SUBSTANTE, 
" without something to support them, we call that sup- 
" port substantial" — § 2. 

§ 27. And in hisTCetter to the Bishop of Worcester, he 
owns that his account of substance is on the same footing 
with that of Burgersdicius, Sanderson, " and the whole 
" tribe of logicians," who, he informs us, define & substance 
to be, "ens, or res per se subsistens." 

§ 28. But indeed we could accumulate so much from 
Locke on this subject, that we must be content with the 
specimen given, and with referring the reader to a great 
part of the Chapter on ' ; Substances," and to his Letter 
and second Reply to Dr Stilling fleet. Etc. 

§ 29. We do not feel ourselves under any necessity of 
adducing a host of Aristotelians, in the shape of Peripa- 
tetics and Schoolmen, % of whose song the constant burden 
is, Substantia est ens per se subsistens, non inhwrens in 
alio, Substance is that which subsists by itself, and has 
itself no subject : Because we believe that Mr Locke was 
an honest man, and an able ; and because (luckily for our 
readers 1 patience) he has spoken for " the whole tribe 
" of logicians." 

§ 30. Our next authority in this matter shall be the 
celebrated author of the True Intellectual System of the 
Universe: of which Lord Brougham declares, " The pro- 
" found learning of this unfinished work, and its satisfac- 
" tory exposition of the ancient philosophers, are above 
" all praise" Note in Section IV. (Vol. I.) The words 
which we are about to adduce, we have made use of al- 
ready, but the occasion was different. ( Vide Part. VIII. 
§ 25. not 4 J 

§ 31. " Unquestionably, whatsoever is, or hath any kind 
" of entity, doth either subsist by itself, or else is an at- 

J Antitheos cannot reject their testimony : At any rate he speaks of 
" the truly estimable wisdom of the sclwols" — Chap. IV. par, 9. 



§§ 27-34.] « ARGUMENT, A PRIORI:' IRREFRAGABLE. 



239 



" tribute, affection, or mode of something, that doth sub- 
" sist by itseff*' Here he opposes a Mode to that which 
subsists by itself, that is, to a Substance. From the whole 
context of the passage, it is indisputably evident that he 
uses to subsist by itself, and IJo be a Substance,^ as com- 
pletely convertible. See also, of the same great work, 
Chapter II. & vii. viii. 

§ 32. Dr Isaac Watts is an author who, in one shape 
or other, has passed through most people's hands, and 
whose authority in matters of logical and ontological 
science used to be none of' the most inconsiderable. Be 
his authority, in metaphysical subjects, exactly what it 
may, now, we may very safely take his opinion upon the 
question before us. We need not require, and did we 
require, we might fail in obtaining, a better judge, as to 
the propriety of bestowing a certain name on a certain 
thing. 

§ 33. In his " Brief Scheme of Ontology" there are 
these words : " Every being is considered, either as sub- 
" sisting of itself * * * and then it is called sub- 
" stance * * * or it is considered as subsisting by 
" virtue of some other being in which it is, or to which 
44 it belongs, and then it is called a mode." — Chap. XVI. 

§ 34. In the second of his " Philosophical Essays," and 
in the third Section, the following sentence is to be seen. 
" If we can lay aside all our prejudices in this point, I am 
" persuaded solid extension would appear substantial 
M enough to be called a substance, since even mere empty 
" space, or extension without solidity, hath been by some 
t; philosophers esteemed substantial enough to subsist by 
" itself and to deserve the honour of this name 2" — To- 
wit, the name of substance. From this passage it appears, 
that the Doctor reckoned that tiling which subsists by it- 
self to be deserving of the name of substance. To this 
extent at least, he agrees with the philosophers he al- 



240 « ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part XI. 

ludes to. Whatever difference there might be between 
the Doctor and the philosophers, otherwise* he evident- 
ly doubts not, for one moment, that u 4 to subsist by itseTf ,, 
is ^to be 44 substantial enough."^ And by the bye, as he 
takes 44 mere empty space" into account, the quotation 
speaks to our point, to a hair. Read, likewise, of the first 
Section of the same Essay, the second paragraph, and it 
will be found to speak no ambiguous language about that 
which the subsisting by itself makes a thing to be.— Etc. 
Etc. 

§ 35. In his " Logic," he says : 44 Every being is con- 
" sidered either as subsisting in and by itself, and then it is 
" called a substance ; or it subsists in and by another, and 
" then it is called a mode" — Part I. ch. ii. sect. 1. See 
also, to the same effect, the first paragraph of the follow- 
ing section : — etc. etc. 

§ 36, Vide quoque SPECIALITER Partis X. § 16. 

§ 37. We shall next produce a philosopher whose spe- 
culations savoured strongly of common sense, and that in 
more than one respect. For which reason, possibly, he 
is none the worse for our purpose. 

§ 38. " Things which may exist by themselves, and do not 
44 necessarily suppose the existence of any thing else, are 
44 called substances ; and with relation to the qualities or 
44 attributes that belong to them, they are called the sub- 
44 jects of such qualities or attributes." Dr Thomas Reid's 
Essays. Essay I. chap. ii. — The chapter, this, in which 
the author points out 44 some of those things" which he is to 
44 take for granted, as first principles," principles 44 com- 
44 mon to Philosophers and to the vulgar," 44 common 
44 principles, which are the foundation of all reasoning, 
44 and of all science," principles which 44 are such as all 
4£ men of common understanding know ; or such, at least, 
44 as they give a ready assent to, as soon as they are pro- 
44 posed and understood,.''' 



§§ 35-41.] ''• ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. 241 



§ 39. But the truth is, there would be no end to the 
quoting of authorities, on this subject, were we not to cut 
the matter short : — which here we do, as far as authors 
of one species are concerned. t 

§ 40. But no farther. — For as we have had our the- 
istical kind of authorities, so we shall let the reader have 
a taste of a-theistical authoia|^;oo, — in relation to the 
very important point which is^retore us — A point in the 
decision regarding which, so very much is involved. 

§ 41. What says Spinoza on the subject \ for we natu- 
rally turn in his direction, he having been the most cele- 
brated (most justly celebrated) atheist of Dr Samuel 
Clarke 's time,+ and there not having arisen his equal in 
atheism since. " Per Substantiam intelligo" ait Spinoza, 
" id, quod in se est, et per se concipitur ; hoc est, id cujus 
" conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei a quo formari 
t: debeat." [" By Substance I understand that which we 
" conceive to exist in and by itself; it is that the con - 

t Were it lawful to quote, in an affair of this kind, a writer who 
had the bad fortune to get, for all time to come, an ill name, one, there 
is no doubt, much worse, by far, than he deserved : we might have 
added, to the authors in the text, — Berkeley : who says — " Thing or 
" being is the most general name of all ; it comprehends under it two 
u kinds entirely distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing 
u common but the name, to-wit, spirits and ideas. The former are 
u * * substances : the latter are * * dependent beings, which sub- 
u sist not by themselves, but are supported by, or exist in, minds or 
" spiritual substances." Principles. Sect. LXXXIX. (Vide Part. x. 
§ 80.) And : " It is acknowledged on the received principles, that 
" extension, motion, and in a word all sensible qualities, have need 
tl of a support, as not being able to subsist by themselves. But the objects 
'* perceived by sense, are allowed to be nothing bat combinations of 
* those qualities, and consequently cannot subsist by themselves. Thus far 
" it is agreed on all hands." »Sect. XCI. See likewise, Section 
LXXIIL, and other places of his works, for the same sort of thing.' 

♦ * k Spinoza, the most celebrated Patron of Atheism in our time." 
Demonstration. 



242 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part XI. 

" ception of which does not stand in need of the concep- 
" tion of aught else, in order to its being formed."] Ethic. 
Par. I. Def. 3. 

§ 42. To all these authorities, which, there is no deny- 
ing, are so entirely satisfactory, we shall add a single 
other one. The Author now to be ushered into notice is 
worth them all put tog^her, for he sets the matter in 
debate quite at rest. 3 Tis Antitheos himself, I speak 
of. To bring him in, when any matter of more moment 
than ordinary is to be decided on, is our wont. Vide 
Part. I. § 34. et 35.— Part. IV. § 14. et seq.—Part. VI. 
§ 31. et seq. usq; ad § 37- 

§ 43. " I would ask" — these are Antitheos^s words — 
" what intelligence is ? Is it a being — a substance — a 
" thing that exists by itself ? Or is it not, on the con- 
" trary, a characteristic property — "f (Ch. XI. par. 4.) 
Here, substance is given as another w 7 ord for being, and 
'existence by ItselfMs the exegesis of substance. With An- 
titheos, then, a substance is that which exists by itself* 

§ 44. Should it be argued, (for we must provide against 
every thing which can possibly be objected,) that all, or — 
if not all — so many of my authorities, when they say, 

What subsists by itself, is a substance, had (if they 

had not, others, when speaking to the same effect, have 
had ) finite things only in view ; and that it is im- 
possible in the nature of things, that there can be an in- 
finite substance :— Then, my reply is, that Spinoza, the 
head of atheists, shall be allowed to settle this particular 
department of the controversy, for us. As a matter of 
course, theistical evidence is to be had in abundance, but 
I shall be content to limit myself to the evidence of atheists 
themselves. 

§ 45. " Substantiam corpoream,^ his verbis utitur Spinoza, 

" qua? non NISI infinita concipi potest " [" Corporeal 

t Vide Part. XII. § 14. 



§§ 42-46.] " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. 243 

" substance * is necessarily conceived to be infinite — "] 
Ut vide § 2. Appendic. Part. VI. — Again : — " Omnisi 
" substantia est necessario infinita." J/' Substance is of 
" necessity infinite."] Ethic. Par. I. Prop. 8. 

§ 46. Thus Spinoza. But I shall be more liberal than 
I promised to be — And to Spinoztis authority I shall again 
subjoin that of Antitheos himself. " We cannot say," 
he observes, " whether matter be infinitely extend- 
" ED OR NOT. In so far as our experience goes, and our 
" observation can carry us, we find substance completely 
" occupying every part of space" (Ch. V. par. 7.) With 
Antitheos. matter is substance, indeed all that we have for 
substance. And this gentleman has no difficulty to throw 
in the way of matter s infinity. That is, he has no diffi- 
culty to throw in the way of infinite substance. 

t The word " omais" goes, here, for nothing — A position, I cheer- 
fully submit to the judgment of the learned. And did I dare to defy 
gainsayers, I should accompany what I hand over, with something, 

m 



244 



PART XII. 

THE " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, FOR THE BEING AND ATTRI- 
u BUTES OF GOD," AN IRREFRAGABLE DEMONSTRATION. 

§ 1. " But WAIVING," — such are the words which 
succeed the passage quoted, from Chapter VI. of the 
" Refutation," in § 17. of the preceding Part — " But 
w WAIVING, in the meantime, our plea of want of evi- 
" dence for the affirmative, a simple man would say in 
" relation to the case before us, that substance possesses 
" attraction, which extension does not ; that it is observed 
" under a thousand varieties of figure, density, colour, 
" motion, taste, odour, combustion, crystallizatibn, &c. 
" which neither extension nor infinity ever is, or can in 
" its nature be. He might, in his deplorable ignorance, 
" ask if ever infinity was weighed, or extension analyzed 
" and its elements reduced to gas \\ This would, I dare 
" say, only evince in the eyes of the theologian, that such 
" a person had no idea of the very convenient art of ap- 
" plying metaphysical language to things physical; where- 
" by a mere abstraction, or at most a property of some- 
" thing else, can so easily be charmed into a reality. His 
" shewing why infinity of extension is not a substance, there- 
' 4 fore, would be set down as grovelling and common-place, 
" and, by consequence, useless." Par. 19. 

t The preceding passage was had in view, when we were in the 3d 
section of Part V. 



5§ 1-4. " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI" IRREFRAGABLE. 245 



§ 2. Antitheos speaks of an art whereby an abstraction, 
that is, a thought, of the mind, — (vide part. i. § 8. — ) can 
be charmed into a reality. Now one would have imagined 
that no art — still less, an art backed by a charm — was 
necessary, or even admissible, for the purpose ; and this, 
simply because tklhight had all along been held to com- 
pose one of the classes of realities. Perhaps the decision 
was erroneous, and a discovery of Inductive Science, has, 
in the hands of some fortunate Modern, made it plain 
that our thoughts are to be dismissed, for the future, to 
the dismal region of un-reality ; where, if un-reality has 
any where, we might expect, with the brightest and cer- 
tainly the best-founded hopes, to behold sights 

unutterable, and worse 
Than fables yet have feign'd,t 

— in short, the very same place (at least according to some) 

Where entity and quiddity, 
The ghosts of defunct bodies, fly. 

^ 3. Antitheos speaks of an art, " whereby a mere ab- 
" straction, or at most a property of something else, 
- can so easily be charmed INTO a reality." — " That it 
" should come to this !"+ Is a property of something in 
need of an art possessed of a charm which, being used, 
behold ! a property starts into a reality. The property, 
then, was no reality before. " That it should come to 
"this!"J 

§ 4. Our atheist waives the plea of want of evidence 
for the affirmative side in regard to the proposition, If 
Infinity of Extension subsist without a substratum by it- 
self, THEN, it IS a substance ; only so far as is compatible 
with his bringing forward reasons for the negative. He 
insinuates, that it is essential\\ to a substance to attract 

t This is here only by way of accommodation. Our gront epic poi?t 
is speaking not of curious, but of dreadful things. 

{ Hamlet. \\ Vide Part. V. § :?. 

U 



246 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part XII. 

and be attracted, to have a certain figure, and density, 
and colour, and motion, and taste, and odour, to be sus- 
ceptible of combustion, crystallization, &c. and of a pro- 
cess whereby it should be reduced to some gas ; and is 
not this to adduce a reason on the negative side ? 

§ 5. It is an attempt at it, at all Events : likely, the 
best which could be made. It is to adduce something, 
however, — any way you take it. When our atheist, (pass- 
ing over in his hurry, by the bye, the exact nature of the 
defiance altogether,) insinuates to that effect, he is fla- 
grantly guilty of a petitio principii, of begging the ques- 
tion to be proved, he is to be held as having uttered, 
once more, " an unproved extravagance." — Observe the 
concluding words : " His," the simple man's, " skewing 
" why infinity of extension is not a substance, therefore, 
" would be set down as grovelling and common-place, and, 
" by consequence, useless." Antitheos had been insisting, 
tho' secretly, that, to be a substance, a thing must possess 
attraction, figure, density, &c. &c. And here he plea- 
santly concludes as if his simple man had actually proved 
that infinite extension is not a substance, because he had 
found it could not be weighed, nor reduced to gas, &c. 
&c. Verily, verily, his simple man, if he had made any 
such thing follow from such a cause, is no such simpleton 
after all, but — -unless we mistake the matter much — is 
more of a knave than a fool. 

§ 6. We advance- to the next paragraph. " After all, 
" however, how does the notable proposition stand, that 
" there is necessarily a Being of infinity of extension ? 
u The principle of the argument brought up in support of 
" it — the dilemma, in short — gives way on every side. It 
(t stands without a vestige of backing, except from the 
4 * vain and swelling words of a blustering defiance," — 
[elsewhere called " a ridiculous bravado"t — ] " the value 
t Last par. of " Refutation." 



§§ 5-7.] " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. 24? 

M of which no one but a fool could be at a loss to esti- 

44 mate." (Par. 20.) — " I thank thee for teaching 

" me that \vord. ,1 -|- — By the bye, although the dilemma is 
said to have given way " on every side" never a word 
was said by Antitheos to shew it gave way in the middle. 
Antitheos has never breathed one syllable against the di- 
lemma, as a dilemma, or disjunctive proposition. He has 
never questioned the connexion of the members composing 
the disjunction, — the propriety of proposing the one al- 
ternative when the other is-rejected. The dilemma, then, 
is in our atheist's eyes unobjectionable. But the members 
— look at them, says he. And so we shall. The one is : 
44 It (Infinity of Extension) subsists not, or we conceive 
• ; it not to subsist, without a support or substratum.' 
Well, what have you to say to that, Antitheos? — I own 
myself to be " dissatisfieoV with your substratum, Antitheos 
replies. (Vide Part. XI. § 8.) — The other member is : 
44 Infinity of Extension subsists, or, (which is the same 
■• thing.) we conceive it to subsist, without a support or 
i4 substratum " What say you, Antitheos, to that ? — As 
I am entirely " dissoJ.isjied" with any substratum, infinite 
extension is left to stand by itself : and this, says Anti- 
theos, I tell you seriously. + Then, Antitheos, I tell you, 
(and the information — shall it increase your serious- 
ness ? — ) you, and all the antitheists in the world, that 
infinite extension is made to be a substance. Vide 
Part. XI. § 21. est sequentes. 

§ 7. Now come we to the concluding paragraph of the 
Chapter before us : which paragraph opens thus : k * The 
" author himself, indeed, seems not half sure of having 
44 made good the doctrine he has announced : for after 
44 having done all he could do, by the foisting in of a 

substratum upon extension' — [he should have said, in- 
finite extension — ] After having foisted in a substratum 

t " Merchant of Venice" t Vide quoq; Part. iX § 10. 11. IS. 13. 



248 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part. XII. 



upon infinite extension : Who or what did that ? Not 
Prop. III., which foists in nothing but a dilemma, a dis- 
junctive proposition, and a conclusion deduced from either 
member or alternative thereof. But to see a little far- 
ther into Antitheos'' s views : — " The foisting in of a substra- 
" turn upon" [infinite] " extension to the destruction of 
" its necessary existence" — He that foists in a substra- 
tum upon infinite extension, by no means destroys the 
necessity of this latter. Infinite extension has not been 
proved to be not a mode only, of existence,-)- and to give 
it a Substratum or Substance in which it inheres, if it is 
a property only, is surely not to destroy, but, were that 
possible, to make more indestructible, its necessary exist- 
ence. || — After the author of the " Argument 1 ' had, by 
Antitheos's way of it, foisted in the substratum " — he," 
we are next assured, " comforts himself with the reflec- 
" tion, that it is of very little consequence whether men 
" will or will not consent to call this substratum by the 
" name of being or substance, because" — And then Anti- 
theos cites a passage from the 11 Argument." The pas- 
sage we shall produce, but the context shall be cited 
likewise. The first portion whereof the reader has had. 
before him, already. Vide Part. V. § 16. 

§ 8. " Secondly, If Infinity of Extension subsist not 
" without a Substratum, THEN, it being a contradiction 
v to deny there is Infinity of Extension,1f it is a contra- 
" diction to deny there is a Substratum to it." — [The 
conclusion here, is the conclusion which Antitheos declaredtt 
to be lame and impotent, and, as if that were not enough, 
laughable. The ground for merriment, I confess I do not 
see. But Antitheos may have a keener perception of the 
ludicrous. Can it be, that he laughs when he should be 

t Vide Fart. VII. § 3. Etc. || See Note- A A. 

f " Prop, I." Note in " Argument." tt Vide Part., V. % 17- 



§§8 10.] •• ARGUMENT. A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. 249 

rather weeping ?+ At all events, he should not have been 
so close, and kept the source of the- jest all to himself : 
Had he but revealed where the cause for the merriment 
lay, others might have participated in the amusement.] — 

§ 9. " Whether or not men will consent to call this 
lk Substratum Substance or Being, is of very little conse- 
'* queuce. For" [The passage cited by Antitheos follows.] 
" ' 'tis certain that the word Substance or Being, has 
' : 1 never been employed, can.never be employed, to stand 
" ' for any thing more, at least, than the Substratum of 
t; 4 Infinity of Extension.'" — The next sentence, in the 
" Argument," Antitheos does not quote. Tis as follows. : — 
" But to refuse to give such Substratum that name, being 
" a thing obviously most unreasonable, let us call the Sub- 
M stratum of Infinity of Extension, by the name of Sub- 
" stance or Being/' Prop. III. §§4 5. 

§ 10. It is in this way that our atheist writes after 
giving the quotation from the " Argument — " It is, of 
; ' course, of no manner of importance whether men 
" consent to do what they always have done and must 
;i continue to do, or whether they will not." — Exactly so. 
Antitheos lays down a general 'rule, applicable to any case, 
and Mr Gillespie gave the particular instance. {Supra, § 9.) 
— " But how far" our atheist next proceeds to ask, " is 
t: the because" [or the "for"] " and its certainty consist- 
" ent with the lurking suspicion of the honoured name of 
" Being or substance being refused to his unsupported sub- 
© t; stratum ?" — How far \ Very far indeecT. As far as any 
one can see. Men often both say and do very perverse 
things, when they think it is for their interest. J. May not 
one see it to be, somehow, necessary, that there should be 
a Substratum to infinite extension, who yet, for some 
whimsical, or for some atheistical reason, refuses to ac- 
cord to the Substratum the name Substance or Being I 
t See Note B B. J See Note C C. 



250 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part XII. 

Much more wonderful phenomena may be witnessed every 
day. Mankind not unfrequently develope the possibility 
there is, that human passions, and even fancies, may suf- 
fice to bring the tongue over to their side, in opposition 
to all the sound dictates of the understanding. There 
are those who will not be hindered by so paltry a difficul- 
ty as the obvious unreasonableness of a thing, from doing 
the thing. To refuse to bestow a name, is as easy, in one 
respect, as to see the propriety of the bestowment. I 
think, that by this time the most inattentive reader must 
have remarked, how very few the insuperable obstructions 
are that lie in an atheist's path. 

§ 11. Antitheos goes on thus : " Yet, on the very heels 
44 of this misgiving, he concludes, — > There is, then, NE- 
44 4 cessarily, a Being of Infinity of Extension." " — Yes : 
Hard upon the heels of the lurking suspicion and misgiving 
as to whether some men may not act very unreasonably, 
by refusing a name to a thing which deserves it, — or, to 
deliver it more after Antitheos 's manner, hard upon the 
heels of the " lurking suspicion" and " misgiving" as to 
whether certain men, having a certain object in view, 
will 44 consent to do what they always have done, and 
44 must continue to do," in other, and similar, circum- 
stances — when no present interest warps their perceptions all 
awry ; the Author of the 44 Argument'' thinks that by 
Proposition III. it is made out, for ever, There is, ne- 
cessarily, a Being of Infinity of Extension., And I shall 
venture to say, I am persuaded my reader must think so « 
too. 

§ 12. Our atheist concludes his Chapter, and what he 
has to say in relation to Mr Gillespie's third Proposition, 
with these words : — 44 The worthy old father of the church, 
" who declared his belief of a Christian dogma because it 
44 was impossible, is not far from having a logician of the 
" mathematical school to keep him in countenance. Mr 



11-15.] " ARGUMENT, A Pi?/Oi?/ ; " IRREFRAGABLE. 251 

" Gillespie frames a most absolute conclusion with his 
; ' premises dubiously faltering on his lips." — Mr Gillespie 
does indeed frame a most absolute conclusion, but that 
he does so with his premises dubiously faltering on his 
lips, is one of those many untruths which the reader has 
seen dropping from Antitheos^s pen. And his is no fal- 
tering pen, on an occasion. It executes no dubious cha- 
racters, when a handsome misrepresentation is necessary 
for the writer's cause 

§ 13. A logician of the mathematical school may be, for 
aught known to the contrary, a very proper person to 
keep company with one who has arrived at a " second 
" childishness." t But whether worthy or unworthy, old 
or young, fathers or sons, of the Church, are more prone 
than certain other descriptions of persons, to believe in 
proportion to the incredibility of the creed, to act as if 
their maxim were, Credimus, quia impossibilia sunt ; 
this is a matter which may admit of doubt, and is open 
for fair investigation. 

§ 14. " Is it (intelligence) a being — a substance — a 
" a thing that exists by itself? Or is it not, on the con- 
w trary," demands Antitheos, " a characteristic property 

of a certain order of beings, dependent upon the exercise 
" of their external senses, and, by consequence, their or- 
" ganization ? We cannot even conceive how it should exist, 
M independent of these circumstances. 8 To have intel- 
* - ligence, it is necessary to have ideas ; to have ideas, it 
" 4 is necessary to have senses : and to have senses, it is 
" ' necessary to be material.' + Intelligence, therefore, 
" speaking generally, is nothing more than an accidental 
"property of matter. "ft Chapter XI. parag. 4. 

§ 15. Now this which Antitheos says, that intelligence, 
speaking either generally or particularly, is nothing more 



t Shakspere. 



X See Note D D. 



tt See E E. 



% 

252 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part XII. 



than an accidental property of matter : that is, that 
such a thought of our minds as is denoted by the word ac- 
cident — or chance — (for is it not plain, that accident — or 
chance — can be no real, separate existence in the world of 
external, independent realities, and that " the honoured 
" name of Being or substance" suits no such thing as the 
letters c-h-a-n-c-e — or a-c-c-i-d-e-n-t — can ever denote ?) 
I say, that such a thought of ours should, some time or 
other, have added thinking {ourselves thus adding our- 
selves^) to certain ' collocations of matter'} — (or was the 
matter not brought together previously \ — ) this, to a 
truly " simple man, 11 is — surely — as wild and monstrous 
a creed as any " worthy old father of the church" ever 
set himself down to frame, in the height of his zeal to be, 
above measure mysterious and " divinely dark. 1 ' || This, 
this IS INCREDIBLE. 

§ 16. And because it is so, we would have our readers 
consider, and evermore bear in mind, that the point now 
before our view touches somehow on the borders of that 
question to which the whole atheistic controversy may well 
be reduced :% To-wit, Is it more credible that Mind 
caused Matter, than that Matter caused Mind ? — To be- 
lieve that Matter (necessarily, or accidentally,) caused 
Mind to come into existence, is impossible. ft Then, 
Atheism IS incredible. 

§ 17. And as it is impossible to believe, that Matter 
was the sole cause of Mind, so, with Antitheos, it is a 

CREDIBLE THING, THAT MlND WAS THE SOLE CAUSE OF 

Matter. Which we shall prove. 

§ 18. Our medium of proof shall be this : With Anti- 
theos, the Creation of Matter was a possible thing. H 

t Thought thus acting before thought existed. 

I A favourite phrase with the Rev. Dr Chalmers.. 

|| Pope— Dunciad. B. iv. 1. 460. f See Note FF. 

tt See Note G G. %% See Note H H. 



§§ 16-23." « ARGUMENT, A PRIORI" IRREFRAGABLE. 253 

§ 19. Antitheos certainly jeers sufficiently at the doc- 
trine of the Creation of Matter. — " Like the dogma of* 
" all things being created out of nothing," [or, being- 
created at all,] " * * * * the thing seems impossible" 
— Ch. I. par. 6. The creation or annihilation of mat- 
" ter, — either of which is an impossibility" Ch. V. last 
par." — The miraculous and incomprehensible feat of 
' J creating the universe out of nothing." — Ch. IX. par. 11. 
t; — The gross and profoundly irrational dogma of crea- 
" tion. This is not precisely the place to detect and lay 
" bare all the absurdities of that dogma (which could easily 
" be done to its inmost core)" — Ch. XII. par. 5. " He 
" ^the theologian) takes for granted the astounding fact 
<; of the material universe having been created out of no- 
" thing* 11 — [or, created at all.] Last Chap. par. 9. 

§ 20. But notwithstanding all Antitheos' 's jeers, on this 
fruitful subject, he says : " We can conceive matter 
" not TO exist." See, also, other passages, the same in 
effect, from our atheist, (no atheist in this,) in Part VI. 
§34. 

§ 21. Now — assuredly — he that can conceive Matter 
not to be, or not to have been, can conceive Matter to 
have had a beginning. Lay together these two positions : 
To-wit, Matter is, and, Matter can be conceived not to hate 
been : And you have the conception of the Creation of 
Matter ; the possibility that Matter may have begun to 
be. # 

§ 22. And as with our atheist (no atheist here,) Matter 
may have begun to be, the Creation of Matter is, with h im, 
a possible thing.t — So that now we have, in FIRM keep- 
ing, our medium of proof. 

§ 23. And I fancy, it will not be denied (at least with 
a grave face, J that if Matter, all Matter, began to be, 



t Sec Note II. 



254 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE* [Part XII. 

Mind, or nothing, must have produced it : That is, If Mat- 
ter began to be, Mind must have been the cause.t 

§ 24. So that — putting one thing by the side of an- 
other — it appears, that, with Antitheos, at the bot- 
tom OF HIS HEART, J WE CAN BELIEVE, THAT MlND 

caused Matter. — And this was the thing to be proved. 
Vide supra, § 17. 

§ 25. Antitheos should call himself " Anti- 

theos" — no, not for another hour. 



§ 26. And here must be terminated our present Exa- 
mination. To advance farther now, would be improper 
in a high degree. We have weighed what Antitheos has 
said in reference to " Proposition I." : We have exa- 
mined every atom of an argument urged against " Pro- 
" position II." : And we have gone over word by word, 
and in order, each syllable written in opposition to the 
evidence of " Proposition III." — On these three liang all 
the rest. If those Propositions be granted, or are fully 
established (whether they be granted or no,) Antitheos 
may as soon cause the heavens to depart by a frown, as 
he can get quit of the proof for the Being of A god. If 
those three positions are necessarily true, there lies close 
to our hands the demonstration of An Intelligent First 
Cause of all the phenomena, and of all the matter, in the 
universe. And that they are so, we have no doubt, each 
one of our readers is by this time most thoroughly con- 
vinced. || — In short, all the remaining positions in the " Ar- 
" gument, a priori, for the Being and Attributes of God," 



t See Note J J. J Or rather, at the top of his head. 

|j Whatever certain readers may say. 



§§ 24-30.] " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. 255 

are mere deductions — doctrines evolved from the doctrines 
laid down in those preliminary Propositions.t 

§ 27. And on the other hand, if the truth of these Pro- 
positions have not been made luminously to appear, 'tis 
quite needless to proceed beyond them. The Zetetics\ were 
challenged to point out some — some one — " specific fal- 
lacy" in my Demonstration. Antitheos, in the charac- 
ter of their avowed champion, alleges, he has detected A 
specific fallacy in the third, that vital, Proposition. If he 
be right, — at that point he should have stopped — It was 
mere supererogation to go over an inch of more ground 
— One of the two foundation-stones of this great argument 
crumbles into dust — And the whole " fabric of the Argu- 
" ment a priori comes lumbering down along with it."!! 

§ 28. That Antitheos resolved on sinking deeper 

into the slough of his own objections, is evidence of any 
thing but his own contentment with the result of his pre- 
liminary operations. He enters upon new ground, and 
demeans himself as if the region he had passed over were 
not territory fully conquered. 

§ 29. We shall come to a halt, then — to see whether 
or no " Theology must be sorely distressed for standing 
44 ground, if this be its strongest position — its fortress — 
44 its rock — its high tower." — 44 Refutation" : last par. 

§ 30. To go on, we should have to subsume the un- 
questionable truth of a proposition to which my antago- 
nist has fairly — I mean, openly — objected. To take for 
granted, against atheists, the truth of the 3d Proposition : 
44 this will we do, if God permit."U But not now will we. 
In the mean time, Antitheos is afforded an opportunity of 

t Of the truth of which, a slight inspection of that work, may sa- 
tisfy one. Puta Part. II. § 19. 
I Vide Append ic. ^ ^. 

|| u Refutation." Ch. X. last par. These words are used as accom : 
modations. 

% I am not arguing with an antitheist, at present. 



256 " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI," IRREFRAGABLE. [Part XII.} 



acknowledging what, we are bold to say, all our readers 
must have perceived. — 

" I PAUSE FOR A REPLY." — 

§ 31. — I conclude, in the words of the penetrating 
Dr Samuel Clarke. — " Infinite Space, is infinite Extension : 
" and Eternity, is infinite Duration. They are the two 

" FIRST AND MOST OBVIOUS AND SIMPLE IDEAS, THAT 

" EVERY MAN HAS IN His mind/' — -Ans, 4ko Sixth Letter. 



NOTES TO PART XII. 



• Note A A. 

*' Space and Duration being- evidently necessary, and yet them- 
^selves not substances, but properties or modes ; show evidently 
" that the Substance, without which these Modes could not sub- 
te sist, is itself much more (if that were possible) riecessary." Dr 
SI. Clarke's 3d. Ans. " Which (Space ) we evidently see to be 
<c necessarily-existing ; and yet which (not being itself a substance,) 
" at the same time necessarily pr&MWDOses a Substance, without 
" which it could not exist ; Whicbj ^M^mce consequently, must be 
H itself (much more, if possible,) necessarily-existing," Fourth Ans. 



Note BB. 

Antitheos may hold in admiration the ancient sect of Stoics, or 
perhaps he may be lineally descended of the Danes. — " On receiv- 

ing mortal wounds in battle, they were so far from uttering groans 
" and lamentations, or exhibiting any marks of fear or sorrow, that 
ce they commonly began to laugh and sing."t — Henry's History of 
Great Britain. B. II. ch. 7. 

Note CC. 

We have, as wc noticed before, atheistical authority touching 
upon something hereabouts. Vide Part. XI. § 18. not. %. And as 
we have atheistical authority, so we shall treat ourselves to theisti- 
cal, too. <e We believe that to be true, which some have affirmed, 
" that were there any interest of life, any concernment of appetite 
u and passion, against the truth of geometrical theorems themselves, 
" as of a triangle's having three angles equal to two right, whereby 
" men's judgments might be clouded and bribed, notwithstanding 
" all the demonstrations of them, many would remain, at least 
u sceptical about them." Cudworth : in Preface. 

t "Bartholin. «},2.'' 



258 



NOTES TO PART XII. 



Note DD. 

I do not know exactly whence Antitheos took this sentence." The 
same sentiments abound, of course, in the Systeme de la Nature, — 
and every atheistical work. 

ec This passage of a modern writer, t We worms, cannot conceive, 
" how God can understand without brains, is vox pecudis, the lan- 
" guage and philosophy rather of worms or brute animals, than of 
" men." Cudworth. P. 841. 

Note EE. 

Antitheos, it thus appears, was the result of accident. The con- 
course of atheistical atoms mentioned in our Preface was product 
by necessity. Doctors differ, and so, we see, do atheists. Both 
hypotheses agree in one respect. Antitheos, as well as that con- 
course of atoms, sprung from a word, or, at most, a thought 

his own? or a neighbour's? (Fide § 15. them.) — Or do I see an 
explanation of the enigma ? Antitheos' s ultimate-particle-ftoefa/ was 
the product of necessity, "jjjKsical necessity/' but his intelligence, 
or mind, that is, his organizewbody, was the result of accident : 
Is this what Antitheos would deliver ? If so, half (and not the 
worse half) of him came by accident, but the other gentleman was, 
every inch of him, the result of " necessary causes." So still the 
pair differ. But is there any harm in that ? 

However, after all : (e Blind fate and blind chance are at 

st bottom much the same thing, and one no more intelligible than the 
" other." Berkeley's (< Siris." Section 273. 

NoteFF. 

It is not an ill observation which Clarke makes, that the main 
question between us and the atheist lies in the Proposition, (his 8th,) 
" The Self-existent and Original Cause of all things, must be an 
" Intelligent Being." 

Note GG. 

Vide Part. VIII. Appendic. B. § 24. et loc. in ed citat. 

f< I appeal," exclaims John Locke, " to every one's own thoughts, 
" whether he cannot as easily conceive matter produced by nothing, 
<c as thought to be produced by pure matter, when before there was 
" no such thing as thought, or an intelligent being existing ?" B. IV. 
ch. x. § 10. See the whole of the unanswerable passage in our 
Appendix. Vide Appendic. K K- 

^ Hobbes. 



NOTES TO PART XII. 



259 



Note HH. 

Thft creation of Matter, but not out of nothing : For that, strictly, 
is absurd nonsense. The proper notion of Creation is — not the 
bringing- something out ovmothing, but — the making something be- 
gin to be which before was not. 

Let him who can, reduce this to a contwdiction — i. e. render ma- 
nifest that to conceive it is impossible. 

Colliher says : c< I confess, if any man could be found so abso- 
** lutely stupid and void of understanding as to affirm that the 
" Deity in Creating the World had * produc't it out of nothing 
" as out of a preexistent subject * * * * such a notion of 
" it might have some right to the character of a Contradiction. 
" But since by Creation there can no more be meant than the 
" causing to be what was not before, or the producing something 
" where once was nothing, this is evidently no more a Contradic- 
" tion than" — &c. " Impartial Enquiry." Book I. ch. ix. 

And Clarke : " To say that something which once was not, may 
" since have begun to exist ; is neither directly, nor by any conse- 
" quence whatsoever, to assert that That which is not, can be, while 
" it is not ; or that That which is, can not be, while it is" Dem. 
under Prop. X. 

Note II. 

I am happy at being able to add Mr Locke s authority to that of 
Antitheos, on the topic of the possibility of the Creation ofi»Matter. 
" Possibly, jive would emancipate ourselves from vulgar notions, 
" and raisd(^ thoughts as far as they would reach, to a closer 
" contemplation of things, we might be able to aim at some dim 
" and seeming conception how matter might at first be made, and begin 
" to exist." Essay, B. IV. ch. x. § 18. It will be observed, Locke 
goes farther than Antitheos, by one step. With Antitheos, the Crea- 
tion of Matter is possible : While Locke conceives, not merely that 
Matter began to exist, but how. 

Note JJ. 

" Man knows by an intuitive certainty, that bare nothing can no 
£ * more produce any real being, than it can be equal to two right 
" angles." " This being of all absurdities the greatest, to imagine 
" that pure nothing, the perfect negation and absence of all beings. 



260 



NOTES TO PART XII. 



ei should ever produce any real existence." Locke. B. IV. ch. x. 
§§ 3, 8. 

We hesitate not to adopt, as pertinent here, one of EjiicHrus's 
maxims, as it was understood by the Sect. 

Nullam rem e nihilo gigni Divmitusf un*quam. — Lucret. Lib. I. 

If there was no Divinity, as they supposed there was not, why then 
— nothing could not cause anything. 

We shall even go so far as to adopt the theorem as stated by 
another Poet. 

De nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti. — Persii Satir. III. 

Nothing cannot be the cause of anything, nor reduce anything to 

nothing.- 'Nothing cannot be a cause at all. 

"It had long ago been received as an indisputable doctrine, 

" if not an axiom in philosophy, that out of nothing, no thing can 
" come ; and it has never yet been shown to be essentially incor- 
" rect." Refutation. Ch. II. par. 25. Antitheos is right : — The 
doctrine, or the axiom, is correct, essentially , — and substantially too. 

t Vide Pwrt. VI. Jppendic. % 2. not.\\ 




APPENDIX. 



APPENDIX TO PART IV. 

§ 1. We are about to bid a final adieu to the infinite divisibility 
of matter, and to infinite divisibility of every kind. But ere we 
take our flight from the Cimmerian darkness of that uncomfortable 
region, we shall do what lies in our power to display the doctrine 
of infinite divisibility in those colours in which it will be seen to 
most advantage. And in truth, it requires to be placed in the most 
favourable light, if we would fit it to be brooked at all, it being 
but a monster at best. Many of the partisans of that doctrine have 
represented it as a very Gorgon. A Gorgon indeed it is : But then 
these gentlemen, with true Grecian mendacity, have bestowed upon 
it more snakes and tusks than it was obliged to carry on 

The very head and front of [its] offending. 
In short, our statement shall be much to the credit of the dogma 
of infinite divisibility ; and if its patrons do not give us their thanks, 
it will be because there is no gratitude in their bosoms, not because 
we have not done any of them a service. 

§ 2. Matter, that is, every part of matter, is divisible in infijii- 
tum : What are we to understand by that ? 

§ 3. — 1. We shall, in the first place, lay down what that doctrine 
does not mean. It cannot mean that any portion of matter con- 
tains an infinite number of parts. 

§ 4. It must, we confess, be admitted, that not a few of those 
who have treated of the subject, not a few friends as well as foes, 
have represented the position, Matter is divisible infinitely, as con- 
vertible with the position, Matter contains, or consists of, an infi- 
nite number of parts. There is no necessity for our producing the 
willing testimony of friends, and the invective of enemies, to bear 
out what w^fcffirm. What we atiinn we suppose to be nothing 
but what is well known. — I'm not sure, that Mr Hume, in a pas- 
sage which we have quoted, (vide part. Hi. §2.) may not have 



262 APPENDIX TO PART IV. 

intended to set out the dogma we treat of under such a represen- 
tation. Certain it is, that in a note upon the place he speaks twice 
of an infinite number. In order to finding absurdities in that dog- 
ma, there is no need first to misrepresent it, or even to state it all 
unfavourably. 

§ 5. But from the infinite, or, if we would be rather more correct 
with our word, the eternal, divisibility of any particle of matter, 
(were the divisibility possible,) we can by no means rationally 
infer the existence of an infinite number of parts therein. For an 
infinite number is a contradiction in terms. The thing is very ob- 
vious. When one speaks of the possible infinity of numbers, 
infinity in this case signifies merely the power of always adding 
units to the sum we before had, and when any one determinate 
number is pronounced to be infinite, the word ceases to possess any 
meaning. What is of infinity in any respect, cannot be made 
greater in that respect. And were any one absolutely determinate 
number infinite, we could make an infinite number greater, if we 
could conceive a unit added to it, as it is most certain we could. 
To speak, then, of an infinite number is to utter a contradiction. 
And therefore, even were every particle of matter eternally divisi- 
ble, all the matter in the universe could not be supposed to consti- 
tute an infinite number of parts. 

§ 6. " The infinity of numbers," says Mr Locke, " to the end of 
ce whose addition every one perceives there is no approach, easily 
cc appears to any one that reflects on it ; but how clear soever this 
ce idea of the infinity of numbers be, there is nothing yet more evi- 
" dent, than the absurdity of the actual idea of an infinite number." 
<c Let a man frame in his mind an idea of any * * number, as great 
<( as he will ; it is plain, the mind rests and terminates in that idea, 
" which is contrary to the idea of infinity, which consists in a sup- 
" posed endless progression." B. II. ch. xvii. § 8. Again: ■" Though 
" it be hard, 1 think, to find any one so absurd as to say, he has 
" the positive idea of an actual infinite number ; the infinity where- 
" of lies only in a power still of adding any combination of units to 
(e any former number, and that as long, and as much, as one will," 
&c. &c. Ibid. § 13. 

§ 7. With reference to those persons who have accustomed them- 
selves to speaking of an infinite number of parts, as the cause, or 
the consequence, or the concomitant, of the infinite jjpisibility of 
matter, and whose speculations have ever been found to be shrouded 
in mists sufficiently opaque to stand in the wa} r of clear views ; be- 



APPENDIX TO PART IV. 



263 



sides what Mr Locke has here already conveyed, conveyed to them 
if they like, we would recommend the study of the following pas- 
sage, provided we be allowed to make one alteration upon it. 
ec The great and inextricable difficulties which perpetually involve 
" all discourses concerning infinity, whether of space, duration, or 
" divisibility, have been the certain marks of a defect in our ideas 
" of infinity, and the disproportion the nature thereof has to the 
" comprehension of our narrow capacities." Ibid. § 21. We pro- 
pose, by way of an amendment, to say, that the difficulties which 
involve many, perphaps nearly all, discourses concerning infinity, 
in particular concerning infinity when divisibility to infinity is spoken 
about, have been the certain marks of a defect in many men's ideas as 
to what the word infinity means, and of the disproportion between 
the true meaning thereof and the confused comprehensions of the 
meaning by certain narrow capacities. Were this amendment suf- 
fered, John Locke, himself, would deal in better sense. Pray, if 

WE CAN RISE SO HIGH AS TO SEE THAT THERE ARE DEFECTS IN OUR IDEAS 
OF INFINITY, WHAT SHOULD HINDER US TO SOAR AWAY FROM THE DEFECTS 
ALTOGETHER ? If WE CAN SPRING SO FAR ALOFT AS TO DESCRY THOSE 
DEFECTS AS UNDER OUR SUPERINCUMBENCY, IS NOT THIS A SURE SIGN THAT 
THE DEFECTS ARE, IN THE BEST OF SENSES, BENEATH OUR NOTICE ? 

Quandoque bonus dormitat Honierus.t 

§ 8. — 2. In the next place, we shall mention distinctly what is to 
be understood by the dogma of the divisibility of matter to all eter- 
nity. As the capacity of every particle of matter to be divided 
everlastingly, (be such capacity an odd chimera, or be it not,) does 
not entitle us to infer that matter contains an infinite number of 
parts, so, on the* other hand, it forces us to draw this conclusion, 
that no portion of matter, viz. that no body, consists of any definite 
number of parts at all. He who alleges that matter is eternally di- 
visible, must maintain, that there is no body which is made up of 
truly ultimate particles ; no body which, with any propriety, can be 
said to contain aliquot parts ; in fine, no body whicli consists of 
parts component in any other sense than proportional, as halves, 
quarters, &c. &c. What are those parts of a body which are not 
ultimate ? which are not aliquot ? but which are only proportional ? 
But to sum up every question in one ; what ar» those parts of a 
body which are of no fixed, definite number ? 

§ 9, These consequences, or these concomitants, arc admitted, or, 
at least, what involves them all is allowed, by those who ought to 

^ f ^ rs I'oetica. 



264 



APPENDIX TO PART IV. 



know something of the affair, and who would not, for the world, 
unnecessarily allow any thing to the prejudice of the doctrine of 
the infinite divisibility of every portion of every body. 

§ 10. " He who maintains divisibility in infinitum," says a stout 
defender of the divisibility he speaks of, " boldly denies, therefore, 
" the existence of the ultimate particles of body ;" " it is a mani- 
" fest contradiction, to suppose at once ultimate particles and di- 
iC visibility in infinitum." — " With all your might, then, resist this 
" assertion : every compound being is made up of simple beings ; and 
" though you may not be able directly to prove the fallacy," &c. 
Eulers Letters. Vol. II. Let. xii. & xvi. And the same in other 
places. 

§ 11. " If it is admitted, that the divisibility of matter has no 
" limit," thus speaks another warm advocate of the dogma of never- 
ending divisibility, " it will follow, that no" [one] " body" [however 
minute'] " can be called one individual substance. You may as well 
" call it two, or twenty, or two hundred" substances, or twenty 
times two hundred substances., or two hundred times two hundred 
nonillions of substances. See Reid's Essays. Essay II. ch. xix. We 
thus represent a nonillion in figures : — • 

1,000000,000000,000000,000000,000000,000000,000000,000000,000000. 

§ 12. Think of the nonillionth part of a mote in a sunbeam being 
as much a body as the huge luminary in whose rays the mote 
dances ! Yet such a part of such a thing is as much a body as. the 
sun, according to Dr Reid's principles. And verily 'tis even so, if 
one small circumstance be true : If such a part of such a thing be 
not a non-entity. And when you have cogitated upon that, suffi- 
ciently : Think of an extension but the nonillionth part of the ex- 
tension of a mote in a sunbeam as really existing in rerum naturd, 
and afterwards of the first of these extensions being divisible to all 
eternity ! These are the high mysteries into which those plunge 
who will have it, that the divisibility of matter has no limit. 

§ 13. To conclude : When one says that matter is divisible in 
ceternum, he must be understood as saying neither more nor less 
than that any particle, however small, can be divided without the 
possibility of ever coming to an end with the divisions. And to 
render his assertion a provcable one, he must be held as maintain- 
ing Cirther, that, in point of fact, when we divide and subdivide 
any portion of a body, we find, that at no time can we give a 
righteous termination to the business. 



265 



APPENDIX TO PAET VI. 

§ 1. The words quoted in the passage to -which this Appendix has 
reference,, are taken from the New-York " Free Enquirers' Family 
" Library Edition" of the System of Nature, (mdcccxxxvi.) There 
are notes, s id to be by Diderot. The translation of the notes is 
said to be by one H. D. Robinson. In the Advertisement, we are 
informed, that " the Systeme de la Nature was first attributed to 
" Helvetius, and then to Mirabeau," (p. iv.) and that it may now 
be attribute!, with truth, to the Baron D'Holbach. (Pp. v. vi. vii.) 

10 . 

§ 2. Of the " System of Nature" Lord Brougham says, in " Note 
IV" : "It is the only work of any consideration wherein atheism 
c: is openly avowed and preached — avowed, indeed, and preached 
" in terms. (See, particularly, part ii., chap, ii)." Like many 
assertions of Brougham's, this one is deficient in a certain good 
quality. " As to Atheists," said one who knew what he was speak- 
ing about, <f these so confident exploders of them are both unskilled 
" in the monuments of antiquity, + and" — &c. Will his Lordship 
take quietly this hint, for want of a reproof, from his favourite Cud- 
u-orth ?% — One of the atheistical monuments of antiquity is the 
" De Rerum Natura" of Lucretius, who sings : — 
Omnia, ut est, igitur, per se, Natura, duabus 

Consistit rebus ; nam Cobpoea sunt, et Inane 

Pra:terea nihil est, quod possis dicere ab ornni 

(Jokpoke sejunctum, secretumque esse ab Inani 

Quod quasi tertia sit rerum natura reperta. 

+ Unskilled in the monuments of antiquity ! Read Brougham's Notes VI. 
VII. VIII. and then deny, if you can, that 

This, this was the uukitulest cut of all. 

t The hint occurs in tho Pre/ace to what Warburton, that colossal man, has 
so well called " one immortal volume." (" Preface" to the 1st Ed. of Bool; 3 
iv. v. vi. of the " Divine Legation of Moses.") 



266 



APPENDIX TO PART VI. 



— Praeter Inane, et Cobpoba, tenia per se 

Nulla potest rerum in nuraero natura relinqui- Lib. i. 

Natura videtur 

Libera continue* Dominis privata superbis, 

Ipsa sua per setsponte omnia Diis agebe expers.|| Lib. ii. 

natubam berum haud dlvina mente cooetam.|| llb. iii. 

And Lucretius sings not unfrequently to the same tunes. — But per- 
haps, my Lord, the atheists of ancient times were of no consider- 
ation ? Or perhaps, they did not avow and preach their atheism 
openly f Or, if they did it openly, perhaps they did not do it in 
terms ? — Your Lordship may be ill to please with atheism. Ex. 
gr. To affirm, with Spinoza, " Substantiam corpoream, quce non 
(( nisi infinita concipi potest, nulla ratione Natura Divina indignant 
" esse did posse." e. " That corporeal substance (or matter,) 
" which is necessarily conceived to be infinite, must be allowed to 
" be not unworthy of the Divine Nature :" Which may, very pro- 
perly, be reduced to this proposition, — Matter is infinite," and there 
cannot be any God besides matter.] To affirm that, may not al- 
together satisfy your Lordship that the writer is an open, and 
avowed atheist, in terms. Your Lordship — I shall repeat it — may 
be ill to please with atheism : So very ill to pl-ease, indeed, that if 
such an one as your Lordship will be at the trouble to read, of the 
" System of Nature," and of the second Part, the 9th chapter, 
(the title of which asks, <c Do there exist Atheists ?" — ) he may 
come to think — not that there has been peradventure one, but that 
— there never was a truly atheistical work at all. 



|| Epicurus, and therefore Lucretius, speak, it is true, of Gods or a Divinity, 
But what says Tully of the Epicureans ? Vebbis ponunt, be tollunt Deos. — 
" As Epicurus, so other Atheists in like manner have commonly had their 
" vizards and disguises * * * * Yet they, that are 
" sagacious, may easily look through these thin veils and disguises" — Cud- 
worth, Ch. II. & ii. 

Epicurus had these reasons for speaking of G-ods. 1. Because the Greeks 
of his day, Heathens though they were, were not prepared to permit such 
a monster as an atheist to exist in peace. 2. He took no small delight in 
making fools of the more unthinking common-people. — One would be apt 
to think that even the common-people might always have appreciated such 
notable irony as the following : 

Tenuis enim natura Deum, longeque remota 

Sensibus a nostris, animi vix mente videtur. Lvcretii Lib. v. 

The majority of Atheists, in all ages, have seen it fit to delude the vulgar, 
and afterwards to mock them. 



APPENDIX TO PART VI. 



267 



§ 3. " There is," says Brougham, " no book of an atheistical de- 
" scription which has ever made a greater impression than the fa- 
" mous Systeme de la Nature." ***** 

§ 4. " It is impossible to deny the merits of the Systeme de la Na- 
" ture. The work of a great writer it unquestionably is." And 
accordingly, his Lordship has devoted a long Note (it is Note IV.) 
to the performance. 

§ 5. Of the merit of the ct System of Nature/' it is thus that 
Lord Brougham speaks : — " Its merit lies in the extraordinary elo- 
" quence of the composition, and the skill with which words sub- 
" stitu^gd for ideas, and assumptions for proofs, are made to pass 
" current, not only for arguments against existing beliefs, but for 
" a new system planted in their stead. As a piece of reasoning, 
" it never rises above a set of plausible sophisms — plausible only as 

long as the ear of the reader being filled with sounds, his atten- 
" tion is directed away from the sense. The chief resource of the 
" writer is to take for granted the thing to be proved, and then 
" to refer back to his assumption as a step in the demonstration, 
" while he builds various conclusions upon it, as if it were com- 
" plete. Then he declaims against a doctrine seen from one point 
" of view only, and erects another for our assent, which, besides 
" being liable to the very same objections, has also no foundation 
" whatever to rest upon. The grand secret, indeed, of the author 
" goes even further in petitione principii than this ; for we often- 
" times find, that in the very substitute which he has provided for 
" the notions of belief he would destroy, there lurks the very idea 
" which he is combating, and that his idol is our own faith in a new 
" form, but masked under different words and phrases. 

§ 6. <c The truth of these statements," continues his Lordship, 
ft we are now to examine." But into the examination we cannot 
follow his Lordship. 

§ 7. His Lordship's volume having crossed the Atlantic, and fal- 
len into the hands of the New-World atheists ; the compliment to 
the author of the book called the System of Nature is repaid, with 
interest. " Henry Lord Brougham * * ," say the Transatlan- 
tic infidels, " in his recent Discourse of Natural Theology, has 
" mentioned this extraordinary treatise, but with what care does 
" he evade entering the lists with this distinguished writer! He 
" passes over the work with a haste and sophistry that indicates 
" how fully conscious he was of his own weakness and his oppo- 
" nent's strength." — The western free-thinkers part from his Lord- 



268 



APPENDIX TO PART VI. 



ship in this manner: " It is with a few pages" [The pages are 
as near to being sixteen, of the closer printed ones, as need be.] 
" of * empty declamation that his Lordship attacks and con- 
e ' demns this eloquent and logical work." See " Advertisement 
mentioned in § 1. above. 



§ 8. " ALL Christian writers on Natural Theology," so write the 
American atheologists, l< have studiously avoided even the men- 
u tion of this masterly production : t knowing" [Herfc is the 
cause'] ce their utter inability to cope with its powerful reasoning," 
[Then follows the effect] " they have wisely J passed it by in silence." 
Advertisement. The whole assertion says (to employ the mild lan- 
guage of Honyhnhnm ) the thing which is not. But whether it be 
an ethical lie, or merely a logical one, — a lie of malice, or only of 
mistake, — I shall not take up time in endeavouring to determine, 
w. The assertion is false, whatever be the reason of the circumstance. 
And did I deem it at all necessary to do so, I should set down the 
names of several writers on Natural Theology, the writers being 
Christians, who not only have not avoided mentioning the System 
of Nature, but who have examined it, rather fully. And as it is 
false, that the production has been passed by in silence by all 
Christian writers on Natural Theology ; so it is not true, that these 
writers were in the knowledge of their utter inability to cope with 
the Anti- Christian writer on (what I hope is Un-Natural, as well 
as) A- Theology. The effect has no existence : Is it any wonder, 
that the cause has therefore none ? 

§ 9. I, for one, in place of studiously avoiding even the mention of 
the " System of Na ture," have, as the reader of my sixth Part is well 
aware, done the very reverse, and mentioned the production, when 
I could have " avoided even the mention" of it, without being very 
studious as to how, and without subjecting myself to be righteously 
found fault with, on account of the avoidance. I have mentioned the 
production : Nay more, I have quoted from it, and have commented 
on the citations. It may be but right to notice, that the citations 
are made from the chapter which forms, as Brougham truly declares, 
" by far the most argumentative part" of the Frenchman's book. 
(Note IV.) With what success I have encountered the Goliath 

| These gentlemen subsequently except Brougham. 

% There were good reasons for the wisdom. Vide infra, § 9. not. \\ 



APPENDIX TO PART VI. 



269 



of Infidels, || let the attentive reader determine. Whether or no I 
display an utter inability to cope with a man so mighty among 
atheists — so far as matters between us have gone — there has been 
at least no wise passing him by in silence. But though I have not 
passed by that author, I must certainly have passed by his " power- 
u ful reasoning," for, to the best of my recollection, I met with 
none of it. But let us not despair. We may yet fall in with the 
powerful reasoning which is so rife (according to report) in " this 
" masterly production." In a word, we may have better fortune 
the next time. And the reader may take our word for it, that wo 
shall not lose any opportunity at all suitable, should such offer, of at- 
toj^pting (at any rate) to cope with this paragon of Philosophers, 
and even — to make use of fine figure in the genuine bathos% — of 
Infidels. 

|| " We have commenced the library with a translation of Baron d'Hol- 
" bach's System of Nature, because it is estimated as one of the most able 
" expositions of theological absurdities which has ever been written.'' 
Again : " Let those read this work who seek to come at a ' knowledge of 
" ' the truth'." But farther: " If the most profound logic, the acutest dis- 
" crimination, the keenest and most caustic sarcasm, can reflect credit on 
" an author, then we may justly hail Baron d'llolbach as the geeatest 
'• AMONG philosophers, and an honour to infidels." In short : " We have 
" no apologies to make for republishing the System of Nature at this time ; 
" the work will support itself, and needs no advocate ; it has never been 
*' answered, because, in truth, it is, indeed, unanswerable." Advertise- 
ment, already mentioned. 

+ To-wit, the Anticlimax. 



Y 



270 



APPENDIX TO PART VIII. 

APPENDIX A. 

u Motion proves a vacuum. — But not to go so far as beyond the 
" utmost bounds of body in the universe, * * * to find a^a- 
" cuum, the motion of bodies that are in our view and neighbour- 
" hood, seem to me plainly to evince it. For I desire any one so to 
tc divide a solid body of any dimension he pleases, as to make it 
i( possible for the solid parts to move up and down freely every way 
" within the bounds of that superficies, if there be not left in it a void 
(i space, as big as the least part into which he has divided the said 
f< solid body. And if, where the least particle of the body divided 
u is as big as a mustard-seed, a void space equal to the bulk of a 
" mustard-seed be requisite to make room for the free motion of 
" the parts of the divided body within the bounds of its superficies ; 
" where the particles of matter are 100,000,000 less than a mus- 
cc tard-seed, there must also be a space void of solid matter, as big 
" as 100,000,000 part of a mustard-seed : for if it hold good in one, 
" it will hold in the other, and so on in infinitum." [_Not in in- 
finitum, or any thing like it : But for a good while, perhaps till our 
minds can minish the particles no longer. Vide Part. III. § 26. et 
seq.~\. " And let this void space be as little as it will, it destroys 
" the hypothesis of plentitude. For if there can be a space void of 
c( body, equal to the smallest separate particle of matter now ex- 
" isting in nature, it is still space without body, and makes as great 
u a difference between space and body, as if it were idy<*. ^a^a, 
(e a distance as wide as any in nature. And, therefore, if we sup- 
" pose not the void space necessary to motion, equal to the least 
" parcel of the divided solid matter, but to T \ or of it, the 
" same consequence will always follow of space without matter." 
Locke's Essay. Book II. Chap. xiii. § 23. 

Mr Locke recurs to this topic in a subsequent chapter. " Of 
" such a void space we have not only the idea, but I have proved, 
" as I think, from the motion of body, its" [consequentially, or 



APPENDIX TO PART VIII. 



271 



hypothetically] " necessary existence." ( 1 It is impossible for any 
" particle of matter to move but into an empty space." B. II. 
Ch. xvii. § 4. 

This demonstration by Locke of the existence of vacuum, will 
suggest, to the classical reader, Lucretius' s exhibition of ttf e argu- 
ment for the impossibility of motion in a perfect plenum. 

locus est intactus, Inane, vacansque. * 

Quod si non ess«gt, nulla ratione moveri 
Res possent ; namque, obficiuin, quod Corporis extat, 
Obficere, atque obstare, id in omni tempore adesset 
Omnibus : haud igitur quidquam procedere posset, 
Principium quoniam cedendi nulla daret res. 
At nuncjper maria, ac teras, sublimaque coeli, 
Multa mbdis multis varia ratione moveri 
Cernimus ante oculos ; quae, si non esset Inane, 
Non tarn sollicito motu privata carerent ; 
Quani genita omnino nulla ratione fuissent : 
Undique Materies quoniam stipata quiesset. — Lib. Prim. 

To the English reader — 

— Take it in the very words of Creech. \ 

A Void is space intangible : Thus prov'd. 

For were there none, no Bod}' could be mov'd ; 

Because where e'er the pressing motion goes, 

It still must meet with stops,} # * * 

'Tis natural to Bodies to oppose. 

So that to move would be in vain to try, 

But all would stubborn,§ fixt,§ aud moveless lie ; 

Because no yielding Body could be found 

Which first should move, and give the other ground. 

But every one now sees that things do move 

"With various turns in Earth and Heaven above ; 

Which, were no Void, not only we'd not seen, 

But * Bodies too themselves hud never been : 

Ne'er generated, for Matter all sides prest 

With other matter would for ever rest. 

Or in those of Dr James Mason Good. 

And know this void is space untouched and pure.* 

Were space like this vouchsaf'd not, nought could move : 
Corporeal forms would still resist, and strive 
With forms corporeal, nor consent to j ield ; 

t Pope— Imitations of Horace. 6th Ep. of B. 1. 
J Four words here left out, — for sense's sake. 
§ These words here transposed, — for sound's sake. 
II The capitals are the translator's. 



272 APPENDIX TO PART VIII. 



While the great progress of creatioi^eas'd. 

But what more clear in earth or heav'n suhliine, 

Or the vast ocean, than, in various modes, 

That various matter moves ? which, hut for SPACE.f 
4t 'Twere vain t'expect : and vainer yet to look 
^ For procreative power, educing still 

Kinds from their kinds through all revolving time.j 

C^ir readers will perhaps pardon us, if we now present them with 
a demonstration of the position, that tlie^hotion of any body proves 
there is an immoveable space. The demonstration shall be from an 
old author, — a modern, however, should you mention liirft in the 
same breath with the Latin Poet. 

The following axioms are laid down, at the ovd^U 

" Primum est, Nullius corporis superficies, quieWknte corpore, mo- 
" veri potest, nec, moto corpore, quiescere. 

" Secundum, Nullum corpus ad aliud corpus quiescens proprius 
ee accedere, nec ab eo recedere, potest sine motu locali. 

" Tertium, Nullius corporis potest fieri motus localis, nisi tran- 
ie seundo per aliquod Externum. 

" Quartum & ultimum, Omne corpus, localiter motum, movetur 
(C adcequate per ilia loca, quae motu suo acquirit.\\ 

" Estojam pro Cylindro, 



" duas vel trcs uncias alto, * 
" super terr am immotam, 
" ut jam supponemus, po- 
" sito, Cir cuius H K M H, 
" Polusq; illius Aoois {circa n 
u quam mojoetur} superior 
c< <fy inferior A A. manifes- 
ec turn est, quod superficies 
" Cylindri extima separat 
i: se a superficie concava 
" ambientis aeris, per par- 
" tes, puta H I a concava 
" parte H I, pergitq; ad 
" I K, 8$ sic de reliquis. Unde plane apparet totam superficiem con- 
" vexam Cylindri eadem ratio est de planis) moveri in orbem ; ac 

t The capitals are the translator's. 

X The last line in the quotation from Lucretius is not so evidently trans- 
lated by Mason Good, as one could have wished. 

|| This last axiom does not appear to he used in the demonstration. But 
surely its nature is such that it can do no harm, although it be left in. 




APPENDIX TO PART VIII. 



273 



" proinde quod totus Cylindrus in orbem movetur, per Axioma pri-^ 
" mum : Sed nullum corpus movetur, nisi transeundo per aliquod 
" Externum : Ergo Cylindrus transit per aliquod Extensum, per 
" Axioma tertium. Sed per nullum Extensum transit extra ambi- 
tc turn H K M H. Ergo per Extensum intra illum ambitum tran- 
" sit. Sed per suam ipsius Extensionem non transit; circumfertur 
" enim cum ea simul. Quid igitur reliquum est prater internum 
" suum "Locum, sive Spatium, quod occupat, per cujus partes tran- 
" sire possit, nempe ab HAIdlAK, S$c. Quod opportebat de- 
" monstrare. 

" Rursus supponamus in eodem Cylindro majori H K M H sex 
"foramina Cylindracea, B, C, D, E, F, G, cequalia, totidemq; mi- 
" nores Cylindros eisdem foraminibus insertos, superficiebusq; con- 
" cavis horum foraminum cequatos et contiguos, Penatusq; aliquod 
" corpus quiescens extra majorem Cylindrum, sitq; corpus P. Mo- 
te veatur jam denuo major Cylindrus, HKMH circa axem A A se- 
" cundum ordinem literarum^. I K, 6$c. Dico, tametsi minor es 
ft Cylindri superficies suas non separent immediate nec a superficiebus 
" foraminum suorum, nec a superficie aeris majorem Cylindrum am- 
" Mentis, quod nihilominus moventur localiter. Nam dum major 
" Cylindrus movetur ab H ad I, Cylindrus B recedit a corpore P qui- 
" escente ; Cylindrus vero E proprius ad illud accedit. Nullum 
" autem corpus ad aliud co?yus quiescens proprius accedere potest, 
si vel ab eo recedere, sine motu locali, per Axioma secundum : nec om- 
" nino moveri localiter, nisi transeundo aliquod Extensum, per Axi- 
" oma tertium. Sed Cylindrus Bper nullum Extensum extra Cylin- 
" drum majorem pertransit, nec penetrat ipsum corpus C, cum ad C 
" pervenit. Igitur Cylindrus B succedit tantum in cylindraceum 
" sputium C, tSj Cylindrus C in spatium cylindraceum D, et singnli 
" Cylindri successive spatia cylindracea, sive locos internos prcece- 
" dentiurn Cylindroma/, occupant. Quod erat demonstrandum." 
K. T. A. Taken from the 6th Chap, of More's Manual of Meta- 
physic. 



APPENDIX B. 

§ 1. "The * opinion * " that "God is present every 
" where by an infinite extension of his essence," " appears most in 
" harmony with the Scri]>turcs ; though the term extension, through 
"the inadequacy of language, conveys too material an idea." 



274 



APPENDIX TO PART VIII. 



Theological Institutes, by Richard Watson. Part Second. Chap. III. 
Edit 2d. 1824. Such is the deliberate sentiment of this Theologian : 
and it will not be easy to name many works, each of them contain- 
ing more talented sober theological discussion. 

§ 2. " We conceive of him/' the " intelligent, self-existent, First 
" Cause," " as existing in all duration, and in all space. This is 
" precisely the idea which we form of the existence of God ; ex- 
" actly the view which the Bible gives us of him." Rev. B. Godwin s 
Lectures on the Atheistic Controversy. Lect. II. (P. 53.) 

§ 3. " He who upholds all things by his power, may be 

<( said to be every where present. 

§ 4. " This is called a virtual presence."^ There is also what 
" metaphysicians denominate an essential ubiquity : and which idea 
<e the language of Scripture seems to favour." So says Dr Paley in 
Chapter XXIV. of his Natural Theology. 



§ 5. Lord Brougham has a note preference to this passage of 
the Doctor's. (Vide Part. Fill. f5. not. X § 2.) In which his 
Lordship informs us : " The three doctrines are— -ubiquity by dif- 
(t fusion, virtual ubiquity, || or that of power only, and ubiquity of 
i( essence." 

§ 6. The sensible and rather shrewd Paley gives us two sorts of 
presence, or omnipresence without hinting there was a third. 
Paley s Annotator loses not a moment in presenting us with three 
doctrines (it is out of his power to present us with three species) 
of omnipresence : the third doctrine being that of ubiquity of 
essence as opposed to ubiquity by diffusion, or that of ubiquity by 
diffusion as opposed to ubiquity of essence ; whichever way his 
Lordship pleases. 

f " Virtue cannot be without substance. — It may be laid down as one of 
" those truths which admit of no contradiction, that, with regard to the un- 
" created substance at least, virtue cannot be without substance. Speaking 
" of this substance, Sir Isaac Newton hath these words : ' 0mnipro3sens est 
" ' non per virtutem solam, sed etiam per substantiam : nam virtus sine sub- 
" ' stantia subsistere non potest. 1 Newton. Princip. Mathemat. Schol. general. 
" sub finem." " Introduction" to the " Argument, a priori" &c. Div. III. 
§ 23. 

II " 'Tis natural to ask, not so much how it is proved, that God can be 
" virtually present, though not substantially present, in every part of na- 
" ture, as what can be meant by being every where present by mere 
" energy,?" " Introduction" to " Argument." Div. I. § 11. 

T| Properly, it is of omnipresence he is treating. 



APPENDIX TO PART VIII. 2J5 

■ w 

§ 7. His Lordship, in entering upon his Note, forewarns us that 
the subject he is to touch is " confessedly abstruse." Those that 
create the abstruseness (well, if not the obtuseness) of a subject, 
ought by all means to confess what the thing grew to under proper 
management. But it is not so right to represent their own handi- 
work as something they found ready made. 

§ 8. The Author of the 'f Natural Theology" presents us with 
two divisions, as not only exhausting the subject, but being in fair 
antithesis. In fair antithesis the members of the division could not 
be, if the (< essential ubiquity" were two-fold : the one species of 
essential ubiquity being " ubiquity of essence," the other, " ubiquity 
' f by diffusion." This matter may perhaps be rendered plainer by 
the following Schema. 

Virtual pre- o 
sence, or 

omni- 
presence, 



Species, Species, 



" Ubiquity of essence" " Ubiquity by diffusion." 

(as in Brougham's words) Queer. Ubiquity of what? 

i. e. — surely — " essential diffusion of what? vkie 

" ubiquity" (as in Paley's infra, § 10. collat. § 11. ct 

language). seq. 

Here one of the species is neither more flRtaess than the ge- 
nus itself. And pray, what is the other species, in contra- 
distinction to its fellow-member, and the genus of both ? 
Tell us, and then we shall see whether the genus — essential 
omnipresence — can in its two-fold nature be fairly opposed 
to the other great member of the division — virtual omni- 
presence. 

§ 9. The Author of the " Natural Theology," in short, recog- 
nises no distinction of the kind introduced by the Noble Annota- 
tor. The Archdeacon of Carlisle had too much of a " natural pre- 
dilection" for what by due care may be " level to all comprehen- 
sions," to be smitten with the love of unadulterated nonsense. 
If our Archdeacon had no talent and no taste for metaphysical 
speculation even though of the genuine cast, as is noticed by his 



276 APPENDIX TO PART VIII. 

Illustrator ;t far less, Lad lie any regard for vile bastard metaphy- 
sics. — Which it would be well to remember. 

§ 10. Lord Brougham speaks of " the Diffusive Ubiquity." Vide 
Part. VIII. § 5. not. % § 2. What can wow-diffusive ubiquity be? 
Verily, the distinction between ' c ubiquity by diffusion" — namely, 
of essence, or substance, (or, else, diffusion of what? — )and "ubi- 
(c quity of essence is a distinction without a difference. How 
can there be ubiquity of essence but by every- where-diffusion of 
essence? What is ubiquity, if not diffusion every where ? Some- 
thing inexpressibly absurd. Ubiquity, then, is just ubiquity by 
limitless diffusion. What else can it be ? 

§ 11. What is ubiquity of essence which is not ubiquity of es- 
sence by diffusion without bounds ?" Did we pretend not to know, 
'twould, after all, be a shame. The nonsense has been fully con- 
secrated: For no inconsiderable period has it been the fashion- 
able theology. Ubiquity of essence which is not ubiquity of essence 
by boundless diffusion, is, let the reader be prepared — —the 

UBIQUITY OF THE ABSENCE OF EXTENSION, 0)' IN EXTENSION, as 

'twas usually expressed. The ubiquity or universal extension, in 
question, is the universal extension which has no exension at all. 
The every-where-ness under notice, is, in plain and honest English, 
just no-where-ness. 

§ 12. We shall dwell a little upon the topic of the fashionable 
theological whimsey. 

§ 13. The Author of the " Argument" has the following passage. 
sc The common sentiment of Theologians, that the necessary sub- 
ce stance, is, at the same time, in every point of space, and every 
<e atom of mattevrentire, is, so far as the opinion is intelligible 
tc at all, just this third hypothesis, that the necessary substance 
<e is infinitely extended : Though, 'tis true, all extension is denied 
" to that substance. For to say that the same substance is in differ- 
" ent parts of extension, at once, without being extended, is no 
" more absurd than to say, extension, itself, is not extended." 
" Introduction." Division III. Note to § 28. 

§ 14. " Qui autem," says the (undeservedly) almost-forgotten 
Raphson, " prcesentia ilia, vere essentialis, § cunctis, quce sunt, in- 

t " His," Paley's, " limited and unexercised powers of abstract discussion, 
" and the natural predilection for what he handled so well — a practical ar- 
u gument level to all comprehensions — appear not to have given him any taste 
" for metaphysical speculations." Note in " Section III." of the " Prelimi- 
" nary Discourse." 



APPENDIX TO PART VIII. '277 

" tima, per inextensionis hypothesin sine manifesto, contradictione 
" (qucecunq; tandem fuerit verborum collusio ) explicari possit, non- 
" dum constitit, neq; unquam constare poterit : Fere enim locis, 
" etiam dicersis, S; a se invicem distantibus, per essentiam ades^y. 
" exempli gratia, globo terrestri, S; lunari, spatiisq; omnibus inter- 
" mediis, quid aliud est, quam ipsissi?na ratio formalis rS extendi ?" 
From " Cap. VI!' 

§ 15. We shall next hear the sentiments of S. Colliber : A writer 
once of some celebrity, and of. undoubtedly, considerable parts, 
and great good sense, in not a few respects. 

§ 16. " This opinion/' — " the opinion of [the Deity's] Inexten- 
" sion," — " being once entertained, 'tis scarce conceivable what a 
u train of riddles and paradoxes it drew after it. For thence the 
" Platonists and the rest of Ana x inlander s Commentators first be- 
u gan to infer what is usually called his Indistance. For distance 
(e being only a relative conception of Space, consequently it could 
" not, as they rightly concluded, be conceived in a being who was, 
" as they imagined, absolutely without amplitude and dimensions. 

§ 17. " Thus far they proceeded in absurdity, their next step was 
" impiety. For since they found it impossible to conceive a being 
f* without amplitude and dimensions any otherwise than as a mere 
" mathematical * point ; they began to speak of the Deity in the 
" like diminutive terms, and, in effect, imprisoned the Great Crea- 
" tor within the smallest dust of his creation." [Less, infinitely less, 
so to speak, than the smallest dust : The smallest dust is always 
something : but a f mathematical point' has no magnitude.'] " But 
*********** they quickly solved 

the difficulty with a mystery, and gravely concluded that it was 
et no impossibility for * an Infinite Being to exist entire, tho' 
" in a certain atomical manner, not only in one but in every indi- 
" vidual particle of the universe at once. For this worthy discovery 
" vre are particularly indebted to Plotinus, one of Plato's dis- 
** ciples, who obliged the world with two whole books to demon- 
" strate that one and the same being may be all of it entirel}' in 
<e each distinguishable part of the world. 

§ 18. " This Philosopher it seems had found the secret of pro- 
" ducing more Deities out of one than the fruitful fancies of all the 
<f Poets in their Theogonies could ever make. * * * 

§ 19. " But fearing, good man! lest this discovery of his should 
" be thought inconsistent witli the unity of God, he made bold to 
" stretch the mystery a little farther by concluding not only that 
" it's the property and privilege of the absolutely Infinite Being to 
" exist whole in even' particle of the world, but that he has an 



278 



APPENDIX TO PART VIII. 



" undoubted prerogative of existing- whole in the whole of it too; 
" so as to be one individual innumerable universal Deity. All which 
" Platonical mysteries were afterwards received as articles of faith 
" by the Schoolmen, and are comprised in that vulgar maxim of 
" theirs, viz., Deus est totus in toto et totus in qualibet parte mundi, 
" God is whole in the whole and whole in every part of the world, Mys- 
t( teries that require a degree of faith beyond that of miracles; a 
ff faith which can transform contradictions into arguments with a 
" Credo quia impossible est." 

§ 20. Listen, for a moment by the way, to the " Treatise of Hu- 
u man Nature" speaking in reference to the Schoolmen's maxim ; 
— a That scholastic principle which, when crudely proposed, appears 
" so shocking, of totum in toto, et totum in qualibet parte ; which is 
" much the same as if we should say, that a thing is in a certain 
"place, and yet is not there." Book I. Part. iv. Sect. 5. — Vide 
Part. III. § 64. not. +. 

§ 21. We now go on with S. C. — " Though 'tis next to impos- 
" sible to speak of such extravagances as these, and, at the same 
u time, to preserve that gravity which is so neeessary in discourses 
" of this nature ; yet I conceive it may not be amiss to have obser- 
ee ved thus much, to the end it may be seen how strangely the 
ie name of Learning has been misapplied to whimsies of this kind, 
" and how profanely the sacred name of God has been abused to 
" consecrate the most egregious nonsense." Impartial Enquiry, &c. 
B. II. Part. ii. ch. 4. 

§ 32. Permit, ye upon whom the mantle of the madmen amongst 
the Schoolmen hath fallen ! permit a word of reproof, for the past, 
and of warning, as to the future. Has not the egregious nonsense al- 
luded to by the author from whom we have this instant parted, 
been one, . and a very fruitful cause of the birth, and growth, of 
Atheism in modern times ? has it not been one of the great nurs- 
ing-mothers of the atheist-monster ? a nursing-mother actively at 
work, though in some respects 

remote from public view ? 
§ 23. Let us call in evidence on the point. — " The partizans of 
" spirituality believe they answer the difficulties they have them- 
l( selves accumulated, by saj'ing, ( The soul is entire, is whole un- 
' f ' der each point of its extent.' If an absurd answer will solve 
" difficulties, they have done it; for after all it witi be found, that this 
te point } which is called soul, however insensible, however minute, 
i( must yet remain something." Thus writes D' Holbach. System 
of Nature, Part. I. ch. vii. And the following is Diderot's note on 
that passage. It is with what is set forth in the note that our pre- 



APPENDIX TO PART VIII. 



279 



sent business most lies. — c< According to this answer an infinity of 
(i unextended substance, or the same unextended substance re- 
" peated an infinity of times, would constitute a substance that has 
c< extent, which is absurd ; for, according- to this principle, the hu- 
^'•man soul would then be as infinite as God, since it is assumed 
(e that God is a being without extent, who is an infinity of times whole 
<c in each part of the universe — and the same is stated of the hu- 
ce man soul ; from whence we must necessarily conclude that God 
" and the soul of man are equally infinite, unless we suppose unex- 
<c tended substances of different extents, or a God without extent more 
<e extended than the human soul. Such are, however, the rhapso- 
ee dies which SOME of our theological metaphysicians would have 
e< thinking beings believe !" <Sfc. Vide Part. VI. Appendic. § 1. 

§ 24. (A single word on a collateral topic. What has rendered 
the doctrine of the immateriality of the soul so much out of vogue 
now-a-days, and another name with many for a monster of ab- 
surdity ? The saying that that soul which is immaterial, is altoge- 
ther destitute of extension, occupying not 'even a point of space. 
That is just the reason : Because, what has no extension is nothing ; 
or to give it in Mr Hobbes' words, " Substance without dimensions 
" are words which flatly contradict each other." Be Homine. — 
Vide Part. III. § 34. et seq.—quoq; Part. IX. § 89. not. f. And be- 
cause, it is repugnant to the dictates of our unsophisticated faculties 
to consider gross matter (ay, or subtile matter, if you. go to that,) 
as the only cause of all thought. Vide Part. III. § 39. atq; § 40.— 
quoq; Part. VI. § 41.— et Part. XII. Appendic. 

§ 2o. And as the hypothesis of inextension is well calcu- 
lated to foster atheism, so the hypothesis of infinite extension is ad- 
mirably adapted to extinguish atheism. 

§ 26. In the first place, this hypothesis distinguishes two different 
sorts of extension. And this of itself destroys the most plausible 
of the atheistic hypotheses : to-wit, the hypothesis of an absolute 
material plenum, and but one substance in nature. 

§ 27. And in the second, if it be established that there is an in- 
corporeal, or immaterial, or spiritual expansion which pervades the 
material universe, it is worth no atheist's while to contend against the 
position, that that expansion is a mode of an Intelligent Spirit. 

§ 28. We shall draw this Appendix to a conclusion with one 
other piece from the " Impartial Enquiry." 

§ 29. " The opinion of the Nullibists. 

" 'Tis well known that Weigelius was the reviver of this extra- 
" vagance among Christians. For one assertion of his (among di- 
" vers others relishing of the height of enthusiasm and (distraction 



280 



APPENDIX TO PART VIII. 



<e was that spiritual beings (since conceived to be unextendecl or 
" without dimensions) are no where and yet every where. But the 
c< chief patron of this profound mystery of Nullibism was Bes 
" Cartes. A philosopher that has rendered himself remarkable for 
<c these three confident assertions, viz., That whatever thinks is im- 
ee material; That whatever is extended, or has dimensions, is mate- 
u rial; and That whatever is unextended, or without dimensions, is 
<( nowhere. Which last assertion (perhaps the truest) is no other 
e< in effect than a frank confession of what the Schools laboured to 
ec conceal under an insignificant and arbitrary distinction between 
u the Locus of a Body and the Ubi of a Spirit ; which it seems the 
" less metaphysical Cartesians find themselves unable to compre- 
" hend." Ibidem. 

§ 30. Unable to comprehend : no marvel. Would any amount 
of metaphysics — short of metaphysics run mad — enable Cartesians 
(to say nothing of others) to comprehend, in all its latitude, the 
scholastic distinction between locus and ubi? Take, upon the 
point, the witness of two famous men. " If it be said by any one, 
ee that it (the soul) cannot change place, because it hath none, for 
" spirits are not in loco, but ubi ; I suppose" — witnesseth John 
Locke — cc that way of talking will not now be of much weight 
" to many in an age that is not much disposed to admire, or suffer 
ec themselves to be deceived by, such unintelligible ways of speak- 
<( ing." Essay. B. II. ch. xxiii. § 21. — " The Schoolmen's distinc- 
cc tions, about Spirits existing in Ubi, and not in Loco ; are" — saith 
the second witness — u mere empty sounds, without any manner of 
" signification." Dr Samuel Clarke's Ans. to 6th Letter. 

§ 31. No less a man than Dr Watts, the Divine, and so respec- 
table a one as Isaac Watts, the Metaphysician, harped mightily, in 
his own way, upon this string, the distinction, to-wit, between the 
locus and ubi of a Spirit. Well, if he had been*helped to go back 
and destroy the empty distinction, by means of an observation of 
his own, which partly serves to bring up the rear, composing as it 
does one of his concluding (they are deeply pious) reflections on 

" Spirits being in a place and removing from it," 8$c. — (Essay 

VI.) " The best, thing we can do," observes he,- cc is, to guard 
" against those ideas of spirits which have any gross absurdities in 
" them." ( ff Conclusion" to Sect. V.) Excellently said, Dr Isaac 
Watts ! I assure you — And completely disregarded by yourself. 



PACE. 



A Scbs 



The same' 
Matter. V 
Part. VII 
10. 



V 



Nothing. Vide 
Part.IX.§Z0, 
31. 



A relation. 
Vide Part. IX. 
§ 33, et seq. 
vsq; ad § 59 
inclus. 



APPENDIX TO PART X. 



APPENDIX N. 

TABLE OF THE DIVISION AND SUBDIVISIONS OF THE OPINIONS CONCEKNING SPACE. 















SPACE 


























A 














A SCBSTANC 


E. Vide Part 


VII. § 8. 




Vide Tart. 


VIII. § 1. 
















V 




V 










V V V \ 


/ V 


The name as 
Matter, vide 
Part. VI !.§!), 
10. 


or, Different 
from Mattel-. 
Vide Part.V II 

i u. 




Of Matter. 
Vide Part. 
VIII j 2. 


or, of Miml 


1 






Neither more 
Part.ix.%10, 


Void.or emp- 
tiness. Vide 
Part. /X.§14, 


Possibility, or 


§ 2C, el tea. 


Pari. 1X.§ 30,1 § 33, cl «eo. 
31. | utq; ad § 09 




V 






V 




















ll 

Unintelli- i 
gent. Vide 
Pan. VII. 1 
§ 12, ctseq. j j 


ulrlli-i'lli. 

Vide Pari. 
VII. § 29, 




Of an Infi- 
nite Mind. 

VIII. § 3, 


Of a Finite 
Min.l. Vide 
Par(.X.§3, 

















282 



APPENDIX n- 

§ 1. " Space ( seems to have a necessary and obstinate exist- 
(CC ence:'" — These words are quoted, in the place whereto this 
Appendix relates, as constituting an argument (to prove that Space 
cannot be a mere idea) which Dr Isaac Watts is to answer. 

§ 2. The whole passage, in the Doctor's work, is as follows : 
" It is said, space cannot be a mere idea, because it seems to have 
" a necessary and obstinate existence, whether there were any mind 
<e or no to form an idea of it." There is no questioning that Watts, 
by " any mind," meant the mind of any man, or, at most, of any 
" created being." 

§ 3. That Space has necessary existence, we are firmly persuad- 
ed. And therefore, that Space would continue to exist, although 
every mind, that ever began to be, ceased to exist, we can easily 
believe. These are points we hold as settled. 

§ 4. But there is a controversy which may be raised. Can any 
person be quite sure, that Space would be, were there no mind 
whatsoever to conceive Space? How could one be sure of that? 

§ 5. To be plain in stating our own sentiment : — We are quite 
convinced, that if there were no Mind to form an idea of Space, 
there would be no Space. That is to say, the suicidalf supposition^ 
of no Space, is not more self-destructive than the supposition of no 
Mind. 

§ 6. Space is not an idea ; not a mind : But is not Space that 
about which ideas are employed ? is not Space an object of con- 
ceptions ? And is not the object of a conception inseparably related 
to a conception ? To think of any thing — is not that to have an 
object of thought ? Is object of thought not relative to mind ? In 
fine, Is not Space relative to a mind cognising it ? 

§ 7. If so, 'tis sufficiently evident, that there could be no Space, 
were no Mind in existence. 

§ 8. Does it any way follow from this, that seeing Space is neces- 
sary, Mind is necessary. 

t Puta Part. II. § 14. &c. collat. § 1. notce t apud § 88. Part. X.—Quoq; 
Part. III. § 16. 17. 

1 Puta not. f apud § 17. Partis IV. 



283 



APPENDIX TO PART XII. 
APPENDIX tftf- 

ft — It is as impossible to conceive that ever bare incogitative mat- 
<e ter should produce a thinking intelligent being, as that nothing 
" should of itself produce matter. Let us suppose any parcel of 
* matter eternal, great or small, we shall find it, in itself, able to 
" produce nothing. For example, let us suppose the matter of 
" the next pebble we meet with, eternal,, closely united, and the 
** parts firmly at rest together ; if there were no other being in the 
" world, must it not eternally remain so, a dead, inactive lump ? 
" Is it possible to conceive it can add motion to itself, being purely 
c< matter, or produce any thing ? Matter then, by its own strength, 
u cannot produce in itself so much as motion : the motion it has, 
" must also be from eternity, or else be produced, and added to 
" matter by some other being more powerful than matter: matter, 
" as is evident, having not power to produce motion in itself. But 
" let us suppose motion eternal too ; yet matter, incogitative mat- 
" ter and motion, whatever changes it might produce of figure and 
" bulk, could never produce thought. Knowledge will still be 
" as far beyond the power of motion and matter to produce, as 
" matter is beyond the power of nothing, or non-entity to pro- 
" duce. And I appeal to every one's own thoughts, whether he 
" cannot as easily conceive matter produced by nothing, as 
" thought to be produced by pure matter, when before there 
(t was no such thing as thought, or an intelligent being existing? 
" Divide matter into as minute parts as you will (which wc are apt 
" to imagine a sort of spiritualizing, or making a thinking thing of 
" it), vary the figure and motion of it as much as you please ; a 
<{ globe, cube, cone, prism, cylinder, &c, whose diameters are 
f * 1,000,000th part of a gry, will operate no otherwise upon other 
" bodies of proportionable bulk, than those of an inch or footYlia- 
" meter ; and you may as rationally expect to produce sense, 
" thought, and knowledge, by putting together, in a certain figure 
" and motion, gross particles of matter, as by those that arc the 



284 



APPENDIX TO PART XII. 



" very minutest, that do anywhere exist. They knock, impel, and 
" resist one another, just as the greater do, and that is all they can 
<e do. So that if we will suppose nothing first, or eternal, matter 
ee can never begin to be : if we suppose bare matter, without motion 
ie eternal, motion can never begin to be : if we suppose only mat- 
" ter and motion first, or eternal, thought can never begin to be. 
" For it is impossible to conceive that matter, either with or without 
ce motion, could have originally in, and from, itself, sense, percep- 
" tion, and knowledge, as is evident from hence, that then sense, 
ce perception, and knowledge, must be a property eternally insepa- 
" rable from matter, and every particle of it." — Locke's Essay. 
B. IV. ch. x. § lO.t 

I shall add a parallel passage from Cudworth.—" As no man can 
" be so sottish, as to conceive himself, or that which thinketh in him, 
c< his own soul or mind, and personality to be no real entity, whilst 
£e every clod of earth is such ; so it is certain, that mind can never 
" be generated out of dead and 'senseless- matter or body, nor re- 
" suit, as a modification thereof, out of magnitudes, figures, sites, 
{C and motions, and therefore must needs be a thing really distinct 
" from it, or substance incorporeal." — P. 749. 

Those passages are brought forward not as authorities, but 

as solemn appeals to the Court of Consciousness. 



APPENDIX I!- 

Alas ! the Zetetic Society is no more. The Zetetics have lost 
their particular existence, in becoming members of e( the Universal 
" Community Society." In finding (to the delight of their hearts) 
that Socialism, or Owenism, completely serves their purpose, and 
in amalgamating themselves, accordingly, with the Glasgow Branch 
of the Socialist " Religionists" — Heaven preserve us from their reli- 

f And in the 3d Chapter of the same Book, he had delivered the follow- 
ing as his sentiments : — " I see no contradiction in it, that the first eternal 
" thinking Being should, if he pleased, give to certain systems of created 
" senseless matter, put together as he thinks fit, some degrees of sense, per- 
" ception, and thought : though, as I think, I have proved, lib. 4. c. 10.— it 
" is no less than a contradiction to suppose matter (which is evidently in its 
" own nature void of sense and thought) should be that eternal first-think- 
" ing Being." § 6. 



APPENDIX TO PART XII. 



285 



gion ! — do not those gentlemen afford new proof, (were new proof 
necessary,) that Socialism and Atheism are quite identical , identi- 
cal in the sense that Socialism is at bottom atheistical? — Every 
Atheist is not a Socialist, but all Socialists are — in true propriety, 
or by strict logical consequence — Atheists, as far as the root of the 
matter is concerned. 

It is but due to Antitheos to state, that imagining Socialism 

would si (heavy on his stomach, he refused pointblank to swallow 
the vile dose. From the very first, he lifted his voice (and it is 
understood, he may lift his pen) against the newly -found-out, hu- 
manly-invented, panacea for all the ills of life. He mercilessly 
takes away the best sources of human consolation, giving nothing 
in return. The Socialists, to do them justice, are more compas- 
sionate. What though they despoil a man of his goods, and chil- 
dren, in addition to all hopes of a happy hereafter : if the offer, in 
exchange, a wife for every year of his life (oftener, if agreeable, — ) 
and bed, board, and lodging, free of all charges, in one of their Com- 
munities — and, as the " last scene of all,"t " the burial of an ass" 
— Antitheos has not, now, even Zetetic atheism to treat people 
with. 

A Society, then, of dogmatic atheists (as they were proud to call 
themselves) has ceased to exist. The world may be doomed to 
sustain losses as great. — We shall by no means lose an opportunity 
so very inviting, to mention, for the sake of such of our readers as 
may not be aware of the circumstance, that the great organ of dog- 
matic atheism, in Britain, is dead also. It is the " Star in the East" 
I speak of : "A regularly stamped newspaper, set agoing in Cam- 
lc bridgeshire about three years ago, for the double purpose of ad- 
" vancing the cause of ultra-radicalism, and of advocating, openly 
" and unblushingly, out-and-out atheistical principles/'IT — The 
" Star in the East" (now set for ever in the West) has given way, 
and made room for a new periodical, having doubtless discovered, 
that the " New Moral World", the grand mouth-piece of Socialism, 
was capitallj^raapted to express and to further its dearest objects. 
Are Atheism and Socialism not identical? is not the one contained in 
the other ? Socialism is a lax and manageable enough thing, and verily 
supersedes the necessity for any form of Atheism besides its own : 
— Wherever Socialism appears and flourishes, it eats out the sub- 



f Shahipere. $ Jeremiah, Ch. xxii. v. 19. 

See the rhilalethean Society's original Circular. Dated May, 1839. 



286 



APPENDIX TO PART XII. 



stance of every other description of Atheism ; to swell its own — 
already overgrown — dimensions. 

I cannot quit this subject without remarking, that, contrary 

to what first appearances might indicate, Socialist atheism is much 
more dangerous and deadly than dogmatic atheism. This affirms, — 
I know, I prove, there is no God : Perhaps it declares with empha- 
sis, — I prove, there cannot be any God. The former yawns out, — 
I know not very well, and I care not at all, whether there be any 
God or no. If it be a truth that there is a God, I. know nothing 
about it. And I shall take no pains to know. I hold the whole 
question to be a " puerile"t one. " Local education" t may make 
some " insane" t enough to trouble their heads with regard to such 
a topic — but I have been taught better. " Let us eat and drink ; 
" for to-morrow we die." — In fine, a dogmatic atheist may be ap- 
proached with reasoning, but a Socialist atheist cuts off your only 
resource when he treats your attempt as wholly insignificant. Your 
dogmatic atheist can be laid hold of : he presents a rough exterior. 
But your Socialist atheistls like a slippery eel, which slides through 
one's fingers. It's away, before one knows. — Few, indeed, if they 
can but be prevailed on to reason at all, will stand out against the 
demonstration of A God ; but (such is the mishap) too many may 
be got to refuse to give the question a fair hearing. 

| See Robert Owen's " Address and Challenge to the Philalethean So- 
ciety." September, 1839. 



a 



[PRIN'TED BY NEILL AND CO., OLD FISH MARKET) EDINBURGH. 



Lb S 78 



